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Abstract 
This study is the first of its kind to examine the conceptualization and the validity of 
the principles of impartiality and independence as they are understood and implemented 
by Canadian Om~uds of general jurisdiction. Twenty interviewees with substantive 
Ombuds experience drawn from all geographical sectors of Canada and from all areas of 
Ombuds practice, provided insightful commentary resulting in the finding that impartiality 
can only be understood, implemented and defended as aspirational in nature. As human 
beings can not purge themselves of their knowledge and experience that create negative 
or bad biases or predispositions, both known and unknown, this information colours all that 
is seen and influences all actions taken and conclusions reached. Simultaneously, it is 
also clear that there should not be any attempt to become a blank slate as the self-
knowledge gained through introspection plus as much familiarity as is possible with the 
experiences had by those that are different from our own is necessary for thinking and 
behaving as impartially as possible. 
Compelling evidence is provided to show that the aspiration to impartiality, which 
by definition will always be a work in progress, requires continual, concerted intellectual 
and behavioural attention and effort. In a similar vein, it is also revealed that the perception 
of a high degree of impartiality is based not on the so-called 'guarantees' provided by 
traditional indicia of structural independence but rather on the strength of the Ombuds' 
independent mindset and resultant ability to think and act independently and to be 
perceived as thinking and behaving impartially. The findings presented which include 
strategies for increasing impartiality as well as the conditions which can both contribute to 
and/or take away from the perception of independence will also benefit the legal field 
ii 
generally as they are readily applicable to other third party roles which are designated as 
independent and impartial, such as judges, adjudicators, arbitrators and mediators. 
As the role of Ombuds has been created and implemented in an idiosyncratic 
manner across Canada, in order to provide the necessary contextual underpinning for this 
study, initially, I put forward a historical foundation. Here I propose a taxonomy detailing 
the three types of Ombuds that operate in Canada: the legislative, hybrid and 
organizational Ombuds. Again, using both historical and contemporary vantage points, I 
examine the theoretical constructs of impartiality and independence on a general basis, 
given their centrality to this study and to the legal field generally. In addition, I survey the 
data derived from empirical research from five major studies of judicial decision-making 
and one administrative tribunal. These results are complemented by data derived from 
ADR scholars and practitioners' examination of their own and others' practices. All of the 
foregoing material demonstrates how unrealistic it is to operate on the premise that 
impartiality is predicated primarily on a high level of structural independence. 
iii 
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Introduction and Overview 
This dissertation explores the conceptualization, validity and implementation of the 
principles of independence and impartiality, as well as their connection to fairness in the 
practice of legislative, hybrid and organizational Ombuds 1 in Canada. The principles of 
independence and impartiality are touted by scholars and practitioners, both historically and 
contemporaneously, as essential characteristics of Ombuds. This is true whether the role 
was created recently by the University of British Columbia or was established by the House 
of Assembly in Newfoundland and Labrador or by the Bank of Nova Scotia many years ago. 
I explain why impartiality and independence are considered foundational principles and how 
they have been defined from a theoretical perspective and are implemented in actual 
practice. However, as the role of Ombuds is practiced differently depending on where, when 
and how it was established in Canada, I add clarity to the qiscourse by identifying what I 
consider to be the three primary categories of Ombuds practice. I have defined these 
according to standard criteria which include structure, powers and enabling legislation or 
administrative platform so as to demonstrate what the Ombuds institution looks like in 
Canada in the twenty-first century. The three categories include: 
1) 'Parliamentary, legislative or classical' which is established by legislation as an 
independent entity, with inquisitorial powers and reporting to a Legislature; 
2) 'Hybrid'2 which is established by policy or terms of reference but maintaining some of the 
characteristics of the legislative Ombuds, such as inquisitorial powers, and some degree of 
1 For ease of reading I will use the term 'Ombuds' to apply to all Ombuds/Ombudsman/person roles and will only use the 
specific name of the role if identifying a particular position. 
2 Linda Reif, a Canadian legal scholar, who has written extensively on the practice of legislative Ombuds has used the term 
'hybrid' to define legislative Ombuds who are also responsible for reviewing complaints of human rights violations. I have 
chosen to use the term 'hybrid' as well but have defined it differently as I think it is reasonable to consider any role that has 
maintained many of the characteristics of the original version as well as adding on different ones as a 'hybrid' as opposed to 
restricting its use only to Ombuds who have oversight of government administrative activity and who also handle human 
rights complaints. 
1 
structural independence. In making use of the term 'hybrid' in this context I am not indicating 
this form of Ombuds is the offspring of the legislative and organizational models; rather, I am 
using this term to demonstrate that this type of role has some, but not all characteristics of 
the legislative role and shares some of the characteristics of other dispute resolution 
modalities. 
3) 'Organizational' which is established by policy or terms of reference, and frequently 
reports to the head of the establishing organization and generally does not have the 
authority to investigate as part of an inquisitorial process. 
While Nathalie Des Rosiers has concluded that there are two basic types of Ombuds 
in Canada, namely, the public or 'classical' role that is founded by legislation and the 
'organizational' or private role that is found within corporations or Universities,3 it must be 
emphasized that a third category, that being 'hybrid' Ombuds role, are also well established 
within the Canadian context. Further, both within the private and public sectors, Ombuds 
roles have been established differently than as envisioned by Des Rosiers. For example, 
within the private sector two different types of Ombuds roles have been put into place within 
the same entity, that is, Canadian banks. For instance, bank Ombuds who investigate 
complaints from clients have strong powers of investigation and operate in the 'hybrid' model 
and bank Ombuds who respond to employee complaints operate in the 'organizational' 
model and do not investigate.4 Hence, two different models of Ombuds practice co-exist in 
3 Nathalie Des Rosiers & Audrey Boctor "The Functions of an Ombudsman: Annotated Bibilography" at 2. This is background 
material produced to support the presentation entitled 'The Many Roles of an Ombudsman' for The Forum of Canadian 
Ombudsman Conference, Ottawa, 1 April 2003) at 2 [unpublished]. Posted at www.ombudsmanforum.ca under 'Resources, 
Conference Speeches'. 
4 The Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) Ombudsman Office describes its service for clients as being impartial and voluntary 
indicating its staff are trained in effective listening, fact-finding and mediation. Reference is made to investigations that focus 
on the facts and fairness being determined. In addition, its annual reports and case studies relate solely to client issues. 
However, under the tab of "Who We Are" reference is made to Deputy Ombudsman and Employee Ombudsman: Ken Brown, 
who deals with employee complaints. This function typically operates in the organization model of practice and does not issue 
public reports. "Office of the Ombudsman" (1995- 2012) online: Royal Bank of Canada <http://www.rbc.com/ombudsman>. 
2 
the same corporate body in the private sector. Operating in a parallel fashion, government 
departments which are typically known as 'public sector' have established Ombuds roles 
which operate either in the organizational model or the hybrid model and are not established 
by legislation.5 In addition, I would argue that universities and by extension, colleges, 
hospitals and not-for-profit organizations, are more of a public organization than a private 
organization and Ombuds in these settings typically have an investigative mandate yet are 
not established by legislation. These examples alone demonstrate that the dichotomy of 
'classical' legislated Ombuds being the purview of the public sector and 'organizational' 
Ombuds operating only in the private sedor is not viable. 
As one might expect there are a wide variety of permutations of the original concept 
now in existence both in Canada and worldwide. In fact, the continuum of ombuds activity 
that is reported on by various media extends from the establishment of an Ombudsman for 
the National Geographic Traveler magazine who will look into complaints about the 
. accuracy of hotel ratings provided online6 to the announcement made by the United Nations 
Security Council at the end of 2009 of its intent to establish an Office of the Ombudsperson 
to deal with complaints regarding the list of people and organizations that are believed to be 
attached to or involved with Al-Quaida and the Taliban.7 Given the immense number of 
Ombuds roles globally, this study is necessarily focussed only on Canadian regimes. 
The achievability of impartiality and independence is now under siege as a result of 
day-to-day observation and experience as well as the dissemination of research findings 
5 
.Health Canada has established an Ombuds role that handles only employee complaints using the organizational model. 
See Ethics and Internal Ombudsman (23 January 2009), online: Health Canada <http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/ahc-asc/branch-
dirgen/paccb-dgapcc/omb/index-enq.php>. 
6 
"Seeing the light about Hotwire ratings for hotels" Dallas News (13, December 2009), online: Dallas News 
<http://www.dallasnews.com>. 
7 United Nations, News Release/Communique, 423268, "Security Council Authorizes Ombudsperson for Al-Quaida Sanctions 
Regime" (17 December 2009), online: UN <http://www.unmultimedia.ora>. 
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that raise questions of systemic bias in the decision-making patterns of the judiciary both in 
the United States of America (U.S.) and Canada. Accordingly, it is timely to examine these 
findings and the arguments from both historical and contemporary perspectives to determine 
if they could also apply to individuals who serve as Ombuds. In conjunction with the results 
derived from the investigation of the validity of the concepts of impartiality and independence 
and informed by the views of practicing Ombuds, I identify how Ombuds should define their 
roles and the work they do as it relates to being 'independent and impartial'. Finally, I 
illustrate the various means used by Ombuds to determine whether or not the decisions they 
have reviewed have been made fairly, as well as investigate Ombuds' perceptions of how 
complainants and respondents determine if the Ombuds has acted fairly. In so doing, I will 
demonstrate the degree to which perceptions of fairness are interconnected (or not), with 
perceptions of Ombuds' independence and impartiality. 
As the field of 'ombudsmanship' in its modern modality is just over forty years old in 
Canada (and North America) and as the role has mutated in a wide variety of ways from the 
first legislative model, there is very little definitive scholarship to draw from and to use for 
comparative purposes. In addition, the small amount of research done and the commentary 
published has focused primarily on the legislative Ombudsman role. However, as the growth 
in the field in Canada is in the public and private sectors through the establishment of 
organizational or hybrid Ombuds roles, this type of model is also well represented in this study. 
This research analyzes the perceptions derived from 20 in-depth interviews with 
individuals who occupy Ombuds roles from all three models of practice. Further by taking 
into account the relevant case law as well as scholarly and popular literature related to 
Ombuds I reflect on the viability of the principles of independence and impartiality, and their 
4 
intersection with fairness in relation to the Ombuds role. In this dissertation I will argue that 
impartiality can only be explained and understood as aspirational, as human beings can not 
purge themselves of all their knowledge and experience that create negative or bad biases 
or predispositions, both known and unknown, thus colouring all that is seen and influencing 
all actions taken and conclusions reached or decisions taken. Simultaneously, it is also clear 
that there should not be any attempt to become a blank slate as the self-knowledge gained 
through introspection plus as much familiarity as is possible with the experiences of those 
that are different from our own is necessary for thinking and behaving as impartially as 
possible. 
My primary objective is that this research will assist Ombuds practitioners in 
reflecting on how they conduct their work on a daily basis with complainants and 
respondents. It is also hoped that it will influence what is communicated to potential 
complainants and respondents about how Ombuds define their roles and the work they do, 
for example, through their presentations and promotional materials and media releases. At 
· the same time, I hope that the research findings will inform governments as well as public 
· and private sector org~nizations on the issues that need to be addressed when 
contemplating or establishing new Ombuds roles, and when these bodies are assessing the 
. effectiveness of how current Ombuds roles have been configured. Finally, I hope that this 
research will assist 1) political scientists to determine if the Ombuds role, in its various 
configurations, can still be seen to be a tool for providing for administrative fairness and the 
. resultant democratization of Canadian society that flows from 'good governance' and fair 
administration; 2) that legal scholars will better understand the specific nature of the 
Ombuds role and where it fits in the alternative dispute resolution (ADR) spectrum; and 3) 
· will inform the expectations of complainants and respondents when interacting with 
5 
Ombuds. A potential side effect is that mediators, arbitrators, members of administrative 
tribunals and adjudicators may find this research useful for assessing their views and 
performance against the expectations delineated for Ombuds for independence, impartiality 
and their connection to fairness. 
General Research Methodology 
As my intent was to gain an in-depth understanding of and provide an explanation 
for how the principles of independence, impartiality and collaterally, fairness, are 
conceptualized and implemented by Ombuds in Canada, I chose the route of primary 
research rather than relying only on secondary research to inform the generation of theory 
on these topics. In addition, while primary research is my preferred approach it is also a 
necessity, as only a small amount of empirical research has been done in Canada related 
to the theories underlying ombuds' practice and its impact. As a result, an additional 
ambition is to add to the emerging development of a theoretical vector as it relates to the 
existing database of Canadian Ombuds research. 
My rationale for choosing a qualitative approach, rather than using a quantitative 
research methodology like a su_rvey questionnaire, was determined by analyzing my 
ontological and epistemological positions according to the work on qualitative methods 
done by Jennifer Mason. My ontological position8 is that becoming privy to the experience 
and knowledge that has influenced Ombuds' perspectives and interpretations is of great 
consequence to the principles or concepts I am exploring through this study. Secondly, my 
epistemological position9 is that the best way to get us_eful data on ·concepts as 
fundamental and conversely, as ephemeral as impartiality, independence and their 
connection to fairness, is to hear from Ombuds' practitioners' own mouths, (and then 
8 Jennifer Mason, Qualitative Researching (London: SAGE Publications Ltd., 2002) at 63. 
9 Ibid. at 64. 
6 
discuss with them) what they believe and why they believe it and how they demonstrate 
these beliefs in their practices. 
I chose to pursue the method of comparative analysis as conceived by Glaser and 
. Strauss 10 in order to discover or generate grounded theory as my primary research 
modality for a number of reasons. As defined by Michael Quinn Patton, grounded theory is 
" ... theory that is inductively generated from fieldwork, that is, theory that emerges from the 
researcher's observations and interviews out in the real world, rather than in the laboratory 
or the academy". 11 This approach is appropriate given the depth and breadth of my 
experience as an Ombuds practitioner and resultant easy access to the 'real world' 
coupled with my desire to contribute to the demystification and provision of accurate and 
comprehensive information on both the theory and practice of Ombuds work. In the same 
vein I was also highly motivated to engage in a research process that would add value to 
those who practice as Ombuds and the individuals and communities who benefit from their 
services. Also, as Melanie Birks and Jane Mills who are experts in the use of grounded 
theory methodology have stated that one of the objectives and the outcomes of theory 
building which occurs through the use of this methodology is greater understanding of a 
particular phenomenon which " ... will ultimately inform practice in a given discipline ... ·12 this 
method seemed ideal for my purposes. Reinforcement of the importance of this motivation 
was also articulated by Glaser and Strauss, the originators of this methodology, by stating 
"As the practical applicability of grounded theory research is the ultimate measure of its 
value, appraisal in this context is appropriate. "13 Hence, the potential for this method to be 
10 Barney G. Glaser & Anselm L. Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory Strategies for Qualitative Research (Chicago: 
Aldine Publishing Company, 1967) at 1. 
11 Michael Quinn Patton, Qualitative Research & Evaluation Methods (Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, Inc., 
2002) at 11. 
12 Melanie Birks & Jane Mills, Grounded Theory A Practical Guide, (London: SAGE Publications Ltd., 2011) at 154. . 
13 Ibid. at 150. 
7 
beneficial to the Ombuds field as well as complainants, respondents and creators of 
Ombuds roles and the communities they serve, had a profound influence on my choice of 
this particular research methodology. 
Secondly, as Tesch indicates in his graphical representation of various types of 
qualitative research that grounded theory flows from the "identification (and categorization) 
of elements, and exploration of their connections"14, it became apparent that this is an 
ideal approach for analyzing practitioners' definitions of independence, impartiality and the 
exploration of the connection of these principles to perceptions of fairness. Thirdly, the 
generation of 'grounded theory' according to Glaser and Strauss requires sufficient 
theoretical sensitivity15 on_ the part of the researcher to be comfortable with the theory 
~mergence and development occurring throughout the research process. As I am both a 
practitioner and researcher, and perhaps as a result of personality as well, I am constantly 
assessing my reactions to behaviours and commentary as they relate to the principles 
under review. Similarly, given my actual immersion in the field of study and my varied 
exposure to different Ombuds roles, I have found that it is not possible for me to be 
dogmatic or doctrinaire about the concepts under review, as what seems logical to me one 
day or one year is buffeted by other points of view that emerge from the professional and 
scholarly literature as well as experiences and conversations had the following day or 
year. As a result, the notion of theories emerging from the data is very attractive to me as 
the viability of such activity is validated on a regular basis through daily practice and 
frequent discussion with colleagues. 
14 Matthew B. Miles & A. Michael Huberman, An Expanded Sourcebook Qualitative Data Analysis, (Thousand Oaks, 
California: SAGE Publications Inc., 1994) at 7. 
15 Glaser & Strauss, supra note 10 at 46. 
8 
Fourthly, given the historical notion of grand theories resulting from the genius of 
individuals who posited" ... "great-man" (sic) theories ... ",16 I was intrigued by the notion of 
using this research to assess the viability of the grand theories imbedded in these widely 
acknowledged historically significant views: John Locke's conception of impartiality flowing 
from indifference and structural independence 17 and the more modern belief that no 
human being is without bias regardless of how the role is established with respect to 
distance a·nd independence. As Judge Frank said almost 70 years ago: "Much harm is 
done by the myth that, merely by putting on a black robe· and taking the oath of office as a 
judge, a man ceases to be a human being, and becomes a passionless thinking 
machine". 18 Similarly, as the pursuit of grounded theory is dependent on continually 
assessing the resilience of great theories as the data accumulates, and Ombuds roles 
typically require constant analysis and reflection, this method seemed ideal for my 
purposes. 19 
Also, prior to settling on the path of generating 'grounded theory' through the use 
of interviews as my preferred research method, I con~idered the possibilities of participant 
observation and non-participant observation. However, due to the requirements of 
confidentiality and privacy in the work conducted by Qmbuds, I determined that it would 
not be possible to engage in any form of participant observation or non-participant 
observation as it is normally conducted. An additional impediment is that observation of 
this type is typically conducted as an 'outsider' and I am clearly an 'insider' with respect to 
16 Ibid. at 10. 
17 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (1690) Source: York University Internet Archive online: 
<http://archive.org/details/twotreatisesofgOOlockuoft> at 296. 
18 Jerome Frank in J.P. Linahan Inc., 138 f.20 650 (1943- 2nd Cir) at p. 651. (p. 1 ). 
19 Glaser & Strauss, supra note 10 at 26. 
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my familiarity with every type of Ombuds practice as well as many of the individuals who 
currently occupy various Ombuds roles. Simultaneously, given my lengthy engagement 
with the Ombuds community having been active in the profession for 18 years, I am aware 
that this undertaking is somewhat akin to an 'autoethnography', given my commitment to 
reflective practice. It is the norm for me to analyze the manner in which I do my work as 
well as the work done by my colleagues in my current small office. In addition, I am also 
comparing and contrasting my current perspectives to my past beliefs, perceptions and 
actions accumulated from my experiences and observations in different Ombuds' settings 
in relation to the concepts under review. However, ultimately, I determined an 
autoethnography was too limiting an approach for the phenomenon under review as I 
believe there is so much more knowledge to be acquired from investigating other Ombuds' 
practitioners' perspectives. In the same trajectory of acknowledgment of the many modes 
of information gathering I engage in professionally, I recognize that I also engage in an 
informal form of participant observation in that I regularly attend Ombuds meetings, 
conferences and workshops and am privy to a wide variety of conv~rsations and have 
observed many interactions between Ombuds who are discussing issues that are seminal 
to this research. However, I am not including the information garne~ed from these 
observations in my data set as they have not been collected in any systematic manner 
and as noted earlier, I am an insider in this context rather than having the requisite 
'outsider' mentality. In addition, I would argue that it would be unethical for me to gather 
and report on information gathered in such a manner. 
Finally, as the design of the constant comparative method has not been configured 
to ensure that different analysts will come up with identical results when reviewing the 
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same data, but rather is a disciplined medium which supports creativity, 20 I determined this 
approach was again ideal for my purposes for the following reason: I am constantly a 
witness to the fact that different individuals who are both well informed and well 
intentioned will come to very different and often valid conclusions when reviewing the 
same situation. As the mode of constant comparative activity recognizes the likelihood of 
various researchers' differing experiences and own beliefs and biases being influential, 
this approach is particularly well suited to a study that seeks to explore the concept of 
impartiality in particular. In an intriguing way this modality also replicates the daily 
experience of an Ombuds who is the continual repository of well-supported rationales for 
often diametrically opposed perceptions on the same situation. 
As I recognize the impact of my experience in various professional roles within the 
Ombuds field is profound, in the interests of full disclosure, I am providing the following 
details of my work in this sector of ADR. Specifically, my entry to the practice of 
ombudsing began with the five years I served as Manager of Investigations/Complaint 
Resolution for a provincial Ombudsman, specifically an Ombudsman for Ontario (Roberta 
Jamieson), which is a legislative Ombuds role operating in the classical tradition, with its 
headquarters located in Toronto, Ontario.21 Within that role I was responsible for the 
management of various teams engaged in both early resolution and investigative activities 
related to individual concerns as well as system-wide and systemic issues. I was also 
involved in the design and delivery of in-house training and education and in the . 
presentation of information on the· role and function of the Ontario Ombudsman to staff of 
20 Ibid. at 103. 
21 When I was affiliated with this Office, there were also regional offices located in Thunder Bay, Sault Ste. Marie, London and 
Windsor. At the moment all staff are centralized in one Office located in Toronto, Ontario. 
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various Ontario government ministries and agencies. As a member of the management 
team, I was involved in discussions revolving around the restructuring and reorganization 
of the provision of services within the Ombudsman Ontario Office both prior to and when 
the funding of the office was decreased by 25% due to province-wide budget reductions 
which resulted in the staff complement moving from approximately 120 to 85 employees. I 
am including this level of detail as this external influence provided a significant opportunity 
to reflect on the concepts under review, particularly that of structural and personal 
independence. 
Secondly, I designed and then fulfilled the role of Ombudsperson, as an external 
contractor, for Corporate Health Consultants (an employee assistance firm), in 
Mississauga, Ontario, for a one-year period only as the role was eliminated when the 
company was sold and the leadership of the organization changed. This role was based 
on the organizational model of practice. Once again, the impact of both external and 
internal influences in the elimination of this role furthered my thinking in relation to the 
. principle of independence. 
Thirdly, shortly thereafter I was recruited to design the role of Ombudsman for the 
Canadian Franchise Association, in Toronto, Ontario, which is a not-for-profit trade 
organization which exists to support franchisees and franchisors in the successful pursuit 
of their business endeavours. I fulfilled this role, based on the organizational model of 
practice, for four years as an external contractor. For a one-year period, at the same time, 
I served as the Ombudsman for the International Franchise Association, headquartered in 
Washington, D.C. that was also predicated on the organizational model of practice. Within 
these roles, in addition to handling complaints, I also made presentations on the role and 
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function of the Ombudsman to audiences of both franchisees and franchisors. I then 
resigned from these roles in order to pursue an LL.M. in Alternative Dispute Resolution at 
Osgoode Hall Law School. In addition, I currently serve as the Ombudsperson for Ryerson 
University in Toronto, Ontario and have done so for a twelve-year period, using the hybrid 
model of practice. As part of that role, I have made many presentations on the role and 
function of the Ombudsperson and lead many training sessions on effective conflict 
resolution, alternative modes of dispute resolution, effective communication, civility and fair 
decision-making processes as well as consulting on the development of a wide range of 
administrative and academic policies and procedures. 
Over the past ten years, I have been active as a member of the Association of 
Canadian College and University Ombudspersons Association by serving on the 
Executive Committee for a two-year period; working on various committees, (one of which 
was tasked with drafting Standards of Practice for the academic Ombuds role) and 
planning, attending and making presentations at a multitude of workshops and 
conferences. In addition, I am a member of the Board of the Forum of Canadian 
Ombudsman, an umbrella organization including all types of Ombuds in its membership, 
and am completing my second two-year term. I have been active with this organization in 
the design and delivery of training programs on effective Ombuds work as well contributing 
to the improvement of internal and external communication strategies. More recently, I 
have been elected to serve as a member of the International Ombudsm.an Association 
Board of Directors to bring a hybrid Ombuds perspective to this Board whose focus is 
primarily organizational Ombuds. I am also an individual member of the International 
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Ombudsman Institute and am a regular recipient of material generated by this body that is 
populated by Ombuds established by legislation worldwide. 
As I am mindful of the impact of my work in the Ombuds field and in keeping with 
the expectation of Marshall and Rossman regarding the pursuit of the generation of 
grounded theory, I have conceptualized myself as both reflective and active in the data 
generation process. 22 I am very aware that I am not a neutral collector and analyst of data 
and I have continually examined how my role as interviewer, Ombuds, conference 
presenter and doctoral student as well as my personal characteristics and social location 
affected the conduct .of this research. 
In summary, the primary methodological underpinning for this research is the 
production of grounded theory through the method of constant comparison. In addition, as 
a result of the approach taken and my academic influences, I have also engaged in a 
complementary mode of analysis, that being 'critical legal analysis' which involves 
scrutinizing the terms under study. The methodological details in terms of recruitment of 
interviewees, conduct of interviews, etc. are explained in-depth in Chapter 4, Detailed 
Methodology. 
Road Map for the Dissertation 
In order to orient the reader to how the dissertation is laid out I am providing a brief 
summary of the contents of each chapter. 
As the focus of the empirical research undertaken in this study is how those who 
occupy the role of Ombuds (or who serve as staff in Ombuds Offices), Chapter One 
serves as an in-depth orientation to how the Ombuds role is viewed and implemented in 
22 Catherine Marshall & Gretchen B. Rossman, Designing Qualitative Research (Newbury Park, California: SAGE 
Publications, Inc., 1989) at 41 and 62. 
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Canada. Since there is a high degree of idiosyncrasy in how Ombuds roles have been 
established and implemented, I begin by illustrating differing points of view on the 
construction of this uniquely named role. I also provide precedents for this role to 
demonstrate how it was established in many different cultures and time periods so as to 
provide a full foundation for understanding this unique form of administrative justice. 
Given the differing constructions of Canadian Ombuds' roles, in Chapter Two I 
provide a taxonomy detailing the three Ombuds models that I argue operate in Canada, 
specifically, the legislative, hybrid and organizational Ombuds. A detailed chronology of 
when and how the ten Ombuds of general jurisdiction (nine provincial and one territorial 
Om buds) were established in Canada is provided at the outset followed by a brief 
summary of various examples of the hundreds of hybrid and organizational Ombuds roles 
in place as well. Using former Chief Justice Dickson's seminal description of the Ombuds 
role which decided a jurisdictional dispute in 1984 between the Ombudsman for British 
Columbia and a Crown Corporation created by the province, I detail the genesis and 
implementation of Ombuds mandates with respect to the following criteria: investigative 
authority; own motion/own initiative investigations; investigations resulting from an 
individual complaint; early resolution techniques; and accessibility as they relate to the 
three models of Ombuds-activity. The use of educational strategies for preventative 
purposes as well as the value of the power to recommend is also discussed. This chapter 
ends with the delineation of the fundamental characteristics of a Canadian Ombuds role 
whether it is established by legislation, policy, terms of reference, charter or executive fiat. 
As independence and impartiality are the key principles that are examined 
empirically in this study, in Chapter Three the theoretical constructs for impartiality and 
independence are presented from both historical and contemporary perspectives. I also 
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use this opportunity to differentiate between the terms of 'neutrality' and 'impartiality' as 
they relate to the subject under discussion. As the principles of impartiality and 
independence have been examined extensively within the legal context through the lens of 
judicial decision-making, this chapter looks at the research results derived from five 
studies of judicial decision-making (four Canadian and one American) and one study of 
administrative tribunal decision-making (Canadian) as there is only a small amount of 
empirical research relating to Ombuds and independence in existence. This type of 
scholarship is both germane to and instructive to this study as while it is readily evident 
that judges and Ombuds are very different in that Ombuds do not make binding 
determinations, it will soon become apparent that these roles also share some common 
characteristics like the requirements for impartiality and independence and the capacity to 
make decisions Oudges) or recommendations (Ombuds), which can have life changing 
impact. The current dominant modes used for the analysis of judicial decision-making, that 
is, attitudinal, legal and strategic, are referenced throughout. This material is key to 
understanding how the traditional theories of independence and impartiality have been 
found wanting in the assessment of decision-making for those theorists and practitioners 
who .operate on the premise that a high degree of structural independence provides for 
impartiality. As I contend that the Ombuds role falls within the Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (ADR) area of the dispute resolution continuum, examples of how the key 
principles under review are now understood by ADR practitioners and scholars are also 
provided. The secondary research presented which includes the theories espoused by 
notable scholar/practitioners as they relate to impartiality and independence is essential to 
this undertaking as there have not been any studies undertaken that assess Ombuds' 
impartiality and independence in an empirical manner. As a result, I make use of these 
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research results along with the theories generated to illustrate the difficulty and comple~ity 
that Ombuds may also encounter in their efforts to act impartially and demonstrate 
independence. As there are those who argue that impartiality is in fact achievable I also 
present these approaches in order to provide a balanced view and when appropriate 
demonstrate the flaws inherent in their propositions. As researchers in the area of social 
psychology have delved deeply into what can be done to modify stereotypical thinking 
these data are also presented. Then the principle of independence is analyzed with 
respect to seminal Canadian case law and the importance of viewing independence and 
impartiality as separate concepts is also addressed. Finally, various means for addressing 
the challenges to impartiality and independence that have been articulated by major legal 
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scholars is put forward for comparative purposes. 
A detailed explanation of the research methodology used, that being, the 
generation of grounded theory, via the mode of constant comparison, as it relates to the 
conceptualization and implementation of the principles of independence and impartiality 
within the Canadian Ombuds role, is provided in Chapter Four. The strategies I used to 
recognize and limit my own bias, to the extent that it is possible to do so, are also 
discussed at this juncture. 
The results of my examination of twenty Ombuds interviewees' perceptions of the 
·constructs of independence and impartiality are delineated in Chapter Five followed by the 
articulation of the key practice points which emerged from these discussions. Specifically, 
ten strategies and techniques for increasing impartiality and seven examples of conditions 
and traditional role characteristics that can both contribute to and/or detract from 
independence, depending on the circumstances, are discussed. 
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As the concept of fairness is considered integral to the role of Ombuds and from a 
legal vantage point intersects with both impartiality and independence, in Chapter Six I 
present my analysis of the Ombuds interviewees' perspectives on whether, and if so, how, 
impartiality and independence are intertwined with complainants' and respondents' 
perceptions of fairness. In Chapter Seven, the primary conclusions that impartiality is 
always aspirational rather than achievable or impossible and that an independent mindset 
can be more influential than the traditional notions of structural independence are 
elucidated. Accordingly, the theories generated from my empirical research are also 
summarized at this juncture~ To complete the circle, in this final chapter, I put forward a 
number of areas for further research that could benefit both the Ombuds field as well as 
the legal field generally that have emerged through the conduct of this study. 
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Chapter 1: Orientation to the Ombuds in Canada 
Introduction 
The Ombuds role in Canadian society contributes significantly to increasing access 
to justice by providing for administrative redress of various wrongs and unfairness in a 
timely, pluralistic and inexpensive manner. However, as the role is often inadequately or 
incorrectly portrayed in the media as well as in some academic and professional literature, 
there is cOnsiderable confusion about the Ombuds role. Given the ubiquity and the 
idiosyncrasy of this role in Canadian society, it is especially important to provide an 
accurate and comprehensive foundation as to its genesis and current status prior to 
inquiring into the foci of this study: impartiality and independence. I repeat, conflicting, 
incomplete, wrong and contradictory information abounds. Therefore, in an effort to 
increase clarity and reduce misconceptions, this introduction will serve as a 
comprehensive depiction and analysis of Ombuds roles as they emerged and now exist 
within all sectors of the Canadian landscape. 
Given that the legal literature is scant in this area and since political scientists have 
devoted considerably more attention to the Ombuds institution due to its contribution to the 
democratization of society, the scholarship of political science is necessarily well 
represented in the exploration of what is a complex, multi-faceted and often misconstrued 
role both in academe and society generally. Similarly, as mainstream and specialized 
popular media also report frequently on the activities and reports of various Ombuds, this 
type.of intelligence has also been explored to provide insight into the various 
representations provided of the Ombuds role in Canada. In addition, I have made use of 
the wide variety of Ombuds-generated reports to inform this analysis. Finally, as the 
research on Ombuds is often segregated in.that researchers tend to focus exclusively on 
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one type of Ombuds role, which to date is primarily the legislative Ombuds, this research 
attempts to provide expression of the multiplicity of Ombuds roles established via policy or 
terms of reference, in public, private, governmental and not-for profit-sectors in Canada as 
well. 
In order to provide a longitudinal context for this discussion as well as demonstrate 
how various precedents contribute to current constructions, I will firstly expand on the 
historical foundations for the role of Ombuds. Much of the legal and political science 
literature indicates that the Canadian Ombuds role is predicated on the original Swedish 
model when in fact it was first introduced in Canada replicating the New Zealand 
experience. Accordingly, I will demonstrate that the New Zealand statute was based on 
the Danish Ombuds model that was a mutation of the second iteration of the Swedish 
model of ombudsmanship. In addition, examples of the ombuds concept found in ancient 
societies well before any Swedish entity appointed its first Ombudsman are recognized as 
they offer useful antecedents to current practice as well. Secondly, I will delineate the 
current state of the continuing evolution of the various roles of Ombuds by observing the 
differences and similarities between what I consider to be the three primary models of 
practice, that is, 'classical, parliamentary or legislative'; 'hybrid' and 'organizational'. 
Thirdly, I will posit. a normative definition for the role of an Om buds in the Canadian context 
and offer a rationale for these essential defining characteristics and principles. 
Om buds-what? 
Prior to explaining how the Ombuds role came to be established in Canada and 
how it is currently defined, it is necessary to explain what it isn't. For example, anyone who 
follows media reports in Canada (and abroad) about Ombuds activity would likely be very 
confused as to what to expect when interacting with an Ombuds given the wide array of 
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descriptions found in media reports, academic texts, as well as Ombuds' generated 
literature. For example, in The Metro, a commuters' newspaper, it was reported that three 
sources from the National Hockey League (NHL) Players Association had indicated that 
they were disappointed in how a former player, Eric Lindros, was fulfilling his role as the 
ombudsman for the union.23 The sources cited were particularly vexed that he was 
inaccessible and causing problems between the players and the association's Executive 
Director. It was noted that Mr. Lindros, as Ombudsman, was also expected to serve as a 
non-voting member of the executive board. This story continued to fascinate the sports 
media as Mr. Lindros resigned and was then replaced by Buzz Hargrove, former head of 
the Canadian Auto Workers. Subsequent reports then indicated that Mr. Hargrove had 
been ousted because of his role in orchestrating the equivalent of a palace coup24 in 
arranging for the firing of the former Executive Director. Mr. Hargrove was quoted as 
saying he had resigned as he could no longer be effective as Ombudsman nor could he 
" ... assist the leadership in building unity and solidarity that is necessary to move the 
NHLPA into the future".25 This combination of activities is very far removed from how an 
ombuds role should be designed, and if the comments made are true, how it should be 
implemented in Canada. 
Contemporaneously, in an article in a community newspaper in New Brunswick, 
reference is made to how difficult the first year had been for the then newly appointed 
'Veterans Ombudsman', Patrick Stogran, due to the high volume of complaints and the 
inefficiency of the Veteran Affairs bureaucracy he encountered. It is then stated that: 
23 Marty York, "Big Mysteries Surround Eric Lindros", Metro (31 December 2008), online: Metronews 
<http://www.metronews.ca>. 
24 Ken Campbell, "NHLPA votes to oust Hargrove, Pink, but can't make it official" The Hockey News (6 October 2009), online: 
The Hockey News<http://thehockeynews.com>. 
25 Brandon Hicks, "Hargrove Resigns from NHLPA" CBC Sports (8 November 2009), online: CBC Sports 
<http://cbc.ca/sports>. 
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"Stogran says he's neither impartial nor neutral as the veterans' ombudsman. He's there to 
serve the veterans, period".26 Perhaps Mr. Strogan was misquoted, as in direct opposition 
to the comments attributed to this Ombudsman, the Veterans Affairs Canada proclamation 
states: "Announced on April 3, 2007, the Veterans Ombudsman is an impartial, arms-
length and independent officer with the responsibility to assist Veterans to pursue their 
concerns and advance their issues". 27 Given that the role is described as independent and 
impartial, the Ombudsman would only be in a position to 'assist Veterans to advance their 
concerns' if he had determined they were valid. However, if the attribution credited to 
Stogran is correct it would seem his role should be more correctly termed as 'Veterans' 
Advocate'. 
In direct contrast to the previously cited depictions of two very different Ombuds' 
roles, a news report in the Investment Executive, a trade magazine, described the first 
year of operations for the Canadian Taxpayers' Ombudsman, Mr. Paul Dube. He is quoted 
as stating: "I am independent and impartial, so I meet both sides of the equation ... I think it 
is important for me to talk to the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) employees to see how 
the systems are set up, see what kinds of challenges they face". 28 This comment was 
prefaced by his stated intention to visit CRA offices across the country so as to understand 
the problems encountered by employees in providing service in addition to those brought 
to his attention by the 3000 individuals and small and medium sized business owners who 
were complaining about the CRA service. Fortunately, for the readers of The Investment 
26 
'Veterans' ombudsman ends first year with a backlog of complaints" The Daily Gleaner (7 November 2008), online: Daily 
Gleaner.com <http://dailygleaner.canadaeast.com/canadaworld/article/43784>. 
27 
'Veterans Ombudsman lntroduction"(2007) online: Veteran Affairs Canada <http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/ombudsman>. 
The bolding of 'impartial' is my emphasis. 
28 Megan Harman, "Tax ombudsman ramps up complaint-handling capacity", The Investment Executive (16 December 
2008), online: <http://www.investmentexecutive.com>. 
22 
Executive, this portrayal of the role of the Taxpayers' Ombudsman is consistent both with 
the published terms of reference and the historical foundations of the Ombuds role. 
Unfortunately, not only do the news media provide widely divergent accounts of 
what an Ombuds does and should do, a similar divergence of views of how the role of an 
Ombuds should be designed and fulfilled also exists in the scholarly literature. For 
example, in Macfarlane's text book entitled Dispute Resolution Readings and Case 
Studies which is used for ADR classes in law schools, universities and colleges across the 
country, the Ombuds role is defined as: "The ombudsman is the quintessential neutral 
evaluator".29 This definition is problematic as many Ombuds (as well as jurists and other 
dispute resolution practitioners) would consider the use of the term 'neutral' to be incorrect 
as an Ombuds should not be seen to be 'neutral' when fairness principles, such as lack of 
notice that an important decision will be made and/or the opportunity to know the case 
against you and respond, or a biased decision-maker, are violated. Further, some scholars 
and practitioners, for instance (Astor (2007), Cain (1997-1998), L'Heureux-Dube (1997), 
MacMillan (1938), Mclachlin (1997) Mulcahy (2001) Resnik (1997-1998), would discount 
the possibility of a neutral human being entirely, regardless ·of the stated requirements of 
the position occupied. In addition, as is evident from the annual reports of all manner of 
Ombuds and from my own observation and experience, the vast majority of complaints 
handled by Ombuds of all varieties are resolved via mutual agreement without an 
evaluation of the merits of the complaints being conducted by the Ombuds. These three 
indicia alone demonstrate why the definition of 'quintessential neutral evaluator' in this 
widely used textbook requires adjustment and amplification. 
29 Julie Macfarlane, ed., Dispute Resolution- Readings and Case Studies, Second Edition (Toronto: Emond Montgomery 
Publications, 2003) at 594. 
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As the role of Ombuds is typically situated in the administrative law section of legal 
reference texts, I looked to Van Harten et al's Administrative Law Cases, Texts, and 
Materials for its definition and analysis of the Ombuds role. In this mammoth edition of 
almost 1400 pages, released for the sixth time in 2010, there are two paragraphs 
dedicated to the role of Ombuds and the definition provided appears to be focused solely 
on provincial Ombuds established by legislation.30 The authors indicate that an 
Ombudsman (the authors' term) has five powers and functions, beginning with 1) the 
ability to investigate governmental administrative actions; and 2) the authority to acquire 
the information needed for the investigation. In addition, in the description of the 
Ombudsman's second power, collateral reference is made to gathering information in 
private. Given how important it may be to the complainant for an· inquiry or an 
investigation to be undertaken anonymously or in private, I would suggest that the 
Ombuds' ability to maintain the complainant's confident.iality and hold her own records in 
confidence, should also be recognized as a stand-alone essential power, thereby bringing 
· the total number of powers and functions posited in this context to six. Th·e additional three 
criteria posited by Van Harten et al include: 3) that the filing of a complaint is easily done 
and free of financial cost; 4) the Ombuds has wide latitude as to how to describe what a 
government has done wrong; and finally, 5) (or the sixth power identified) that the Ombuds 
can ask for redress appropriate to the wrong identified, but since he has no legal basis for 
binding the wrong doer, his recommendations are only enforceable via political or public 
pressure. 31 However, I would argue that while external pressure can be used, frequently 
none is necessary when an Ombuds presents feasible and reasonable recommendations 
30 There are two factual errors in this description in that it indicates that: 1) all Canadian provinces have an Ombudsman role 
in place when in fact Prince Edward Island has not yet established an Ombudsman of general jurisdiction; 2) the Yukon 
Territory Ombudsman is not included even though it has been in place since 1996. 
31 Gus Van Harten, Gerald Heckman, David J. Mullan, Administrative Law Cases, Text, and Materials 61h ed.(Toronto: Emond ' 
Montgomery Publications, 2010) at 22. 
24 
based on compelling conclusions derived from a thorough review of an issue(s). Stanley 
Anderson, noted American Ombudsman scholar, who wrote extensively on Canadian 
ombuds roles has taken another tack and opined that it is the 'prestige' of an Ombuds that 
allows for his 'suggestions' (Anderson's term) to be accepted and implemented. 32 In the 
same vein, noted British Ombuds scholar, Mary Seneviratne, observes that the inability to 
enforce recommendations is irrelevant as respondents typically accept them given the 
respect that is accorded to the Office.33 As a result, the lack of enforcement inherent in the 
Ombuds role is not necessarily an impediment to the promise and delivery of 
administrative fairness if the recommendations made are based on a credible review 
process. It is also surprising that no reference is made to either 'impartial' or 'independent' 
in Van Harten et al's description of the Ombuds powers and functions. Perhaps, though, 
these characteristics are considered implicit to an investigative body of this nature and 
therefore are not included as descriptors. 
It is noteworthy that Van Harten et al only make reference to provincial 
Ombudsman34 (as well as recognizing the Newfoundland and Labrador Citizen's 
Representative and the Quebec Protecteur des Citoyens as members of this group) in · 
their preamble to laying out the defining characteristics of an Ombudsman that 
investigates the fairness of governmental administrative actions. The emphasis on 
provincial Ombuds is intriguing as there are a number of other roles specifically named as 
'Ombudsman' as well that have also been established by legislation, but at federal and 
municipal levels. For instance, the federal Public Procurement Ombudsman and the 
32 Stanley V. Anderson, Canadian Ombudsman Proposals, (Berkeley, California: Institute of Governmental Studies, University 
of California, 1966) at ix. 
33 Mary Seneviratne, Ombudsmen Public Services and Administrative Justice· (U.K.: Butterworths Lexis Nexis, 2002) at 54. 
34 An Ombudsman for the Yukon Territory has also been in existence since 1996. Also, only nine provinces have established 
Ombuds roles to date, with Prince Edward Island being the exception. 
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Correctional Investigator (often referred to as the federal Prison Ombudsman) are also 
established by statute, and at least two municipal Ombudsman (for the Cities of Montreal 
and Toronto) have been established via by-laws which are underpinned by provincial 
statute, and they also enjoy all of the six powers and functions attributed to the 
aforementioned prqvincial Ombudsman but are not included or identified. While not 
created by statute, the previously noted Veterans' Ombudsman and Taxpayers' 
Ombudsman, which have been established by Order-in-Council, also enjoy the six powers 
cited above. In addition, various federal Ombuds roles have been established by 
departmental policy, terms of reference or Charter. Some examples include the National 
Defence and Canadian Forces Ombudsman, Passport Canada, Parks Canada and 
National Capital Commission.35 Similarly, as there are many Ombuds roles established 
within the private, public and not-for-profit sectors which also have the same powers and 
functions as they relate to the administration of an organization or institution or private 
company, but are not statutorily established, it would be interesting to know if the authors' 
intent is to indicate that only provincial and by logical extension, territorial and municipal 
Ombuds' roles of general jurisdiction established by legislation actually qualify as Ombuds·. 
In addition, Van Harten et al's description also prompts the reader to contemplate 
whether they believe that those Officers of the Legislature whose roles have been 
established via statute to investigate the implementation of specific pieces of legislation, 
·(e.g. Privacy and Language Commissioners), also fall outside the definition of an Ombuds. 
Interestingly enough, the current federal Privacy Commissioner, Jennifer Stoddart, 
35 Please see descriptions of each of these roles and their terms of reference at the following locations: "About Us" (April 17, 
2009), online: National Defence and Canadian Forces Ombudsman online: <http://www.ombudsman.forces.qc.ca>; 'The 
Ombudsman"(19 February 2009), online: Passport Canada <http://www.ppt.gc.ca>, "Code of Ethics, Chapter 4: Avenues of 
Resolution, Resolution of Ethical Dilemmas" (15 April 2009) online: Parks Canada <http://www.pc.gc.ca>, "Ombudsman 
NCC/CCN" (3 April 2009), online: National Capital Commission <http://ombudsman.ncc-ccn.ca>, online: Health Canada 
<http://www.hc-sc.qc.ca/ahc-asc/branch-dirqen/paccb-dgapcc/omb/index-enq. php>. 
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identifies the Privacy Commissioner's role as being based on the Ombuds model of 
dispute resolution36 as did her predecessor Bruce Phillips. Phillips defended and promoted 
the use of the Ombuds model when the protection of personal information was extended 
into the private sector via the introduction of the Personal Information Protection and 
Electronic f?ocuments Act (PIPEDA). 37 It is also instructive. that Lorne Sossin and France 
Houle were given a specific research mandate to assess the effectiveness of the Ombuds 
model as it applies to PIPEDA. Interestingly, in Sossin and Haul.e's 201 O report, situated 
in the preamble to their findings, the following general characteristics for an Ombuds were 
posited as background information: 
• Advancing goals of fairness, transparency, accountability, and equity; 




• Independence from government; 
• Authority to conduct investigations; 
• Authority to issue public reports; and 
• The absence of binding orders, remedial sanctions or disciplinary powers. 38 
In reviewing the characteristics of Ombuds as delineated by all of the 
aforementioned legal scholars, it is startling to me that only independence and not 
impartiality is required by Sossin and Houle in their defining characteristics, given the 
import that is normally ascribed to both of these characteristics for fairness purposes. 
However, I suspect that this omission is explained by the fact these two criteria are 
considered implicit to the role given the usual legislative underpinnings for Ombuds. 
Typically, provincial and territorial and some federal Ombuds provide for a very high 
36 Jennifer Stoddart, "Cherry Picking Among Apples and Oranges: Refocusing Current Debate About the Merits of the 
Ombuds-Model Under PIPE DA" (21 October 2005) online: Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada 
<http://www.priv.gc.ca> at 3. 
37 Lome Sessin and France Houle, " Powers and Functions of the Ombudsman in the Personal Information Protection and 
Electronic Documents Act An Effectiveness Study Part II: Approaches and Alternatives in evaluating the Privacy 
·Commissioner's PIPE DA jurisdiction" online: Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada <http://www.priv.gc.ca/> at 120. 
38 Ibid. at 117. 
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degree of structural independence and stipulate an impartial approach. Also, shortly after 
setting out the features characteristic to the Ombuds model, Sossin and Houle indicate 
that the Om buds' investigative approach is impartial as well as fast and informal. 39 
Next, in order to provide a means for understanding how the Ombuds role has 
evolved in an environment that is largely self defined and unregulated, I will attempt to 
articulate the development and construction of the broad spectrum of Ombuds activity 
extant in Canada. It will soon become apparent that familiarity with this circuitous route is 
essential to appreciating the many current manifestations and constructions of the 
Ombuds role. 
The Ombuds Foundation 
At this juncture it is important to draw attention to the fact that the multiple models 
of ombudsing established within the public, private and not-for-profit sectors in Canada, 
which have been growing in number 40 and diversity, since the 1960s and 70s, have 
evolved serendipitously rather than by design. Not surprisingly, the current implementation 
of Om buds roles and functions in Canada are illustrative of the winding developmental 
paths of this alternative mode of dispute resolution. Specifically, as there is no federal 
Ombuds of general jurisdiction nor regulatory nor professional body in place in. Canada to 
specify how an Ombuds should be created or what model it should follow, the type of 
Ombuds role established and the nature of its inquisitorial powers is dependent entirely 
upon what entity established it, its vision for how oversight for the purpose of 
administrative fairness should be fulfilled and by whom, as well as which political and/or 
personal philosophies have influenced the entity's thinking. This reality has important 
39 Ibid. at 119. 
4
° Frank Stacey, Ombudsmen Compared (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978) at 51. Stacey observed in his world wide study of 
Ombuds roles published in 1978 that in North America, Canadian jurisdictions had demonstrated the greatest zeal for 
establishing Ombuds offices overall. 
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implications for the implementation of the principles of independence and impartiality. It is 
noteworthy that the opposite approach was taken in New Zealand where the Ombudsmen 
Act 1975 (N.Z.), 1975/9 (28A s. 1 )41 protects the use of the term of 'Ombudsman' by 
· requiring consent in writing from the Chief Ombudsman in advance of any non-
governmental Ombudsman service being established in that jurisdiction.42 In addition, in 
an effort to prevent the misuse of the Ombudsman name the Australian and New Zealand 
Ombudsman Association (ANOZA) have set out six required criteria for the use of this 
tern~ or title. Their specifications include structural independence; general jurisdiction for all 
administrative actions; strong powers of investigation, including ability to undertake 
investigations on the Ombuds' own initiative and determine own procedures; accessibility; 
procedural fairness in how the Ombuds work is accomplished; and accountability.43 The 
New Zealand reference is particularly relevant to this discussion, as noted earlier, in that 
the first Canadian Ombuds roles established by legislation were strongly influenced by the 
Ombuds regime as it was created by that country in 1962. It is also worthy of mention that 
New Zealand was the first common law country government to create an Ombudsman 
and it did so following _the Danish Ombudsman model of operation.44 This decision is 
significant with respect to the shape of the Canadian Ombuds role as the Danish model 
does not include judicial oversight and any form of prosecutorial powers which were 
elemental to the more frequently referenced Swedish model.45 
41 Ombudsmen Act1975 No 9 Section 28A 'Protection of name<http://www.leqislation.govt.nz>. 
42 Ibid. Section (1 ). 
43 The Australian and New Zealand Ombudsman Association (ANZOA) "Essential Criteria for Describing A Body As An 
Ombudsman" ANZOA Policy Statement, February 2010. 
Online: ANZOA <http://www.anzoa.com.au>. 
44 Severatine, supra note 33 at 15. 
45 Ulf Lundvik, The Ombudsmen in the Provinces of Canada, (Edmonton: International Ombudsman Institute, 1981) at 5. 
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Canadian 'early adopters' of the Ombuds· concept were exposed to the New 
Zealand experience when Sir Guy Powles, the first New Zealand Ombudsman, visited 
Canada in 1964 to speak at the annual general meeting of the Canadian Bar Association 
(CBA). This speech resulted in the CBA recommending the Ombuds role be studied for 
application in provincial and federal jurisdictions.46 As well, a political scientist, Karl 
Friedmann, who became the first Ombudsman for British Columbia, described the New 
Zealand Ombuds legislation as" ... a nearly perfect statute".47 However, interestingly 
enough, two years prior to the establishment of any Ombuds role in Canada by legislation, 
in 1965, an Ombudsman was established, (in fact, according to some sources, the first 
academic Ombuds role in North America), at Simon Fraser University in Vancouver by the 
Students' Association.48 This inaugural role continues today with joint funding from two 
Students' Associations and the University and is likely the first instance of the meandering 
approach to the establishment of Ombuds roles in Canada. 
Taking a longer view of history, in order to demonstrate that the Ombuds role 
existed prior to the often referenced Swedish model created in 1809, Stephen Owen49 , 
who was previously the Ombudsman for the province of British Columbia, began his 
46 Karl Friedmann, Proceedings of the Conference on Ombudsman "Let Justice Be seen To be Done" (Vancouver: British 
Columbia Human Rights Council, March 1970) at 10. 
47 Ibid. 
48 This information was presented verbally and supported by copies of printed documentation by Laurine Harrison (now 
deceased), former Ombudsperson at Simon Fraser University (SFU) at a mid-year meeting of the Association of Canadian 
College and University Ombudsperson 2001 at Wilfrid Laurier University in Waterloo, Ontario. In 2012, the website for the 
current Simon Fraser University Ombudsperson indicates that the office has been in place for " ... over forty years." Source: 
"Office of the Ombudsperson" Simon Fraser University online: <www.sfu.ca>. 
Interestingly enough, this information is contradicted by reference made in the obituary of the former first Principal of 
Concordia University, John O'Brien where Mr. O'Brien was credited for having established the first Ombudsman role in a 
university in North America at Concordia University in Montreal. Unfortunately no specific date for the office being put in place 
is provided. Source: Philip Fine, "Administrator Negotiated merger that created Concordia University" (24 January 2012) The 
Globe and Mail online: <http://vl.globeandmail.com>. Ultimately, it may be that both institutions are accurate in their claim of 
'first Ombudsman' in that SFU was likely the first Ombudsman role established within a Canadian university solely by a 
student association and Concordia is likely the first University to have directed the establishment of an Ombuds of general 
jurisdiction for the institution as a whole. 
49 Mr. Owen was also a Deputy Minister and Deputy Attorney-General for BC, a professor of Dispute Resolution at the 
University of Victoria, and a federal Member of Parliament and a Cabinet Minister. Most recently he was the Vice-President, 
External, Legal and Community Relations for the University of British Columbia. 
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historical account of the world-wide establishment of the Ombuds role with reference to 
the Control Yuan of ancient China and the Roman tribune.50 In contrast, Paul Murray, a 
Research Officer with the Ontario legislature, started his historical analysis with earlier 
examples taken from Caiden et al who produced a comparative study on the 
establishment of Om buds roles worldwide. 51 For example, Murray included the kings of 
ancient Egypt who provided for complaints officers to be attached to their courts; using a 
comparable arrangement, the Roman Republic arranged for the appoin.tment of two 
censors to analyze administrative activity and to handle complaints about 
maladministration. 52 Murray also recognized the Han Dynasty and the similar role played 
by the Control Yuan as identified by Stephen Owen. In addition, he noted that rulers in the 
Middle Ages arranged for civilian oversight of the activity of public officials. 
Emily Gill, in her analysis of the evolution of the Ombuds role described the 
aforementioned Roman role as a 'tribunisplebis' that served as a protector of the lower 
class against the patricians as a potential Ombudsman antecedent. This tribune could veto 
the decisions of consuls, magistrates or senators and anyone who did not accept the veto 
could be sanctioned severely. As a result, Gill opined that 'the tribune' is the precursor of 
the current role of Ombuds as it was an important means for ensuring the 'powerless' in 
Roman society were not subjected to arbitrary decision-making that did not show respect 
for tradition.53 However, as it must be acknowledged that Ombuds typically do not have 
veto authority or the ability to mete out sanctions or punishments, I would argue that the 
'tribune' reference is not necessarily applicable to the Ombuds role in Canada. Gill also 
50 Stephen Owen, "Essential Elements & Common Challenges" The International Ombudsman Anthology: Selected Writings 
from the International Ombudsman Institute (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Kluwer Law International, 1999) at 52. 
51 See International Handbook of the Ombudsman (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1983) edited by Gerald E. Caiden. 
52 Paul Murray, 'The Ombudsman: Historical Development, Different Models and Common Problems", (1994) Current Issue 
Paper 153. (Toronto: Legislative Research Service, Ontario Legislative Library) at 2. 
53 Emily R. Gill, The Civil Ombudsman and the American Scene (Ph.D. Thesis, Claremont Graduate School, 1971) at 5. 
31 
provided examples of other means for balancing power by observing that in Europe in the 
middle ages, on occasion, the Christian Church would intercede between a subject who 
felt oppressed and the relevant ruler, and that in Norman times in England the Court of the 
Exchequer served as a means for redressing government malfeasance. 54 
C. McKenna Lang excavated the historical roots somewhat differently in her 
attempt to demonstrate the cultural diversity inherent in the origins of the role of Ombuds. 
For example, Lang begins her historical analysis by identifying a number of simple 
mechanisms established for airing grievances like the 'lung stone',55 found_ in China in the 
third or fourth century. People stood on this stone to air their criticisms of the government 
publicly if the person, who was responsible to receive them, that being the 'headman', did 
not accept them and transmit them to the proper authority. 'Gentlemen' who happened to 
be in the area of the lung stone and heard these complaints were then required to report 
them to the Emperor and the recalcitrant 'headman' would be held accountable for not 
bringing them forward himself. Another evocative image from the fifth century in China is 
what was described as the 'vilification tree'. 56 In this modality, individuals would attach their 
written complaint to the appointed tree so it could be read by the ruler. The only Empress 
of the time was said to have expanded the options available to provide for the use of 
locked metal complaint boxes outfitted with slots that allowed for complainants to submit 
their grievances on paper privately. 57 These boxes could be found in close proximity to the 
I 
vilification tree resulting in easy access, for those who were literate, to both a private and 
public means for submitting a concern. Apparently these modalities were thought to have 
54 Ibid.at 6. 





contributed greatly to the Empress' positive reputation as a ruler as by using these 
sources of information she became more knowledgeable about the citizenry's concerns. 58 
Lang also singled out the Chinese 'Censorate' (which others refer to as the Central or 
Control Yuan) which by the twelfth century had investigative powers and the ability to look 
at complaints in confidence as well as the previously mentioned Roman tribune, as 
prototypes for the current Ombuds role as they were much more sophisticated 
mechanisms for investigating and overseeing governmental bureaucracies. 59 However, I 
would posit that the aforementioned 'lung stone' which was used to hold the 'headman' 
accountable for not doing his job properly should also be considered as a viable precedent 
for the Ombuds role. This acknowledgement is appropriate given that many individuals 
who bring complaints forward to Ombuds indicate that their primary rationale for doing so 
is to be 'heard' as their experience is that no one who actually had responsibility to do so 
has actually been willing to listen to their concerns. In addition, as many complaints 
. brought forward to an Ombuds are resolved only through an informal discussion with the 
complainant and/or the respondent, without any in-depth investigative activity being 
undertaken, the principle behind the 'lung stone' and the 'gentleman' carrying the message · 
forward is replicated every day in all manner of Ombuds' offices. Similarly, the motif of the 
'locked box' has been readily assimilated into the Ombuds' current authority to receive 
written complaints in confidence whether they are submitted by incarcerated inmates in 
sealed envelopes, unread by prison authorities, or electronically via email from citizens or 
employees, via an Ombuds' secure website. In addition, some provincial Ombuds, for 
instance, the Ombudsman for Saskatchewan, was also recently named as the appropriate 
recipient for complaints made by government employees through the enactment of 'whistle 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. at 14. 
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blowing' legislation. In this instance, The Public Interest Disclosure Act, provides the 
means for the Saskatchewan provincial employees to disclose concerns about 
government wrong doing without fear of reprisal.60 
The City of Toronto Ombudsman proffers another example as a precursor to the 
modern Ombuds role by indicating that First Nations in Canada had well-established 
means for mediating disputes between decision-makers and individuals. 61 Another 
example of a society having established a prototype of the Ombuds role many centuries 
ago is that which is known within the Muslim faith as 'Mohtasib'. According to Duhaime, 
originally this position was identified as fulfilling both a prosecutorial and policing role. 62 
However, other historical accounts suggest otherwise by the following description: 
Out of your hours of work fix a time for complaints and for those who want to 
approach you with their grievances. For this purpose you must arrange public 
audience for them, and during this audience, for the sake of God, treat them with 
kindness, courtesy and respect. Do not let your army and police be in the audience 
hall at such a time so that those who have grievances against your government 
may speak to you freely, unreservedly and without fear. All this is a necessary 
factor for your rule because I have often heard the Prophet (Peace of God be upon 
him) saying: "that nation or government cannot achieve salvation where the rights 
of the depressed, destitute and suppressed are not guarded, and where mighty 
and powerful persons are not forced to accede to these rights. 63 
Another view is that this concept is based on the term of 'Hisba' and is defined as 
accountability to self and others and was created by Omer, Second Caliph of Islam. The 
person in this role was ·expected to travel to both urban areas and market places in 
medieval times to intervene between customers and sellers when cheating was suspected 
as well as to address dishonest behaviour on the part of public officials. 64 Both, the term 
60 Government of Saskatchewan, News Release, "ACTING PUBLIC INTEREST DISCLOSURE COMMISSIONER 
APPOINTED" (9 February 2012) online: Government of Saskatchewan <http://www.gov.sk.ca>. 
61 
"History of the Ombudsman" online: City of Toronto Ombudsman <http://ombudstoronto.ca>. 
62 Legal Dictionary Duhaime Law online: <http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/M/Mohtasib.aspx>. 
63 S.A. Bokhari, "Ombudsman: An Introduction" online: International Policy Fellowship 
<http://www.policy.hu/bokhari/ombud_intro.html> at 2. 
64 Ibid. at 1. 
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and _the concept live on in Pakistan, in particular, where the federal Ombudsman of 
general jurisdiction and provincial Ombudsman roles and banking Ombudsman roles are 
known as 'Mohtasib'.65 
The 'justiceombudsman' (JO) established by the Riksdagen (the Swedish 
parliament) in 1809 is frequently noted as the 'first' Ombudsman in many articles written 
about Ombuds in academic journals or in organizational newsletters and reports. In fact, 
Nathalie Des Rosiers observed that " ... most scholars point to Sweden as the place where 
the modern Ombudsman had its roots".66 However, as noted earlier, the Swedish model is 
very different from the Canadian model. Geoffrey Sawer, Australian Ombudsman scholar, 
has indicated that the English translation of the JO is 'Procurator for Civil Affairs' and this 
role provided not only for the ability to address criminal matters but also to initiate 
prosecutions of public officials. 67 However, Ulf Lundvik, a former Chief Parliamentary 
Ombudsman for Sweden, indicates that, in practice though, the JO's function was actually 
only to take action against public officials who had neglected their duties or committed 
illegal acts. 68 Lundvik's assessment is supported by Lang who concurs with the view that 
the primary purpose of the role is to address complaints about public officials. 69 
For the sake of clarity from a current perspective I will provide a brief summary of 
the manner in which the Office of the Swedish Ombudsman is now organized as portrayed 
by the current Ombudsmen themselves. There are now four Swedish Parliamentary 
Ombudsmen who are elected by Parliament. The roles are defined and differentiated in 
the following manner: the Chief Ombudsman provides general direction for the Office as 
65 Wafaqi Mohtasib(Ombudsman) of Pakistan online: <http://www.mohtasib.gov.pk> and /Ombudsman's (Mhotasib) 
Schemes An Introduction" Banking Mhotasib Pakistan online: <http://www.bankingmohtasib.qov.pk>. 
66 des Rosiers, supra note 3 at 1. 
67 Geoffrey Sawer, Ombudsmen (Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1968), at 7. 
68 Lundvik, supra note 45 at 1. 
69 C. McKenna Lang, supra note 55 at 37. 
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well as oversight of the National Defence force, prisons, probation officials, the National 
Health Service, etc. but can not interfere with the opinions of the three other Ombudsmen 
who have their own specific areas of jurisdiction. Respectively, Ombudsman 2 has 
responsibility for oversight of public prosecutors, police, customs officials, National Arts 
Centre, public service employees. Ombudsman 3: a.k.a. the Children's Ombudsman, is 
also responsible for social services generally, health and medical services, and education. 
The jurisdiction of Ombudsman 4 includes courts of law, tribunals, legal aid, guardianship, 
etc. 70 While the occupants of these f~ur roles have the power to initiate prosecutions of 
public officials who are charged with criminal acts, 71 they rarely do so and tend to operate 
more in an advisory and consultative manner 72 or issue what is an 'admonition' which has 
no binding effect on its recipient but can be circulated publicly. These four individuals have 
the authority to visit all manner of public facilities for inspection purposes and assess their 
operations. This authority also includes inspection of district courts and county 
administrative courts. 73 
In contrast to the current Swedish Ombudsman construction, it is also useful to 
know that an earlier version of the Ombuds role and a precursor to the JO was appointed 
to act in the role entitled 'Supreme Ombudsman' in Sweden in 1713 almost two hundred 
years earlier. 74 This Officer who was responsible for ensuring the government was 
operating properly in the King's absence was not established by legislation and reported to 
the King directly. Therefore, this configuration could be more accurately described, in 
modern parlance, as an example of the first 'hybrid'. or 'organizational' Ombudsman, 
70 
"The Ombudsmen"online: The Parliamentary Ombudsmen <http://www.jo.se>. 
71 
"Powers and Sanctions "online: The Parliamentary Ombudsmen <http://www.jo.se>. 
72 
"History'' online: The Parliamentary Ombudsmen <http://www.jo.se>. 
73 
"Inspections" online: The Parliamentary Ombudsmen <http://wwW.jo.se> 
74 Peter Haskins, The Ombudsman: An Approach for the Layman: A Survey and Discussion (Ottawa: Public Service 
Commission, 1966) at 4. 
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depending on the powers provided to that Ombudsman. Another view of how the first 
Ombudsman role came to be established in Sweden in 1713 was provided in an October 
2008 interview with Olli Rehn, the Member of the European Commission responsible for 
Enlargement. Mr. Rehn indicated that' the Ombudsman institution was actually created by 
the Ottoman empire and was brought to Sweden by King Charles after he spent time in 
Turkey.75 This may have been the 'Mohtasib' role referenced earlier. 
Apparently the Ombuds role lay fallow in Scandinavia, outside of Sweden, until 
1919 ·when Finland established a parliamentary Ombudsman after gaining its 
independence from Russia.76 Then, in 1954 the Danish ombudsman was established by 
Folketing (the Parliament of Denmark) and the highly respected Professor of Law, 
Stephan Hurwitz was elected to the position in 1955.77 Subsequently, the Norwegian 
government added an Ombudsman for reviewing public administration in 1962, based on 
the Danish model of operation, after having established an Ombudsman for military 
matters in 1952. 78 Of considerable import to Canada is the fact that in 1962, as observed 
earlier, the first common law country to establish an Ombudsman was the government of 
New Zealand and it did so following the Danish model of operation as opposed to following 
the Swedish model established in 1809. 79 It is opined by Lundvik that interest in Canada 
in the Ombuds' concept was stimulated by two political scientists, namely Hugh Thorburn 
of Queen's University and Donald C. Rowat of Carleton University who said they became 
aware of the Ombuds concept by following discussions about the possible creation of the 
75 Interview of Dr. Olli Rehn by Sel~uk GU>lta~ (18 October 2008) online: Today's Zaman <http://www.todayszaman.com>. 
76 Gill, supra, note 53 at 29. 
77 Stacey, supra note 40 at 18. 
78 Ibid. at 32. 
79 Lundvik, supra note 45 at 5. 
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role in Britain. 80 Rawat continued his engagement with the Om buds role by providing 
commentary on its proper construction and served as a life long advocate for the benefit of 
legislatively based Ombuds roles, particularly a federal Ombudsman of general 
jurisdiction, in Canada until his death in 2009. 
As noted earlier, in 1964, Sir Guy Powles, the first New Zealand Ombudsman, in 
addition to speaking to the CBA which resulted in that organization recommending the 
Ombuds role be studied for application in provincial and federal jurisdictions, also spoke to 
the Canadian Parliamentary 'Standing committee of Privileges and Elections' known as 
the Moreau Committee.81 Rawat and the Auditor-General at the time also spoke to the 
Committee and in 1965 the Moreau Committee recommended the establishment of a 
federal Ombudsman of general jurisdiction. In response, in the next Throne Speech then 
Prime Minister Pearson included a plan to appoint a Royal Commission to study the 
proposal. Sir Powles also spoke to the McRuer Commission in Ontario 82 about the 
efficacy of the New Zealand Ombudsman role. Interestingly enough, Harry Arthurs of 
Osgoode Hall Law School, was also cited as testifying to the McRuer Commission in 1965 
at which time he voiced support for a " ... massive Ombudsman-like organization of 
lawyers, political scientists and psychologists ... "83 which would be responsible for helping 
Ontarians who were having difficulty with provincial government departments. 8~ Given the 
interest developing in establishing some means for administrative oversight coupled with 
the timing of the establishment of the role in New Zealand, the first common law 
jurisdiction to establish the role, and the p~rsuasiveness of Mr. Powles' commentary, the 
80 Ibid. at 9. 
81 Stanley Anderson, supra note 32 at 30. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid at 18. 
84 Ibid. 
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New Zealand model was adopted in Canada. In 1966, Stanley Anderson stated that aside 
from New Zealand and Scandinavia; from a world wide perspective Canada had shown 
the greatest interest in the Ombudsman institution. In fact he referred to the level of activity 
observed as a 'crescehdo'.85 It is worthy of note that Frank Stacey also observed in 1978 
that in North America, Canadian jurisdictions had demonstra~~d the greatest zeal for 
establishing Ombuds offices.86 In fact, Patrick J. Smith also refers to the period from 1977 
to the time of writing of his paper in 2006 as the "Ombudsmania era".87 In contrast, from 
1969 - 1975 only four states, that is, Hawaii, Iowa, Nebraska and Alaska, in the United 
States of America had established Om buds roles of general jurisdiction, 88 while all 
provinces except Prince Edward Island 89 had done so or were in the process of doing so 
in Canada. Interestingly the Canadian constitutional principle of 'Peace, Order and Good 
Government' 90 (POGG) as set out in the Constitution Act in 1867 is also found in Section 
51 the Australian constitution now and the New Zealand constitution, formerly, thus 
sharing the constitutional expectation for POGG. Interestingly, by chance or by design, 
these jurisdictions are also very well populated with Ombuds roles. 91 
At this juncture in order to provide a foundation for further exploration of the theory 
and practice of ombuds activity, particularly as it relates to independence and impartiality, I 
85 Ibid. at 36. 
86 Stacey, supra note 40 at 51. 
87 Patrick J. Smith, "Taking the 'Mal' out of Administration: Administrative Justice in British Columbia - the OmbudsOffice 
@29, Going on 30" (Paper presented to the Ombudsman and the Democratic Deficit, Canadian Political Science Association 
Conference, Toronto, June 2006 [unpublished] online: Canadian Political Science Association < http://www.cpsa-aesp.ca>. 
88 Stacey, supra note 40 at 51. Today, there is only one other state that has since established an Ombuds of general 
jurisdiction and that is Arizona. 
89 The Liberal government in PEI included its intent to establish a provincial Ombudsman in its 2007 election campaign. As 
this election promise has not come to fruition to date, Cynthia Dunsford, a member of the Legislative Assembly, announced 
that she would be proposing a private member's bill to create a provincial Ombudsman as she believes that elected members 
of the legislature do not have the capacity to address the kinds of complaints raised by their constituents. See "PEI Member 
of the Legislature calls for creation of provincial ombudsman", online: The News Serving Pictou County (2007) 
<http://www.ngnews.ca/>. 
9° Constitution Act, C. 1867, Section 91. 
91 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, Section 51(as of 1997). 
39 
will delineate the evolution and current construction of what I consider to be the three 
primary models of Ombuds operating in Canada and how they came to be established. In 
my view, the models of practice in place include: 'classical/legislative/parliamentary', 
'hybrid', and 'organizational'. For ease of understanding, following a general description of 
how each model was created, I will use standard criteria to demonstrate how each of the 
three models fulfills their mandates. 
40 
Chapter 2: Ombuds Models 
The Classical/Legislative/Parliamentary Ombuds (Legislative Ombuds) 
The classical, legislative or parliamentary Ombuds92 is established by statute and 
operates at arms length from the establishing entity. It has a high degree of structural 
independence and a requirement for impartiality as well as having the authority and 
responsibility to maintain confidentiality. In addition, the legislative Ombuds has strong 
powers of investigation and the ability to determine what procedures and dispute 
resolution techniques it will use in implementing its mandate. Ultimately, when a 
determination is made that a complaint is valid, conclusions and recommendations are 
made rather than a binding directive being issued. 
In addition, it is important to recognize that a variety of supplementary mandates 
have been provided to some of the Ombuds of general jurisdiction established via statute 
in Canada. This contributes to the complexity associated with providing a concise, easily 
understandable definition of the Ombuds role. The idiosyncratic approaches taken by the · 
provincial and territorial legislatures which established these roles are illustrative of the 
unique construction of some governmental Ombuds roles even within this very specific 
frame of reference for Ombuds activity, that is, the Ombuds role established by legislation. 
For instance, in 1967 both the Alberta Ombudsman and New Brunswick Ombudsman 
were created93 with responsibility for general governmental administrative oversight. 
However, as result of additional legislative activity, the Ombudsman for New Brunswick 
took on a multiplicity of mandates. For instance, until April 2011 this Ombudsman was also 
92 Please note that when I am describing Ombuds established by legislation the entities which are included are those bodies 
which do not have power of prosecution or enforcement and do not serve a regulatory, disciplinary or compliance function 
consistent with the foundational principles of the Danish Ombudsman model as originally established in Canada. 
93 Stacey, supra note 40 at 51. It is noteworthy that Joe Loran, current Deputy Ombudsman for the province of Alberta 
indicated in a speech on June 6, 2012 in Edmonton, Alberta at the Association of Canadian College and University 
Ombudspersons that when the Alberta Ombudsman role was established there were only ten Ombudsman roles in existence 
world wide. 
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the Child and Youth Advocate;94 and had the responsibility to review decisions made by 
government with respect to the protection of personal information95 until an Access to 
Information and Privacy Commissioner was recently established. The New Brunswick 
Ombudsman is also responsible for complaints related to the provincial archives96 and is 
empowered to review civil service employee appointments.97 Next, in 1968 the Le 
Protecteur du Citoyen/ Quebec Ombudsman was enacted 98 and in 2001 the mandate of 
the Health and Social Services Ombudsman was incorporated into that of the Protecteur 
du Cityoen. 99 In 1969 the Nova Scotia Ombudsman 100 and the Manitoba Ombudsman 101 
were established. However, while the Manitoba Ombudsman was originally established 
with responsibility for administrative oversight of general jurisdiction only, from 1988 - 1997 
the Office also became responsible for complaints related to the implementation of the 
Freedom of Information Act M.1988. 102 As of 1997, re·sponsibility for complaints related to 
the administration of the Personal Health Information Act, M.1997 and the Freedom of 
. Information and Protection of Privacy Act, M.1997103 followed. In 1973 the Saskatchewan 
Ombudsman 104 was established followed by the Ontario Ombudsman in 1975105 with the 
most restricted mandate of any Ombuds of general jurisdiction in Canada as is evidenced 
94 See the Child and Youth Advocate Act, N.B. 2007. In other jurisdictions, this function is typically a stand-alone entity. 
95 See Right to Information Act N.B. 2001 and the Protection of Personal Information Act N.B. 2001 and Stewart Hyson, ed., 
Provincial and Territorial Ombudsman Offices in Canada {Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009) at 106. 
96 See 1997 Archives Act, N.B. 1997 
97 See Civil Service Act, N.B.1994. 
98 Stacey, supra note 40 at 51. 
99 
"History" Le Protecteur du citoyen!The Quebec Ombudsman online: <http://www.protecteurducitoyen.ac.ca>. 
100 Stacey, supra note 40 at 45. For a short period of time in the 1990's the Nova Scotia was also required to serve as the 
Human Rights Commissioner due to fiscal woes. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Hyson, supra note 95 at 83. 
103 The function of oversight of Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy legislation is performed by separate 
Commissioners in other provinces. 
104 Stacey, supra note 40 at 51. 
105 Ibid. 
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in the comparative chart prepared by the current Ombudsman for Ontario 106 as part of his 
lobbying efforts to expand his jurisdiction to include municipalities, universities, social 
services and hospitals (MUSH). The following chart demonstrates at a granular level, both 
the differences and similarities in the provincial and territorial Ombuds' of general 
jurisdiction mandates in relation to MUSH. 
106 
"The Push for Mush" (7 June 2011 ), online: Ombudsman Ontario <http://www.ombudsman.on.ca>. 
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Table 1: Summary of Jurisdiction of Legislated Ombuds of General Jurisdiction in 
Canada in the areas of Municipalities. Universities. Social Services and Hospitals (MUSH) 
a.k.a 'The Push for Mush' 
Ill 
~ Ill Ill 
... c c Ill e u 111 J!? E :! 0 0 ~~ n; n; c Ill Ill~ u == g>c;; ~ ~ .!!! Q. ·n; 3:: ·c: "i!? Province/ 'O nl u u 
·- Q. ·-Cl) -== 
·c:; Cl) c. Cl) nl Cl) 
... u 'O Cl)·- l!!e-g>e= ·c: ~ E ·:;: -5 =o~ - Ill > Territory nl :I .c 0 0 'O .c ... Cl) ~'I. ::::ioons~ :I 0 0 Cl) Cl) ·c: Ombudsperson/man mw (.) ll.. (/) z 'I. ...J (.) u. ::!: a. (.) a: ::!: :::> 
Alberta (AB) No Yes Yes101 Yes1oa No Yes No 
British Columbia (BC) Yes Yes Yes109 Yes Yes No Yes 
Manitoba (MB) No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes110 No 
New Brunswick (NB) Yes Yes111 Yes112 No Yes Yes113 No 
Newfoundland & Labrador Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Nova Scotia Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Ontario No No No No No114 No No 
Quebec No Yes11s Yes Yes No Yes No 
Saskatchewan No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 
Yukon Yes Yes Yes Yes By No111 No 
reference 116 
Please note that this chart is configured somewhat differently than the original entitled "The Push for Mush" 118 
amended June 2011 in that the jurisdictions are ordered alphabetically for ease of reading and acronyms have 
been used in the footnotes rather than repeating the name of the province or territory in full. 
101 The AB Ombudsman has jurisidiction to investigate complaints about the patient concerns resolution processes of 
hospitals. 
108 The AB Ombudsman has jurisidiction to investigate complaints about the patient concerns resolution processes of L TC 
facilities and nursing homes. 
109 The BC Ombudsperson has jurisdiction over regional health boards and regional hospital districts. 
110 The MB the Ombudsman's jurisdiction over police, which are municipal, flows from her jurisdiction over municipalities. The 
Ombudsman also has jurisdiction over the Law Enforcement Agency (LERA) which is part of the Justice Department. 
111 The NB Ombudsman is prevented from investigating a matter that is or has been investigated or reviewed by the the 
Office of the Child and Youth Advocate. The NB Ombudsman is also the Child and Youth Advocate. 
112 The NB Ombudsman has jurisdiction over Regional Health Authorities, which operate, own and dispense all services in 
hospitals. 
113 The NB Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the NB Police Commission. The Commission is not included in the Schedule to 
The Ombudsman Act, but the Ombudsman has a working agreement with the Commission allowing them to review 
Commission files. 
114 The Ombudsman can investigate some municipal closed meetings. 
115 Le Protecteur du citoyen has some jurisdiction over administrative procedural matters relating to child protection services 
provided for by the directors of youth protection. 
116 A municipality or Yukon First Nation government may at any time refer a matter to the Ombudsman for investigation and 
report. 
117 The only police force operating in the Yukon is the RCMP, a federal body. 
118 Ombudsman Ontario, supra note 106. 
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In 1975, the same year that the Ombudsman for Ontario was created, the 
Newfoundland and Labrador Parliamentary Commissioner was finally established after the 
underlying legislation being passed in 1970119 with broad jurisdiction that included 
universities, social services and hospitals but not municipalities. However, in 1990 after 
such a strong beginning, the Newfoundland and Labrador government de-commissioned 
the Office due to a change in political philosophy. The Premier at the time held the view 
that the Ombudsman was an unnecessary exp~nse as he believed Members of the House 
of Assembly should be serving as Ombudsmen. 120 This belief is intriguing given that 
elected politicians are by definition partisan and do not necessarily come equipped with 
the requisite dispute resolution and investigative skills nor do they necessarily have the 
staff resources required to resolve complaints fairly and expeditiously. Subsequently, in 
2002, the role was re-established under the name of the Citizens' Representative for 
Newfoundland and Labrador and a second responsibility was added via the House of 
Assembly Accountability, Integrity and Administration Act that provides for the Citizens' 
Representative to investigate gross mismanagement within the confines of the House of 
Assembly (the legislature). 121 Interestingly, the Citizens' Representative requested in 2010, 
after consultation with public representatives, his own staff and citizens of the province, 
that the Legislative Assembly change the name from 'Citizen's Representative' to 
Ombudsman' so the role of the Office would be more accurately identified. 122 To date, this 
change has not been made. 
119 Stacey, supra note 40 at 45. 
120 Bradley Moss, "Expedition Sailors: The Ombudsman in Newfoundland and Labrador" in Stewart Hyson, ed., Provincial and 
Territorial Ombudsman Offices in. Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009) 126 at 128. 
121 
"Review of the Governing Legislation of the Office of the Citizens' Representative" (March 2010) at 3, online: Citizen's 
Representative of Newfoundland and Labrador <http://www.citizensrep.nl.ca>. 
122 Ibid. at 4. 
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In 1977 the British Columbia Ombudsman for general governmental administrative 
oversight was created. 123 Lastly, the most recent addition to the governmental Ombuds of 
general jurisdiction was established by statute iii 1996 as the Yukon Territory 
Ombudsman. However, in this instance, the part-time role was designed to be dual 
purpose and included the responsibility of the Freedom of Information and Privacy 
Commissioner as well. 124 Presumably this approach was taken given the small population 
size of the jurisdiction, which was identified as 27,797 in 1991 and 30,776 in.1996. 125 
Both Frank Stacey 126 and Donald C. Rawat, 127 agreed that all of the Canadian 
provincial offices were established using the New Zealand model. In particular, Rawat 
articulated such foundational characteristics as: any person held in a prison or mental 
health facility has the right to have his or her written sealed complaint delivered to the 
Ombudsman unopened; the Ombudsman Office should be a place of last resort and 
investigations may not be undertaken until all available appeal routes (except for litigation 
via the judicial system) have been exhausted and, the. Ombudsman may not review 
decisions issued by a court. This final characteristic as noted previously deviates from the 
Swedish (as well as the Finnish and Polish) model of ombudsman statutes which provide 
for oversight of courts 128 in the same fashion as the usual oversight of governmental 
administrative activities. 129 However, it is important to note that while the Swedish and 
123 Patrick J. Smith "Fairness Inc.: Administrative Justice in B.C. -The Ombudsman Office at Thirty" in Stewart Hyson, ed., 
Provincial and Territorial Ombudsman Offices in Canada, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009) 53 at 53. Please note 
that as of 2009, the B.C. Ombuds role is now officially recognized via legislative amendment as the British Columbia 
Ombudsperson in The Ombudsperson Act, R.S. B.C. 1996 c. 340. 
124 The Ombudsman Act, Yukon Territory was made effective in 1996. online: <http://www.ombudsman.yk.ca/>. 
125 Statistics Canada, "Population, urban and rural, by province and territory (Yukon)", online: Statistics Canada 
<http://statcan.qc.ca>. 
126 Stacey, supra note 40 at 52. 
127 Donald C. Rowat, The Ombudsman Plan: The Worldwide Spread of An Idea (University Press of America: Boston, 1985) 
at 33. 
128 Gabriel Kucsko-Stadlmayer, European Ombudsman-Institutions: a comparative legal analysis regarding the multifaceted 
realisation of an idea, (Springer: Wein; New York, 2008) at 27. 
129 
"About the Parliamentary Ombudsmen", online: The Parliamentary Ombudsmen <http://www.jo.se>. 
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Finnish Ombudsman legislation allow for intervention in court proceedings even to the 
extent of contacting judges to acquire both substantive and procedural information on 
cases being reviewed, as well as having the authority to impose penalties for lack of 
cooperation, current Swedish Ombudsmen responsible for judicial oversight have 
voluntarily limited their reviews to matters of procedure in an effort to demonstrate respect 
for the independence of the judiciary. 130 Interestingly enough, by comparison, the Finnish 
Ombudsman, still reviews jurisprudence for inappropriate ex~rcise of judicial discretion. 131 
In 1992 Rawat called for the inclusion of judicial oversight as the way of the future 
for Canada as has been practiced by Swedish and Finnish Ombudsman, in different ways, 
since the inception of their roles. 132 This recommendation, though, has been rebutted by at 
least one legal scholar, T.J. Christian who argued that the Canadian constitution would not 
allow for such activity. 133 However, Stephen Owen who is both a respected legal scholar, 
former Deputy Attorney-General for the province of British Columbia, and a former federal 
Member of Parliament, in addition to having served as the British Columbia Ombudsman, 
has opined that the establishment of an Om buds via legislation with circumscribed 
supervision over the judiciary would not compromise judicial independence as oversight 
would be limited. 134 Owen also observed that Canadian Ombuds in .many jurisdictions 
already have oversight of police, prosecutors, probation and parole officers, court staff, 
registrars, prison officials and also review decisions of administrative tribunals. In future, 
he suggests that a beneficial evolution of Ombuds oversight would be to expand 
13° Kucsko-Stadlmaye.r, supra note 128 at 26. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Donald C. Rawat, 'Why An Ombudsman to Supervise the Courts? (1992) 10 The Ombudsman Journal in Linda C. Reif, 
ed., The International Ombudsman Anthology: Selected Writings from the International Ombudsman Institute, (Cambridge: 
Kluwer Law International, 1999) at 527. 
133 T.J. Christian, T.J. 'Why No Ombudsman to Supervise the Courts in Canada?" (1995) The Ombudsman Concept, in LC. 
Reif, ed., The International Ombudsman Antholopgy: Selected Writings from the International Ombudsman Institute, 
(Cambridge: Kluwer Law International, 1999) 539. 
134 Stephen Owen, 'Why We Need a Federal Ombudsman" (1992) Policy Options, 13 (6) at 4. 
47 
jurisdiction to include the conduct of judges (as distinct from their decisions) or the review 
of decisions of judicial councils if complainants felt inaction on the part of the council was 
unacceptable. 135 Since an Ombuds of general jurisdiction has not yet been established for 
the oversight of federal government administration in Canada, the discussion about 
whether or not the Canadian constitution allows for judicial oversight has not been initiated 
on a broader scale. 
It is worthwhile to look at what happened, or stated more precisely, what didn't 
happen with respect to the establishment of an Ombuds of general jurisdiction for Canada 
at a federal level. If any of the following attempts had come to fruition one can now easily 
see how differently organized administrative oversight for federal government activities 
might be now. For example, in 1960, a Member of Parliament, Douglas Fisher, proposed a 
resolution asking the government to consider establishing an office of redress for 
administrative grievances from citizens based on the Scandinavian model of 
Ombudsman. 136 Following this initiative, as early as 1963 a more robust proposal was 
made via a Royal Commission lead by J. Grant Glassco 137 reporting on how the federal 
government should be organized on a more general basis which also recommended that a 
Parliamentary Commissioner founded on the ombudsman model as established in 
Sweden be put in place. 138 Following the Glassco report, the Standing Committee on 
Privileges arid Elections in 1965 after scrutinizing Bill C-7 entitled Act to Establish the 
Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner recommended that an Ombudsman be 
established for the purpose of receiving complaints from the public about government 
135 Ibid. 
136 Lundvik, supra note 45 at 11 and Stanley Anderson, supra note 32 at 27. 
137 Lundvik, ibid. at 12; Philip Rosen, 'The Ombudsman, The Legislature, and Legislators", Background Paper for 
Parliamentarians, June 1978, Library of Parliament at 25; Friedmann, supra note 46 at 12 
138 Rosen, ibid. 
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actions. The Committee also went a step further to recommend that each province should 
be 'urged' to establish the same type of role in their jurisdiction. 139 It appears that no 
further action was taken by the federal government relative to these recommendations at 
that juncture. 
Thirteen different private members' bills were introduced between 1962 and 1976 
for the purpose of establishing a national Ombudsman without any success. 140 This flurry 
of activity at a federal level may also be the reason Smith opined that a wave of 
'ombudsmania' was developing within Canada. 141 However, no federal ombudsman 
institution of general jurisdiction came into being as a result of these initiatives. Then, in 
1976, initiated by then Prime Minister, Pierre Trudeau, another effort of significant 
proportion was directed to studying the notion of a federal Ombudsman of general 
jurisdiction. A group of senior federal bureaucrats, the majority of whom were Deputy 
Ministers, was assembled to study the concept and make a recommendation. The 
resulting recommendations delivered in 1977 by Deputy Minister John Love, posited the 
creation of a federal Ombudsman of general jurisdiction, based on the New Zealand 
model, established as an Officer of Parliament, with the power to address all manner of 
complaints about administrative actions. 142 This report appears to have been accepted by 
the Prime Minister and the Liberal Party as .the idea of a federal Ombudsman was 
introduced to the country in 1977 via the Throne Speech and proposed legislation for 
establishing a federal Ombudsman was identified as Bill C-43. This proposal was based 
on the recommendations made in the previously described report and was introduced by 
139 Ibid. at 26. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Smith, supra note 87. 
142 J.D. Love, Chairman of the Committee on the Concept of the Ombudsman, "Report of the Committee of the Concept of 
the Ombudsman" Ottawa, Government of Canada, 1977. This is a 69 page report providing a detailed analysis and 
recommendations on jurisdiction, methodologies for establishment and operation of the proposed Office of the Ombudsman. 
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the Justice Minister of the time, Ron Basford, in the spring of 1978. However, this bill did 
not make it off the Order Paper. Apparently the government indicated its commitment to 
continue with this legislation in its subsequent 1978 Throne Speech but then walked away 
from it shortly thereafter for fiscal reasons. 143 
Interestingly enough, Karl Friedmann, Ombudsman for the province of British 
Columbia at that time, and A.G. Milne, who was affiliated with Magdalen College at 
Oxford, examined Bill C-43 and found it wanting in many areas. They described it as " ... an 
exceedingly narrow, rigid and subservient conception ... " 144 resulting in what these critics 
considered to be a "third rate Ombudsman". 145 Hence, these authors weighed in with 
many changes to provide for a greater degree of de jure independence and ironically given 
our current understanding of the importance of self-reflection and self-discipline for the 
maintenance of an impartial and independent Office, argued for less emphasis and 
dependence on the personal and stellar qualities of the appointee. They also 
recommended a greater degree of informality in the implementation of the mandate and a 
more expansive approach to jurisdiction along with the ability to comment on policy while 
maintaining the normal authority for investigating administrative activity. 
Yet another attempt was made in 1989 and 1990 when Kim Campbell, former 
Minister of Justice and Attorney General and Minister of Defence and briefly, the Prime 
Minister of Canada, asked Stephen Owen, former Ombudsman for British Columbia, to 
prepare a model for a federal Ombudsman. The model he developed was then included in 
Ms. Campbell's policy promises for the 1993 election. However, as Ms. Campbell's 
143 K.A. Friedmann and A.G. Milne "The Federal Ombudsman Legislation: A Critique of Bill C-43Canadian Public Policy Vol.6, 
No.1, Winter, 1980 63 at 64. Philip Rosen's, (supra note 137) description of what happened with the attempted passage of 




government was defeated and she lost her own seat, the policy never became law. 146 One 
of the key features of Mr. Owen's proposal was the opportunity its establishment would 
provide to reduce duplication of effort, confusion and costs for the various Commissioners 
(also known as Officers of the Legislature) themselves, the agencies responding to their 
inquiries, the legislature and the public. For example, he proposed an umbrella approach 
whereby the federal Ombudsman, who would have general jurisdiction of all federal 
administrative matters, would also serve a coordinating function in relation to the 
Parliamentary Officers with solo jurisdictions. 147 In his oral presentation Mr. Owen 
indicated each of these Officers would become a Deputy Ombudsman. 1-48 This kind of 
construction would have allowed for a high concentration of both specialized and 
generalized oversight expertise in one independent body. It was also suggested that in 
order to increase efficiency, arrangements would be made, where appropriate and with the 
agreement of the provincial Ombudsman, to delegate the jurisdiction of the federal 
Ombudsman, so as to reduce the start up costs; to provide complainants with easier 
geographical access; and to allow for the efficient handling of complaints that related to a 
number of different levels of government. As well, the model included the establishment of 
a Director of Accountability for each public body that reported to the Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) of the organization and liaised with the Ombudsman. The individual in this 
position would be responsible for contributing to an ethos of fairness throughout the 
organization with the ultimate objective being that the agency or department would deal 
with complaints first and in so doing, learn what areas of unfairness were causing concern 
146 Stephen Owen, "A Proliferation of Ombudsman: Good, Bad or Ugly'' (Keynote Address delivered at the Forum of 
Canadian Ombudsman Conference/Association of Canadian College and University Ombudspersons Conference, 
Vancouver, 17 May 2011) [unpublished]. 
147 Owen, supra note 134 at 4. 
146 0wen, supra note 146. 
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so they could be corrected without the Ombudsman's involvement. In the event the 
complainant was not satisfied with the agency's review and any action taken, the 
complaint could then be investigated by the Ombudsman. 149 
The foregoing exploration demonstrates how the legislative Ombuds roles of 
general jurisdiction were initially established in Canada and why the New Zealand model 
was the chosen by the 'early adopter' provinces in the 1960s and 70s. It is also evident 
that the original model of general jurisdi_ction mutated as time went on to include various 
specialized functions under one entity at some provincial and one territorial levels. 
Interestingly enough, Britain was exploring the concept at the same time as the first 
provincial Ombuds roles were legislated in Canada but as that government engaged in an 
extensive and lengthy consultation process, the British equivalent - Parliamentary 
Commissioner for Administration - was not legislated until 1967.150 As a result, at the time 
of the first indication of interest in Ombuds roles by political scientists in Canada, there 
was no established British model to follow. Ultimately, the British model adopted was that 
of a Parliamentary Commissioner of a more specialized nature that initially was only· 
allowed to accept complaints via Members of Parliament (MP) acting on behalf of their 
constituents. It appears the rationale for requiring the MP's involvement was to ensure 
passage of the bill as it was recognized that without including the MP's direct involvement 
in bringing compla_ints forward to the Commissioner on behalf of constituents the bill itself 
would never have been supported. 151 It is striking how limiting that kind of Ombuds model 
was as it is readily evident that citizens could easily be concerned about whether 
149 0wen, supra, note 134at127. 
150 Gregory Roy & Peter Hutchesson, The Parliamentary Ombudsman A Study in the Control of Administrative Action 
(London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1975) at 87; Charles Ablard, "The Parliamentary commissioner: the ombudsman for 
Parliament" (1987) The International Ombudsman Institute: Occasional Paper #40 June at 4. 
151 Ibid. at 93. 
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partisanship would influence how their complaint was reviewed if they could only submit it 
through their MP. In addition, those who did have confidence in and/or the ability to access 
their MP would also have to be comfortable with having the details ofthe outcome of the 
review of the complaint shared as well, as the Parliamentary Commissioner was required 
to report back in writing on the disposition of the complaint to the MP. As a result, the 
records show that it didn't take long for people to start approaching the Commissioner 
directly.152 In addition, in the U.K., respondents can not only challenge the legislative 
Ombuds' jurisdiction, as is the case in Canada, but can also litigate conclusions and 
recommendations, and more recently, complainants are also using the judicial system to 
challenge the Ombuds findings or a refusal to take up a complaint. 153 Seneviratne 
comments on how this evolution is problematic as it militates against the essence of the 
Ombuds role which is to provide easy access to administrative redress through its flexible 
and informal approaches.154 Similarly, one can only imagine how differently organized 
Canadian Ombuds institutions would be if a federal Ombudsman based on the original 
Swedish model, that is, including judicial oversight and prosecutorial powers, or if the 
Owen model h_ad been acted on and all independent officers of the legislature were rolled 
into one major oversight body or if the British model had been adopted in Canada. Not 
surprisingly, given that there has been no central design in force, the current Ombuds 
landscape is a bit of a patchwork but perhaps also representative of an approach that is 
distinctive to Canada, given the regional differentiation and customization that is so much 
the norm in the Canadian confederation. 
152 Ibid. 
153 Seneviratne, supra note 33 at 314. 
154 Ibid. 
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As my intent is to provide an accurate and complete overview of the Canadian 
Ombuds institution it is also instructive to know that the first Ombudsman for the province 
of New Brunswick, Ross Flemington, suggested the following characterization to the BC 
Human Rights Council in an address on the role of the Canadian Ombudsman: "Let's 
accept the definition that the Ombudsman is an independent and politically neutral officer 
of the Legislature". 155 This broad definition would therefore include the federal, provincial 
and territorial Auditors General, Integrity Commissioners, and Information and Privacy 
Commissioners, Language Commissioners, Police Commissioners, Environmental 
Commissioners, Chief Electoral Officers, etc. as Ombuds. However, it is noteworthy in this 
regard that the Supreme Court stated unequ.ivocally in The Auditor General of Canada v. 
The Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources, the Minister of Finance, the Deputy 
Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources, and the Deputy Minister of Finance Canada 
(Min. of Energy, Mines & Resources)156 that the Auditor General is not an ombudsperson 
by stating: 
While acknowledging that the Auditor General fulfills a crucial function in the 
sphere of public accountability and thereby enhances our democratic system, 
the Auditor General does not play the same role as does an ombudsperson as 
protector of citizens against administrative abuse. 
This commentary illustrates that the Supreme Court in 1989 made a conscious decision 
to demonstrate the distinctive nature of these two roles even though both are Officers of 
the Legislature. In an earlier attempt to demonstrate what is an Ombuds role and what 
is not, the drafters of the aforementioned Love Commission report, which recommended 
the establishment of a federal Ombudsman, took the position that the Privacy 
155 
"Ombudsmen in Canada" Proceedings of the Conference on Ombudsman "Let Justice Be seen To be Done" (Vancouver: 
British Columbia Human Rights Council, March 1970) at 22. 
156 The Auditor General of Canada v. The Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources, the Minister of Finance, the Deputy 
Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources, and the Deputy Minister of Finance Canada (Min. of Energy, Mines & Resources) ' 
[1989] SC.J. No. 80 at 75. 
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Commissioner and the then 'in development' Information Commissioner fulfilled 
ombudsman-type roles and should be folded in under the umbrella of the Ombudsman 
of general jurisdiction. However, it is worthy of note that the Commissioner of Official 
Languages was specifically excluded from Love's model for a federal Ombudsman as it 
was determined that this Commissioner was not restricted to only dealing with the 
implementation of legislation. 157 Interestingly enough, Yvan Gagnon did an assessment 
· of the Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages (COL) a few years later in 1979 
to determine if this Commissioner, and presumably, by extension, other specialized 
Commissioners, should be properly identified as ombudsmen. He determined by 
comparing the structure and powers of the COL to the standard definition of a classical 
Ombudsman that the COL " ... to a considerable degree, both possesses the main 
characteristics of and performs the normal functions of any other ombudsman" .158 
However, Gagnon went on to say that since the scope of the Commissioner's mandate 
is limited to one piece of legislation it would be more accurate to refer to him as a 
linguistic ombudsman 159 and then· further refined this distinction to conclude that the 
term 'monojurisdictional' 160 would ultimately be a better identifier for this type of role. 
However, Ombudsman scholars Mary Marshall and Linda Reif refer to specialized or 
mono-jurisdictional Ombuds as " ... attenuated ombudsman-like institutions". 161 To be 
attenuated is not necessarily a complimentary adjective in this context as it means "to 
weaken or reduce in force, intensity, effect, quantity, or value". 162 The Oxford English 
157 Love, supra note 142 at 36. 
158 Yvan Gagnon, "Canada's Language Ombudsman: An Assessment of the Innovative Characteristics of the Office" 
Occasional Paper #3 (Occasional Paper Series: The International Ombudsman Institute, July 1979) at 10. 
159 Ibid. 
160 Ibid. at 6. 
161 Mary A. Marshall and Linda C. Reif, "The Ombudsman: Maladministration and Alternative Dispute Resolution" (1995-
1996) 34 Alta L. Review at 231. 
162 Dictionary.com online: <http://dictionarv.reference.com/browse/attenuated>, s.v. "attenuated". 
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Dictionary provides a similar definition in that it also emphasizes " ... the reduction of 
strength, effect or value" .163 Marshall and Reif's terminology suggests that this type of 
Office is therefore not as forceful°, effective or valuable as an Ombuds role established 
for oversight of general administration. I take umbrage with that characterization and 
would suggest, instead, that it is more accurate to describe Commissioners of this 
nature as performing an 'ombuds-like function'. ·Initially it might be said that they operate 
in their specific sphere using an Ombuds model, in that they receive complaints, engage 
in mediation and conciliatory processes and/or investigate whether or not the 
complaints are valid, but they do so only in relation to specified pieces of legislation. As 
well, while some Commissioners only have the power to recommend and have no 
further recourse if the government chooses not to implement the recommendations, the 
Commissioner of Official Languages can apply to Court for a remedy if the government 
does not act on his recommendations. Similarly, the federal Privacy Commissioner can 
assist complainants to litigate their complaints if the government body does not accept 
the Privacy Commissioner's recommendation. The capacity to appeal to federal court to 
enforce a recommendation under the PIPEDA regime or to assist a complainant to seek 
judicial review via the Privacy Act 164 is a dramatic deviation from the aforementioned 
Ombuds role of the 'master persuader'165 who relies on the quality of her investigation, 
conclusions and recommendations and/or the ability to articulate her concerns publicly 
as opposed to having the power of enforcement. As noted previously, all Ombuds of 
general jurisdiction in Canada, and in most developed countries, only have the power to 
· recommend. To include roles that hold some degree of enforcement capacity would add 
163 AskOxford.com online: <http://askoxford.com/concise oed>, s.v. "attenuate". 
164 Stoddart, supra note 36 at 10. 
165 Roberta Jamieson, "Alternative Dispute Resolution" Linda Reif, ed., The Ombudsman Concept (Edmonton:lnternational 
Ombudsman Institute, 1995) at 619. 
56 
another significant and I would argue, incongruent dimension to this already complex 
and often misunderstood role. In addition, many hybrid and organizational Ombuds 
deliberately highlight in their promotional literature that they are not an office of notice or 
of compliance for the institution, department or orga_nization about which they receive 
conwlaints. Clearly, language and privacy Commissioners are compliance officers 166 
with respect to a specific piece of legislation. Hence, the potential for further confusion 
as to 'what is an Ombuds' is increased and perhaps even exacerbated by the 
specialized Commissioner with strong powers of enforcement being included in the mix. 
It must also be acknowledged that some provincial and one territorial Ombudsman also 
serve as Information and Privacy Commissioners as well as having overall oversight for 
government administration. In these instances, their offices are organized and identified 
as two separate entities 167 in comparison to the stand alone, specialized commissions 
created for investigation of violations of particular pieces of legislation and with varying 
degrees of enforcement capacity. A further complication, though, must also be 
mentioned. As was identified earlier through the discussion of the evolution of the 
classical or parliamentary Ombuds role there are differing points of view as to whether 
the federal Privacy Commissioner or the Commissioner for Official Languages should 
be identified as Ombuds. 
Rather than this question being seen as a semantic debate or an esoteric 
discourse a major concern that has arisen with respect to the naming of the specialized 
Commissioner as an Ombudsman is so significant that it deserves its own explanation and 
analysis. As has been identified earlier on a number of occasions, the confidentiality of 
166 Sossin & Houle, supra note 37 at 112. 
167 Even with the separation described above, it is apparent that great effort is made by the incumbents and their offices to 
demonstrate the differences between the two roles by issuing separate annual reports and having two separate websites 
specific to each function. 
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complainants' identities and the information garnered when making inquiries and 
investigations is imbedded in Ombuds' statutes and stipulated in terms of reference and 
policy and is considered an essential element or characteristic of the Ombuds role. 
However, a major incursion into the confidentiality of Ombuds investigations was found in 
Lavigne 168 a 2002 Supreme Court decision involving not only the Commissioner of Official 
·Languages (COL) but also the Privacy Commissioner of Canada. This situation arose 
when Robert Lavigne, a federal public servant who worked for the former Department of 
National Health and Welfare (the department), complained to OCOL as he felt forced to 
use French. He alleged his rights with regard to the language he used at his work place 
and his opportunities for other employment and for promotion had been violated. When 
the OCOL investigators were conducting interviews in order to assess his claim they found 
that some employees did not want to provide information as they feared reprisal from the 
respondent. In order to get their cooperation the investigators assured the potential 
interviewees that their input would be held in confidence to the limits prescribed by the 
Official Languages Act. The investigators found that Lavigne's complaints were valid and 
the Department agreed to implement the COL's recommendations. While the 
investigation was being conducted Lavigne requested disclosure from COL of all of his 
personal information held in the files on the complaints under review. The information 
requested was provided except for the information provided by some employees which 
was acquired through the COL investigation. The disclosure of this information was 
refused on the basis that the Commissioner believed that to release it could have a 
negative impact on the conduct of its investigations. Lavigne then filed a complaint with the 
Privacy Commissioner and through mediation some of the interviewees agreed to have 
168 Lavigne v. Canada (Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages) and The Commissioner of Official Language v. 
Lavigne and the Privacy Commissioner of Canada. [2002) S. C.J. No. 55 (QL). 
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the investigators' notes on their views and opinions of the respondent released to him. The 
Privacy Commissioner agreed with COL that the information obtained from interviewees 
who wanted the information they provided to the investigators kept confidential should be 
exempted. Lavigne then sought judicial review of this decision and indicated that he was 
now only requesting the notes taken in the COL interview with his supervisor. The Federal 
Court, Trial Division ordered disclosure of the personal information requested and denied 
the non-personal information. The Federal Court of Appeal affirmed that decision. This 
decision was app~aled to the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) to determine whether the 
disclosure of the information sought by Lavigne could reasonably be expected to be 
injurious to the conduct of lawful investigations. The SCC dismissed the complaint by the 
COL as it determined that he had not exercised his discretion properly. The COL argued, 
on a general basis, that if OCOL investigations were not confidential this would 
compromise its work. The sec was of the view that the COL had to make his 
determination as to whether or not interview notes should be released on a case-by-case 
basis. This determination runs contrary to the notion that has been established with those 
provincial and territorial Ombuds of general jurisdiction whose enabling legislation 
exempts them from complying with freedom of information and privacy legislation and 
which also provides immunity from being called to testify or produce documents about 
information collected while investigating a complaint. For example, the British Columbia 
Ombudsperson legislation states explicitly: 
The Ombudsperson or a person holding an office or appointment under the 
Ombudsperson must not give or be compelled to give evidence in a court or 
in proceedings of a judicial nature in respect of anything coming to his or her 
knowledge in the exercise of duties under this Act, except (a) to enforce the 
Ombudsperson's powers of investigation, (b) to enforce compliance with this 
·Act; or (c) with respect to a trial of a person for perjury. 169 
169 The Ombudsperson Act, RS. B.C. 1996 c. 340, s. 9(5). 
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Also, the province of Quebec amended its Cities and Towns Act in 2006 not only to re-
affirm the expansiveness of the investigative authority of Ombuds for municipalities but 
also to ensure the confidentiality of their files was protected. 170 
Similarly, it must be emphasized that the majority of hybrid and organizational 
Ombuds Offices, which by definition are not established by legislation, assert that all of 
their communications are confidential and their terms of reference or policy frameworks 
specify that their records may not be reviewed by anyone other than the Ombuds and 
staff. Furthermore, those Ombuds who abide by the Code of Ethics for the International 
Ombudsman Association operate on the following premise with respect to confidentiality: 
The Ombudsman holds all communications with those seeking assistance in strict 
confidence, and does not disclose confidential communications unless given 
permission to do so. The only exception to this privilege of confidentiality is where 
there appears to be imminent risk of serious harm.171 
Similarly, in the Standards of Practice for the International Ombudsman 
Association it is also stated that: 
Communications between the Ombudsman and others (made while the 
Ombudsman is serving in that capacity) are considered privileged. The privilege 
belongs to the Ombudsman and the Ombudsman Office, rather than to any party 
to an issue. Others cannot waive this privilege. 172 
This expectation is supplemented by a 'best practice' approach that states the following: 
3.3 The Ombudsman does not testify in any formal process inside the organization 
and resists testifying in any formal process outside of the organization regarding a 
visitor's contact with or confidential information communicated to the Ombudsman, 
even if given permission or requested to do so. 173 
11
° Cities and Towns Act R.S.Q. c.19. 
171 International Ombudsman Association, "Code of Ethics"( January 2007) online: International Ombudsman Association 
<http://www.ombudsassociation.ora>. 
172 International Ombudsman Association, "IOA Standards of Practice" (October 2009) online: 
International Ombudsman Association <http://www.ombudsassociation.org>. 
173 International Ombudsman Association, "IOA Best Practices, A Supplement to IOA's Standards of Practice"(October 13, 
2009) online: International Ombudsman Association <http://www.ombudsassociation.ora>. 
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However, in Lavigne it was indicated that the COL and the Privacy Commissioner 
are actually fulfilling the role of an 'Ombudsman' by stating: "In many significant respects, 
the mandates of the Commissioner of Official Languages and the Privacy Commissioner 
are in the nature of an ombudsman's role" .174 Further, Gonthier specifically provides one 
example from Marshall and Reif who stated that Ombudsman "As a rule, they may not 
disclose information they receive" .175 However, in direct opposition to the expectation for 
confidentiality of all Ombuds' communications and work product, in the final analysis, the 
SCC judgment was that, while in certain instances the COL could legitimately determine 
that disclosure of personal information would be injurious to the conduct of an 
investigation, given the intersection of the Privacy Act and the Official Languages Act, the 
COL could not defend blanket confidentiality or argue for it on a general basis. The sec 
view was that the COL had to defend why in a particular case he should be able to protect 
his investigators' notes. This outcome is problematic for hybrid and organizational 
Ombuds whose confidentiality is not already protected by legislation. If the COL had not 
been specifically described by the SCC as fulfilling an Ombudsman role, the outcome of 
this case would not be so important to the individuals who make use of non-legislated 
Ombuds roles, and those who respond to this type of Ombuds queries given they do not 
enjoy confidentiality clauses and privacy provisions. This is just one example of how the 
use of the term 'Ombudsman' on a broad basis has resulted in potential negative 
consequences for Ombuds who abide by the ethic of confidentiality, given the normative 
expression of the role and its historical antecedents, but who are not protected by a 
legislated exemption. 
174 Lavigne, supra note 168 at 37. 
175 Ibid. 
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The issue of confidentiality of records is further confused and illuminated by a letter 
issued by the Public Interest Advocacy Centre (the Centre) to Ms. Jennifer Stoddart, the 
federal Privacy Commissioner. The Centre sought full disclosure of the names of 
respondents, (e.g. major corporations), when Canada's Privacy Commissioner's findings 
are issued. The author, Mr. Lawford, references Lavigne in observing that the Privacy 
Commissioner as been identified as having ".,..such "ombudsman" like proceedings". 176 
He also notes that the " ... ombudsman model adopted for the Privacy Commissioner ... "177 
has contributed to a lack of transparency. In this instance the argument is being made for 
the complainants' identities to be kept confidential, but for the names of the respondents to 
be made public. Mr. Lawford also advocates for the tradition of publicizing anonymized 
reports to be replaced with the publication of an agreed statement of facts along with the 
aforementioned names of the respondents. Lisa Austin also complains that the Privacy 
Commissioner does not 'out' the respondents which are the subject of complaints. 178 The 
current Privacy Commissioner, Jennifer Stoddart, argues in response to these concerns 
that PIPEDA is explicit in this area. She states: "The obligation of confidentiality is integral 
to an ombuds approach where it is ·intended to encourage parties to engage in a 
conciliatory process aimed at reaching resolution". 179 For an ombudsman to be required to 
report her findings in relation to all of the matters reviewed and the respondents involved, 
is yet another significant attack on the traditional notion of the Ombudsman solely 
determining what information can be shared publicly, if any, in order to ensure the privacy 
of its processes for all concerned. · 
176 Letter from John Lawford to Ms. Jennifer Stoddart, Privacy Commissioner of Canada (18 December 2003) at Page 3 
online: The Public Interest Advocacy Group <http://www.piac.ca>. 
177 Ibid. at 5. 
178 Lisa Austin, "Reviewing PIPEDA: Control, Privacy and the Limits of Fair Information Practices", (2006) 44 Canadian 
Business Law Journal 21 at 27. 
179 Stoddart, supra note 36 at 6. 
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In my view, a more accurate view of an Ombuds has been identified by Christy 
Ford in discussing alternatives to judicial remedies for disputes regarding governmental 
action. She speaks to the existence of other official bodies within the public realm, 
specifically, freedom of information and privacy commissioners, the auditor general, 
provincial aud_itors, and human rights commissioners as being " ... similar to 
ombudspersons"180 rather than identifying these roles as Ombudspersons. I am drawing 
attention to that definition as the provinces and the territory that first established the 
Ombuds roles did so by articulating administrative oversight of general jurisdiction in the 
enabling legislation. The officers of the legislature with specialized or 'mono' mandates 
that were already in place at that time and have been established subsequently while they 
share many of the characteristics of the Ombuds role are responsible for only specified 
pieces of legislation and are in place to protect rights by ensuring compliance with the 
legislation. In addition, Officers of this type do not necessarily determine their own 
procedures and timelines and have limits on their ability to hold matters in confidence or in 
the case of the Auditors General are solely respo·nsible for the forensic auditing of 
government activities as they relate to the expenditure and accountability for financial 
expenditures and reporting their findings on the effectiveness of the government's 
stewardship. In the final analysis, it may be more. accurate to describe these Officers of the 
Legislature as being based on an Ombuds model with respect to impartiality, 
independence and accessibility, while acknowledging that they deviate from this model 
when they are accorded powers of enforcement or coercion. Further, when Officers of the 
Legislature do not have the authority to determine how they conduct their work, (e.g. 
18° Christie L. Ford "Dogs and Tails: Remedies in Administrative Law'' in Administrative Law in Context, eds. Colleen M. Flood 
and Lorne Sessin (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications Ltd., 2008) at 60. The emphasis on 'similar' in the quotation is 
mine. 
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timelines and approaches may be prescribed in the enabling legislation rather than being 
determined by the Ombuds as is appropriate to the situation), I would argue the Ombuds 
title is no longer applicable as well. 
To round out the legislative Ombuds spectrum, qontinuing in the tradition of 
diversity for how Ombuds roles have been established in Canada, I will comment on how 
two current stand-alone municipal Ombuds roles were established via by-law and ratified 
by provincial statute. Notably, the City of Montreal established an Ombudsman in 2002 as 
a result of a resolution issued from the Montreal Summit Wo~kshop on Democracy. Its 
enabling legislation which provides for oversight of government administrative activities 
entitled the 'By-Law concerning the ombudsman'181 . was put in place in 2002. 
Subsequently, the Montreal Charter of Rights and Responsibilities as set down in 2006, 182 
also provides for the Ombudsman to receive complaints about municipal politicians not 
abiding by the aforementioned Charter. 
In contrast, the City of Toronto took a different route and established a separate 
position of Integrity Commissioner to provide a means for complaint resolution and 
education for local politicians on the Codes of Conduct, policies and legislated means put 
in place for ethical behaviour. 183 On an overall basis, the City of Toronto· indicates that in 
an effort to demonstrate its commitment to accountability and transparency it mandated 
four oversight functions including the Auditor General, the Integrity Commissioner, a 
Lobbyist Registrar and an Ombudsman. The first Ombudsman was appointed in 2009 via 
the City of Toronto Act with responsibility" ... for addressing concerns about City Services 
181 CITY OF MONTREAL BY-LAW 02-146-1. 
182 
"Our History'' online: Ombudsman de Montreal <http://ville.montreal.gc.ca>. 
183 
"Statutory Accountability Requirements" City of Toronto online: <http://www.toronto.ca>. 
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and investigating complaints about administrative unfairness".184 ltis also instructive that 
prior to both the Montreal and Toronto roles being established, in 1995 the City of 
Winnipeg created an Ombudsman of general jurisdiction via by-law. However, this office 
was eliminated in 2003185 when its authority to investigate complaints about municipal 
matters was legally added to the Manitoba Ombudsman's mandate. 186 
The foregoing is illustrative of the idiosyncratic manner in which the Ombuds roles 
of general jurisdiction established by legislation came to be established at 
provincial/territorial and municipal levels. As is clear from the various configurations 
described, each legislative body responsible for the creation of an Ombuds role 
determined how the role would be configured based not only on historical considerations 
but also on its unique circumstances like size of population as well as cultural and political 
perspectives and institutional influences. 
Hybrid and Organizational Ombuds Models 
There are hundreds of hybrid and organizational roles in Canada. For example, 
over 150 individuals are employed in the financial services Ombuds area in ~he Greater 
Toronto area 187 alone and the Forum of Canadian Ombudsman has 575 individuals who 
·participate on its list serve, 188 of which only a small proportion are legislative Ombuds 
and staff. Accordingly, it is not possible to provide a similar survey of the development 
of these types of roles. Rather, I will provide some examples of how Ombuds roles in 
184 Ibid. 
185 Barry E. Tuckett, "Manitoba Ombudsman 2003 Annual Report" at 11 online: http://www.ombudsman.mb.ca 
186 There are other Ombuds of general jurisdiction in place in various municipalities in Canada, most notably, in smaller cities 
and towns in the province of Quebec. As they have been created not only through by-laws but also via executive fiat or are 
filled by a number of volunteers, e.g. Laval and Gatineau, I have not included these offices in this environmental scan. 
187 Statistic provided by the Ombudsman for Banking Services and Investments, Doug Melville in September 2010. 
188 Information provided by Steve Olive, Administrator for Forum of Canadian Ombudsman (FCO) in July, 2011. 
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these two categories came into being in order to provide context for the discussion of 
the three Ombuds models. 
The Hybrid Ombuds 
For purposes of clarification, I am reiterating that I have chosen to use the term 
'hybrid' in this context as it seems reasonable to consider any role that has maintained 
many of the characteristics of the original version as well as adding on different ones as a 
'hybrid'. Restricting its use only to Om buds who have oversight of government 
administrative activity and who also handle human rights complaints as posited by Linda 
Reif et al would be very limiting given how the Ombuds role has evolved in Canada:189 It is 
important to recognize that I am not suggesting that the hybrid Ombuds role is the 
offspring of the legislative model and the organizational model. In fact, the hybrid model 
was well established in Canada before the organizational model came into use. In 
contrast to Reif's definition, Ellen Zweibel in "Hybrid Processes: Using Evaluation to Build 
Consensus" refers to hybrid processes within ADR as combining elements of evaluation, 
adjudication, 190 negotiation and mediation. She has used hybrid in this context to 
demonstrate that processes can evolve in such a fashion rather than being rigidly 
defined. 191 Following this line of thinking, as the Ombuds role has evolved in a wide variety 
of ways over time, the use of the term of 'hybrid', in my view, is particularly applicable to 
the Canadian context. 
189 Linda C. Reif, a Canadian legal scholar, who has written extensively on the practice of legislative Om buds has used the 
term 'hybrid' to define legislative Ombuds who are also responsible for reviewing. complaints of human rights violations. See 
Linda Reif, Mary Marshall and Charles Ferris (eds). "The Ombudsman: Diversity and Development..lt's Time Has Arrived' 
(Calgary: International Ombudsman Institute, 1993) and Linda C. Reif, The Ombudsman, Good Governance and the 
lntemational Human Rights System (Leiden; Boston: Martinius Nijhoff Publishers, 2004 ). 
190 Please keep in mind that by providing this definition I am not stating that Ombuds in Canada adjudicate. Rather, the 
opposite is true in that Ombuds' formulate conclusions and make recommendations which are non-binding. 
191 Ellen Zweibel, "Hybrid Processes: Using Evaluation to Build Consensus" in Julie Macfarlane, ed., Dispute Resolution-
Readings and Case Studies, Second Edition (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications, 2003) at 557. 
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The hybrid Ombuds is established by policy, terms of reference, Memorandum of 
Understanding, Order in Council or charter. Typically these instruments provide for the 
authority to investigate, (often both on a reactive and proactive basis); access to all 
records; some degree of structural independence, (e.g. hires its own staff and has the 
authority to produce public reports); as well as the requirement for impartiality and the 
maintenance of confidentiality. In addition, this type of Ombuds role has the authority to 
determine its own administrative procedures, (e.g. record retention schedules and time 
lines for completing work), as well as determining which form of dispute resolution 
technique will be used for handling a complaint (e.g. facilitation of discussions, advice and 
referral, shuttle diplomacy and mediation) and/or initiating an investigation in response to a 
complaint or on an own-motion basis. Examples of hybrid Ombuds roles include: 
• the majority of University and College Om buds 192 
• the majority of Canadian Bank Ombuds who respond to complaints from 
customers and the over arching Ombudsman for Banking Services and 
Investments (0881)193 
• media Ombuds roles (e.g. Canada Broadcasting Corporation 194 and Radio-
Canada 195) 
• Crown Corporations, (e.g. Canada Post Corporation Ombudsman)196 
192 Links to the websites of all university and college Ombuds who are members of the Association of Canadian University 
and College Ombudsperson (ACCUO) is available at this link: 
<http://www.uwo.ca/ombuds/accuo_aoucc/english/membership_websites.html>. 
193 The participating firms and the mandate for OBSI is available at this link: 
<http://www.obsi.ca/Ul/ParticipatingFirms/ParticipatingFirms.aspx>. 
194 The Office of the Ombudsman CBC online: <http://www.cbc.ca/ombudsman/> 
195 L'ombudsman de Radio-Canada online: <http://blogues.radio-canada.ca/ombudsman/>. 
196 Canada Post Ombudsman online: <http://www.canadapost.ca> . 
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• Federal governmental Ombuds, (e.g. National Defence and Canadian Forces 
Ombudsman, 197 Taxpayers' Ombudsman, 198 Office of the Federal Ombudsman for 
Victims of Crime)199 
• Not-for-Profit Organizations, (e.g. some Community Care Access 
Centres in Ontario,200 The Canadian Ski Patrol Association)201 
Organizational Ombuds 
The organizational Ombuds is typically founded by policy, terms of reference or 
executive fiat and operates on the ~asis of de facto forms of independence along with the 
requirement to act impartially and maintain confidentiality. This type of Ombuds does not 
have the authority to investigate, but often has access to all organizational records and 
immediate access to the most senior personnel in order to generate discussion and gather 
intelligence about issues that are brought forward. It is most often found in large, private 
and public sector and not-for-profit organizations, and in some government departments 
and agencies. Typically, the people who can make use of the Ombuds' services are 
employees, and in some instances, consumers and suppliers. Often this type of Ombuds 
serves as a sounding board; assists with the generation and evaluation of options to 
resolve a concern; mediates disputes between peers (sometimes between supervisor and 
supervisee or client and service provider); facilitates conversations; and/or engages in 
shuttle diplomacy, and in some instances, conducts fact-finding exercises. 
In addition, this type of Ombuds does trends analysis on a month-to-month or year-
over-year basis so as to identify and provide recommendations to senior management on 
197The National Defence and Canadian Forces Ombudsman online: <http://www.ombudsman.forces.gc.ca/index-eng.asp> 
198 Canadian Taxpayers' Ombudsman online: <http://www.oto-boc.gc.ca/menu-eng.html>. 
199 Office of the Federal Ombudsman for Victims of Crime, online: <http://www.victimsfirst.gc.ca> . 
20
° Community Care Access Centre, Toronto Central, online: <http://www.ccac-ont.c>. 
201 I met the Ombudsman for this Association at workshop sponsored by the Forum of Canadian Ombudsman held in Toronto 
in September 2010. This Ombuds role hs been in place for 15 years and conducts all manner of investigations. 
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the emergence or proliferation of systemic and/or system-wide concerns. However, when 
an issue is raised that can not be resolved by one of these means and requires 
investigation, typically the employee or client seek~ng assistance is referred to an office of 
compliance like the Human Resources Department or the Equity and Diversity Office in 
order for a formal investigation to be undertaken. Those occupying organizational Ombuds 
roles typically do not keep records and if they do, the records are non-identifying, brief 
notes and are shredded shortly after discussions have been concluded. It is also worthy of 
noting that the individuals who approach this type of Ombuds are typically called a 'visitor' 
or 'client' rather than a complainant. 202 Examples include: 
• Corporations, (e.g. Protectrice de la personne/Corporate Ombudsman for Hydro-
Quebec, for employees of the majority of Canadian banks;203 VIA Rail);204 
• Not-for-profit organizations, (e.g. Canadian Franchise Association Ombudsman); 
205 
• Some federal government departments which handle employee complaints, (e.g. 
Health Canada, 206 Heritage Canada )207 ; 
• Some law societies in Canada, specifically Alberta, British Columbia, 
Saskatchewan and Manitoba208 set up Equity Ombudsperson roles which have 
202
• Visitor' is the term used by the International Ombudsman Association to denote an individual who approaches an Ombuds 
for assistance. In my experience this term is used rarely in Canada and only by those who identify themselves as 
'Organizational' Ombudsman. 
203 While the availability of an Ombuds is not explicitly promoted on the Royal Bank of Canada website, the name of the 
Employee Ombudsman (Ken Brown) is shown and a description of his role is provided. Office of the Ombudsman, online: 
RBC <http://www.rbc.com>. 
204 I am aware of the existence of this position as the current appointee is a member of International Ombudsman Association 
and the availability of the position was advertised throughout Ombuds professional association networks. 
205 
"Franchise Ombudsman Program", online: Canadian Franchise Association <http://www.cfa.ca>. 
206 
"Internal Ombudsman Service", online: Health Canada <http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca>. This was created in 2003. 
207 
"Ombudsman Office of Values and Ethics", Organizational Chart for the Department of Canadian Heritage online: 
<http://www.pch.gc.ca>. 
208 
"Equity Ombudsperson", The Law Society of Alberta online: <http://www.lawsociety.ab.ca>; 'The Equity Ombudsperson", 
The Law Society of British Columbia, online: <http://www.lawsociety.bc.ca>; "Equity/Diversity Policies, Ombudsperson", The 
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been designed to assist lawyers, support staff and law students to address 
harassment and discrimination they have experienced in their workplaces, that is, 
within law firms. In addition, the Manitoba Law Society Equity Ombudsperson also 
has the mandate to speak with clients of law firms who believe they have suffered 
harassment or discrimination. 
All of the foregoing descriptions demonstrate the idiosyncratic nature of the 
Ombuds role depending on how it was established, where and by whom or what body. 
While the manner in which it was designed may vary and its powers and construction differ 
from category to category, it is important to note that independence and impartiality are 
ever present iri each type of Ombuds role identified above. The next section will 
investigate how each model of Ombuds practice fulfills its inquisitorial mandate and how 
its collateral functions contribute to administrative fairness, using the former Right 
Honourable Supreme Court of Canada Chief Justice Brian Dickson's (Chief Justice 
Dickson) indicia in a landmark decision as an organizing framework. 
Genesis and Implementation of Ombuds' Mandates 
In order to appreciate the breadth and depth of the Ombuds' function in relation 
to its impact on administrative fairness and access to justice as well as the significance 
of the principles of impartiality and independence, a useful starting point for the 
definition of a modern Ombuds, wherever and how it was established in Canada, can 
be found in British Columbia Development Corp. v. British Columbia (Ombudsman). 209 
In this judgment former Chief Justice Dickson provided, in my view, the seminal 
Law Society of Saskatchewan online:http://www.lawsociety.sk.ca>; "Equity Ombudsperson", The Law Society of Manitoba 
online: <http://www.lawsociety.mb.ca>. 
209 British Columbia Development Corp. v. British Columbia (Ombudsman) [1984] S.C.J. No.50 QL. This case is also 
referenced as the 'Friedmann case' as Karl Friedmann was the Ombudsman for British Columbia at the time the suit was 
launched. I was first introduced to this case by a University Ombudsman who advised that she always consulted Friedmann 
when she was encountering particularly difficult situations and needed guidance on how to proceed. 
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definition for a Canadian Ombuds as part of his rationale for determining that the 
Ombudsman for British Columbia did indeed have jurisdiction over a provincial Crown 
Corporation: 
... The Ombudsman represents society's response to these problems of potential 
abuse and of supervision. His unique characteristics render him capable of 
addressing many of the concerns left untouched by the traditional bureaucratic 
control devices. He is impartial. His services are free, and available to all. Because 
he often operates informally, his investigations do not impede the normal 
processes of government. Most importantly, his powers of investigation can bring 
to light cases of bureaucratic maladministration that would otherwise pass 
unnoticed. The Ombudsman "can bring the lamp of scrutiny to otherwise dark 
places, ever over the resistance of those who would draw the blinds": Re 
Ombudsman Act (1970). 72 W.W.R. 176 (Alta. S.C.), per Milvain C.J., at pp. 192-
93. On the other hand, he may find the complaint groundless, not a rare 
occurrence, in which even his impartial and independent report, absolving the 
public authority, may well serve to enhance the morale and restore the self-
confidence of the public employees impugned. In short, the powers granted to the 
Ombudsman allow him to address administrative problems that the courts, the 
legislature and the executive cannot effectively resolve. 210 
While this description was written to describe the role of a provincial Ombudsman 
established by legislation, I 9ontend it also applies to 'hybrid' Ombuds roles and, if the 
investigation reference is removed, it is also applicable to organizational Ombuds roles, 
given that they are able to shed light on potential systemic issues through their analysis 
of trends, and make inquiries about the circumstances surrounding complaints raised 
even though they are not conducting investigations. Using Chief Justice Dickson's 
description as an anchor while taking into account the tremendous diversity evident in 
the various Ombuds roles across the country, I will analyze the three primary Ombuds 
models of practice from the following perspectives: the essential inquisitorial nature of 
the role as expressed through reactive investigations conducted in response to 
individual complaints as well as investigations undertaken proactively on an own motion 
or own initiative basis; the emphasis placed on addressing systemic and system-wide 
210 Ibid. at IV (b ). 
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concerns; the wide-spread use of early resolution modalities; the importance of 
accessibility and how it is achieved; and the use of preventative activities and the 
promulgation of fairness standards both for educative and Om buds' accountability 
purposes. 
Chief Justice Dickson provided useful commentary as to why the role of 
Ombudsman came to be established in Canada (and presumably in other jurisdictions) 
and perhaps contributed to the 'crescendo' observed by Anderson211 and the 
'ombudsmania' identified by Smith 212 in relation to Canada and by Rowat in relation to 
early developments in the U.S.213 For instance, the then Chief Justice Dickson, noted 
that the increase in the size and complexity of government services, both from a 
qualitative and quantitative perspective along with the high degree of governmental 
involvement with all facets of citizens' lives, was unprecedented. As a result, the 
plethora of public agencies and boards that had to be established to implement 
governmental initiatives created the potential for increased instances of abuse of 
authority and poor administration. Dickson also observed that the traditional forms of 
government control over its bureaucracies, namely, the legislature, the courts and the 
executive branch, were neither well suited nor capable of providing adequate 
supervision. In addition, in some cases, these oversight bodies did not have the 
resources to investigate complaints about government maladministration. Where 
investigative capacity was available, that is, through the courts, there was often no legal 
remedy and if there was, the pursuit of it was torturously slow and prohibitively 
211 Stanley Anderson, supra note 32 at x. 
212 Smith, supra note 87 at 40. 
213 Donald D. Rawat. "Recent Developments in Ombudsmanship" (1967) 10 (1) Canadian Public Administration at 35. 
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expensive. 214 These conditions provided an ideal environment for the rise of the 
legislative Ombudsman in the last half of the twentieth century. 
A similar impetus contributed to the growth of the hybrid Ombuds role within the 
banking system in Canada. David McNabb, a long serving RBC Group employee and 
now Deputy Ombudsman for client complaints, indicated that due to the volume of 
complaints from small businesses about poor treatment at the hands of the banks 
during the economic recession of the early 1990s, discussions with the federal regulator 
and the banking industry resulted in the creation of a national ADR program for non-
binding mediation conducted by an independent third party.215 After observing for a one 
year period in 1993 that the free mediation program set up for use by small business 
owners and the banks was not well used, then Finance Minister, Paul Martin, and the 
former head of the Canadian Banking Association, Helen Sinclair, agreed in 1994 that 
each of the large banks would establish an Ombudsman to handle complaints from 
small businesses. In 1996, an industry Ombudsman, known as the Canadian Banking 
Ombudsman, was put into place to respond to issues that could not be resolved with a 
·particular Bank Ombudsman. Subsequently, one year later, the mandate was 
.expanded to allow for individual customers to bring their complaints forward. As a result 
of these early agreements, as of 2006 approximately 95% of consumers of financial 
services (e.g. banking, investments and insurance), in Canada had access to 'industry 
specific' Ombuds at no cost.216 It is noteworthy that in 2010 the recommendations made 
by the Ombudsman for Banking Services and Investments (OBSI) after an investigation 
214 Ibid. 
215 David McNabb, "Adjudication Idols and Ombudsman Bridges: The Private Enterprise of Independence and Fairness" 
Conference on Consumer Finance Law, (2006) 60 (4) at 645. 
216 Ibid. 
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had been completed, coupled with the monetary compensation that arose from 
facilitation by OBSI staff with member banks, resulted in financial compensation of 
approximately three and half million dollars. For this particular time frame, complaints 
were supported in 29% of the cases reviewed. 217 Interestingly, in 2008 the Royal Bank 
ended its voluntary relationship with the OBSI and arranged with ADR Chambers (a 
private sector dispute resolution firm) to review complaints about conclusions reached 
by individual bank Ombudsman and serve as the oversight body for the RBC Bank 
Ombudsman's conclusions on the legitimacy of client complaints. ~ubsequently in 
2011, TD Bank followed suit and has also retained ADR Chambers to fulfill the role 
previously held by OBSI. 218 This evolution is ironic as OBSI was evaluated in 2011 by 
an external body - The Navigator Company - and was accorded high praise for its 
accessibility, transparency and fairness. 219 The landscape in this area of endeavour has 
changed even more dramatically in 2012 as Finance Minister Jim Flaherty advised that, 
in opposition to the lobbying of consumer advocates, he will not force banks to use the 
services of OBSI. Instead, he is in the midst of developing rules and regulations that will 
allow banks to hire others to address disputes about individual Bank Ombudsman's 
determinations. 220 
Not surprisingly, the same kinds of forces, that being student discontent, 
contributed to the development of academic Ombuds roles throughout Canada. Long 
217 OBSI 2010 Annual Report online: Ombudsman for Banking Services and Investments <http://www.obsi.ca> at 48. 
218 Unfortunately, it is not possible to compare the quantum of compensation recommended or facilitated by the ADR 
Chambers Banking Ombuds Office (ADRBO) as the ADRBO 2011 annual report does not provide this type of information in it 
publicly accessible report. See <http://www.bankinqombuds.ca>. 
219 The Navigator Company, "Ombudsman for Banking Services and Investments 2011 Independent Review" , online: 
Ombudsman for Banking Services and Investments <http://www.obsi.ca> at7,8. 
220 Theresa Tedesco, "Ottawa to set new rules for Bank Mediators" The Financial Post (30 April 2012), online: Financial Post 
<http://business.financialpost.com>. Please note that in the 1990's the majority of major Canadian banks also established 
Ombuds' roles based on the organizational model of practice. These Ombuds roles were established to respond to employee , 
concerns given the huge number of employees involved in these operations and the complex policy frameworks governing 
their employment. 
74 
serving academic Ombuds have observed that pressure came from student 
unions/associations initially through their lobbying the university administration to 
establish Ombuds roles to address the difficulties associated with increasingly 
bureaucratic structures. Many academic institutions had become so complex with 
respect to policy and procedure that they were difficult for many students to navigate 
and apply to their personal situations. As a result, it is not uncommon to see funding 
arrangements whereby the Ombuds role is financially supported both by the academic 
institution and by the student union(s) or associations, (e.g. University of Victoria, 
University of Western Ontario, McMaster University, Camosun College, Algonquin 
College, Simon Fraser University, Carleton University, etc.).221 In a similar vein in 2009, 
President Alan Rock confirmed that the University of Ottawa after many years of 
consultation and consideration was finally in the last stages of approving the Terms of 
Reference for an Ombudsperson role that is also jointly funded by the University and 
the student associations. He expressed his support on his blog in the following manner: 
I think it is high time for us to provide for such an officer. Having access to an 
independent, professional person who will carry out a thorough and objective 
assessment of matters in issue between members of our community is bound to 
make us all feel as though the system is a little fairer. 222 
The genesis of an Ombuds role can also be derived from a number of different 
community members, (e.g. parents, teachers, students, administrators, politicians), within 
221 The joint funding model in place is.described on the websites for each of these Ombudsperson Offices. One example is: 
''The SFU community is committed to the fair and just treatment of each and every member of the University community. SFU 
is proud to have established one of the first Ombuds Offices at a Canadian university. For over 40 years the Office has 
provided confidential, infonnal, independent, and neutral dispute resolution services to all members of the university 
community by providing infonnation, advice, intervention and referrals. In keeping with this commitment, the University joined 
with the Simon Fraser Student Society (SFSS) and the Graduate Students Society (GSS) in 2008 to support the development 
of a new jointly funded Office of the Ombudsperson." Office of the Ombudsperson online: Simon Fraser University 
<http://www.sfu.ca>. 
222 Alan Rock, "Ombudsperson" on Rock Talk The University of Ottawa (14 April 2009), online: The University of Ottawa 
< http://www.president.uottawa.ca/blog/>. 
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a large political jurisdiction who concluded that there should be a means in place for 
providing a proper response to t_he complaints related to local schools. For example, the 
province of Quebec in 2009 passed legislation that requires all Quebec school boards to 
establish a means for dealing with complaints from students and parents. For many this 
requirement has been translated into the establishment of a Student Ombudsman role. 
Writing in support of this· initiative Chris Eustace of The Gazette states: "Access to a 
school board ombudsman ensures fair treatment for all, curbs abuse of power and relieves 
a lot of unhealthy stress. An ombudsman also' provides policy-makers with 
recommendations to improve the education system. An ombudsman is a gift to the 
public". 223 
·The foregoing examples are not intended to be exhaustive with respect to how 
various forms of Ombuds came into being but rather are illustrative of the type of forces at 
play at the time of development, specifically, a desire to humanize governmental 
organizations as well as public and private sector institutions that were increasing in size 
and influence and to provide informal and inexpensive means for complainants to hold 
their government administrator, bank manager or college employee accountable. In these 
milieux the Ombuds role is a dispute resolution mechanism that is designed to be 
independent, impartial, fair, flexible and easily accessed. In addition, it is very clear from 
Chief Justice Dickson's commentary that the Onibuds role was envisioned from the outset 
as an alternative to the traditional form of dispute resolution, that is litigation, by using 
informal means for dispute resolution based on an inquisitorial approach rather than being 
modelled on the adversarial tradition of court based dispute resolution. 
223 Chris Eustace "Creation of school board ombudsman is a gift" The Gazette (Montreal) (20 November 2008), online: 
Canada.com Network <http://www.canada.com/com>. 
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The key characteristics as identified by former Chief Justice Dickson as they relate 
to the pursuit of administrative fairness and access to justice will now be examined in 
relation to each of the three models of Ombuds practice. This analysis is undertaken in 
order to provide an organizing platform for the common threads and distinctive differences 
in the dispute resolution processes employed within the plurality of Ombuds roles. This 
analysis will include in-depth illustrations of how the three generic Ombuds' models that I 
contend operate in Canada fulfill their inquisitorial mandates, in an independent and 
impartial manner, and deliver on the promise of administrative fairness. 
INVESTIGATIVE MANDATE 
Classical. Legislative or Parliamentary Ombudsman (Legislative) 
In order to demonstrate the legislative Ombuds' investigative mandate, prior to 
detailing the various methods of investigation used by a variety of provincial and 
territorial Ombuds, I will reference the Ombudsman Ontario enabling legislation for 
illustrative purposes. It is important to recognize as noted by M.A. Marshall and Linda 
Reif that the statutes created for comparable purposes across the country are 
extremely similar.224 Specifically, the Ombudsman Act, R.S.O. 1990, (the Act) most 
recently amended in 2006, defines the function of the Ontario Ombudsman in Section 
14 (1) as: 
The function of the Ombudsman is to investigate any decision or 
recommendation made or any act done .or omitted in the course of the 
administration of a governmental organization and affecting any person or body 
of persons in his, her or its personal capa~ity. 
After completing an investigation, the Act declares that the Ombudsman will 
then determine whether the act or omission being scrutinized: 
224 Marshall & Reif, supra note 161 at 217. 
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... a) appears to have been contrary to law, b) was unreasonable, unjust, 
oppressive, or improperly discriminatory ... c) was based wholly or partly on a 
mistake of law; or was wrong.225 
However, prior to forming a final opinion that is adverse to a governmental organization 
or employee, the Ombudsman is required pursuant to Section 18(3) to provide tentative 
conclusions and recommendations to the head of the Ministry so that the Ministry can 
respond to the evidence assembled and the conclusions drawn from it. At this point, 
depending on the nature of the representations made by the Ministry or governmental 
agent, the Ombudsman may then decide to withdraw the report, do additional 
investigation, amend or refine the conclusions and/or change or maintain the 
conclusions, observations and recommendations as originally stated. 
Given the emphasis on the independence of the Ombuds it is important to ask if 
the requirement to provide the respondent with tentative or preliminary conclusions and 
recommendations impinges on the autonomy of the Office or the impartiality of the 
Office holder. It appears to me that the rationale for providing this opportunity is to 
ensure the respondent is able to point out any errors or misunderstandings prior to a 
final report being issued. As well, an exchange of information at this stage in the 
process may result in a resolution such that there is no need to take the matter further 
and the resources that would have been used to create a final report can be dedicated 
to other useful purpose$. However, the legislation is also constructed in such a fashion 
that if a Minister or senior staff attempted to exert pressure.to downplay or forego 
issuing a negative report, if the Ombuds also maintains an independent mindset, the 
likelihood of any such pressure being effective is mitigated by the high degree of 
structural independence enjoyed by the Office. 
225 Ombudsman Act, R.S.O. 2006, c. 35, Sched. C, s. 21 (1 ). Please note that the other provincial and territorial Ombuds of 
general jurisdiction have comparable enabling legislation. 
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If the Ombudsman determines that a governmental agency has made 
administrative errors or omissions that need to be rectified for fairness to prevail, a 
concluding report detailing the rationale for the recommendation(s) pursuant to Section 
21 (3) may be issued along with the requisite recommendation(s) for correcting the 
area(s) identified. This report will be sent to the governmental organization involved and 
the Minister responsible for that entity, initially. The robust powers made available for 
publicly identifying unfairness are evident in the legislative authority provided by Section 
21 (4) of the Act, which ensures that if a Ministry is recalcitrant or tardy in its response, 
the Ombudsman may forward a report to the Premier of the province and then all of the 
members of the legislature if within a reasonable period of time no action is taken by 
the government agency which the Ombudsman considers to be adequate and 
appropriate to the situation. The ability to report on an individual case beyond the 
Ministry directly to the Premier and then the legislature as a whole is yet another 
example of the strength of the structural independence afforded to this role. As well, the 
Ombudsman may release a report publicly at any time after the organization has been 
given notice of the Ombudsman's final determination. 
Another unique characteristic of the classical or legislative Ombuds role is that she 
typically has vigorous powers for compelling testimony and the production of records in 
order to fulfill her investigative mandate. For example, in the Ontario Ombudsman Act it is 
stated in Section 19(2) that the Ombudsman may summon and examine under oath any 
complainant, government employee or any other person who is able to provide information 
related to the matter being investigated. Similarly, under Section 25 of the Act, the 
Ombudsman is empowered to enter any premises occupied by any governmental 
organization for the purposes of inspection and for conducting an investigation. In addition, 
79 
it is an offence under Section 27 of the Act that any person who without lawful rationale 
intentionally" ... obstructs, hinders or resists ... "226 the Ombudsman or (any other person 
empowered to assist by the Act). 
My understanding and experience is that these powers are rarely if ever used, but 
their existence demonstrates the degree of strength inherent in the legislative 
Ombudsman's investigatory powers so as to fulfill its inquisitorial mandate. In addition to 
these powers, the current Ontario Ombudsman has also established and published 
procedures for when he may notify the public about issues he is investigating in order to 
encourage more witnesses to provide information, or simply because he has concluded 
that the subject of the investigation is so compelling it is in the public interest for that 
information to be widely disseminated.227 The Ombudsperson for British Columbia has 
taken this type of notice a step further by posting a questionnaire relating to an ongoing 
investigation, (e.g. the quality of seniors' care) on her website which could be responded 
to confidentially so as to inform her investigation of this subject matter on an even broader 
basis. 228 Further to that overture, Part II of the Ombudsperson's report, which is focused 
on improving the care of seniors in both community care as well as residential settings, 
was released in February 2012. This report detailed 143 findings and 176 
recommendations and has generated immense media interest. 229 
A further protection exists via Section 24 (1) of the Ontario Ombudsman Act which 
prohibits any legal action being taken against the Ombudsman or his or her staff for any 
226 Ibid. s. 27(a). 
227 
"Procedures Under the Ombudsman Act" online: Ontario Ombudsman< http://www.ombudsman.on.ca>. 
228 Wendy Stueck, "Seniors Care in B.C. gets mixed review" The Globe and Mail (17, December 2009), online: The Globe 
and Mail <http://www.theglobeandmail.com>. It is worthy of note that this reporter also added a new term to the Ombuds 
lexicon through her story, that of 'Ombudswoman'. 
229 Ombudsperson B.C.'s Independent Voice for Fairness, News Release, NR12-01, "Improving the Care of Seniors: 
Ombudsperson Releases Report with 176 Recommendations" (14 February 2012), online: BC Ombudsperson 
<http://www.ombudsman.bc.ca>. 
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action taken or report made in fulfilling the function of the Office unless it is done in bad 
faith. In addition, except if a person is being tried for perjury, as stated in Section 19 (6), 
none of the information acquired by the Ombudsman during the course of conducting an 
inquiry or an investigation can be used in court proceedings for any purpose. 
Finally, Ombudsman legislation for Ontario and the majority 230 of other classical 
Offices allows for the Ombuds to initiate investigations on her 'own motion' on a 
· proactive basis as opposed to being limited to taking up only those issues that are 
brought to her attention by complainants. This power again demonstrates the high 
degree of structural independence enjoyed by the legislated Ombuds. These types of 
investigations often result in a 'special' report being issued on a specific area of 
government activity. While special reports are issued at the discretion of the Ombuds, 
each legislative Ombuds is required to report annually on the work undertaken by her 
Office and to submit that report to the Speaker of the House who will then bring it to the 
attention of the Legislature. While the annual report is considered to be a measure of 
accountability for the Ombuds Office itself, it is also a key means by which the Ombuds 
can publicly demonstrate her independence, impartiality and efficacy in contributing to 
fair decision-making. 
All of the provisions described above demonstrate the independence of the Office; 
its inquisitorial nature and the strength of the investigative and reporting responsibilities 
afforded to it by its enabling legislation. In addition, these types of legislated powers also, 
in my opinion, loudly proclaim the high expectations held by the legislators and, 
presumably, the electorate, for this type of Ombudsman to use all of the resources at her 
230 The Yukon Territory Ombudsman legislation does not allow for investigations to be initiated other than via the lodging of a 
complaint. See note 124. 
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disposal to ensure public sector administrative decision-making is both just and fair and 
when it is not, that redress is easily accessible for all concerned. 
Gregory Levine, former senior counsel of long-standing to the then named 
Ombudsman for British Columbia, and current Integrity Commissioner for two municipal 
governments in southwestern Ontario, states in relation to the Ombudsman's enabling 
legislation for British Columbia and Ontario: "These are codes of immense moral 
magnitude. They are inspiring statements of administrative justice and they constitute 
challenges to any ombudsman to be creative and concerned". 231 From Levine's vantage 
point this means the Ombuds must be aware of social context, willing to undertake 
investigations and report publicly when necessary. His observation is that reporting 
requirements and 'own motion' or self-initiated investigations both provide for an 
opportunity for Ombuds' activism. I would argue that these powers are also demonstrative 
of the high degree of structural independence enjoyed by the legislative Ombuds and is 
indicative of the impartiality expected of the appointee. 
Approaching the inv~stigation of complaints from a systemic perspective rather 
than simply dealing with each individual complaint on a 'one off' basis has also provided 
additional opportunity for Ombuds to contribute to greater administrative fairness and 
organizational effectiveness. Stephen Owen, former Ombudsman for the province of 
British Columbia, began to make use of this style of investigation in the 1980s after 
analyzing the work of his Office to determine how it contributed to the development of 
governmental administrative policy.232 It is noteworthy that the majority of the Ombuds 
established by legislation have attracted a great deal of media attention locally, regionally, 
231 Gregory J. Levine, "The Engaged Ombudsman - Morality and Activism in Attaining Administrative Justice" in Linda C. 
Reif, ed., The lntemational Ombudsman Yearbook (Lieden/Boston: Marinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004) at 137. 
232 Stephen Owen, "The Expanding Role of the Ombudsman in the Administrative State" (1990) 40 University of Toronto Law 
Journal at 675. 
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nationally and internationally when they issue their special and annual reports. In addition, 
the responses of the various government agencies, which have also been publicized, have 
demonstrated that these types of recommendations have had a profound impact by 
publicly illuminating mistakes made and providing recommendations that will clearly 
improve government administration, for all affected, in an expeditious manner. It is also 
worthy of comment that a government's rejection of an Ombuds report can also generate 
a great deal of positive media attention and greater public support for the Ombuds' view 
on how the matter in dispute should be resolved. For example, when the Minister of 
Defence, Peter Mackay, rejected the recommenc;jation that military personnel should not 
be required to reimburse the government for sick leave pay given that the benefit was 
· used as a result of employment related illness, media reports emphasized the fact that the 
National Defence and Canadian Forces Ombudsman's well-founded and reasonable 
recommendation had been rejected.233 
In some instances, Ombuds also use their annual and special reports to comment 
on the accomplishments achieved by employees of both the public and private sector 
entities for which Ombuds have oversight. For instance, the Ombudsman for New 
Brunswick has gone a considerable step beyond clearing those impugned of unfair actions 
to providing awards of excellence for exemplary civil service based on the following 
criteria: 
... providing exceptional responsiveness and co-operation during the complaint-
resolution process; consistently demonstrating the values of administrative fairness 
and accountability; demonstrating leadership in informal problem-solving and 
helping ensure the efficient resolution of complaints; and encouraging the 
application of systemic and system-wide problem-solving.234 
233 David Pugliese, "Military wants sick pay back" The Vancouver Sun (23 October 2012), online: Vancouver Sun 
<http://vancouversun.com>. 
234 Bernard Richard, "Annual Report 2009/2010 Ombudsman New Brunswick" at 11, online: New Brunswick Ombudsman 
<http://www.qnb.ca>. 
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The individuals selected were then acknowledged publicly for their work via ceremony and 
in.print in Mr. Richard's 2009/2010 annual report .. Similarly, the National Defence and 
Canadian Forces Ombudsman also publicizes its annual awards on its website for 
Canadian Forces personnel and family members who go beyond the call of duty to resolve 
problems informally and contribute to faimess.235 Interestingly enough, no mention is 
made of how either Office will deal with complaints that arise at a later date related to 
these award winners' actions or omissions. 
In order to demonstrate how 'own motion' or 'own initiative' investigations have 
been used to increase access to justice for many Canadians, particularly those who are 
disadvantaged, the following examples will illustrate the diverse ways that this form of 
Ombuds inquisitorial activity has been implemented. I examine two different models of 
Ombuds practice, and how these investigations have contributed to increased access to 
services and a higher level of fairness in the delivery of services in a number of different 
areas of public sector activity. The following case studies also demonstrate how important 
the principles of independence and impartiality are to the execution of these types of 
investigations. . 
OWN MOTION/OWN INITIATIVE INVESTIGATIONS 
Classical/Legislative/Parliamentarv/Ombuds (Legislative Model) 
An outstanding example of how an investigation initiated on an Ombuds 'own 
motion' was introduced and conducted is well represented in the Newfoundland and 
Labrador's Citizen's Representative's (the Representative) report entitled "Alone Among 
235 
"Award Recipients" online: Department of National Defence and Canadian Forces Ombudsman 
<http://www.ombudsman.forces.ge.~com-mh/ar-lau/index-eng.asp>. 
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the Few".236 This report included five recommendations for significant improvements for 
the care and treatment of female inmates along with mechanisms for increased access to 
justice for those held in geographically isolated parts of the province. The genesis of this 
investigation is worthy of comment as it was sparked when the Representative, Mr. Lewis, 
read media reports about a female inmate who was forced to remain naked in her cell for a 
number of days due to concerns about her mental health.237 Subsequently, two years later 
Mr. Lewis issued a press release 238 congratulating the government for allocating two 
milli~n dollars for the construction of a facility for women and children in Happy Valley-
Goose Bay. It is noteworthy that Mr. Lewis comments in his report that "Our office has · 
never received a complaint from a female offender from Labrador." 239 As it is not unusual 
for individuals who are marginalized due to disability and/or poverty, racism or sexism (or 
for all of the foregoing reasons intertwined) not to complain, it is only due to the 
Representative's ability to carry out an investigation on his own initiative that some of the 
needs of this very vulnerable population were addressed. 
By way of methodology, this five-month investigation was launched on the basis of 
written notice of the intent to investigate the availability of facilities and support services for 
female offenders in Labrador .being provided to the Departments of Justice and Health and 
Community Services and a regional health authority. As the investigation progressed, 
another notice of intent to investigate the same matter was provided to a regional health 
authority and the Legal Aid Commission. In addition, meetings were held with or 
236 Barry Lewis, "A Report on Facilities and Support For Female Offenders from Labrador Alone Among the Few" Office of the 
Citizen's Representative Province of Newfoundland and Labrador (June 2007) at 1, online: Citizen's Representative of 
Newfoundland and Labrador <http://www.citizensrep.nl.ca>. 
237 Ibid. 
238 Office of the Citizens' Representative for Newfoundland and Labrador, News Release/Communique, "Office of the 
Citizens' Representative - Commentary on Recent Infrastructure Spending Announcement" (19 February 2009), online: 
Citizens' Representative for Newfoundland and Labrador <http://www.releases.gov.nl.ca>. 
239 Lewis, supra note 236 at 4. 
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submissions were received from current and ex-offenders, various Status of Women 
councils, relevant government bodies and not-for-profit organizations. In addition, 1100 
pages of text (including Court and Corrections and Community Services reports and 
United Nations standards) as well as photographic materials were analyzed by the three 
Investigators and one Senior Investigator who conducted the investigation. In addition, two 
trips were made from the Citizen's Representative urban office in St. John's, 
Newfoundland to various locations in Labrador. As is the norm with Ombuds' 
investigations a detailed investigative plan was prepared prior to the start of the 
investigation and amended as the investigation progressed.240 
Referencing another vulnerable population, the then Manitoba Ombudsman Irene 
Hamilton released a lengthy report on the status of progress made towards implementing 
recommendations for a major overhaul of the child welfare system in a report entitled 
"Strengthen the Commitment: An External Review of the Child Welfare System". In 
introducing this progress report, Ms. Hamilton gave notice that she would be reporting 
. annually on the implementation process of the recommendations that resulted in the 
government committing $42,000,000 in short and long term funding after her report was 
originally tabled. 241 All of these investigations are consistent with Levine's admonitions 
that Ombuds are morally bound to use all of their powers to address injustices by being 
sufficiently engaged with and attentive to other means by which they may become aware 
of issues that require their review for fairness to prevail. Not surprisingly, the attendant 
publicity that the wide dissemination of these types of investigative reports by external 
media has generated along with the Ombuds' willingness to host on-line chats; to use 
240 Ibid. at 5, 6. 
241 Ombudsman Manitoba, News Release/Communique, "Manitoba Ombudsman Reports on the Progress of Implementing 
Child Welfare Recommendations" (16 July 2008), online: <http://www.ombudsman.mb.ca/news/jul15-08.htm>. 
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Twitter and host Face book sites as well as making speeches about the scope of their 
work and attending community events regularly, has highlighted their investigative powers 
and their commitment to holding governments accountable for the manner in which they 
deliver government services. Similarly, investigations of this nature could not be 
successfully undertaken without the degree of structural independence that provides for 
Ombuds' control of procedures used, time lines followed, and how resources are 
allocated, as well as a commitment to and a public and governmental perception of 
impartiality. 
OWN MOTION/OWN INITIATIVE INVESTIGATIONS 
Hybrid Ombuds 
Hybrid Ombuds with own motion capacity and reporting requirements have also 
generated considerable change and access to justice through their investigative activities. 
For example, the Charter for the Fair Practices Commissioner states: "The Fair Practices 
Commissioner may, on his or her own initiative, investigate, identify and make 
recommendations on systemic issues within the WSIB [Workplace Safety and Insurance 
Board]." 242 By way of background, the Fair Practices Commission was established in 
2003· as an Om buds role to investigate complaints from employers and injured workers 
regaroing the Ontario safe workplace and injured workers' compensation scheme. The 
above noted authority to initiate an investigation on her own motion was used by the Fair 
Practices Commissioner, a.k.a. the Workers Compensation Ombudsman, in 2006 to 
undertake a system-wide investigation into the processes used for making decisions about 
claims based on occupational diseases as in some instances the adjudication process 
242 
"Fair Practices Commission Charter Document" (2007), online: Fair Practices Commission 
<http://www.fairpractices.on.ca>· at 8(1 )(b) 
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was taking more than six months to complete. 243 This lengthy time frame had generated 
complaints both about the emotional and financial consequences attributable to this 
waiting period as well as the impact of the lack of communication as to what was 
happening with the injured workers' cases·. The methodology followed was that written 
notice was provided to the President of the WSIB indicating the investigation would focus 
on organizational performance rather than individual staff performance in the areas of 
decision-making processes, communication and timeliness. The Commissioner's office 
initially identified a sample of statistically valid claims that were still in process after six 
months had elapsed to determine if the complaints being received were indicative of a 
widespread problem. In addition, the Commission staff reviewed statistics and data on the 
claims in the sample as well the information obtained from conducting a random file 
review; and discussed the reports on file as well as interviewing the staff and managerial 
personnel in the Occupational Disease Unit. The Commission staff also met with other 
stakeholders including some union representatives and the Directors of the Offices of the 
Worker Advisor and Employer Advisor whose offices are in place to provide advice and 
support to employers and injured workers respectively. 
A seven-month investigation was concluded with a final report being issued after 
the WSIB President provided her written response to the Commissioner's preliminary 
findings and resultant recommendations.244 In brief, the Commissioner, Laura Bradbury, 
concluded that the time frame for decision-making was too long and that the impact of the 
resultant delay on injured workers had to be given more consideration within the WSIB's 
243 
"Fair Practices Commission Annual Report for 2006-2007" at 8, online: Fair Practices Commission 
<http://www.fairoractices.on.ca>. 
244 Ibid. at 9. 
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model of adjudication.245 Ten recommendations were made which were accepted in full by 
the WSIB in 2007 and which by 2008 had resulted in increased staff resources; a new 
comprehensive database which allows for easier tracking of data; a pilot project being 
initiated which included two specialized back log teams to deal with claims over six months 
old; new means for measuring accountability; new training resources; as well as a model 
for delivery of service that emphasized a customized approach.246 
A very important aspect of this investigation, and many that are conducted by 
Om buds in all sectors, is the commitment to and authority for follow-up on the fulfillment of 
accepted recommendations. In this situation, the Commissioner received bi-monthly 
reports on the progress made over the following year and met regularly with leadership 
from within the Occupational Disease Services Divisio!'). In 2008, two years after initiating 
her investigation, the Commissioner indicated in a summary report that as a result of the 
progress made by the WSIB that the complaints to her office about occupational disease 
claims had been reduced by almost half and that the back log of cases held by WSIB that 
were more than six months old had decreased substantially. 247 Three more years later in 
April of 2011, the Commissioner-stated that the number of complaints in the area of 
occupational disease claims has been reduced by 75% and there is no backlog.248 These 
data demonstrate how an own motion investigation had a profoundly positive effect on the 
injured workers whose claims are now being processed in a more customized and timely 
manner. In addition, the staff of WSIB has benefited from training and the implementation 
of a new model for service delivery that has increased their capacity to handle 
245 Ibid. 
246 Laura Bradbury, "Fair Practices Commission 2008 Annual Report" at 5,6, online: Fair Practices Commission 
<http://www.fairpractices.on.ca>. 
247 Ibid. 
248 Conversation with Laura Bradbury, Fair Practices Commissioner (25 April 2011 ). 
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occupational disease claims in a timely and effective manner. Such an investigation could 
not have been undertaken without a high degree of structural independence allowing for: 
1) the ability to determine an investigative process appropriate to the circumstances and 2) 
the ability to allocate sufficient resources to complete the review in a timely manner. 
Similarly, it is unlikely that the investigation could have been completely as quickly as it 
was and with as high a degree of cooperation from the respondent, if the approach taken 
. had not been perceived to be constructive (rather than punitive) as well as both impartial 
and independent. 
INVESTIGATIONS RESULTING FROM AN INDIVIDUAL COMPLAINT 
Legislative Model 
Ombuds undertaking thousands of individual investigations, on an annual basis, 
across Canada has also resulted in life-changing outcomes for particular complainants. 
For example, the Ombudsman for Saskatchewan determined through an investigation that 
an individual should be reimbursed for the $59,000 he spent paying for medical treatment 
he received in the U.S. related to the removal of a brain tumour.249 This complainant 
sought medical assistance in the U.S. as he had not been able to obtain a definitive 
diagnosis as to his condition in his consultations with various Saskatchewan physicians. 
While the Ombudsman indicated the criteria used by the government to assess the claim 
were valid, and it was not reasonable for this individual to expect a response to his request 
for coverage so quickly, (e.g. one day in advance of the prescribed surgery), he was still 
recommending the costs be reimbursed by the government. The Ombudsman's rationale 
for doing so was that the government had communicated its decision to deny the 
complainant's request for payment as the treatment he sought was available in 
249 Kevin Fenwick, "Ombudsman Saskatchewan Recommendations 2010 Third Quarter Report Update" ( July - September 
2010) at 2, 3 online: Ombudsman Saskatchewan <http://www.ombudsman.sk.ca.>. 
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Saskatchewan, via fax to his home and in a voice mail message when it knew the 
complainant was not at home. In fact, the complainant had corresponded with Ministry 
staff to advise that he had travelled to the U.S .. and was in the process of being prepared 
for the surgical procedure at the heart of the complaint. In this instance, the administrators 
of this program did not accept the Ombudsman's recommendation. However, the Minister 
responsible for this department overturned this decision and indicated the payment would 
be made as he accepted the Ombudsman's rationale as being reasonable given the 
communication difficulties and the special circumstances. 250 This type of individual 
investigation is conducted quickly and involves the review of relevant legislation, policy 
and procedure as well as interviews with key personnel and is conducted in a manner 
solely determined by the Ombuds. In addition, the recommendation made and the. 
resolution achieved applies only to the individual complainant whose concern was 
investigated. 
Another example of how individual concerns can be investigated is evident from a 
report prepared by the Ombudsman for the Yukon Territory in 2010 as a result of several 
complaints from citizens about a regularly scheduled territorial health care insurance 
survey. The Ombudsman found that this survey, which was significant in scope and 
potential impact as it was conducted twice a year (and had been handled this way for 
many years), had been implemented in such a fashion that the government breached its 
own legislation, that is The Statistics Act. The government had done so by collecting and 
sharing personal information in a manner that was not consistent with the legislation and 
by advising the 5113 recipients of the survey that if they did not complete the so called 
250 James Wood "Gov't overrules ministry decision not to fund man's U.S. surgery" (04 February 2011) The Star Phoenix 
online: Canada.com <http://www2.canada.com>. 
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'voluntary' survey their health insurance could be cancelled.251 While the Ombudsman 
recognized the effort to collect information was well intentioned, served useful purposes, 
and that the same wording had been used for previous surveys, she also had to point out 
that the. approach taken was contrary to the government's own legislation. It was also 
noted by the Ombudsman that the government was not appreciating the import of its 
actions when it indicated that" ... only a small group of people ... "252 was inconvenienced by 
having their health care insurance cancelled and then reinstated. In response, the 
government was advised by the Ombudsman that the use of a threat to encourage 
cooperation with this data collection effort when the legislation did not allow for such action 
was unacceptable. The government accepted the Ombudsman's recommendations for 
the proper conduct of future surveys and for communicating with those residents whose 
health care insurance coverage was cancelled on how to have the coverage reinstated on 
a retroactive basis.253 In this legislative regime, the Ombudsman Act 254 provides a 
comparable methodology to that cited earlier in that it requires the Ombudsman to give 
notice of her intent to investigate a matter to the relevant authority and have unfettered 
access to facilities, files and personnel. She also has the responsibility to advise the 
authority whose work is being investigated if her investigation results may be of an 
adverse nature before she finalizes her report so that the authority has the opportunity to 
make submissions verbally or in writing prior to the final report being issued. This 
requirement, as noted earlier, rather than compromising independence and impartiality 
251 Tracy-Ann McPhee, "Report after Investigation Ombudsman Act section 31(2) December 6, 2010 Re: Complaints to the 
Ombudsman - Health Care Insurance Survey Authorities: Health and Social Services; and Yukon Bureau of Statistics" at 1 
online: Yukon Ombudsman <http://www.ombudsman.yk.ca>. 
252 Ibid. at 3. 
253 Ibid. at 4. 
254 Chapter 63 Ombudsman Act Y.1996, online: Yukon Territory <http://www.qov.yk.ca> at 15(1), 16(1), 17. 
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provides a means for the respondent to provide input in order to correct any factual errors 
or misunderstandings 
ADDRESSING SYSTEMIC/SYSTEM-WIDE CONCERNS 
As the mission of an Ombuds on a general basis is to contribute to a higher level of 
fairness in administrative regimes, the use of investigations to inquire into systemic or 
system-wide concerns, whether they are initiated on an own motion basis or in response 
to an individual complaint, is also deserving of particular attention. Examples of how 
systemic concerns have been addressed in the province of Ontario, since 2005, can be 
found in the 33 (as of May 2012) Special Operations Response Team (SORT) 
investigations, reported on by Andre Marin.255 The SORT style of investigation is 
undertaken when the issues under review are complex, sensitive and serious in nature 
and of interest to many people; when an informal resolution is unlikely; and/or when the 
implications of the issues raised or observed are potentially far-reaching and systemic. 256 
Typically, a team of investigators is brought together for the express purpose of 
completing in-depth reviews in an expeditious manner. Frequently, interviews with 
witnesses are audio taped and then transcribed to ensure accuracy. The foci of Mr. 
Marin's reports range from the rules around parental custody of children with special 
needs and eligibility for appropriate forms of residential care, to questioning the 
governmental restrictions on the use of Avastin, a cancer treatment drug, to the 
transparency of property assessment methods to the use of advertising for promoting 
private colleges' programs, etc. 257 
255 
"SORT INVESTIGATIONS", online: Ombudsman Ontario <http://www.ombudsman.on.ca>. 
256 
"Special Ombudsman Response Team", online: Ombudsman Ontario <http://www.ombudsman.on.ca> at "Investigations". 
257 
"SORT INVESTIGATIONS" supra note 255. 
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Mr. Marin's investigation of the origin and subsequent communication of the 
controversial security regulation (Regulation 233/10) passed by the province prior to the 
G20 summit held in Toronto in June 2010 culminating in his report entitled "Caught in the 
Act" deserves more in-depth attention. In this undertaking Marin employed particularly 
innovative investigative techniques. The investigative focus was the involvement of the 
Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services in the origin of Regulation 233/1"0 
and the communication of the regulation to police, media and the public. 258 In this 
instance, seven investigators and two early resolution officers rolled out their investigation 
in the usual fashion by conducting structured interviews; reviewing text provided by the 
Ministry; researching what had taken place at summit meetings that had been hosted 
elsewhere; visiting physical locations and speaking with individuals in the area.259 The 
investigative innovation can be seen in their use of social media like YouTube, biogs, 
podcasts and Face book to gather additional information. Using this approach, the 
investigators were able to identify in excess of 5000 videos related to the G20 a6tivities. In 
addition, the Ombudsman communicated with individuals via Twitter to ask them to 
contact his Office if they had information relevant to the issues being investigated.260 The 
volume and variety of materials acquired and witness accounts received demonstrated 
how traditional investigative approaches can be enhanced by the use of social media. 
Another example of how an Ombuds' investigation on a systemic matter can be 
conducted is found in the work of the Protecteur du citoyen/Ombudsman for Quebec 
Raymonde Saint-Germain. In October 2009, her Office tabled a report with the Quebec 
258 Andre Marin, "Investigation into The Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services' conduct in relation to Ontario 
Regulation 233/10 under the Public Works Protection Act "Caught in the Act" (December 2010) online: Ombudsman Ontario 
<http://www.ombudsman.on.ca>. 
259 Ibid. at 39. 
260 Ibid. at 40. 
94 
National Assembly on its investigation of the quality of government services for children 
with pervasive developmental disorders (PDDs). In this instance the methodology used 
was a survey approach whereby one survey was distributed to 150 parents of children 
with PDDs and another survey was distributed to 13 local bodies responsible for handling 
complaints from rehabilitation centres for people with intellectual disabilities and 
developmental disorders.261 In addition, 167 people including parents, practitioners and 
those responsible for managing services participated in interviews or focus groups. This 
approach was taken so as to be able to examine and document the experience of parents 
seeking services for their children from the point of first indicators of concern to the time 
the child was seven years of age or had completed the first grade. In this instance, the 
three ministries and their agencies responsible for providing support, funding and care for 
children with PDDs accepted all 21 recommendations that resulted from the Protecteur du 
Citoyen/Ombudsman's investigation. 262 
In yet another area of considerable public import, the Ombudsperson for British 
Columbia, Kim Carter, released a report entitled "Fit to Drink: Challenges in Providing Safe 
Drinking Water in British Columbia (2008)" in which she provided 39 recommendations on 
how various governmental bodies could improve on the safety of drinking water. All of the 
recommendations were accepted and are in the process of being implemented. Similarly, 
then Ombudsman for New Brunswick, Bernard Richard, released a report in June 2008 on 
the Minister of Education's decision to modify French Second Language Curriculum in 
which he outlined serious deficits in the Minister's approach. He also released a report 
261 Raymonde Saint-Germain, "Looking Towards Greater Continuity in Service Delivery, Approaches and Human Relations" 
Special Ombudsman's Report on Government Services for Children with Pervasive Developmental Disorders", (October 
2009) at 7, 8, 
online: Le Protecteur du citoyen <https://www.protecteurducitoyen.qc.ca>. 
262 Press Release# 161 online: Le Protecteur du citoyen<http://www.protecteurducitoyen.qc.ca>. 
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entitled "R.esidential Property Assessment Appeal Process in New Brunswick: Levelling 
the Playing Field" in June 2008 in which he concluded that there was a pressing need for 
the government to make the information it used to determine assessed values for 
properties accessible to the public and to improve the appeal process.263 
In the same tradition, then Ombudsman for Alberta, Gord Button, issued a report in 
May 2009 entitled "Prescription for Fairness" dedicated to reporting on an investigation 
undertaken to look at the government's handling of requests for payment for out-of-country 
medical care. The majority of his 53 recommendations were accepted as stated, or in 
principle.264 The Ombudsman for Saskatchewan, Kevin Fenwick, released a special report 
titled "My Brother's Keeper"265 in which he reported on the outcome of his review of the 
introduction of Electronic Control Devices (ECO), commonly known as Tasers, into all 
Saskatchewan correctional centres. In this instance the Ombudsman found that the use of 
a Taser in one specific incident was consistent with the guidelines for use. However, the 
Taser had been used on an inmate prior to the government authorizing the actual use of 
this technology. The outcomes of the foregoing reviews demonstrate the wisdom of 
addressing complaints from a systemic perspective, as first articulated by Stephen Owen 
in the 1980s, 266 whenever possible so as to increase access to justice for all who may be 
affected by a systemic or system-wide fault. 
263 Bernard Richard, "Residential Property Assessment Appeal Process in New Brunswick: Levelling the Playing Field" (2008) 
Ombudsman New Brunswick online: Ombudsman New Brunswick <http://www.gnb.ca>. 
264 Alberta Ombudsman, News Release/Communique, 07-20-2009, "Ombudsman receives response to Prescription for 
Fairness" (20 July 2009) online: Alberta Ombudsman <http://www.ombudsman.ab.ca.>. 
265 Saskatchewan Ombudsman, News Release/Communique, 2008-07-29, "OMBUDSMAN SAYS GOVERNMENT HAS 
WORK TO DO IF IT PLANS TO INTRODUCE ELECTRONIC CONTROL DEVICES INTO ADULT MALE CORRECTIONAL 
CENTRE" (29 July 2008) <http://www.ombudsman.sk.ca>. 
266 Owen, supra note 232. 
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·INVESTIGATION RESULTING FROM AN INDIVIDUAL COMPLAINT 
Hybrid Model 
An example of an investigation undertaken by an academic Ombuds on the basis 
of an individual complaint is captured in a case reported on by then Ombudsperson, Herve 
Depew, for Algonquin College in Ottawa, Ontario in 2008/2009. In this instance, an 
investigation was undertaken in response to a student's complaint that her professor had 
not graded her fairly. 267 Initially, the Ombudsperson encouraged the student to familiarize 
herself with the policy governing her situation and then to meet with her professor so as to 
better understand why she had received a zero for an assignment. A meeting was held 
and as the student remained dissatisfied she formally appealed the grade of zero following 
the College's standard appeal process. The appeal was not successful and the student 
believed the review process was handled unfairly so she asked the Ombudsman to 
investigate as a last resort. As the student had exhausted the College's appeal process 
and was alleging the process had not been conducted fairly, the Ombudsman met with the 
Chair of the Committee who had heard the student's appeal and reviewed the process 
followed and the material submitted by both the professor and the student. Through the 
Ombudsperson's review of the professor's submission it became apparent that the 
Professor was not complying with the directive in place for how any changes to the 
previously circulated information on evaluation of assignments was to be conducted. As a 
result, the Ombudsperson recommended that the Appeal Committee, which had originally 
denied the student's appeal, be reconvened to review the complaint taking into account 
the course outline, the directions for completing assignments, the evaluation criteria for the 
assignment in question and how the Professor had determined the mark for this particular 
267 Herve Depow, "Office of the Ombudsperson Annual Report 2008 to 2009" Case 5 at 7,8, online: Algonquin College 
Ombudsperson <http://www.algonguincollege.com>. · 
97 
student. The Committee reconvened and the Ombudsperson was invited to attend and 
meet with the Professor. Subsequently, the Professor agreed to review the grade 
assigned (which resulted in the grade moving from a zero to a passing grade) and to 
review his evaluation methods in relation to the College's directives on this subject. 
Through this investigation an individual unfairness was corrected, without the student 
having to invoke an external judicial review of the grade appeal process, and the likelihood 
of a comparable problem occurring again for other students was reduced. It is important to 
recognize that the methodology used in this case is common to a hybrid Ombuds 
approach for an individual matter whereby notice to investigate is generally provided 
verbally rather than in writing and the conclusions and recommendations are often issued 
verbally as well. In addition, the investigation, which is undertaken on an impartial and 
independent basis, is completed in a short time period rather than extending over weeks 
and months and as is the norm for an Ombuds process, the methodology used is 
determined solely by the Ombuds. 
Many bank Ombudsman who respond to client complaints also have the authority 
to investigate individual complaints. For example, the Canadian Imperial Bank of 
Commerce's website on complaint resolution indicates that if a customer is not able to 
resolve a concern with a local branch or office or the central 'customer care' service, the 
client can bring the cone.em to the attention of the Ombudsman for" ... a thorough 
investigation".268 Similarly, the mandate for the TD Bank Financial Group Ombudsman 
includes the authority to" ... conduct an independent review of customer concerns that 
remain unresolved" 269 as well as being identified as an intermediary between individual 
268 Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce online: <http://www.cibc.com/ca/cibc-and-you/to-our-customers/service-
commitmenUresolvinq-complaints>. 
269 TD Bank Financial Group online: <http://www.td.com/ombudsman.jsp>. 
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and small business clients and TD Bank and its subsidiaries. In addition, the majority of 
banking Ombudsman websites advertises that customers who are not satisfied with their 
interaction with a particular bank Ombudsman can escalate their complaint to the attention 
of the Ombudsman for Banking Services and Investments (OBSl).270 
It is worthy of reiterating that the banking Ombuds who respond to client 
. complaints are structured quite differently than those who respond to employees' 
concerns. Specifically, the Ombuds who receive employee complaints operate within the 
organizational model of practice which does not include an investigative mandate. As a 
result, within the same corporate body, both a hybrid and an organizational model of 
Ombuds practice have been established for use by different constituencies. This evolution 
demonstrates again the idiosyncrasy of the Ombuds' mandate depending on how and 
when and by whom the role was established. 
In addition, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation's (CBC) Ombudsman website 
indicates under its statement of principles that: 'The Ombudsman is completely 
independent of CBC program staff and management, reporting directly to the President of 
the CBC and, through the President to the Corporation's Board of Directors".271 This 
configuration could suggest that this role falls into the organizational Ombuds category. 
However, other components of the CBC Ombudsman's mandate indicate otherwise. For 
example, it is mandated that this Ombudsman will evaluate whether a piece of journalism 
or a broadcast complained about violated the CBC requirement that all journalistic activity 
must demonstrate accuracy, integrity and fairness. In addition, reference is made to the 
responsibility for fact finding as part of the Ombudsman's review process. As well, this 
27
° For more information on this organization see online: Ombudsman for Banking Services and Investment 
<http://www.obsi.ca>. 
271 The Office of the Ombudsman online: The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) 
<http://www.cbc.ca/ombudsman/page/mandate.html>. 
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Ombuds role provides explicitly for the ability for the Ombudsman to publish reports on 
specific cases that he has determined to be particularly noteworthy or consequential not 
only within the CBC and to the complainant(s) but to the general public as well. 
It must also be recognized that in the course of investigation whether it be 
conducted by a legislative or hybrid Ombuds, it will be found that the governmental agency 
or institution has not made an error and the Ombuds has determined that the decision 
complained about has been made fairly. While these decisions do not receive the same 
amount of media attention as reports indicating that a department or agency is rife with 
serious administrative errors or illegalities, acknowledgments of effective administration 
are routinely found in the annual reports of legislative Ombudsman and, as noted by Chief 
Justice Dickson, can boost the morale of government administrators. 272 
EARLY RESOLUTION TECHNIQUES 
Legislative and Hybrid Models 
It is also important to be mindful of the fact that in addition to in-depth investigative 
activity, all legislative and hybrid Ombudsman Offices receive, in totality, literally 
thousands of complaints annually that are handled outside of the investigative process. 
For instance, in the 2009/2010 annual report of the Ombudsman for Ontario it is stated 
that of the 13,894 complaints handled, (8035 within jurisdiction) 780 were resolved with 
the Office's intervention and 5,206 were handled via "inquiry made/referral given/resolution 
facilitated". 273 Similarly, the City of Toronto Ombudsman noted in her 2009/2010 annual 
report that of the 1562 complaints received, 1525 were dealt with using 'early resolution' 
techniques; 9 cases were investigated and 2 investigations were still in progress. 274 Due to 
the size of the jurisdiction and the sheer volume of complaints, in some instances, the 
272 Ombudsman, supra note 209· 
273 Andre Marin, Ombudsman Ontario Annual Report 2009/2010 at 76, online: <http://www.ombudsman.on.ca>. 
274 Fiona Crean, Toronto Ombudsman Annual Report 2010 at 34, online: <http://ombudstoronto.ca>. 
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l 
Om buds Office may use a clearing house (or call centre) format whereby calls, emails, 
faxes and letters are received and then 'triaged' by skilled information and referral staff. 
For obvious reasons, the first priority regardless of whether the Ombuds Office is a 
sole proprietor or has dozens of staff, is to determine whether the matter raised is within 
the jurisdiction of the Office. Typically those complaints falling outside of the Ombuds' 
jurisdiction are closed with the provision of a well- informed referral. For those that are 
within jurisdiction, the vast majority of complaints received by both legislative and hybrid 
Ombuds are handled via early resolution techniques which include: inquiries for the 
purpose of clarification; shuttle diplomacy275 , mediation and conflict coaching. Stephen 
Owen, former Ombudsman for the Province of British Columbia, who addressed the 
importance of expanding upon the traditional investigative approach opined: 
In keeping with the general principle that it is the proper role of an ombudsman 
office to strive for the mutually acceptable resolution of a problem rather than 
necessarily finding a fault or absence of .it, the office should attempt to provide 
informal mediation services wherever such an approach may be productive. This 
approach not only tends to result in greater satisfaction among all parties, but 
frequently provides a more rapid resolution than a full investigation oriented 
towards a finding of right or wrong.276 
Some current legislative Ombudsman Offices have adopted the same posture. For 
example, the Quebec Ombudsman/Le Protecteur du cityoen describes her role on the 
home page for the Office as "A neutral and independent mediator/Un mediateur neutre et 
independant ". 277 A similar approach is used by the Ombudsman for Saskatchewan (Kevin 
Fenwick) who noted on the cover of his 2006 annual report: 
• We. are Fair, Independent, Impartial 
• What we do: Negotiate, Investigate, Mediate 
275 Shuttle diplomacy in the Ombuds context involves the Ombuds or staff member conveying information from the 
complainant to the respondent and vice versa in a fashion that results in more effective communication between the two 
parties. 
276 Owen, supra note 50 at 55. 
277 Le Protecteur du citoyenrrhe Quebec Ombudsman online: <http://www.protecteurducitoyen.qc.ca> (English} and 
<http://www. protecteurducitoyen .qc.ca>. (French)>. 
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• Has Government Been Fair? 278 
A senior employee, Acting Deputy Ombudsman at the time, Ms. Renee Gavigan, advised 
that in the early years of this century the government of Saskatchewan amended the 
Ombudsman Act to include provision for mediation as well as investigation. The Office 
then developed a process known as alternative case resolution (ACR) which includes 
mediation, negotiation, facilitation and coaching. Usirig the ACR approach, a case analyst 
identifies whether or not a complaint is suitable for mediation using the following criteria: 1) 
the complainant is concerned about the relationship deteriorating; 2) the complainant 
wants to better understand how a decision was made or why it was made; 3) the 
complainant indicates that he hasn't felt heard by the government in that he feels he's hit a 
wall and can't communicate with them in a productive way; 4) the complainant expects to 
have an ongoing relationship with an administrator or department and wants to maintain or 
improve the quality of the relationship; or 5)'urgent' cases that would normally be 
investigated, but given how long the process could take using that route the outcome 
would be rendered 'academic'. If the issue presented meets one or more of the above 
criteria, the staff will canvass the parties to see if an ACR process may be acceptable to all 
involved. If the parties are amenable to proceeding with mediation they are reminded that 
the Ombudsman retains .the right to evaluate any settlements reached to determine if they 
are fair to the public overall. Ms. Gavignan emphasized that: 
As mediators/facilitators our job is to encourage the parties to be creative in 
coming· up with solutions that best meet their individual circumstances. 
We wouldn't support an agreement that didn't meet basic fairness standards, as 
mediators we use the fairness lens to assist the parties in developing a solid 
agreement. 279 
278 Kevin Fenwick, Annual Report 2006 Ombudsman Saskatchewan online: <http://www.ombudsman.sk.ca>. The balding of 
the term 'Mediate' is my emphasis. 
279 Interview of Renee Gavigan, Acting Deputy Ombudsman/Ombudsman Assistant by Nora Farrell in April 2007 for 
preparation of workshop delivered at Forum of Canadian Ombudsman conference held in Montreal, April 2007 for a 
workshop entitled "Should Ombuds mediate?" 
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Interestingly enough, as early as 1975, the Alberta Ombudsman at the time, Dr. 
lvany, described two scenarios in his annual report where he_ served as what he described 
as "a catalyst in the relations between the individual and society". 280 He fulfilled this role, in 
one instance, by organizing a meeting that assisted native fire fighters to bring their claims 
of discriminatory ways of thinking to the attention of senior governmental personnel. 281 
Another example of the use of a mediated approach is the situation reported whereby an 
Ombuds staff met with a farmer who was complaining about flooding and erosion of his 
land due to an alleged governmental action. Through discussion with government 
personnel who were also on site for the Ombudsman staff visit and the farmer, a mutually 
acceptable solution was found.282 
Geoffrey Wallace, a former University Ombuds in an American university, provides 
additional fodder for determining how the role of an Ombuds should be implemented as it 
relates to the use of dispute resolution techniques other than an investigative approach. In. 
1993 he observed that the Ombuds role in some universities in the U.S. in recent years 
had mutated into what could more accurately be called the 'University Mediator'. He noted 
"The major benefit [of the mutation] is that the Ombudsman, instead of taking on the task 
of the complaint, may simply put disputants together and act as if they are neutral with 
regard to the outcomes". 283 He posits in a similar vein to Levine (2004 ), Marin (2007) and 
Rawat (1985, 2007) that taking this approach does a disservice to the role and the 
university community. Specifically, Wallace says "The University Mediator would certainly 
280 Lundvik, supra note 45 at 49. 
281 Ibid. 
282 Ibid. 
283 Geoffrey Wallace, "Recent Role Variations in the Ombudsman in Education", online: (1993) California Caucus of College 
and University Ombuds Association. UCI Ombudsman: The Journal 10 at 2 
<http://www.ombuds.uci.edu/JOURNALS/1993/variations.html>. 
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have a neutral position, but they would not fulfill the fairness role that defines the role and 
function of the ombudsman".284 This explanation highlights the belief that an Ombuds, 
regardless of where she is situated, always has a responsibility to address issues of 
fairness and equity from an institutional or community perspective even if the parties in 
dispute are only interested in their needs and the quality of their relationship. While 
Wallace's frame of reference is American post secondary institutions, his admonition is 
instructive to Ombuds in other settings well as other jurisdictions as whenever an Ombuds, 
wherever he or she is located, serves as a mediator she maintains a professional and 
moral responsibility for expecting that both substantive and procedural fairness standards 
are met in this context as well. 
Michael Mills, former long standing Ombudsman for the City of Portland, Oregon 
also articulates the primacy of the notion of an Ombuds being an 'advocate for fairness' 
rather than simply mediating disputes in a compelling manner: 
The ombudsman's role of advocacy becomes evident after the facts are known 
and the conclusion begins to gel. While the mediator strives to achieve a resolution 
the parties can accept, the ombudsman is more often faced with advocating for a 
solution which he or she believes to be the most fair and equitable even though it 
may not be completely acceptable 
to both parties.285 
This kind of caution reinforces the importance of the. principles of independence and 
impartiality that require the Ombuds to move beyond the sole pursuit of client satisfaction 
to determining what is appropriate given the circumstances. Hence, Ombuds wherever 
they are located and however they choose to do their work, are mindful when using early 
resolution processes that they are not in place to facilitate a quick fix for one or two 
284 Ibid. 
285 Michael Mills, "Mediation Vs. Ombudsmanry", (no date available). I contacted Mr. Mills who was the Ombudsman for the 
City of Portand, Oregon to ascertain where the article I have in hard copy was published and when. Unfortunately he can not 
locate this information. 
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individuals but rather to contribute to a fair, enduring and timely resolution of complaints 
both of an individual and systemic nature. 
While the foregoing material has been dedicated to how legislative and hybrid 
Ombuds implement their investigative and early resolution mandates, it is important to 
recognize that as another indicator of the degree of their structural independence, 
Ombuds typically have means at their disposal which allow them to refuse to investigate or 
take up a matter. For example, Section 17 of the Ombudsman Act for Ontario states that if 
there is an adequate remedy that the complainant has not made use of or having looked 
at the case in its entirety the Ombudsman (and this authority is delegated to various staff 
as well) has the discretion to refuse to investigate further. Not surprisingly, Ombuds 
legislation generally requires that a decision to reject a complaint and the rationale for 
doing so be provided to the complainant in writing. 
Similarly, hybrid Ombuds also have the authority to refuse to take up a complaint 
on the basis that it is considered to be frivolous or vexatious. Typically the same 
expectation for providing a written rationale (on either a request or pro forma basis) for 
refusing to accept the complaint is also required. In the same tradition, organizational 
Ombuds often have the ability to state they do not think it is appropriate to become 
involved in the discussion of some matters. In order for complainants to accept such an 
action as being fair, in all three models of practice, there must be a clear demonstration 
and perception of impartiality. The traditional ability of the Ombuds to independently 
determine what is the appropriate approach for handling a matter is also well represented 
in the diversity of techniques used and the time frames evident in the use of early 
resolution modalities for resolving complaints lodged with either a legislative or hybrid 
Om buds. 
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Organizational Ombuds Model 
The daily fare of organizational Ombuds which is the resolution of complaints on 
the basis of what other Ombuds models would call 'early resolution' activities like the 
provision of advice, making inquiries, mediation, shuttle diplomacy, mediation, fact-
finding exercises and coaching is complemented by the regular analysis of trends to 
identify potential systemic or system-wide problems. However, there is an overarching 
issue that must be addressed in conjunction with the analysis of the category of 
Ombuds' practice. It is important to acknowledge that there are respected political 
scientists and ombuds practitioners who believe that any Ombuds role which is not 
established by legislation is more properly referred to as a 'Wannabe' Ombudsmen'286, 
or a pseudo or quasi Ombuds. In this vein, the current Ombudsman for Ontario (Andre 
Marin) asked this provocative query in a keynote address to the attendees of the 2ih 
Annual Conference of the United States Ombudsman Association speech: 
Do you wonder why the private sector is awash with positions that masquerade 
as Ombudsmen, when these positions may more accurately be described as 
extensions of their human resources or customer relations department? Simply, 
it is because of the vast amount of goodwill that the word Ombudsman conjures 
in the minds of the public .... As originally conceived, the Ombudsman was 
meant to challenge, not cower, to speak out, not whisper and to lead, not follow. 
An Ombudsman was meant from the get-go to be a powerful agent of 
change.287 
However, though, in my experience, observation and review of organizational Ombuds' 
activities, Marin's (2007) and Hill's (1997) characterizations of the non:-legislative Ombuds, 
located in the private sector, are not necessarily consistent with how they actuany operate 
in practice in Canada. For example, then Corporate Ombudsman/Protectrice de la 
286 This term was introduced by Larry B. Hill in 1997, a Professor of Political Science, in an address to the Administrative Law 
and Regulatory Practice Section of the American Bar Association in a speech and subsequent article entitled: American 
Ombudsmen and Others; or, American Ombudsmen and 'Wannabe' Ombudsmen. 
287 Andre Marin, "Innovate or Perish" (2007) 20 Canadian Journal of Administrative Law and Practice at 105. 
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personne for Hydro- Quebec, Justine Sentenne, indicated in her 2009 Annual Report that 
of 148 cases settled, 15 had been mediated by the Ombudsman; 28 by the provision of 
advice or counsel and 21 by referral to the appropriate authority. 288 In this time period 
complaints were raised in a number of important areas such as discrimination, harassment 
and job status. These areas of concern which were identified publicly, rather than being 
'whispered', were successfully settled with the assistance of this Ombudsman. As a result 
of her discussions and interventions, in fulfilling her role as a change agent, the Corporate 
Ombudsman/Protectrice de la personne made two philosophical recommendations in her 
annual report that are indicative of leading rather than cowering. Specifically she 
commented on how the corporation could ensure a strong work ethic continued within the 
company by suggesting an increased focus on human dignity and respect for improving 
the work atmosphere. She also recommended the establishment of standards and 
guidelines for the efficient use of voice mail. In addition, praise was given to the 
corporation for its compassionate approach to accommodating employees who also serve 
as caregivers in demanding family situations and she expressed hope that the underlying 
value of compassion would be evident in the future. 
While the Corporate Ombudsman/Protectrice de la personne for Hydro- Quebec's 
annual report is posted on the company website and distributed widely in a hard copy 
format, many organizational Ombuds do not report publicly. Instead, their confidential 
reports summarize trends and issues and provide aggregated complaint data that are then 
provided to senior management for use in determining how to address systemic issues. In 
addition, organizational Ombuds are often asked to provide their insight and advice on 
how trends which are cause for concern should be best addressed. 
288 Justine Sentenne, "Report of Activities of the Corporate Ombudsman 2009 Hydro- Quebec" at 3, online: Hydro Quebec 
<http://www.hydroquebec.com>. 
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In light of the foregoing discussion it is worthwhile to know that Canadian Ombuds 
scholar, Donald C. Rowat held the view that ombuds roles not founded by legislation 
should be described as 'internal Ombudsmen'. While I support the importance of 
distinguishing the type of Ombuds roles that have been established in a wide variety of 
different locations in many different ways, so as to ensure that users know what to expect 
when they approach them, I believe the use of 'internal Ombudsman' may unintentionally 
convey the notion that this type Ombuds is neither independent nor impartial when in fact 
it may exemplify very high standards in these area. For instance, due to the culture of the 
organization, the quality of the policy or terms of reference or charter coupled with the 
Ombud's personal credibility, while the role may not be configured so as to be as 
structurally independent as a legislated Ombuds, the incumbent may be perceived as 
operating at the same level, by virtue of her demonstrated capacity to 'speak truth to 
power'. 
The policy statement issued by the Australian and New Zealand Ombudsman 
Association (ANZOA) is instructive as well in articulating its opinion on the criteria which 
are essential for indicating that an entity is entitled to be called an 'ombudsman'. 
Specifically, it is stated that it is oxymoronic or contradictory to use such a term as 'internal 
ombudsman' as this terminology indicates that the ombudsman is actually directed by an 
industrial organization or governmental official.289 As a result, the identification of the type 
of ombuds role should be based on an examination of not only on how it was established 
and the powers that it has in place but also on how it is implemented. For instance, annual 
and special reports, the Ombuds promotional material as well as observation of the 
Ombuds' practice are useful means for determining both the independence of the Office 
289 Australian and New Zealand Ombudsman Association (ANZOA), Media Release, "Essential Criteria for Describing a Body 
as an Ombudsman" (18 May 2010), online: ANZOA < http://www.anzoa.com.au>. 
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and the impartiality of the incumbent. Given how important perception is to the proper 
implementation of the role of Ombuds, I concur with ANZOA that the use of the descriptor 
of 'internal' in concert with Ombuds is never appropriate as it clashes with and undermines 
the traditional understanding of and the commonly stated expectations for independence 
and impartiality associated with this role. 
As noted previously, early resolution techniques are 'the bread and butter' of many 
Ombuds roles and are a regularly used complement to the investigative activities 
undertaken by both legislative and hybrid Ombuds. The authority that allows for the 
organizational Ombuds to select whatever form of dispute resolution assistance he deems 
to be appropriate to the situation is also representative of the independence inherent to the 
organizational Ombuds role. 
ACCESSIBILITY AS IT APPLIES TO ALL TYPES OF OMBUDS 
(Legislative. Hybrid. Organizational) 
A key defining characteristic of an Ombuds role, which is by definition an 
alternative to the traditional dispute resolution system, should be the ease with which its 
services can be accessed and used. As noted by Chief Justice Dickson, Ombuds 
services are" ... free ~nd available to all."290 Therefore, in order for an Ombuds Office to 
be effective, knowledge of its existence and how it functions should be wide-spread. 
Hence, many Ombuds roles in all models of practice place great emphasis on reaching 
out to potential complainants through educational campaigns using all manner of public 
relations and marketing programs. Considerable attention is also paid to ensuring 
complainants are able to make use of Ombuds' services easily. For example, 
information is posted in many languages; staff or interpreters are able to communicate 
290 Ombudsman, supra, note 209 at IV B. 
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in a variety of languages 291 ; complaints may be submitted via email or telephone; 
meetings are arranged to accommodate those for whom traditional office hours or 
locations are a barrier, etc. As a result of a high level of accessibility, individuals who 
· believe they have been treated unfairly have the opportunity to acquire expert dispute 
resolution assistance at no cost to themselves, other than the time they invest in 
submitting and discussing their concern or complaint. Clearly there is very little benefit 
to having strong powers of investigation and highly skilled, committed dispute resolvers 
on hand if no one knows about the Ombuds' role and how it functions and how the 
service may be beneficial. 
Following in the same tradition, the emphasis placed on providing education 
about the work of an Ombudsman can be seen in a recent annual report where the 
Nova Scotia Ombudsman reported that his office had increased by 51 % the number of 
individuals it had connected with through its outreach work. It was noted that reaching 
youth in residential and custodial facilities as well as seniors in residential care facilities 
had been a particular focus and that future efforts would include adult offenders as 
well.292 Through this kind of effort more vulnerable detainees. may then reach out to the 
Ombudsman themselves for assistance. This Office's various communication strategies 
are specifically targeted to meet the Ombudsman's educational goal of increasing 
citizens' accessibility in order to make use of the Office and for clarifying its role and 
mandate. 293 This approach is well established in all manner of Om buds offices where 
291 In a 2011 newsletter the Ombudsman for Banking Services and Investments (OBSI) indicated that inquiries were being 
handled in 170 different languages. See "OBSI serving Canadians from Coast to Coast" (24 November 2011 ), online 
Ombudsman for Banking Services and Investments <http://www.obsi.ca>. 
292 Dwight Bishop, "Nova Scotia Office of the Ombudsman Annual Accountability Report for the Fiscal Year 2009-2010" (July 
13, 2010) at 17, 18. 
Online: Nova Scotia Ombudsman <http://www.qov.ns.ca>. 
293 Bishop, supra note 292 at 17. 
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outreach strategies are constantly being reviewed and improved in order to ensure the 
availability of the Ombuds role is communicated widely and that the service itself is 
easily accessible. 
EDUCATION FOR POTENTIAL RESPONDENTS AND PROBLEM SOLVERS 
Legislative Model 
While education of potential respondents so as to encourage fair process without 
any Ombuds' involvement is not specifically identified in Chief Justice Dickson's 
foundational description, a preventative orientation is now well developed within the ambit 
of a wide variety of Ombuds roles. For instance, well before a complaint is brought to the 
.attention of a service provider or administrative decision-maker, Ombuds from all models 
often offer orientation sessions to personnel in the agencies, organizations or corporations 
who may be responding to their queries in the future, on their role and function and 
operating procedures. For example, the Ombudsman for Saskatchewan has pursued the 
educational vector in an in-depth manner by developing a program known as the 'Fine Art 
of Fairness' complete with a comprehensive workbook entitled A Guide for Fair 
Practice. 294 This training program is delivered around the province to government staff on 
a regular basis to assist them to make fair decisions in what is recognized are often 
difficult circumstances. In a similar vein, the Ombudsman for Manitoba has issued a 
training manual entitled "Understanding Fairness: A Handbook on Fairness for Manitoba 
Municipal Leaders".295 In the same trajectory but taking a different focus, the Ombudsman 
for Saskatchewan also published a detailed resource entitled Practice Essentials for 
Administrative Tribunals 296 in 2009. These kinds of initiatives demonstrate a preventative 
294 
"A Guide of Fair Practice", online: Ombudsman Saskatchewan <http://www.ombudsman.sk.ca>. 
295 
"Understanding FAIRNESS A Handbook on Fairness for Manitoba Municipal Leaders", online: Manitoba Ombudsman 
<http://www.ombudsman.mb.ca>. 
296 
"Practice Essentials for Administrative Tribunals", online: Ombudsman Saskatchewan <http://www.ombudsman.sk.ca>. 
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orientation and a commitment to capacity building within the actual organizations that are 
designing and delivering services so as to forestall the emergence of complaints. 
Hybrid Model 
A comparable approach has been used by the Ombudsperson for Students at the 
University of British Columbia (UBC), Shirley Nakata, whereby a "Fairness Toolkit" has 
been created including a "Fairness Checklist for Decision-makers". This list poses 
questions related to twelve different aspects of 'procedural fairness' so that individual 
administrative units can determine for themselves as they are developing processes 
and/or making decisions what criteria they should be taking into account in order to be as 
fair as possible. 297 
Organizational Model 
As Ombuds operating in the organizational model typically do not issue 
public reports, I will rely on my own experience working in this model of practice and the 
anecdotal reports of Ombuds at various workshops and conferences to inform this aspect 
of Ombuds practice. In my experience, the most frequently referenced type of training 
arranged and lead by organizational Ombuds is that which is related to effective conflict 
resolution and civility. Typically, community members are invited to participate in Ombuds-
led training that has been set up at the request of particular constituent groups or by senior 
management or on the Ombuds own initiative. 
These kinds of educational approaches are an important adjunct to Ombuds' 
dispute resolution activities as they have the potential to reduce complaints substantially 
and contribute to an ethos of fairness within decision-making processes generally. 
Nathalie Des Rosiers also refers to this kind of Ombuds work as prophylactic in nature by 
297 
"Fairness Toolkit: Fairness Checklist for Decision-makers" (June 2010) online: Office of the Ombudsperson for Students 
<http://ombudsoffice.ubc.ca>. ' 
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specifically identifying ombuds educational efforts as 'preventative mechanisms' in 
addition to providing a forum for the resolution of disputes in an alternative fashion. 298 
These types of preventative activities undertaken by many Ombuds are primarily designed 
to build the precepts of administrative fairness and respectful interpersonal communication 
into all governmental, private, public and not-for-profit administrative activity. The 
interaction this kind of activity provides also allows for the Ombuds to expand upon and 
reinforce the independence and impartiality associated with its complaint handling 
activities. 
FAIRNESS STANDARDS 
In addition to promoting ways and means for public, private and not-for-profit 
sector employees to engage in fair decision-making so as to prevent complaints from 
arising, both legislative and hybrid Ombuds often publicize the administrative fairness 
criteria they expect of others and that they apply themselves when conducting 
investigations and determining outcomes. 
Legislative Model 
Within the legislative model of practice the Ombudsperson for British Columbia has 
posted a Fairness Checklist 299 for a somewhat different purpose than the aforementioned 
UBC Ombudsperson approach, that being, to clarify both for complainants and 
respondents what criteria will be used when complaints are assessed. For instance, in the 
jurisdiction of British Columbia the following areas will be taken into account: 
communication, facilities and services, decision procedures, appeal, review and complaint 
procedures, organizational issues and agency review and planning. 
298 des Rosiers, supra note 3 at para 20. 
299 
"Fairness Checklist", online: Ombudsperson British Columbia <http://www.ombudsman.bc.ca>. 
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Hybrid Model 
The Ombudsperson for the University of Western Ontario has posted an 
Administrative Fairness Checklist that is designed to assist decision-makers to become 
aware of the fairness criteria the Ombudsperson expects they will use before, during and 
after decisions are being made and communicated.300 In addition, a checklist is ·also 
provided to demonstrate what is expected for 'fair service', e.g. non-discriminatory, 
efficient, good follow-up and fair interpersonal communication, e.g. respectful, honest, 
etc.301 
Organizational Model 
The International Ombudsman Association makes a general pronouncement on 
'fairness' in its 'Best Practices' commentary as it relates to the organizational 
Ombudsman's Standards of Practice by stating: 
2.2 The Ombudsman strives for impartiality, fairness and objectivity in the 
treatment of people and the consideration of issues. The Ombudsman advocates 
for fair and equitably administered processes and does not advocate on behalf of 
· any individual within the organization. 302 
Unfortunately, for the purposes of this discussion, no specific techniques or checklists are 
provided. However, it is instructive that an in 2012 an entire volume of the Journal founded 
by the International Ombudsman Association ~as focused primarily on fairness providing 
a plethora of articles on this topic. 303 
300 
"Administrative Fairness Checklist for Decision-Makers" July 2006 online: University of Western Ontario 
<http://www.uwo.ca/ombuds>. 
301 
"Fair Service Checklist for Institutions/Organizations" July 2006 online: University of Western Ontario 
<http://www.uwo.ca/ombuds>. 
302 
"IOA Best Practices, A Supplement to IOA's Standards of Practice" Version 3, October 13, 2009 online: International 
Ombudsman Association <http://www.ombudsassociation.ora>. 
303 Journal of the International Ombudsman Association, Volume 4, Number 1, 2011. The articles included are:."ls Life Fair?"; 
"The Ombudsman's Ability to Influence Perceptions of Organizational Fairness: Toward a Multi-Stakeholder Framework"; 
Justice as Basis of Equity and Fairness in Ombudsman Practice"; 'The Ombudsman's Guide to Fairness"; "I Was Just 
Thinking About Neutrality"; I Was Just Thinking About Fairness"; and "Fairness and Self-Evaluation". 
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As a result of the recognition of the Ombuds' expertise in fair practice and comfort 
with the use of a wide variety problem solving modalities, it is not uncommon for Ombuds, 
from all categories of practice, to be asked to deliver training on fairness principles. In 
addition, some hybrid and organizational Ombuds are also known for offering training on 
effective communication, civility and team building as well as fair decision-making and the 
application and delivery of various forms of effective dispute resolution. Another means for 
advancing the ethos of fairness specific to an organization or more broadly to a large 
jurisdiction, can be seen in Ombuds from all models of practice commenting on draft 
policies, and for legislative Ombuds on draft bills, as well as on the design of appeal 
processes and conflict resolution systems as experts on fair process. Often the feedback 
provided relates to ensuring that administrative fairness principles have been adequately 
and properly embedded in notice provisions; decision-making criteria are clearly 
articulated; and that opportunities for inclusion of ADR modalities are considered as is 
appropriate to the situation. This kind of consultation is done on the basis of providing 
input rather than ·indicating the policy has been accepted by the Om buds as 'perfect'. 
Clearly, if the Ombuds was to qualify a policy in such a fashion it would mean the Ombuds 
would have no credibility when addressing complaints about it at a later date and would 
not be seen to.be either independent or impartial. 
THE POWER OF RECOMMENDATION 
Once again, while Chief Justice Dickson does not specifically reference this 
quality, it is worthy of note that one characteristic that is common to all Ombuds roles of 
general jurisdiction or as Ombuds for specific communities, wherever they are located in 
Canada, is the manner in which they interact with the establishing body to effect change 
on a specific matter or issue. This pervasive characteristic is that Ombuds make 
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recommendations that are not binding or enforceable rather than issuing directives, rules, 
sanction or vetoes. In my view, one of the primary rationales for Ombuds providing 
recommendations rather than issuing orders or binding decisions is that in all instances an 
Ombuds' independence should not be compromised by being seen as or to function as a 
decision-maker for the organization or the government body whose administrative actions 
are being overseen. If the recommendations made were binding or enforceable the 
Ombuds is then, by default, determining how the organization or jurisdiction's human 
resources will be deployed and/or how its financial resources will be spent. In addition, it is 
recognized within many spheres of dispute resolution304 that there is great benefit to an 
individual or organization contributing to the construction of a beneficial outcome and 
deciding to voluntarily implement a recommendation made as they see its value rather 
than being forced to do so.305 As a result, a higher degree of commitment to its effective 
implementation may occur. 
In an attempt to better understand this phenomenon, Marc Hertogh examined the 
degree to which Ombuds recommendations and administrative court decisions were 
implemented in the Netherlands, by contrasting the policy impact that resulted from a 
cooperative approach versus a coercive approach, respectively. Hertogh found that the 
Ombudsman who adopted a c.onsultative approach, including frequent opportunities for 
dialogue, which allowed for adjustments as was appropriate, demonstrated a solid 
understanding of what was practical and achievable in the recommendations made 306 and 
his interventions were well received and the implementation rate was high. Whereas, by 
304 Examples of various processes specifically designed to solicit parties' input on an appropriate resolution include 
mediation, facilitation, restorative justice procedures and talking circles. 
305 Examples of areas of endeavour which have moved from a focus on an adjudicated outcome to incorporating the use of 
various forms of ADR so as to increase parties' commitment to implementing a joint solution include child welfare, child 
custody arrangements, divorce and separation and human rights discrimination and harassment claims. 
306 Marc Hertogh, "Coercion, Cooperation, and Control: Understanding the Policy Impact of Administrative Courts and the 
Ombudsman in the Netherlands" (2001) Law and Policy Vol.23, No.1. at 61. 
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comparison, the decisions of the administrative court under review in his study, in some 
instances, could not be implemented at all. It was observed that this problem occurred as 
it was logistically impossible to implement some judicial decisions given the judges' lack of 
understanding of the current administrative environment and the complete lack of 
opportunity for this kind of information to be made available to the court before the 
decision was made.307 In addition, Hertogh's interviewees' comments demonstrated that if 
an administration didn't like the court ruling they could find a technical means for getting 
around it; or interpret the ruling in such a fashion so that it was deemed irrelevant or 
encourage the passage of legislation to override the court's ruling.308 In addition, in the 
Netherlands, the administrative court's decision applies only to the instant case 309 so it 
lacks the systemic or system-wide impact that can result from the Ombudsman's ability to 
make a recommendation of that nature. As a result, it is ironic that the lack of enforcement 
that some see as a weakness of the Ombuds model was found not to be an inhibitor, and 
in fact, supported positive policy improvement. By comparison, it is readily apparent from 
Hertogh's research findings in the Netherlands context, judicial coercive force did not 
always have the desired result whereas the Ombudsman's cooperative approach often 
resulted in system-wide benefit.310 
It is important to acknowledge that once recommendations are made and 
accepted, Ombuds typically follow up on how and when those recommendations have 
been implemented. If a recommendation was accepted and then never implemented it is 
likely that the Ombuds will bring this lack of accountability to the attention of the head of 
the organization or in some instances, via public reporting. Ombuds have often been 
307 Ibid. 62. 




quoted as saying that the Ombuds' authority is only the power of moral suasion311 or the 
power of persuasion.312 However, I believe this type of comment is somewhat 
disingenuous as virtually all Ombuds who have the capacity to report publicly on the 
issues investigated by their Offices have the ability to put considerable pressure on the 
government or institution or organization to adopt their recommendations. Similarly, if the 
respondent is not willing to accept the recommendations, the Ombuds may also publicize 
the respondent's unwillingness to acknowledge the import of the problem stated or take 
any steps to deal with a documented fault or failure to execute its mandate properly. While 
restricted to the ability to recommend only, it is readily apparent that the ability to publicize 
findings and reports greatly enhances the strength of the recommendation and in my view 
goes beyond the notion of 'moral suasion' alone. 
Recognition of how important 'non-dispositive' decisions can be even though they 
result in a recommendation rather than a binding decision, was evident in the debate that 
ensued over the level of fairness required for disclosure of documents pertinent to an 
appeal made by Mr. Abel, a psychiatric patient who was incarcerated, to the then named 
Advisory Review Board (the Board) to be released from custody. In Abel and Advisory 
Review Board 313 (Abel) it was decided both by the Divisional Court and the Court of 
Appeal that even though the Board's recommendation was non-binding the impact was. 
such that the rules of natural justice had to be applied to the appellant's right to know the 
entirety of the case against him. In this case, the appeal was generated by the fact that the 
files and reports prepared by the staff in the institution where he was held would only be 
311 Andre Marin "Ontario's Ombudsman uses moral suastion to push accountability and the public interest" Ontario College of 
Teachers Magazine Professionally Speaking (1 September 2011) online: 
<http://www.ombudsman.on.ca>. 
312 Jamieson, supra note 165; Owen, supra note 50. 
313 Abel and Advisory Review Board (1979), 97 DLR (3D) 304 (Ont. Div. Ct.); affd. (1981), 119 DLR (3D) 101 (Ont.CA). 
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seen by the members of the Board and not by the appellant himself. While Abel is focused 
on the level of fairness required in the conduct of a particular hearing, the judicial decision-
makers' finding recognizes that non-binding decisions can have significant import hence 
the resultant requirement for a high level of procedural fairness. In addition, from 
reviewing the special and annual reports of Ombuds from across Canada it is readily 
apparent that non-binding recommendations made by Ombuds can and have had huge 
impact on many individuals' lives and the organizations and governments that provide 
services to them. Analogous to Abel, the potential for a positive or negative impact for 
either the complainant or the respondent as a result of an Ombuds investigation or early 
resolution in~ervention or a decision not to pursue a. matter, underlies the importance of the 
Ombuds demonstrating the highest degree of impartiality, independence and fairness in 
their decision-making processes. 
Given the foregoing analysis, it is now readily apparent that the Ombuds role is 
multi-faceted, unique and complex and the approach the Ombuds will take in any given 
situation is context specific. While common threads are easily identifiabl·e, the notion of 
caveat emptor ('user beware') should be clearly evident in that users of Om buds' services, 
respondents and their various publics must be educated on the specific terms of 
engagement specified by the enabling Ombuds legislation, terms of reference, 
Memorandum of Agreement, Charter or policy in order to ensure expectations are 
accurate and desired outcomes are feasible. 
119 
The Future of Ombudsing in Canada 
The historical review of the genesis of the Ombuds role in Canada begins with a 
student association establishing an Ombudsman314 at Simon Fraser University in 1965. 
This effort was followed by the proclamation of legislation so as to establish Ombuds of 
general jurisdiction in nine provinces and one territory. Betwixt and between and after 
these occasions, private sector organizations were establishing hybrid Ombuds roles and 
public sector entities and government departments were creating organizational Ombuds 
roles. As a result, it can be very difficult for uninitiated complainants and respondents to 
know exactly what to expect when they encounter an Ombuds. This reality presents the 
Canadian Ombuds world and potential complainants or respondents or counsel who 
inter~cts with these Ombuds with a conundrum, as it is difficult to know what powers are 
held by a particular Ombuds even though the title itself appears to be unique. Rawat 
provides his rationale for his disagreement with what he would consider the indiscriminate 
use of the term of 'ombudsman' by stating: "The fact that there are so many other types of 
ombudsmen with less demanding requirements obscures the importance of having 
absolutely independent ombudsmen in both the private and public sectors for the weH-
being of democracy".315 In particular, Rawat laments the 'Americanization' of the Ombuds 
model in Canada and states the distortion of the concept is too far gone and too firmly 
established, most notably in the U.S., for any remedial action to allow for the use of the 
term 'Ombudsman' to be limited to the classical role. He also believes the classical or 
legislative Ombudsman should be" ... restored to its former luster".316 However, he does 
314 The history suggests that this Ombudsman operated as either an organizational or hybrid Ombuds depending on the 
decade. Currently, the SFU Ombudsperson operates in the hybrid model of practice. 
315 Donald C. Rowat, ''The American Distortion of the ombudsman concept and its influence on Canada" (2007) 50 Canadian 
Public Administration 42 at 46. 
316 Ibid. at 47. 
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not provide any rationale for why this burnishing of the legislative Ombuds role is 
necessary and how it would occur. In fact, I would argue that even the small number of 
examples of Om buds activity provided previously demonstrate that the Om buds luster is 
bright in Canada today. In contrast, noted British Ombuds scholar, Mary Seneviratne 
opined that Ombuds worldwide have been very successful. She emphasizes not only the 
growth in these offices but also the adaptability and flexibility observed in the 
establishment of this role in a wide variety of contexts.317 
Rawat also encouraged all Ombuds, wherever they are situated, which, for 
obvious reasons is much easier said than done, to advocate for greater protection of their 
independence by establishment of the office by legislation. This scholar's piece of advice 
is incongruous as it makes one wonder what legislative entity would be in a position to tell 
the Bank of Montreal or the University of British Columbia or a regional health care 
association that the Ombuds functions they have created via policy or terms of reference 
must now be established by legislation? While this approach may be desirable from a 
theoretical perspective, many practitioners and scholars would submit that 'this ship has 
sailed' in that it is no longer possible to identify the legislative model as the only correct 
form for an Ombuds. Additionally, as there is no data to demonstrate that organizational or 
hybrid Ombuds can not operate effectively, absent a legislative mandate, there may be no 
compelling reason to do so from a competency perspective. Rawat also proposes that all 
industries should have independent Ombuds as was established in 1996 by the Canadian 
Banking Association. However, as pointed out earlier, in November 2008 the Royal Bank 
of Canada and in November 2011 TD Bank opted out of this scheme and have chosen to 
retain ADR Chambers (a Toronto based private sector firm that also provides training, 
317 Seneviratne, supra note 33 at 322. 
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mediation and arbitration services) to serve as final non-binding arbiters of complaints that 
were not successfully resolved through their own Ombuds process. This unwillingness to 
accept the not-for-profit OBSI as the banking Ombuds for Canada suggests that an 
'industry Ombudsman' may not be a universal remedy either. Once again, as Canada's 
best known Ombuds scholar, Rowat also advocates for all professions to have an 
independent ombudsman so that the public would respect the handling of complaints 
against members of a particular profession. He observes "These reforms may seem far-
reaching, but they are necessary if Canada is once again to become a leader in 
ombudsmanship". 318 
Notwithstanding Rowat's considerable reputation, it is also important to recognize 
that in Canada, in opposition to Rowat's point of view, the evidence provided 
demonstrates that hybrid and organizational Ombuds roles are neither organizational 
lapdogs nor are they hamstrung by their terms of reference or founding policy. Their 
annual and special reports and the systemic changes that have resulted from individual 
case work and trends analysis that were presented earlier are in fact a testament to the 
contrary. Typically Ombuds in these roles are not restricted to being only an 'active 
listener' or 'conflict coach' or 'agent of information and referral' and/or 'impassive mediator'. 
It must also be reiterated that hybrid Ombuds conduct investigations, both in response to 
complaints and on their own initiative, and publicize their findings and recommendations in 
public annual and special reports that have considerable individual and system-wide 
impact. In many cases, organizational Ombuds are also seen as change agents who 
identify systemic issues and make recommendations that are implemented in their 
entirety. 
318 Rawat, supra note 315 at 47. 
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This journey through a number of perspectives on the establishment and the 
execution of the roles of Ombuds in Canada demonstrates the similarities, the differences 
and the resulting complexity and the diversity of contemporary legislative, hybrid and 
organizational Ombuds' roles. Based on this review the following criteria have emerged as 
fundamental to the Ombuds role, in whatever category of practice they are established: 
• an inquisitorial rather than an adversarial framework for assisting with the 
resolution of disputes and for determining what is fair for legislative and 
hybrid roles and/or contributing to fairness for organizational roles; 
• analyzing individual concerns and complaints for indicators of systemic 
and/or system-wide implications and making use of own-motion or own-
initiative authority to analyze trends and address emerging systemic issues; 
• administrative control of the Ombuds operation along with the ability to 
investigate (hybrid and legislative) and/or make inquiries (organizational) in 
the manner that the Ombuds alone determines to be appropriate given the 
subject matter and the circumstances; 
• the power of recommendation only; 
• an operational style that demonstrates the Ombuds is situated on the 
informal side of the standard dispute resolution spectrum and which does 
not interfere with the work of the body or unit for which the Ombuds has 
oversight; 
• a high degree of accessibility (services widely advertised, easy to use and 
no fees charged); 
. 
• the authority and responsibility to hold all information received and 
collected in confidence; 
123 
• Ombuds' adherence to the principles of natural justice and administrative 
fairness in conducting their own work and examining or assessing the work 
of others; 
• Use of preventative activities, (e.g. input on draft policies or legislation and 
leading training initiatives) as is appropriate to the situation; 
• Requirement for impartiality, and 
• Structural independence (provided through arms length arrangements 
coupled with administrative and financial independence and capacity to 
determine own operational policies and procedures). 
When these characteristics are evident in the design of the Ombuds role and are 
implemented properly, the Ombuds role is as cited by former Chief Justice Brian Dickson 
"an effective alternative to the courts, the legislature, and the executive branch for righting 
administrative wrongs."319 In addition, the historical analysis demonstrates how the role 
has evolved from reacting to complaints received into systemic analyst and change agent 
and educator so as to prevent 'administrative wrongs' from occurring in the first place. 
Given the import of independence and impartiality to the traditional perception of 
fairness and the current configuration of Ombuds roles, the controversy surrounding their 
viability will be investigated in detail in the following chapter. 
319 Ombudsman, supra note 209. 
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Chapter 3: Theoretical Constructs for Impartiality and Independence 
Historical Review 
The traditional icon of impartiality, Justitia or Lady Justice is replicated throughout 
the western world320 in the same imposing posture in marble and stone replete with 
blindfold, scales and a sword. 321 Curtis and Resnik in their homage to Robert Cover, the 
celebrated Yale law professor and activist, who attempted to explain the meaning of law, 
the role of judges and how justice functions through myth-making and folktales, have 
explored Mr. Cover's awareness of the ambiguity of the blindfold. On first blush, it appears 
the blindfold was configured to demonstrate that as Justitia can not see the disputants, by 
definition, she can not favour one over another.322 Interestingly enough, this view does not 
take into account the potential influence of a disputant's style of speaking with respect to 
social status or level of education or ethnicity which could also result in favour or disfavour. 
Cover also proffers the potential alternative belief that the use of the blindfold also 
demonstrated that while having no favouritism, Lady Justice also has no means of gaining 
insight. In addition, he suggested that Justitia's use of a blindfold could be emblematic of 
her self-restraint in that she has deliberately chosen to be constrained in a particular 
way. 323 Curti~ and Resnik reconcile these differing forces represented in the blindfolded 
eyes in their adoption of Fiera's view that" ... justice as depicted, simultaneously be 
attuned to individual nuances and be evenhanded; that objectivity and subjectivity both be 
present; that justice know all that is needed but not know that which might corrupt or 
320 Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik, "Images of Justice" (1987) 96, 8 The Yale Law Journal 1727 at 1742 and 1747. 
321 According to Matthew Robinson, the icon of impartiality, a tall and majestic woman holding a set of scales, wearing a 
sword and a blindfold, who is known as Justitia, the Roman goddess of justice, may have been inspired by the Greek 
goddess of divine justice, Themis. See Matthew B, Robinson, "Justice Blind? Ideals and Realities of American Criminal 
Justice". (2002) online: <htttp://www.justiceblind.com/issue.html> 1. Dennis Curtis and Judith Resnik also contend that Justitia 
had antecedents and was likely preceded not only by Themis and Dike but also by the goddess known as Ma'at from 
Egyptian culture. See Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik, "Images of Justice" (1987) 96, 8 The Yale Law Journal 1727 at 1729. 
322 Curtis & Resnik, supra note 320 at 1728. 
323 Ibid. 
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unfairly influence; that justice be rigourous in its equality yet "now and then" relax in 
compassion".324 It is also worth noting that others, including Judge Otto Kissel 325, 
interpreted the blindfold differently and saw it as depicting either willful or unintentional 
failure to see the truth. 
Early expressions of 'impartiality' can also be found in textual form in the Latin term 
of 'nemo judex in parle sua' which was an important principle in the Roman judicial 
system. The literal translation,'no man shall be a judge [or is fit to be a judge] in his own 
cause', is currently understood to be the prohibition against bias on the part of a decision-
maker and is a key aspect of the articulation of the principles of natural justice. This 
terminology is evocative in its simplicity in that virtually anyone regardless of age, amount 
of education and experience, can both rationally and intuitively understand that a decision-
maker should not be driven by self-interest if his or her decision is to be accepted as fair 
by those who are affected by it, and by those who are observing both the process and the 
outcome. 
In comparison, the other well known Latin phrase, audi alteram partem, which is 
the first criterion for natural justice, declares that disputants must be able to hear the case 
against them and present their views to the decision-makers before a final conclusion is 
reached. This phraseology includes the requirements for appellants or claimants having 
adequate notice of the timing and nature of the proceedings; knowledge of the 'case' 
against them and the opportunity to both know and question the evidence provided in 
support of the case.326 While this expectation could be interpreted to relate solely to" the 
mechanical aspects of how proceedings are conducted, there is also a qualitative aspect 
324 Ibid. at 1764. 
325 Ibid. at 1757. 
326 This principle is explained well by Lorne Sessin in "An Intimate Approach to Fairness, Impartiality and Reasonableness in 
Administrative Law" (2007) 27 Queen's Law Journal 819 at 824. 
126 
inherent in these exhortations; that is, the proceedings must be organized and conducted 
in such a fashion so as to provide the best opportunity for the parties to a dispute to 
. present their cases in full, whether it be to a sole decision-maker or a tribunal of multiple 
decision-makers. In the same vein, Cover observed that in the Code of Maimodes, a 
twelfth century Jewish law, a 'righteous judgment' is defined as one that is perfectly 
impartial in relation to the litigants in that neither receives more or less courtesy or respect 
than the other. 327 
Stanley Benn quotes Aristotle whose perspective was articulated at some point 
between 364 and 322 B. C. in Greece and defined impartiality as a 'kind of equality'. 328 
Aristotle's view was " ... justice consists in treating equals equally and unequals unequally, 
but in proportion to their relevant differences".329 It appea.rs that the Aristotelian view is the 
equivalent of the modern day definition of 'equity' whereby cases should be treated the 
same if the parties are similarly situated, and if the decision-maker has determined there 
were relevant differences they should be treated differently in accordance with their 
distinctive circumstances. 330 Duhaime states "Equity is based on a judicial assessment of 
fairness as opposed to the strict and rigid rule of common law". 331 
Fast forward to the 1500s and 1600s and according to Curtis and Resnik, Judge 
Kissel observed that the use of the blindfold imagery in paintings, sculptures and woodcuts 
of Lady Justice is directly related to the evolution of the judicial role from that of a lay 
person to a 'trained professional' along with the establishment of a judiciary independent 
327 Curtis & Resnik, supra note 320 at 1758. 
328 Louis P. Pojman, Justice, (New Jersey: Pearson Education Inc., 2006) at 1. 
329 Ibid. at 1. 
330 Lorne Sossin adds depth to this concept in the following comment: "Treating all parties the same when in fact all parties 
are unique is itself a kind of bias." Sessin, supra note 326 at 821. 
331 Duhaime Legal Dictionary, s.v. "equity". Online: <http://www.duhaime.org>. 
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from royalty or governing bodies. 332 This theory is predicated on the existence of the 
blindfold which considered in this context would prevent the Justice from seeing any 
directive signals sent by an authority figure attempting to interfere with his independence. 
Madam Justice Huddart describes the Middle Ages in Britain similarly as being a 
time when judges were no longer beholden only to the King, as their employer, who had 
the power both to appoint and dismiss them, at his pleasure, as well as to determine their 
remuneration. At this juncture judges became loyal to the concept of the Crown, as a 
symbol of the people as a whole, rather than being devoted to a monarch. Justice Huddart 
noted that it was not until the Stuarts were overthrown in the 1 ih century that the 
codification in 1689 of the separation of the judiciary from the monarch in the British Bill of 
Rights resulted in the true independence of the judiciary. Furthermore, it was in The Act of 
Settlement, written in 1700, that the British Parliament guaranteed security of salary and 
tenure for its judges. In 1760, the more extreme form of 'tenure for life' predicated on good 
behaviour, was enacted by the Hanovers. The Right Honourable Chief Justice Beverly 
Mclachlin also noted in her comments to the Conference on Law and Parliament in 2006, 
that prior to getting to the point of the enactment of the aforementioned Act of Settlement, 
Henry 11 who set up the first permanent court, retained the ability to 'hire and fire at will' 
and both Charles II and James II routinely released judges with whom they disagreed. 
Chief Justice Mclachlin notes that the high degree of judicial independence that is 
now so well established in Canada is also the" ... foundation of impartiality".333 Justice 
Huddart .takes this theoretical construct further in that she identifies the concept of 
332 Curtis & Resnik, supra note 320 at 1757. 
333 Beverly Mclachlin, Remarks Presented at the Law and Parliament Conference, Ottawa, (2 November 2, 2006) online at 
<http:www.scc-csc.gc.ca>. 
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independence as a 'guarantor'334 of impartiality in paraphrasing the sec statement that 
independence guarantees impartiality in 27 47-317 4 Quebec Inc. v. Quebec (Regie des 
permits d'alcool) (Regie). 335 Interestingly, in a separate area of endeavour, that of the 
regulation of broadcasting in Britain, Sylvia Harvey pointed out that the Chairman of the 
Governors of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) promoted the use of the reverse 
of that equation in that she concluded that impartiality was in fact the precursor to 
independence. Specifically, the Chairman indicated that it is only if the BBC is perceived to 
be impartial by its audience that it will be given the degree of support, presumably financial 
and a properly constructed regulatory framework that assures its independence. 336 This 
belief is also contained in the Standards of Practice established by The International 
Ombudsman Association stated as: "The Ombudsman endeavors to be worthy of the trust 
placed in the Ombudsman Office" 337 and as a result of her behaviour is perceived to be 
impartial. 
A historical voice central to the concept of judicial impartiality in western, liberal 
society is that of John Locke. His Two Treatises of Government, published in 1690 in 
Britain is also coincident with the creation of an independent judiciary. Locke's view, that a 
proper adjudicator," ... a known and indifferent judge ... "338 is essential to the supremacy of 
the rule of law and fair. adjudication, has reverberated throughout history to current times. 
His rationale for the requirement for 'indifference' is predicated on his assertion that men 
who are in a state of nature will naturally be 'partial' to their own needs, and may also 
334 Madam Justice Carol Mahood Huddart, "Know Thyself: Some Thoughts About Impartiality of Individual Decision-makers 
From an Interested Observer" (1999-2000) 13 Canadian Journal of Administrative Law and Practice at 147. 
335 2747-3174 Quebec Inc. V. Quebec (Regie des permits d'alcool) (Regie) 1996 D.L.R. {41h) sec 577 at 106. 
336 Sylvia Harvey, "Doing it my way- broadcasting regulation in capitalist cultures: the case of fairness and impartiality", 20 
Media, Culture & Society. 549. 
337 
"IOA Standards of Pr~ctice" (January 2007) online: International Ombudsman Association 
<http://www.ombudsassociation.org>. 
338 Locke, supra note 17 at 296. 
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demonstrate great passion and vengeful feelings.339 He also observed that the possibility 
of men being negligent and unconcerned about others also exists. As a result, men who 
are not 'known and indifferent', could not realistically be given the authority to weigh in on 
disputes and apply the law as required. Another rationale for the legitimacy of 
'indifference', from a judicial standpoint, in the Lockean context, is that Locke's treatise 
envisioned all men as being free and equal members340 of society who were able to 
pursue whatever goals they chose to be important in terms of creating their legislative 
governments, supporting and opposing legislation, and acquiring and maintaining 
property. 341 Clearly his concept of freedom and equality for all was an idealized version of 
society rather than representative of reality. A few centuries later, John Rawls also 
expounded on the concept of impartiality in his treatise modestly entitled A Theory of 
Justice. One of the key elements of the theory he proposed for establishing a system of 
justice for a democratic nation is the notion of the 'original position'. 342 The 'original 
position' is predicated on the concept of a fair procedure being used to determine rights. 
and responsibilities so that, by definition, whatever is decided upon through the 
participants' deliberative process wilJ be just. As a result, this foundational concept, (which 
he emphasizes is purely a hypothetical construct), is that the precepts upon which a 
system for justice is built would reso.nate as being acceptable to everyone who had liberty 
of thought and person, was a rational thinker and was equal to everyone else in this 
utopian universe. 
339 Ibid. 
340 Ibid. at 75. 
341 Ibid. at 294. 
342 John Rawls, J. A Theory of Justice. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971) at 130. 
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A key element of the deliberation involved in choosing the principles of justice is 
that none of the participants would know the nature of 'his'343 actual physiology, (e.g. 
knowledge of a physical disability and/or a high degree of athleticism); intelligence, (e.g. 
no understanding of whether associates' perception of the participant was 'Einsteinian' or 
otherwise); social status, (e.g. would not know whether a well connected, financially 
independent philanthropist or a small business owner struggling to keep up with the 
minimum payments on a 'line of credit') and no knowledge of personal values, (e.g. no 
awareness of being in the military or a conscientious objector or of being pro-life or pro-
choice). 
The metaphor coined by Rawls to depict this lack of personal knowledge and self 
interest is 'the veil of ignorance'.344 His hypothesis is that only individuals, wearing this 
figurative veil, would be in a position to determine the rights and responsibilities of all the 
members of a particular jurisdiction. However, Rawls made it clear that the people in the 
'original position' would have a great deal of wide-ranging knowledge about " ... the 
general facts about human society .... political affairs ... economic theory ... basis of social 
organization ... and the laws of human psychology'.'.345 His proposal that a body of 
universally accepted factual knowledge would inform the participants in the 'original 
position' is 'easier said than done' as it is not only.readily apparent from daily living but 
also from popular and scholarly literature how difficult it is to separate fact from opinion in 
each of the aforementioned areas. 
343 While Rawls (1971) only uses the pronouns of 'he' and 'his' throughout his description of the original position in describing 
his views I will use more modern language. 
344 Rawls, supra note 342 at 136. 
345 Ibid. at 137. 
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Rawl's 'veil of ignorance' is noted by Julie Macfarlane as representing an 
aspiration to " ... ultimate objectivity"346 and is used to introduce the topic of 'neutrality' as 
one of the critical issues in the practice of mediation. However, while .Rawls devotes an 
entire chapter to the concept of 'The Veil of Ignorance' he makes no reference to neutrality 
or impartiality at this juncture of his theory building. While he does introduce the notion of 
a 'referee'347 who could be retained to announce what alternatives were under 
consideration and the rationale for proposing them; who could also ensure that no 
coalitions were being built; and could summarize the discussion, he then dismisses the 
value of having a third party referee involved. He states that as everyone must be thinking 
similarly as they are required to assess principles being posited in relation to general 
considerations rather than to how the principles under discussion would affect them 
personally; the involvement of a third party would be superfluous. 
Ironically, while Macfarlane's view is that the 'veil of ignorance' is a symbol of 
objectivity or impartiality it does not appear to me that Rawls ever intended his metaphor 
to be applied to describe how a judge, arbitrator, mediator or an Ombuds should view the 
evidence collected or information provided to her. In fact as noted earlier, Rawls 
specifically jettisons the utility of a referee in the theory building process. However, he 
does begin to make use of the terms of 'impartial and impartiality' later in building his 
theory for justice when he introduces the concept of a " ... rational and impartial 
sympathetic spectator''. 348 This is a person who has a general view; is knowledgeable and 
intellectually capable and has no self-interest in whatever is to be determined. In Rawls' 
view, though, this spectator is more than an uninvolved observer than the use of the term 
346 Macfarlane, supra note 29 at 443. 
347 Rawls, supra note 342 at 139. 
348 Ibid. at 186. 
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'spectator' would normally imply. Specifically, Rawl's 'spectator' is actually someone who 
is both responsive and sympathetic to what everyone else in the social system wants and 
needs. In Rawls' view the misnamed 'spectator' is expected to put himself in the place of 
each of the societal members and appreciate in an in-depth manner, through what he calls 
" ... giving free rein to his capacity for sympathetic identification ... "349 how the principle that 
is being debated would affect these individuals' lives. Rawls concludes that his spectator 
would then, after understanding each person's situation and aspirations, balance the 
positive and negative ramifications so the final result is the most positive outcome for 
everyone. 
In fact, Rawls (1971) indicates that after the principles of justice have been 
established by individuals in the 'original pos_ition, 'the veil' can be removed. Thus, his 
terminology at this stage of his explanation suggests he is proposing when justice is 
· actually being meted out or applied to a particular circumstance, the type of information 
allowable is that which is necessary for the intelligent application of the principles of justice 
that have been accepted. In addition, the use of any knowledge that would result in bias 
would be restricted. Rawls (1971) succinctly states: 
... The notion of the rational and impartial application of principles defines the kind 
of knowledge that is admissible. At the last stage, clearly, there are nQ reasons for 
the veil of ignorance in any form, and all restrictions are lifted.350 
Perelman's view is similar in that he states it would be misleading to expect a judge to be 
" ... a mere 'spectator' of the human scene".351 In his Justice, Law and Argument, he 
reminds us disinterest and detachment are not qualifications of a judge who is just, rather, 
a judge must take a position on the facts as presented. 
349 Ibid. 
350 Ibid. at 200. 
351 M. Perelman, Justice, Law and Argument: Essays on Moral and Legal Reasoning (Dordrecht, Bost.~:m, London, 1989) 67. 
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Brian Barry, in Justice as Impartiality argues that we must recognize there are two 
types of impartiality. He defines second order impartiality as " ... a test to be applied to the 
moral and legal rules of a society: one which asks about their acceptability among free and 
equal people". 352 Clearly this is the type of impartiality Rawls is referring to in his theory of 
justice. However, Barry notes: "The critics [of Rawls] are talking about first-order 
impartiality - impartiality as a maxim of behaviour in everyday life."353 Rawls, in fact, 
defined impartiality as a capacity that" ... prevents distortions of bias and self interest".354 
While it would be unreasonable to expect people to be impartial about interactions 
between their loved ones and strangers if health and safety are at risk, it is the traditional 
conception of impartiality, whereby no favour or predisposition or positive or negative bias 
is shown by a third party to those in dispute, that is the subject of this discussion and this 
study overall. 
Challenges to Impartiality and Independence 
The terms of 'neutrality' and 'impartiality' are ubiquitous in descriptions of traditional 
dispute resolution within the historical and contemporary legal literature and lexicon. 
These terms are also central to the definitions of various forms of alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR) like arbitration, mediation, (as practised in western society), conciliation, 
facilitation and ombudsmanship/ombudsry (ombudsing), as well as some forms of 
administrative decision-making. Nonetheless, there are many scholars and practitioners 
who have critiqued the notions of 'neutrality' and 'impartiality' and have said categorically 
they are not only impossible to achieve but should not even be presented as desirable 
aspirations. My analysis is to explore these conflicting notions in three parts. Firstly, I 
352 Brian Barry, A Treatise on Social Justice Volume II JUSTICE AS IMPARTIALITY (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) 194. 
353 Ibid. 
354 Rawls, supra note 342 at .187. 
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discuss the manner in which these terms have been defined and understood in theory and 
practice as well as analyzing whether 'neutrality' and 'impartiality' are appropriately used 
as synonyms or whether they actu~lly have different meanings. 
Secondly, I will elucidate the three most common models of judicial decision-
making established by political scientists and legal theorists to provide a foundation for my 
examination of six key examples of empirical research on independence and impartiality in 
relation to Canadian and American judicial decision-making as well as one Canadian 
administrative tribunal's decision-making patterns. Following this examination, I will 
investigate the rationales provided by those who have determined impartiality is both 
impossible and undesirable, as well as those who aspire to be and those who believe they 
can be impartial by the use of particular strategies and methodologies. In addition, I will 
discuss how the construction of traditional and contemporary legal structures as seen 
through the lens of critical analyses that is on the basis of gender, race and class can 
detract from the concepts of impartiality and independence. In addition, I will introduce the 
concepts of 'multi-partiality', 'responsible partiality' 'omni-partiality' and 'structural 
impartiality' to add yet another dimension to this complex dialectic. Finally, I will also 
review the research conducted by social psychologists on how information is processed 
and decisions made in relation to bias and stereotyping to further inform this analysis. 
Thirdly, given the interconnectedness of independence and impartiality in some 
contexts, I will comment on seminal examples of Canadian case law on the relationship 
between these two principles. Finally, I will offer various theorists' perspectives on ways 
and means for meeting, and indeed overcoming, the many challenges to impartiality and 
independence that some would consider to be inherent in our psyches and within many 
legal structures. 
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What is meant by Neutrality or Impartiality? 
As early as 1938 Lord Macmillan posited the following view: 
For a judge does not shed the attributes of common humanity when he assumes 
the ermine. The ordinary human mind is a mass of prepossessions inherited and 
acquired, often none the less dangerous because unrecognized by their 
possessor. Few minds are as neutral as a sheet of plate glass, and indeed a mind 
of that quality may actually fail. in judicial efficiency, for the warmer tints of 
imagination are needed to temper the cold light of human reason if human justice 
is to be done. 355 
In more recent times, feminist and critical theorists in law, philosophy, and social 
psychology have injected a great deal of energy and expertise into this debate. For 
example, scholars and practitioners in the area of mediation, who are often one and the 
same, have been particularly active in stating neutrality [and presumably, impartiality as 
the terms are often used interchangeably] is impossible to achieve. For example, legal 
scholar and mediator, Linda Mulcahy has explored whether neutrality is possible and more 
importantly, from her perspective, desirable, in the context of the use of mediation for 
resolution of disputes between residents of disintegrating, poorly built, social housing units 
located in one of the most economically disadvantaged areas in London in the United 
Kingdom. She observes that within the legal system, neutral judges are supposed to 
" ... rise above personal politics, to resist and transcend their personal, instinctive and 
intuitive sympathies and submit to something beyond them."356 In her opinion, this is not a 
desirable model for mediators to replicate or emulate as, in her view, it is not only 
impossible for any third party to achieve such a state, it would not be ethical to do so. In 
particular, she conducted research with the seven staff and 20 volunteers associated with 
the Southwark Mediation Centre who conducted in excess of 400 mediations annually 
355 Rt. Hon. Lord MacMillan. Law and Other Things (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1938) at 217. 
356 Linda Mulcahy, ''The Possibilities and Desirability of Mediator Neutrality- Towards an Ethic of Partiality?" (2003) 10 Social 
& Legal Studies 505 at 507. 
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within the context of deteriorating and dangerous social housing. Given her belief that the 
inherent dysfunction and unfairness of the social housing organization itself is the root 
cause for the disputes between community residents, she emphasizes the respect she 
has for mediators who take stands on the ethical issues that come to their attention rather 
than subscribing to an ethic of neutrality based on disinterest.357 In light of Macmillan's 
arid Mulcahy's rejection of the validity and value of the principle of neutrality both within a 
judicial and ADR context, I will investigate whether impartiality can stand on its own or 
should it also be jettisoned from the legal lexicon given the terms are often used 
interchangeably. 
Neutrality vs. Impartiality 
It is not uncommon for some legal scholars and all manner of third parties, such as 
adjudicators, arbitrators, mediators, Ombuds and the people who interact with them, to 
use neutrality and impartiality as synonyms. Accordingly, it is vital to the debate to 
interrogate how these terms are defined and the ways in which they are used. As this 
manner of speaking is both confusing and, in my opinion, an inaccurate use of this 
terminology, I will investigate the definitions behind common legal parlance to demonstrate 
why it is actually unacceptable to continue this practice. 
Surprisingly, given how often reference is made to a 'neutral third party' in the 
descriptions of various forms of traditional and alternative dispute resolution the Canadian 
Law Dictionary does not include an entry for 'neutral' or 'neutrality'. However, it does 
provide a definition for 'impartial' as "the state of being fair and neutral, lackin-g any and all 
bias and/or prejudice".358 By comparison, A Dictionary of Modem Legal Usage does not 
have entries for either 'neutral' or 'impartial'. In contrast, in looking at fourteen different 
357 Ibid. at 521. 
358 John Yogis, ed., Canadian Law Dictionary, (New York: Baron's Educational Series Inc, 1998) s.v. '1mpartial". 
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non-legal dictionary definitions, the term of 'neutrality' was defined as relating to non-
interference in a war in a particular situation or a state of continual non-interference or 
non-intervention; and 'impartiality' was frequently defined as being even-handed, 
unbiased and unprejudiced. However, in some instances, these two terms were used as 
synonyms for one another or Edmund Burke's famous 1794 phrase - "the cold neutrality of 
the impartial judge"359 - was used to provide context for the definition of both 'neutrality' 
and 'impartiality'. 
The gold standard for legal terminology, Black's, makes a greater degree of 
distinction than previously cited legal dictionaries in that 'impartial' is defined as "unbiased, 
disinterested"360 and 'neutral' is defined as " 1) indifferent, and 2) of a judge, mediator, 
arbitrator, actor (refrain from taking sides in a dispute)".361 Black's first criterion for the 
definition of 'neutral' reinforces the validity of Mulcahy's view in that it would clearly be both 
wrong and unethical for a mediator in the milieu investigated by Mulcahy362 to be neutral 
and therefore indifferent to the horrors of the parties' lives created by their publicly funded 
and operated housing environment. 
In assessing the terminology used to define 'impartiality' the question arises as to 
how an individual who is truly 'disinterested' and therefore 'impartial' could fully appreciate 
the realities and nuances of circumstances very different from her own. It is also ironic, in 
my view, that Black's continues in the same vein as some of the other dictionaries 
consulted in that 'neutrality' is defined as maintaining peaceful relations with those that are 
359 Lexipedia Beta online: <http://www.lexipedia.com/enqlish/> s.v. "impartial". 
360 Black's Law Dictionary, 81h ed., s.v. "impartial". 
361 Ibid. s.v. "neutral". 
362 Mulcahy supra note 356. 
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described as 'belligerents' within the context of a war as opposed to disputes of a more 
general nature. 363 
In looking at the etymology of these terms, important clues are provided for why 
'neutrality' and 'impartiality' are considered synonymous in some settings. Specifically, the 
term 'neutrality' first appeared in the English language in 1480 as a derivation of the 
French term of 'neutralite' and was used to identify "the neutral Q..9.ffi! [person] in a 
dispute".364 It then appeared again in 1494 as used by Jean Froissart, differently, to refer 
to an attitude neutral in nature. Next 'impartial' came into being in England in 1593 and 
was used, not surprisingly, to demonstrate a lack of partiality or bias. It was observed that 
the new term of 'impartial' was first used by William Shakespeare in his play entitled 
Richard II. 365 Given this initial foundation it is not surprising these terms were and are still 
often seen to be interchangeable. 
However, as noted by Dominick Donald in his analysis of peace-keeping 
operations, the modern dictionary definitions of these two terms are thoroughly confusing 
and therefore not defensible. 366 While he observes there is common ground to be found in 
these terms, their meanings, in reality, are distinct. He notes in order to be impartial one 
has to have the capacity to make judgments while the notion of neutrality is that of 
passivity. In particular, to be impartial is often equated with being fair and just. In order to 
demonstrate fairness and justice, clearly a position has to be taken on the issues in 
dispute. However, the essence of neutrality is that no position is taken. Donald articulates 
363 Black's supra note 360 s. v. 'neutrality". 
364 The Online Etymology Dictionary online: <http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=neutrality>. 
365 Ibid. s.v. "impartial". 
366 Dominick Donald, "Neutral is Not Impartial: The Confusing Legacy of Traditional Peace Operations Thinking" (2003) 29 
Armed Forces and Society 415 at 415. 
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the difference between these two terms as: "At its simplest, neutrality is an absence, 
impartiality is a presence". 367 
Louis Pojman also weighs in on this debate by declaring that rather than 'neutrality' 
and 'impartiality' being the same or even similar they are in fact opposites. His view is 
impartiality can not be defined as indifference or equated with neutrality as acting 
impartially requires" ... making judgments according to rules".368 He uses the analogy of 
the umpire at a sporting event as someone who is impartial rather than neutral in that 
determinations are made on how to call the game fairly, as required by the rules, 
regardless of the umpire's personal likes or antipathies to particular players or any 
financial benefit that could accrue to him personally by making particular choices. 
How Does an Umpire Demonstrate Impartiality? 
Bruce Weber makes use of the same analogy, in "Umpires v. Judges"369 in 
commenting on the then upcoming confirmation hearings for Sonja Sotomayor, the first 
Latina nominee to the U.S. Supreme Court. He observes that at the current Chief Justice's 
(John J. Roberts) own confirmation hearing Roberts had stated "Judges are like 
umpires370• Umpires don't make the rules; they apply them ... ".371 Presumably, Chief 
Justice Roberts made this statement in an effort to demonstrate his personal commitment 
to judicial restraint. Similarly, by referring to his confidence in the comportment of umpires, 
this Chief Justice was also telegraphing that he could be trusted not to insert his personal 
views into his decision-making process. As Weber indicates, the conventional belief is that 
judges can" ... check their personal beliefs and biases (not the same thing) at the door of 
367 Ibid. at 418. 
368 Pojman, supra note 328 at 25. 
369 Bruce Weber, Week in Review, "Umpires v. Judges" The New York Times (12 July 2009) 1 at 1. 
370 In contrast to Chief Justice Roberts analogy, Sunstein at al take a different view when they say: "Judges are not exactly 
umpires: they have a great deal of discretion." Sunstein et al note 432 at 83. 
371 Ibid. 
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the courtroom ... ".372 Unfortunately, no explanation is provided for how the process of 
'checking one's biases or beliefs' is accomplished. 
In querying the now Associate Justice Sotomayor's understanding of the role of a 
judge, Weber notes that Senator Caryn, a member of the U.S. Senate Judiciary 
committee, also used the umpire metaphor in pondering whether Ms. Sotomayor saw the 
role of a judge as a means for advancing causes that were personally important to her or 
to" ... call balls and strikes".373 In my view it is ironic that the individuals who occupy such 
influential roles in society, that is, the current U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice and a high 
ranking Senator who is vetting nominees for this bench, have reduced their understanding 
of the complex and important role of a judge, and the influence their values have on their 
decisions, to that of an umpire who has a very limited sphere of responsibility, that is, the 
size of the strike zone. 
Interestingly enough, 'the judge as umpire' theory has segued into the ADR world 
as 'complaint handler as referee' via the appointment of Bruce Hood, a former National 
Hockey League (NHL) referee, as the Canadian Travel Complaints Commissioner. 
Presumably to emphasize the applicability of his former role, Mr. Hood " ... pulled out a 
whistle at a news conference in Ottawa, just like the one he used as an NHL referee for 
~ore than 20 years ... "374 when his appointment was announced. The conventional belief 
that umpires, as described previously, and a referee, as described above, have no vested 
interest in a particular outcome and always operate dispassionately when they don their · 
uniforms, defies reality as no evidence has been provided to support this supposed truism. 
The structural aspects of independence may be seen to .contribute to this perception. 
372 Ibid. at 5. 
373 Ibid. 
374 
"Ex-NHL referee will blow whistle on air travel complaints" (1 August 2000) CBC News online: CBC News Canada 
<http://www.cbc.ca>. 
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However, day-to-day experience demonstrates that the structural guarantees alone are an 
insufficient underpinning for impartiality. 
In keeping with the aforementioned sports analogies another metaphor has been 
added to the discussion of how impartiality should be defined. Martha Minow noted that 
Clarence Thomas, as the second African American nominee for the U.S. Supreme Court 
and now Associate Justice Thomas, when testifying to the Senate Judiciary Committee 
indicated that a judge should want " ... to be stripped down like a runner, ... ". 375 Her view is 
such a metaphor is not apt for justice to be done. Rather she opines it would be more 
appropriate for Justice Thomas to draw upon the experiences that made him feel 
disenfranchised, as well as to assist his colleagues to examine their own perspectives on 
bias. Her thesis is that judges and juries should not only be objective in relation to the 
facts of the case and determining guilt or innocence but they should also be " ... committed 
to building upon what they already know about the world, human beings, and each 
person's own implication in the lives of others".376 This theory of 'judging' demonstrates the 
importance of knowing what has influenced you, what you believe to be true and why you 
believe it so you can challenge those beliefs and be open to new interpretations. Minow 
also makes the point that 'fair representation', (that is, decision-makers being drawn from 
a variety of ra~es, genders, social and economic backgrounds), contributes to impartiality 
by virtue of the availability of a wider variety of perspectives on the so-called 'facts' of the 
case.377 
In an attempt to achieve this goal in populating administrative tribunals in the 
province of Ontario, the Public Appointments Secretariat (the Secretariat) which is 
375 Martha Minow, "Stripped Down Like a Runner or Enriched by Experience: Bias and Impartiality of Judges and Jurors" 
(1991-1992)33 William & Mary Law Review 1201at1201. 
376 Ibid. at 1217. 
377 Ibid. at 1209. 
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responsible for advertising and organizing selection processes for the recruitment of 
appointees for the 630 entities which are known as 'Agencies, Boards and Commissions' 
has publicly articulated its commitment to the principle of 'fair representation' as one of its 
governing principles. 378 For example, it is stated in the Secretariat's mission "Persons 
. selected to serve must reflect the true face of Ontario in terms of diversity and regional 
representation ... "379 as well as making certain appointees have professional and personal 
integrity and are well qualified. 380 A further commitment to broad representation is found in 
the Secretariat's stated devotion to ensuring " ... all segments of Ontario society ... " 381 are 
included in the ranks of those who serve on agencies, boards and commissions. 
It is also important to note that in order to be considered qualified, specialized 
expertise is also a criterion for many appointments to administrative tribunals. However, 
the means by which that expertise has been acquired may result in decision-makers being 
challenged for not being impartial, or, for being biased in favour or or against particular 
individuals or issues.382 For example, in Marques v. Dy/ex Ltd.383 the validity of the 
certification of a union was challenged because a member of the Ontario Labour Relations 
Board had worked for a law Ji rm that had previously represented the union involved. 
However, Justice Morden pointed out in dismissing the challenge that it is both appropriate 
. . 
and necessary that" ... the chairmen [sic] of Panels will have had experience and expertise 
in the law and labour relations. The Government of Ontario looks to people with such a 
378 
"Principles Governing the Appointments Process" (04 September 2009), online: The Government of Ontario Public 




382 David J. Mullan, Administrative Law Cases, Texts and Materials, "Bias and Lack of Independence", 51h ed, Toronto: Emond 
Montgomery Publications Ltd., 2003) at 571. 
383 Marques et al. v. Dy/ex Ltd.et al. [1977], O.J. No. 2469 (QL). 
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background in making appointments". 384 As a result, appointees who have acquired the 
requisite expertise through working in a specialized area of law, or through study and 
practice in particular areas of endeavour, (e.g. health, science, education, gerontology, 
etc.) will not automatically be deemed to be biased due to the extent of their subject 
matter expertise; and instead will be chosen precisely for their in-depth knowledge on 
particular subjects. Given this view, it would appear that it is the responsibility of the 
'expert appointees' to recognize and manage their personal and professional biases or 
partialities, as is appropriate to the situation. 
Impact of Confusion in the Use of 'Neutral' and Neutrality 
In Catherine Morris' view the lack of clarity in the definitions of neutrality and 
impartiality has resulted in " ... a confusing discourse".385 In making this observation she 
strives to illustrate how difficult it is to discuss what are often considered to be essential 
characteristics of 'third party neutrals' in a useful way. In addition, her view is the lack of 
consistency found in these definitions would make it very difficult to evaluate the quality of 
'third party neutral' interventions where there is little understanding of, or agreement on 
what these two defining characteristics mean. In addition, Morris also opines that while 
she finds it" ... abhorrent. .. " 386 to remove the term 'impartial' in regard to the description of 
a mediator's role and work, she does so for the sake of clarity and uses instead 'non-
partisan fairness'. She defines this term as " ... the general concept of fairness to all 
parties".387 The introduction of this term, in my view, does not add any greater precision to 
the subject under discussion as 'fairness' is defined by the context in which decisions are 
384 Ibid. at para 34. 
385 C. Morris, "The Trusted Mediator: Ethics and Interaction in Mediation" in Julie Macfarlane, ed., Rethinking Disputes: The 
Mediation Alternative (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications Ltd. 2003) 443 at 444. 
386 Ibid. at 455. 
387 Ibid. at 444. 
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made. As a result, while it is important to address the pervasive inaccurate use of 
terminology I would arg1:Je that Morris' preferred alternative neither provides clarity nor 
advances the understanding of the concept of impartiality. 
The difficulty with lack of precision in the definitions of these terms and the actions 
taken under their mantle is also rampant in the ADR literature in relation to various types 
of mediation. This problem is encapsulated by Kovach and Love in their critique of the 
emergence of certain types of mediation described as 'evaluative mediation', 'liti-
mediation', and 'Michigan mediation'. 388 Their concern is that in what is also known as 
'muscle mediation', the parties in dispute continue in an adversarial mode and the 
mediator simply becomes an arbiter of the facts who provides a non-binding opinion or an 
arm-twister who gets the parties to agree to 'split the difference' or 'get as much as you 
can while you can'. This style of mediation is anathema to the notion of 'transformative' 
mediation, whereby parties communicate with each other in such a way as to transform 
their relationship or their views of each other and develop through synergistic discussion a 
much better outcome than either could have arrived at on their own or one imposed by an 
external decision-maker. 389 This migration from the original concept of facilitative 
mediation, which is simply to help people in dispute come up with their own, mutually 
satisfactory resolution, to describe activities which are not actually mediations or some 
subset of mediation is also evident in an expanded use of the term of 'neutrality'. For 
example, other scholars and practitioners within the field of mediation have coined 
additional terms like Solstad's 'active neutrality'390, Taylor's 'expanded neutrality'391 and 
388 K.K. Kovach & LP. Love, "Mapping Mediation: The Risk of Riskin's Grid" (1998) 3 Harvard Negotiation Law Review 71 at 
92. 
389 C. Menkel-Meadow, 'The Many Ways of Mediation" (1995) 11 Negotiation Journal 217 at 228. 
39° K.E. Solstad. 'The Role of the Neutral in Intra-Organizational Mediation: In Support of Active 'Neutrality' " (1999) 17 (1) 
Conflict Resolution Quarterly 67 at 69. 
Friedman's 'positive neutrality'. 392 Unfortunately, the aforementioned terms are even more 
perplexing than the indiscriminate use of the original terms of 'neutrality' and 'impartiality' 
as they conflate opposing notions and make it difficult to both understand and analyze how 
these qualities contribute to effective dispute resolution. In fact, in some instances, the 
pairings are actually oxymoronic if the reader accepts the traditional view that 'neutral' 
means being passive and uninvolved. James D. D. Smith, in advocating for more precision 
in the definition of what constitutes a mediation, refers to the idea of mediator impartiality 
as a chimera as so little effort has been made to distinguish between what he refers to as 
'pure' mediation and 'power' mediation. His view is impartiality is a requirement for 
success for a 'purist' approach whereas it is self evident that mediators who are 
conducting 'power' or 'muscle' mediations are undeniably partial in some way shape, or 
form.393 
The eminent mediation scholars and practitioners, Rifkin, Millen and Cobb have 
also critiqued the notion of neutrality within mediation and refer to the paradoxical 
description of neutrality as both a means and an end in the practice of mediation as the 
equivalent of folk lore.394 These authors' view of the prevalence of the use of 'equidistance' 
within mediation, which is the practice of the mediator temporarily aligning herself with the 
parties, on an equal basis, so as to assist and encourage them to fully describe their 
perspective on what happened, is actually contradictory to the traditional notion of 
impartiality. It is worthy of note that it is not uncommon for Ombuds and facilitators to use 
391 A. Taylor. "Concepts of 'neutrality' in Family Mediation: Contexts, Ethics, Influence and Transformative Process" (1997) 14 
(3) Spring Mediation Quarterly 215 at 223. 
392 J. Hennikoff & M. Moffit. "Remodeling the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators" (1997) 2 Harvard Negotiation Law 
Review 87 at 101. 
393 James D.D. Smith, "Mediator Impartiality: Banishing the Chimera" (1994) 31 Journal of Peace Research 445 at 448. 
394 J.Rifken, J. Millen & S. Cobb, "T~ward a New Discourse for Mediation: A Critique of Neutrality'' (1991) 9 (2) Winter 
Mediation Quarterly 151at152-153. 
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the same practice, intentionally or not, to get sufficient information out in order to 
determine how to best proceed. 
The same confusion evident within the field of mediation can be observed in the 
Ombuds world. Hybrid Ombuds may describe their practice as 'neutral' or refer to 
themselves as a 'designated neutral' in their promotional or educational materials when in 
fact theyform opinions after conducting an investigation and/or they make 
recommendations for systemic or system-wide improvements. They argue 'neutral' still 
does apply because in conducting their investigations and forming conclusions and 
making recommendations they looked at the matters under discussion 'impartially'. Some 
take a different route and say 'neutrality' is still an acceptable descriptor as the 
recommendations flowing from their findings are non-binding on the institution. In addition, 
those Ombuds who do not make determinations on fairness also have a responsibility to 
think about the correct use of the term 'neutral' as they make decisions daily about how to 
handle complaints in the sense of determining whether or not to intervene or simply to 
provide information and referrals. As a result, the continuing usage of the term 'neutral', in 
my view, in relation to Ombuds, (and other third parties who assist with the resolution of 
disputes) is also problematic. 
However, there is an alternate point of view to what I have just proposed with 
respect to the importance and value of precise definitions. For instance, James Vice, the 
former Ombudsman for Loyola University in Chicago, opines " ... neutrality is not 
something to be given an explicit and essential definition. Neutrality is not an essence; it is 
an absence. We must dance around it with enough synonyms and examples to be able to 
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recognize when "it ain't present".395 I would respectfully disagree. Given there is a 
multiplicity of differing definitions in existence as well as those that are contradictory, to 
then say the term should be indefinable or enigmatic is not a helpful addition to the 
dialectic on this subject. As a result, Vice's approach only serves to complicate Morris' 
'confusing discourse'396 further by making one of the terms under discussion and the 
underlying concept itself ephemeral when it should actually be sufficiently well formed that 
it can be the subject of critical analysis. 
While the existence and proliferation of these modifications or equivocations 
relative to the use of the term 'neutrality' create a considerable conundrum not only for 
scholars and practitioners from an analytic perspective, it is even more problematic for 
those who are about to engage with a 'third party neutral', a 'designated neutral', an 
adjudicator, an Ombudsperson, or a mediator who describes himself as 'neutral' as the 
disparate foregoing views on this topic demonstrate how difficult it would be to know what 
to expect. In addition, all of the abovementioned commentary demonstrates how unwise it 
is to operate on the premise that impartiality and neutrality are synonyms describing the 
same concept. 
Clarification of the Difference between Neutrality and Impartiality by Two Supreme Court 
Jurists 
Fortunately, the differentiation between these two terms in the Canadian judicial 
arena was clearly articulated in R. v. R.D.S (R.D.S) 397 by Justices McLachlin and 
L'Heureux Dube who stated " ... Judges, while they can never be neutral in the sense of 
395 J.W. Vice, "'Neutrality', Justice and Fairness", online: (1997) California Caucus of College and University Ombudsman 
UCI Ombudsman: The Journal, 6 at 2 online: <http://www.ombuds.uci.edu/JOURNALS/1997/neutrality.html>. 
396 Morris, supra, note 385. 
397 R.v .R.D.S. (R.D.S.), [1997] S.C.J. No. 84 (QL) at (2) per La Forest, L'Heureux-Dube, Gonthier and McLachlin JJ. 
148 
being purely objective, must strive for impartiality". 398 Chief Justice Mclachlin expanded on 
this thesis to say not only it is impossible for judges to be neutral by expunging their 
experiences and knowledge, rather we should not want them to do so as it is all that a 
judge has learned and experienced that has equipped her to adjudicate in a way that is 
" ... fair and wise". 399 
This distinction was made between 'neutrality' and 'impartiality' as a result of 
adjudicating the charge of a reasonable apprehension of bias against Justice Sparks of 
Nova Scotia who had dismissed three charges resulting from the following circumstances: 
A black fifteen-year old (R.D.S.) was riding his bicycle and either 1) stopped to see what 
was going on when he saw a crowd gathered around a police car; learned that his cousin 
had been arrested and then inquired as to whether he should tell the arrested youth's 
mother what had happened (R.D.S.'s version of what happened); or, 2) R.D.S. while 
riding his bicycle ran into the legs of a white police officer, yelled at him and pushed him 
while he was standing by the side of the road (the police officer's version of what 
happened). R.D.S. was charged with:" ... unlawfully assaulting a police officer; unlawfully 
assaulting a police officer with the intention of preventing an _arrest; and unlawfully 
resisting a police officer in the lawful execution of his duty".400 The Crown's rationale for 
appealing the dismissal of R.D.S.' charges was predicated on Judge Sparks' observations 
that while she had not concluded that the police officer had been untruthful in his 
testimony in this instance, police officers had been known to do so previously; and 
secondly, that while she had not concluded that the officer in this case had overreacted, it 
398 Ibid. 
399 Beverley Mclachlin, 'On Impartiality" in A Canadian Judgment The Lectures of Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin in New 
Zealand Eds. Andrew Stockley and David Rowe (Christchurch: The Centre for Commercial & Corporate Law Inc., 2004) 1 at 
7. 
400 R.D.S., supra at note 397 at 62. 
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had been her experience that police officers do overreact especially when dealing with 
groups that are not white.401 In commenting on the Supreme Court decision which 
ultimately found that Judge Sparks was not biased, Richard Devlin refers to the principle of 
impartiality as a shibboleth402 and notes that Chief Justice Mclachlin and Justice 
L'Heureux Dube have determined " ... objectivity and neutrality are chimeras in the world of 
judging ... ".403 Simultaneously, Devlin appears to take exception to the willingness of these 
justices to abandon neutrality and objectivity while maintaining the possibility of . 
impartiality404 as he believes they have done so without providing sufficient foundation for 
how impartiality can be achieved.405 He notes if a judge does make use of perspectives 
which are reflective of what she has experienced and learned as well as the 
characteristics of her identity, she is in danger of being seen to be biased as was 
purported by the Crown and the Nova Scotia Appeal Court in R. D.S. He emphasizes how 
Judge Sparks, a black woman, who was accused of bias for taking social context into 
account when making her decision about the actions of a young black man and a white 
police officer, conflicts with the 'bar and bench' expressed desire to create a more diverse 
judiciary, specifically, increasing diversity with respect to race and gender. The obvious 
·question is: if one is not allowed to make use of 'difference' that is acquired through place 
of birth, social location, personal knowledge and experience when deciding cases, what is 
the point of the recommendations put forward in the much heralded ten year anniversary 
401 Ibid. at para 1. 
402 Richard F. Devlin, 'We Can't Go On Together with Suspicious Minds: Judicial Bias and Racialized Perspective in R. v. 
R.D.S." (1995) 18 Dalhousie Law Journal 408 at 409. 
403 Richard F. Devlin & Dianne Pothier, "Redressing the Imbalances: Rethinking the Judicial Role after R.v.R.D.S." (1999-
2000) 31 Ottawa Law Review 1 at 18. 
404 Ibid. at 17. 
405 Ibid. at 19. 
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of the Touchstones406 report? For example, in an effort to create a more diverse bench 
the following recommendations were made in 2003: 
The CBA and the Federal Department of Justice review the criteria for judicial 
appointments to identify and eliminate systemic barriers in the current appointment 
process. Particular focus should be given to having Aboriginal judges· and judges 
from racialized communities at appellate levels. 
That the Office of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs for the federal 
judiciary and the departments or bodies which make judicial appointments for the 
provincial and territorial judiciary gather statistics on the representation at all levels 
in the judiciary of women and members of minority groups and keep the same up 
to date.407 
Even with this type of effort in place to increase the diversity of the judiciary it was 
disappointing to learn that federal appointments with respect to the representation of 
women have decreased dramatically of late. In 2011, 41 men and 8 women (20%) were 
appointed to federal judgeships. In 2010, 37 men and 13 women (35%) were appointed. In 
comparison, in 2005, 40% of the federal appointments were women.408 No explanation for 
this trend was provided by the government spokesperson quoted other than she indicated 
that since the current government has been in power, 30% of the appointees have been 
women, which is reflective of the volume of women who apply and the committee that 
makes the recommendations.409 Given the number of women practicing in the field has 
increased dramatically in the last two decades it's odd that there would not be a large pool 
of candidates who are women to choose from in order to populate the bench in a manner 
more consistent with demographic realities. 
406 Canadian Bar Association (CBA), Annual Equity Report "TEN YEARS into the future: WHERE ARE WE NOW AFTER 
TOUCHSTONES?" 1993-2003, (August 2003). ''Touchstones for Change: Equality, Diversity and Accountability" is the report 
created by the CBA Task Force lead by Justice Bertha Wilson which was published in 1993 and contained 200 
recommendations. 
407 Ibid. at 33, 10.4t. 
408 Kirk Makin, "Gender Imbalance Appointments of female judges slump under Harper's Tories" (11 November 2011) The 
Globe and Mail. · 
409 Ibid. 
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An even more shocking statistic was released subsequently that demonstrated that 
out of 100 federal appointments to the bench made over the past two and a half years, 98 
of the appointees are white.410 The government has not provided any rationale for this 
outcome given the potential pool of racialized candidates is significant. Instead, in 
defending the quality of the appointment process, Julie Di Mambro, is quoted as speaking 
on behalf of the Justice Department, indicating that the selection process was guided both 
by legal excellence and merit.411 
Interestingly enough, in an indication of further progress being made in the 
diversification of the judiciary, the Touchstones report pointed out that the Canadian 
Judicial Council had " ... adopted a resolution approving the "concept of comprehensive, in-
depth, credible education programs on social context issues which includes gender and 
race"412 which had previously been delivered to judges by the National Judicial Institute. In 
the same trajectory but using different means, it was advanced that " ... Recognizing the 
principle of judicial independence, the CBA recommends that the judiciary assume the 
responsibility to educate itself regarding the social context in which judicial decision-
making takes place, including gender and racial issues".413 
Sonia Lawrence argues for a more comprehensive and foundational approach to 
increasing the potential for impartiality on the bench by expanding on the importance of 
the members of the judiciary being not only diverse but actually reflective of and 
representative of the population it serves through its adjudication of both private and public 
41
° Kirk Makin, "Of 100 new federally appointed judges 98, are white, Globe finds" The Globe and Mail (17 April 2012), online: 
The Globe and Mail <http://www.theqlobeandmail.com>. · 
411 Ibid. 
412 Canada Bar Association, supra note 406. 
413 Ibid. at 10.6t. 
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disputes.414 Lawrence makes reference to the value of 'structural impartiality', the term 
coined by Sherrilyn Ifill, which results from dialogue informed by a wide variety of 
perspectives such that the possibility of the domination of one particular viewpoint is 
reduced.415 
Notably, the Supreme Court did decide, not unanimously, but by a slight majority, 
(i.e. per La Forest, L'Heureux-Dube, Gonthier and McLachlin JJ), to dismiss the claim that 
Justice Spark's decision was biased because she did take social context as it relates to 
racial issues into account, and her original decision was upheld.416 The machinations of 
various Courts in relation to R.D.S., and their differing decisions, leads inexorably to the 
important discussion of how judges and adjudicators (and perhaps even other dispute 
resolvers) actually go about making their determinations. The following discussion of 
theoretical models for decision-making and their application to various empirical studies 
will demonstrate how adjudicators make their decisions in some situations. I am 
investigating this research as foundational material for this study as the researchers' 
hypotheses, modes of analysis and findings are highly relevant to the discussion of the 
viability of the principles of independence and impartiality generally. It is also necessary as 
there has been no empirical work of a similar nature done in relation to Ombuds roles in 
any jurisdiction. 
Models for Judicial Decision-making 
There has been a great deal of research done with respect to the viability of the 
concepts of independence and impartiality in relation to decisions made by judges. This 
research is undertaken in an effort to determine if judges' political affiliations and/or policy 
414 Sonia Lawrence, "Reflections: On Judicial Diversity and Judicial Independence" in Adam M. Dodek & Lorne Sessin, eds., 
Judicial Independence in Context (Irwin Law, 2010) (SSRN) 193 at 201. 
415 Ibid. at 199. 
416 R.D.S., supra note 397. 
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preferences are evident in their decision-making, and hence affect whether or not they 
should properly be described as impartial and independent. For example, C.L. Ostberg 
and Matthew E. Wetstein observed that as early as 1881 the U.S. professor of law and 
Supreme Court jurist, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., was questioning the reality of judges 
actually 'finding the law' 417 rather than fashioning it to fit with their views. Similarly, Anna 
Miller, in her more recent analysis of the applicability of various decision-making models to 
the U.S. Supreme Court, observed that sixty years after Holmes' speculation, in 1941, 
Pritchett's research had determined that " ... the justice's attitude (ideological or policy 
based) is paramount in determining his vote ... ".418 Correspondingly, Donald Songer 
opined that Gordon Schubert in 1965 produced a well-defined theory for how judges' 
attitudes influence their decision-making by developing a system for 'scaling' which used 
judges' prior votes to predict the probability of future votes.419 The work of Rhode and 
Spaeth published more than 35 years ago in 1976 is also reported on by Songer and 
others to demonstrate these researchers verified that Schubert's attitudinal scales for 
predicting decision-making by the U.S. Supreme Court was accurate " .. .for many 
decades". 420 James Stribopolous and Main Yahya also point to the work of Schubert as 
pioneering in his use of a social psychology technique which allowed him " ... to reveal the 
attitudinal commitments of individual judges ... " .421 
417 C.L. Ostberg & Matthew E. Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision-making in the Supreme Court of Canada (Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 2007) at 4. 
418 Anna L. Miller, "Judicial Decision-making on a Collegial Court: The Separation of Church and State", (Paper presented to 
2005 Annual Meeting of the Southwestern Political Science Association, 23 - 26 March 2005) [unpublished]. 
419 Donald R. Songer, The Transformation of the Supreme Court of Canada An Empirical Examination, (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2008) at 177. 
420 Ibid. 
421 James Striboplous & Moin Yahya, "Does A Judge's Party of Appointment or Gender Matter to Case Outcomes?: An 
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Currently, the dominant modes for analyzing judicial decision-making are generally 
known as the attitudinal, legal and strategic models.422 According to Andrew Green and 
Ben Alarie, the attitudinal model is based largely on research conducted in the U.S. and 
the research to date supports the belief that decisions are influenced to some degree by 
judges' ideological or political or policy predilections.423 Others take a stronger view, 
specifically Donald Songer, who states the attitudinal model is founded on the belief that 
the justices' votes are explained entirely by their political ideology.424 To support his 
conception of the strength of the attitudinal model, Songer quotes Segal and Spaeth as 
stating the degree of influence of attitudes is such "Even when the plain meaning of the 
text of the law or precedent is clear, 'they are easily avoided"'. 425 
At the other end of the spectrum, the legal model, according to Green and Alarie, 
operates on the basis that judges' decisions are based only on the legal standards, the 
rules of statutory interpretation and stare decisis. They note this approach is also known 
as " ... "idealist", "traditionalist" or "positivist" ... ". 426 One of the best-knowri supporters of 
this tradition is H.L.A. Hart who wrote "Positivism and the Separation of the Law and 
Morals"427 extolling the virtues of this approach. Legal theorist, Allan Hutchinson, describes 
422 It is also instructive to look at Peter McCormick and Ian Greene's matrix for categorizing decision-making processes using 
the axes of formalism and discretion in Judges and Judging: Inside the Canadian Judicial System (Toronto:James Lorimer & 
Company Ltd., 1990) at 123. This style of categorization deserves recognition as it emerged from the interview data acquired 
from sitting judges. The matrix includes: Model I: Improvisers (low formalism, low discretion); Model II: Strict Formalists (high 
formalism, low discretion); Model Ill: Pragmatic Formalists (high formalistm, high discretion); Model IV: lntuitivists (low 
formlism, high discretion). 
423 Andrew Green & Ben Alarie, "Policy Preference Change and Appointments to the Supreme Court" (July, 2007), 2nd 
Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies online: SSRN: http://ssm.com/abstract=1013560 1 at 10. 
424 Songer, supra note 419 at 176. 
425 Ibid. 
426 Green & Alarie, supra note 423 at 10. 
427 H.L.A. Hart, "Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals", in R.M. Dworkin, ed., The Philosophy of Law (London; 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1977) at 22. 
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Hart as being almost singularly responsible for bringing " ... analytical jurisprudence, 
especially in its positivist incarnation, squarely and decidedly back into vogue".428 
The third model is strategic in nature and, according to Green and Alarie, 
" ... assumes that judges do not "sincerely" or directly vote for their preferred policy 
outcome in each case, but instead they take into account how their votes in the particular 
case will affect and be affected by other actors such as other justices on the court and 
other institutions (such as the legislature or the media)."429 In his description of this model, 
Songer also cites evidence of how the decisions made by justices from around the world 
have obviously been influenced by anticipated political changes, e.g. in Argentina, South 
Africa and Spain.430 Miller quotes Epstein and Knight as defending the belief that" ... law is 
a cumulative product of numerous short term strategic decisions made by the justices over 
various terms of the Court".431 Keeping these models of judicial decision-making in mind, 
there are a number of recent studies of judicial decision-making that have important 
implications for the viability of the principle of 'impartiality' and concomitantly of 
'independence' as they relate to political affiliation, known policy preferences and gender. 
Empirical Research :Results 
I will now review the results of six empirical studies released between 2006 and 
2008 in the chronological order they appeared so as to demonstrate the increasing level of 
research interest in the viability of impartiality and independence related to judicial and 
quasi-judicial decision-making in both Canadian and U.S. settings. The progression in 
thinking about these essential principles is also demonstrated ~hrough the presentation of 
these results. 
428 Allan C. Hutchinson, The province of jurisprudence democratized (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 3. 
429 Green & Alarie, supra note 423. 
430 Songer, supra note 419 at 180. 
431 Miller, supra note 418 at 10. 
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U.S. Appeal Court Decisions (2006) 
An important research study by Cass R. Sunstein, David Schakde, Lisa M. Ellman 
& Andres Swack published in 2006 focused on decisions made by federally appointed 
U.S. Appeal Court judges. The researchers examined 6,408 published decisions issued by 
Panels composed of three judges and 19, 224 associated votes of individual judges made, 
for the most part, in the time period from 1995 to 2004.432 The researchers confirmed three 
hypotheses through their analyses and their findings will be presented sequentially. Firstly, 
the votes of judges in many important areas of law like protection of the environment, 
disability and sex discrimination, political campaign financing and more, can be accurately 
predicted on the basis of the political party in power at the time of their appointment and 
the President responsible for their appointment in that Republican and Democratic 
appointees voted differently.433 Secondly, it was also evident that the impact of political 
ideology could be reduced or dampened by Panels made up of both Democratic and 
Republican appointees with two notable exceptions. Specifically, in cases involving capital 
punishment and abortion Panel members voted on the basis of their personal convictions 
regardless of the composition of the Panel.434 Thirdly, the research revealed that 
ideological beliefs could be amplified by 'same party' Panels in some areas of law. 435 
These findings are also supported by an analysis done by Adam Liptak in his 
efforts to determine whether or not religious belief would be important in selecting a new 
justice for the U.S. Supreme Court given the 2010 resignation of Justice Stevens who was 
the only remaining Protestant on that bench. While Liptak was advised by Associate 
432 Cass R. Sunstein, David Schakde, Lisa M. Ellman & Andres Swack, Are Judges Political? An Empirical Analysis of the 
Federal Judiciary (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2006) at 17, 18. 
433 Ibid. at 147. 
434 Ibid. at 56. 
435 Ibid. at 148. 
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Justice Ruth Ginsberg that society [presumably she's referring to only a part of American 
society] no longer worries about justices' religious affiliations 436 it would seem they should 
if the following analysis cited by Professor Geoffrey Stone of the University of Chicago 
Law School is accepted as being correct. That is, in 2007 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld 
federal legislation prohibiting partial birth abortion, at which point Stone observed in an op-
ed piece in The Chicago Tribune that "All five justices in the majority in the Gonzales case 
are Roman Catholic" and "The four justices who are not followed clear and settled 
precedent".437 In the same vein, Jeffrey Toobin in his analysis of Gonzales v. Carhart 438 
pointed out that" ... the expansiveness of [U.S. Supreme Court Justice] Kennedy's opinion 
[a Roman Catholic] (with its dismissive acknowledgements of the Roe and Casey 
precedents) left the four liberals on the Court shocked" .439 The outcome in Gonzales 
supports Sunstein et al's findings about federal Appeal court judges' voting patterns as all 
five U.S. Supreme Court justices who went againstsettled law and precedent in this case 
cast votes consistent with the political platforms of the Republican Presidents who 
appointed them as well as, by chance or intent, ·the teachings of the Roman Catholic 
Church. It is also noteworthy that four of the five judges who voted in favour of precedent 
are considered to be the justices who most consistently favour argumentation in favour of 
'liberal' positions. 
Sunstein et al also observed important trends when cases are being decided 
based on laws that this group of researchers has identified as being ambiguous and 
containing many gaps and uncertainties, such as the Clean Air Act, Federal 
436 Adam Liptak "Stevens, the only Protestant on the Supreme Court" The New York Times (11 April 2010) at 3. 
437 Ibid. 
438 Gonzales v. Carhart, 05-380 U.S. (2006) (QL). 
439 Jeffrey Toobin, The Nine Inside the Secret World of the Supreme Court (New York: First Anchor Books Edition, 2008) at 
381 -382. 
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Communication Act, and National Labor Relations Act. 440 The statistical data representing 
the voting patterns of Republican and Democratic appointees, demonstrate that these two 
groups regularly make readily discernable " ... different judgments about both policy and 
principle"441 on what appears to be an ideological basis. This finding is particularly 
important as the type of legislation noted above necessarily has a huge impact on 
individuals' health and well-being and how their governing bodies operate. In these 
instances, the lack of clarity and direction in the statutes themselves provides multiple 
opportunities for ideological beliefs to influence the votes rendered by individual judges. 
Secondly, Sunstein et al concluded the voting behaviour of judges is dampened by 
the addition of one appointee of another party.442 For example, a Republican appointee on 
a Panel with two Democratic appointee's votes in a liberal manner 55% of time while a 
Republican appointee sitting with two other Republican appointees issues a liberal vote 
only 23% of the time. In comparison, a Democratic appointee sitting with two Republicans 
issues a liberal vote 50% of the time and when a Democratic appointee is sitting with two 
other Democratic appointees liberal votes are made 75% of the time.443 One rationale 
suggested for these striking differences is the powerful desire of justices to behave in a 
collegial manner 444 which overcomes their political preferences. Or, it was speculated that 
the judge who does not share the dominant political affiliation. may take on the role of 
'whistle blower' and in doing so, may be successful in persuading her fellow Panel 
members to more carefully consider the legal arguments made.445 
440 Sunstein et al, supra note 432 at 132. 
441 Ibid. 
442 Ibid. at 148. 
443 Ibid. at 30. 
444 Ibid. at 65. 
445 Ibid. at 79. 
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Thirdly, the Sunstein et al data demonstrates that ideological orientations which 
are recognized as stereotypically 'liberal' or 'conservative' points of view can be amplified 
by the composition of a Panel of all Republican and Democrat appointees. For example, 
Panels made up of Democratic appointees voted in favour of affirmative action plans 81 
percent of the time whereas Panels composed of all Republican appointees did so only 34 
percent of the time.446 It is noteworthy that Sunstein et al state "A litigant who draws three 
Democratic appointees will often have very different prospects than a litigant who draws 
three Republican appointees".447 This finding demonstrates very clearly that the traditional 
belief of justice being meted out on the basis of the facts and the law can not be sustained 
for many different types of cases. 
While Sunstein et al indicate that a variety of perspectives, based on the notion of 
" ... reasonable diversity or diversity of reasonable views ... "448 is an important principle, 
they are not prepared to recommend U.S. federal judicial appeal Panels be composed so 
as to provide for as much as diversity as is possible as they believe to do so would be 
such a-complex undertaking. Unfortunately, from my vantage point, given the value that 
can be found in a variety of perspectives being taken into account when analyzing issues 
of life-changing proportions, the authors do not put forward any rationale for why the 
logistical complexity they envision is so daunting. Their conclusion is surprising given their 
findings demonstrate unequivocally that political diversity, in particular, in the composition 
of a Panel would contribute to more in-depth deliberation when deciding cases in areas of 
law with far-reaching implications.449 
446 Ibid. at 25. 
447 Ibid. at 45. 
448 Ibid at 138. 
449 Ibid. 
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These findings go to the heart of the notions of impartiality and independence as 
the strength of the impact of political affiliation demonstrates unequivocally that it can not 
be assumed or blithely stated that by a decision-maker taking an oath of office and 
enjoying a high degree of structural independence an unbiased view will result. These 
data reinforce the reality of the influence of political affiliation or a strongly held personal 
opinion on judges' decisions. In response to these particular data, it is important to 
acknowledge that if justice is seen to be the result of carefully considered argumentation, 
and by taking into account a wide variety of perspectives, significant changes as to how 
Panels are assembled should be a priority. 
Ontario Appeal Court Decisions (2007) 
James Stribopoulos and Moine Yahya's research findings which relate to Ontario 
appeal court judges are also illuminating. They· investigated whether party of appointment 
and additionally, gender, should matter to litigants who appear before them; and 
concomitantly, from a societal perspective, whether the principles of impartiality and 
independence are viable. Specifically, the study assessed every reported decision made· 
by the Ontario Court of Appeal between 1990 and 2003. This time period yielded over 
4000 decisions and 12,000 individual votes.450 As was found in the Sunstein et al study 
discussed earlier, the Canadian research also demonstrated a high degree of unanimity in 
that in 95% of the cases heard, all of the judges on the Panel came to the same 
conclusion.451 However, it is worth noting that the consensus of opinion went up to 99% for 
450 Stribopoulos & Yahya, supra note 421 at 318. 
451 Ibid. 
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narcotics cases and went down to 93% for sexual assault cases.452 Against this backdrop, 
the two variables that were explored in this study are political affiliation and gender. 453 
Influence of Political Affiliation 
The centrality of the expectation of, and in fact requirement for judicial impartiality 
within our legal system informed Stribopoulos and Yahya's methodology in that they 
specifically chose party of appointment as one of their explanatory variables as if political 
affiliation was irrelevant there should be no patterns of voting that indicated otherwise.454 
Theoretically speaking, when beginning from a positivist perspective, the judicial 
appointment process should not result in any observable patterns in decision-making in 
comparison to political ideologies. That is, if appointees are chosen for " ... their legal 
excellence and merit"455 rather than the expectation being that they will judge in a manner 
that is consistent with the government that appointed them no trends should be evident. 
However, Stribopolous and Yahya found statistically significant differences in judges' 
voting patterns depending on party of appointment in crir:ninal cases where remedies 
under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Charter) were claimed. For 
instance, it was apparent that Conservative appointees voted for more conservative 
results and Liberal appointees favoured more liberal conclusions, though they did so by 
making finer distinctions.456 This finding is important as if a Panel of judges was populated 
by individuals who were not influenced by their political affiliati,ons or stereotypical thinking, 
that is, if the jurists were adjudicating on the basis of the facts of the cases before them; 
considering what had transpired from a variety of perspectives and taking into account 
452 Ibid. 
453 These researchers modeled their study after the Sunstein et al 2005 study that demonstrated the variable of political 
affiliation was determinative with respect to U.S. appeal court judges' decision-making patterns. It is important to note that 
these variables are readily quantifiable categories and therefore not dependent on perception or subjective analysis. 
454 Ibid. at 332. 
455 Kirk Makin, supra note 408. 
456 Striboploulos & Yahya, supra note 421 at 332. 
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points of view that are different than their own, one would not expect to be able to regularly 
match conservative outcomes with Conservative appointees and liberal outcomes with 
Liberal appointees. 
Interestingly enough, however, as was also observed by Sunstein et al in their 
analysis of U.S. appeal court decisions, 457 Stribopoulos and Yahya found the presence of 
one appointee from the other political party had a marked dampening effect on the final 
decision. 458 Specifically, when criminal cases with Charter claims involving requests to 
reject evidence were decided, Panels made up of appointees from both political parties 
affirme.d the conviction of the accused in 70% of the cases heard, whereas Panels made 
up of only Conservative appointees affirmed 65% of the cases and those Panels made up 
only of Liberal appointees affirmed the conviction at the much higher rate of 87%. 
Stribopoulos and Yayha concluded that since the affirmation rates of single.party Panels, 
when averaged, was close to the affirmation rate of the Panels made up of a mixture of 
appointees, (i.e. 70%) the sheer placement of one person with a different political point of 
view could overcome the trend established by Panels populated by justices appointed by 
the same political party.459 
The affirmation and rejection of cases involving human rights also yielded 
surprising outcomes. For a claimant who did not prevail at trial when claiming a human 
right had been violated, mixed party Panels upheld the conviction in 70% of the cases 
whereas Panels made up of Liberal party appointees upheld at the much higher rate of 
85% and Panels made up of Conservative party appointees upheld at the rate of 80%.460 
The researchers' speculated that these unexpected results, that is, the lower rate of 
457 Sunstein et al., supra note 432 at 132. 
458 Stribopoulos & Yahya, supra note 421 at 347. 
459 Ibid. 
460 Ibid. at 348. 
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affirmation for Panels made up of both party appointees was that the lack of a shared 
normative standard based on differing political beliefs may have forced the mixed Panel 
members to look at the cas~s in a more thoughtful manner.461 For example, one might 
speculate that when confronted with a different perspective, the mixed Panel model 
required the jurists with opposing view points to look more carefully at the issues and 
examine their initial reactions to determine if they were being influenced solely by personal 
ideology or by past experiences which were irrelevant. One could speculate that this type 
of analysis may also have reduced the potential for 'group political think' and forced the 
utilization of a more in-depth and deliberative decision-making process overall. 
Influence of Gender 
The area that provided for more dramatic results was gender. While there were no 
obvious patterns of difference between how male and female judges voted in many areas 
of law, the researchers identified some key areas where gender made a difference. For 
example, judges who are women were more likely to support the interests of mothers and 
complainants in criminal cases involving sexual or domestic violence as well as in cases 
involving custody or support. In comparison, male judges were more supportive of the 
accused person and fathers.462 If judges were not influenced by their personal experiences 
as a man or a woman, or as a parent or child, or did not feel sympathy for litigants of their 
particular gender, would this finding have emerged? The troubling spectre that emerges 
from this evidence is the possibility that an unexamined gender stereotype or personal 
antipathies could have undue influence. However, taking into account social context and 
being appropriately informed by judges' own and others' experiences rather than being 
driven by known and unknown prejudices such as classism, racism, sexism, and/or 
461 Ibid. 
462 Ibid at 319. 
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ageism, is recognized to be both a fair and reasonable approach. As it is impossible to 
know what information the judges took into account when making their decisions, we do 
not know whether the apparent bias is, as coined by Patricia Cain, 'Good and Bad Bias'.463 
For example, Chief Justice Beverly McLachlin identified good biases as" ... predispositions 
to fairness, equality and protection of the weak and the vulnerable ... the rule of law; 
justice ... ".464 Notably, as identified earlier, while the effect of gender was not predictable 
for many areas· of law, in looking at the differences in voting patterns between male and 
female judges Stribopolous and Yahya observed that" ... none is more pronounced than 
the difference between male and female judges in cases involving sexual and domestic 
violence".465 Specifically, in these types of cases, if the Crown appealed the sentence, 
individual male judges allowed the appeal at a rate of 67% whereas female judges allowed 
the appeal 91 % of the time. Also, when the Crown appealed cases that have been 
acquitted, male judges voted to reverse the acquittals 64% of the time while female judges · 
reversed. 85% of the time. 466 As the research methodology focused on decisions only and 
there was no interview data to examine, it is not possible to state why these staggering 
differences emerged in male/female voting patterns. Once again, theoretically speaking, if 
the positivist view was in play then there should be no deviation evident on the basis of 
gender, given in that tradition, both men and women should be able to equally apply clear 
rules on the proper disposition of sexual and domestic assault cases. However, in this 
instance, it must be acknowledged that we do not actually know whether good or bad 
biases are in play. Nonetheless, as stated by Stribopoulos and Yahya their empirical work 
463 Patricia A. Cain, "Good and Bad Bias: A Comment on Feminist Theory and Judging" (1987 - 1988) 61 South California 
Law Review 1945 at 1945. 
464 Beverly McLachlin, supra note 399 at 7. 
465 Stribopoulos & Yahya, supra note 421 at 354. 
466 Ibid at 356. 
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has now validated the proposition made by the Honourable Madam Justice Bertha Wilson 
in "Will Women Judges Really Make Difference?" that the inclusion of perspectives of 
women within the judiciary will result in different outcomes in some areas of law. 467 
Given the fact that the researchers used two explanatory variables, they being, 
gender and political appointment, it is also possible to look at the influence of both gender 
and political affiliation in relation to individual judges' voting patterns. It is worthy of 
comment that when an appellant who is a man involved in a family law matter came 
forward, Conservative appointees allowed the appeal in 43% of the cases whereas Liberal 
appointees only did so in 33% of the cases. This statistic demonstrates that appellants 
who are men, in this area of law, had a ten percent greater chance of success with 
Conservative appointees.468 This type of information could be put to good use by litigants 
in attempting to determine the best venue and composition of the bench for achieving their 
preferred outcomes. As there were twenty-eight judges who are men and eight judges 
who are in women in the researchers' sample 469 it is readily apparent that if the Ontario 
Court of Appeal bench was representative of the actual population 470, (that is, men and 
women were represented on an equal basis, rather than the 22% women and 78% men 
breakdown shown in this study), there is a strong likelihood of even more dramatic 
differences in success rates depending upon the gender composition of the Panel hearing 
the appeal. 
In summary, in looking at all of the data, it was determined that both party of 
appointment and gender had an impact on outcomes, and that gender had the most 
467 Ibid. at 354. 
468 Ibid at 355. 
469 Ibid. at 332. 
470 Statistics Canada indicates that 49.6% males and 50.4% females made up the Canadian population on July 1 in 2009. 
See "Proportion by Sex and Age Group by Province and territory" at www.statcan.qc.ca for more details. 
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significant impact.471 In observing these conclusions the researchers stated unequivocally 
that the unproven assumption of unbiased judicial decision-making could not be 
substantiated. 472 For many this outcome will not be surprising as it would never have 
occurred to them judges would be automaton-like in their deliberations and prove Thomas 
Nagel's notion of the possibility of the existence of the 'view from nowhere'. 473 Nagel 
coined this metaphor to explain how an individual can combine his own world view with an 
objective view of the world he lives in. While Nagel has acknowledged that "We see things 
from here, so to speak."474 he aiso contends we are able to abstract ourselves from our 
individual perspective and develop an" ... impersonal standpoint".475 While making this 
statement he acknowledges that regardless of how committed an individual or an 
institution is to acting in an impartial and egalitarian manner it must also be accepted that 
the. 'personal' perspective is also still present.476 Chief Justice McLachlin comments on 
Nagel's view by acknowledging the importance of the requirement for impartiality to prevail 
to" ... to step back from her own motives ... ".477 However, she posits that impartiality 
requires not the detachment from personal perspectives espoused by Nagel but" ... an 
ability to imagine them all, in their full particularity".478 While following Chief Justice 
McLachlin's prescription one would expect decision-makers will also be mindful of how 
important it is to attempt to prevent 'bad bias' or wrong information from informing their 
efforts when endeavouring to imagine others' perspectives. 
471 Stribopoulos & Yahya, supra note 421 at 358. 
472 Ibid. at 362. 
473 Thomas Nagel, The View From Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986) at 3. 
474 Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) at 10. 
475 Ibid. 
476 Ibid.at 18. 
477 Mclachlin, supra note 399 at 7. 
478 Ibid. 
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In contrast to Sunstein et al's theoretical speculation on the potential value of 
establishing more diverse Panels on the basis of gender and political affiliation, 
Stribopoulos and Yahya specifically proposed that the Registrar who currently determines 
the composition of Panels for the Ontario Court of Appeals should actually be ensuring 
diverse Panels are composed with respect to party of appointment and gender so as to 
reduce the potential for polarization around either ideology or gender.479 Further, it seems 
reasonable to expect that such an innovation would also reduce actual bias in decision-
making as a result of greater diversity in Panel members' perspectives and exposure to 
and interaction with jurists who have had different life experiences and opposing 
perspectives on the matters of considerable import that come to the attention of appeal 
court judges. Having access to greater depth and breadth of experience and knowledge 
would also increase the degree and quality of deliberation on a more general basis. 
However, the information referred to earlier detailing federal judicial appointments over the 
past three years which illustrated the low percentage of women judges appointed as well 
as the virtual non-representation of racialized judges does not bode well for any 
Registrar's capacity to create diverse benches.480 Unfortunately, this recommendation for 
reducing partiality and increasing independence is not applicable to the majority of ADR 
practitioners as typically they work alone and if they are making decisions, they do so as a 
sole decision-maker, rather than as a bench of equals. 
First Analysis of Canadian Supreme Court Decisions (2007): 
C.L. Ostberg and Matthew E. Wetstein specifically designed their study to assess 
whether the attitudinal model of decision-making was applicable to the Canadian Supreme 
479 Stribopoulos & Yahya, supra note 421 at 363. 
480 Makin, supra notes 408 and 410. 
168 
Court as it has been found to be in various levels of judicial decision-making in the U.S.481 
These researchers were interested in finding out if judges' decisions could be predicted 
based on knowing the political party of the Prime Minister who appointed them and their 
known ideologies. As there have been critiques of the validity of the use of 'party of 
appointment' for identifying conservative or liberal voting patterns these researchers used 
a complex factor analysis method to determine the probability of a liberal vote through the 
use of a mathematical equation. Specifically, the two v_ariables used by the researchers to 
measure whether or not the judges' liberalism or conservatism influenced their votes were 
1) the impact of the perception of the judge's degree of liberalism and 2) the facts of the 
case.482 The researchers also included a factor analysis to control for other variables. The 
factors taken into account for predictive purposes were: the perception of the judge's 
ideology taken from an analysis of opinions published in nine different newspapers483 from 
across the country; the judge's personal characteristics, (e.g. gender); the area of law in 
which they practiced beforehand; the facts of the cases before them; the personal 
characteristics of the parties and the intervenors appearing before them; which Chief 
Justice they worked with; and unexplained variances.484 In their final analysis, Ostberg 
and Wetstein declared their findings demonstrate that the attitudinal model of decision-
making wa$ in play in that it was evident that the jurists were influenced by their political 
preferences. This outcome again contradicts the traditional notion of judgments being 
made solely on the basis of indifferent legal analysis. 
481 Ostberg & Wetstein, supra note 417 at 3. 
482 Ostberg & Wetstein, supra note 417 at 13. 
483 The newspapers listed at 49 include: The Globe and Mail self identified as Canada's national news paper and published in 
Toronto; Ottawa Citizen, Halifax Chronicle-Herald, The Gazette (Montreal), Toronto Star, Winnipeg Free Press, Calgary 
Herald, Edmonton Journal, and Vancouver Sun. 
484 Ostberg & Wetstein, supra note 417. 
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Interestingly enough, another political scientist, Emmett Macfarlane, has taken 
umbrage with the validity of Ostberg and Wetstein's findings as he found their 
determination of what is a 'liberal' or 'conservative' vote wanting. For example, while he 
recognizes their methodology is sophisticated, he believes there is still an element of 
circular logic in play when they define what is a 'conservative' or a 'liberal' vote.485 
Specifically, he contends the judges' perceptions of the nature of their role, (e.g. whether it 
is to be deferential or an activist jurist), may in fact determine how they vote rather than 
they being motivated by their political ideologies.486 However, in my view, while 
Macfarlane's point is valid to some degree from a theoretical perspective, the sheer 
volume of votes cast is such that I believe it is possible to draw conclusions about where a 
justice fits on the ideological spectrum in relation to what is well known to be traditionally 
'liberal' and 'conservative' political platforms. In addition, Macfarlane acknowledges that 
Ostberg and Wetstein also recognize their findings do not provide sufficient specificity to 
pigeon-hole each justice with a definitive ideological stance.487 However, Ostberg and 
Wetstein are unequivocal ·in their assessment that the majority of justices demonstrate a 
consistent attachment to some degree of a readily discernable political ideology and it is 
only a few justices that are impossible to categorize.488 
The Ostberg and Wetstein study included all of the cases decided by the SCC 
from 1982 (post proclamation of the Charter) to 2003. The indicators of the applicability of 
the attitudinal model can be seen most clearly in their findings related to criminal matters. 
For example, they found in cases not receiving unanimous support, the judges who were 
485 Emmet Macfarlane, "Book review of Attitudinal Decision-making in the Supreme Court of Canada", 33 Queen's Law 
Journal, (2007 - 2008) at 253/254. 
486 Ibid. p. 254. 
487 Ibid. at 258. 
488 Ostberg & Wetstein, supra note 417 at 209. 
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identified as most liberal were much more likely to side with 'the individual', that is 72% 
more likely, in right to counsel cases and 44% more likely to support the individual in 
search and seizure cases, than their more conservatively ranked colleagues.489 It is also 
noteworthy, while not surprising given the findings of Sunstein et al and Stribopoulos and 
Yahya cited previously, that Ostberg and Wetstein's research also revealed gender 
differences were a significant influencing factor in some areas of law. For example, in the 
area of free speech, justices who are women were 34% more likely than their counterparts 
who are men to vote in a liberal fashion.490 In addition, they observed all of the justices 
who are women who have been appointed since the Charter have cast liberal votes for 
civil rights and liberties cases. This finding confirmed for the researchers " ... the women on 
the Court have developed a unique feminist approach toward these types of rights 
claims".491 Once again Justice Wilson prescience that women appointees would approach 
the adjudication of disputes differently has also been proven by another study of 
considerable magnitude. Unfortunately, from my perspective, these researchers did not 
consider the impact of ethnicity or religion on decision-making patterns. For obvious 
reasons, race could not be considered as all sec jurists, to date, are white and it would be 
impossible to know the race of all the litigants' whose cases were being decided. 
Second Analysis of Canadian Supreme Court Decisions (2007) 
Andrew Green and Ben Alarie also assessed the decisions made by the SCC 
\ . 
using much different approaches than the researchers previously cited.492 An empirical 
analysis was undertaken by assessing all SCC decisions issued from 1982 to 2004 and 
reviewing newspaper accounts of the jurists' points of view on various issues prior to 
489 Ibid. at 113. 
490 Ibid. at 151. 
491 Ibid. at 152. 
492 Green & Alarie, supra note 423 at 1. 
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appointment 493 and then ranking them numerically as to how liberal or conservative they 
were by using the Cover-Segal 494 scoring method. 495 These researchers looked at 
political affiliation differently than Ostberg and Wetstein in that they looked at judges' 
choices in comparison to the political philosophy of the Prime Minister who appointed them 
and found judges' decisions often diverged dramatically from what would be considered 
Liberal or Conservative 'party lines' rather than being consistent with the views of their 
party of appointment. As a result, Green and Alarie's data demonstrated there is not a 
strong relationship between the political ideology of the Prime Minister who appoints the 
judge and their subsequent voting pattern. It is noteworthy that of the four judges who 
provided the most "conservative" decisions, three were appointed by Liberal Prime 
Ministers.496 For ease of understanding the descriptors used for each category of votes, I 
am summarizing and presenting the criteria used to demonstrate whether or not a decision 
is considered liberal or conservative 497 in chart form: 
493 Ibid. at 12. 
494 The Cover-Segal scoring system was developed by Jeffrey A. Segal and Albert D. Cover so as to provide a numeric value 
(from -1.0 to +1.) for the degree of 'liberalism or conservativeness' evident in the newspaper editorials about U.S. Supreme 
Court Justices. Ostberg and Wetstein used a similar methodology for Canadian judges using a numerical range of -210 for 
very conservative to +2.0 for very liberal to rank individual Canadian judges " ... overall approach to the law in general as well 
as to specific areas of law" from Ostberg and Wetstein, supra note 417 at 55. 
495 Green and Alarie, supra note 423 at 14. 
496 Ibid. at 23. 
497 Ibid. at 16. 
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Table 2: Criteria used by Alarie and Green to Determine if a Vote for a Decision is 
Conservative or Liberal 
Votes on: Conservative Vote Liberal Vote 
Charter appeals In favour of the In favour of the claimant 
government 
Criminal appeals In favour of the In favour of the defendant 
prosecution 
Labour appeals In favour of employer, In favour of a union, labour 
business interest organization, worker 
Tax appeals In favour of taxpayer In favour of government 
Aboriginal rights appeals In favour of government In favour of aboriginal group 
or individual 
Also, the perception of how the SCC justices would likely weigh in on particular 
types of cases based on newspaper accounts of the appointees' views on various social 
issues prior to being appointed was not borne out in their decisions. These data 
demonstrated judges' preferences do shift over time but it is very difficult to predict in what 
direction they will go.498 Green and Alarie's specific observation was " ... the dynamic 
results suggest that justices may _behave in unexpected ways in their first term, and will 
then shift randomly from the initial voting behaviour".499 By comparison with the U.S. 
Supreme Court as noted by Adam Liptak in his "Supreme Court Memo" in The New York 
Times, in the past there have also been a number of surprises when U.S. Republican 
presidents appointed individuals who they thought were conservatives who then moved to 
the left, that is, John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, and Sandra O'Connor.500 However, 
Liptak's analysis is that since 1990 the individuals who have been appointed have not 
498 Ibid. at 36. 
499 Ibid. at 36. 
500 Adam Liptak, 'Why Newer Appointees Offer Fewer Surprises From Bench" The New York Times, (18 April 2010) at 1. It is 
surprising that Liptak does not include Justice Blackmum in his identified list of defectors as his chart demonstrates that 
Justice Blackmum started out as conservative and moved dramatically to the left side of political spectrum over time. 
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been a disappointment from an ideological perspective. Rather the appointees " ... have 
performed largely as expected ... ". 501 Liptak's thesis is that the current intense scrutiny of 
appointees' past performance on the bench and their CV's, especially whether or not they 
have worked in the executive branch of the government that has appointed them, has 
resulted in no surprises. He notes in particular Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., Justice 
Antonin Scalia, Justice Clarence Thomas and Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr., all who worked 
for Republican Presidents, have stayed on a politically conservative course.502 In looking 
at the chart developed by Liptak to illustrate the Justices' decision-making bent, it is 
noteworthy only Justice Kennedy who was nominated by a Republican president has 
tacked back and forth staying in the middle zone of Liptak's 'estimated ideology' of the 
Liberal/Conservative spectrum.503 However, it is worthy of comment that as observed by 
Jeffrey Toobin, Justice Kennedy, who identifies as a Roman Catholic, was the author of 
the Gonzales decision that overturned settled law and in doing so favoured a Roman 
Catholic precept. 504 
On the face of it, the findings presented by Green and Alarie could lead the reader 
to be satisfied that contemporary Canadian Supreme Court judges, by comparison to the 
U.S., are indeed independent and impartial in relation to internal and external influences. 
However, Green and Alarie do not make this claim. Rather their conclusion is that the 
judicial appointment system for sec judges has not become as politically polarized 505 as 
501 Ibid. 
502 Ibid. at 18. It must be noted that Liptak's view was presented and this chart was prepared prior to Chief Justice Roberts' 
decision to support the constitutionality of 'Obamacare' (the Affordable Care Act) in National Federation of Independent 
Business et al v. Sebelius, Secretary of Health & Human Services et al, 567 U.S. S. Ct. (2012) in stark opposition to the 
expectation that he would fall in line with the Republican Party's policy platform on health care coverage. 
503 Ibid. 
504 Toobin, supra note 439. 
505 Green & Alarie, supra note 423 at 19. 
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it has in other jurisdictions even though these researchers observed there is some 
evidence to show Liberal appointees did vote differently than Conservative appointees. 
The overall results could also lead the reader to conclude the majority of the 
judges made their decisions on the basis of the facts of the case. For example, it could be 
inferred they were using the 'legal' model of decision-making rather than attempting to 
please the party that appointed them or to apply their known' policy preferences as would 
be the case with the 'attitudinal' model for judicial decision-making. 
However, the authors acknowledge that: 
First, judges may be as likely to vote in accordance with their political preferences 
or attitudes in Canada as the U.S. but as stated by Ostberg and Wetstein due to 
" ... historical patterns of judicial selection in Canada have ensured that justices with 
diverse characteristics, largely unrelated to their ideological leanings have been 
elevated to the Court. 506 
' . 
Thus, Green and Alarie conclude the Canadian selection process has resulted in judges 
being appointed to the sec who are not driven by political ideology to the same extent 
that has been observed in the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Green and Alarie used two analytical approaches to assess their data, namely, the 
(1) Direct Method and (2) Indirect Method: Martin-Quinn. The use of the Martin-Quinn 
approach is unique in that they state: "Importantly, the Martin-Quinn method does not 
assume that a vote to affirm or reverse in any given case is 'conservative' or 'liberal'. 507 As 
their data does not support the application of the 'attitudinal' model of decision-making to 
the sec justices, the authors suggest a more sophisticated theory has to be developed 
that takes into account not only the reality of attitudinal, legal and strategic influences 
having impact on decision-making, but should also make use of newer theories such as 
506 Ibid. at 40. While the term of 'diverse' is used to describe the SCC bench, we are aware that only geographical origins are 
diverse and that there are more women on this bench than in other common law jurisdictions. 
507 Ibid. at 39. 
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provided by Baum of the import and presumably the pervasiveness of the desire of judges 
to please various audiences. 508 Another important influence for consideration as was 
observed by a Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) interviewee,509 as well as 
Emmet Macfarlane, the political scientist, 510 is the adjudicator's perception of the proper 
execution of his role and function. 
While Green and Alarie did not make any pronouncements on the concepts of 
independence or impartiality, they did declare their research findings demonstrated the 
'attitudinal' model of judicial decision-making [the assumption that judicial decision-making 
is based in part on policy preferences] did not apply to Canadian Supreme Court judges to 
the extent it had in other jurisdictions. They did, however, take the position that their 
results demonstrate that any tampering with the current selection process for appointees 
to the Canadian Supreme Court should be re-considered in light of their findings. 511 
However, it is also worthy of emphasizing these researchers noted throughout their 
analysis that the votes of one jurist caused great difficulty given she was such an extreme 
outlier512 in that she demonstrated the highest level of support for decisions in favour of 
labour unions which was considered to be a 'liberal' attitude but had the lowest level of 
'liberal' votes overall. 513 In some instances they had wondered whether or not her votes 
were so off the chart that they were influencing the results found using the Martin-Quinn 
method to the extent that they were unreliable. 514 
508 Ibid. at 41. 
509 Fran~ois Crepeau & Delphine Nakache, "Critical Spaces in the Canadian Refugee Determination System: 1989 - 2002" 
(2008) 20 (1) International Journal of Refugee Law 50 at 100. ' 
510 Emmet Macfarlane, supra note 485. 
511 Green & Alarie, supra note 423 at 39. 
512 Ibid. at 25,30. 
513 Ibid. at 12, 30. 
514 Ibid. at 24. 
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Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board Decision-making (2008) 
It is also instructive to look at decision-making within the context of a large, national 
administrative tribunal where individual adjudicators are also routinely referred to as 
'judges' and whose decisions also have life-changing impact. To this end Sean Rehaag 
has undertaken an empirical review of decisions made by the Canadian Immigration and 
Refugee Board (IRB) to determine the rate at which individual adjudicators granted claims 
for refugee status. As this information is not in the public domain, Rehaag used 'access to 
information' legislation to acquire details about decisions issued for the calendar year of 
2006.515 This request resulted in the creation of a database of 9,984 decisions on refugee 
claims which included not only administrative information but more importantly, the country 
of origin and gender of the claimant; and the name of the decision-maker.516 It was 
immediately obvious that there was extreme divergence in the grant rates by individuals. 
For instance, Gilles Esthier and Martin Gisherman granted refugee status, respectively, in 
95.65% and 94.55% of the 340 cases they heard in 2006 whereas Sajjad Randhawa and 
Suparna Ghosh conferred refugee status, respectively, in only 2.17% and 9.24% of the 
165 cases they heard for the same time period.517 As a result, the researcher attempted to 
determine the reason for these great disparities. After taking into account obvious reasons 
for why some adjudicators' grant rates would be much higher than others, (like removing 
cases that were likely to be successful as they had already been determined as being 
appropriate for expediting by staff as well as recognizing some geographic regions had 
much higher rates of success due to the social norms, prejudices and dangers inherent in 
the geographic region), it was still evident that there were dramatic differences among 
515 Sean Rehaag, "Troubling Patterns in Canadian Refugee Adjudication" (2008) 39 Ottawa Law Review at 340. 
516 Ibid. at 342. 
517 Ibid. 
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adjudicators. As a result of this phenomenon Rehaag determined it was reasonable to 
infer that the success rate could have been influenced by the identities of the decision-
makers. 518 While Rehaag could not verify this speculation with the data he had assembled 
as he was not able to compare adjudication outcomes and rates to the personal 
characteristics of the adjudicators, he noted that a useful mechanism for determining if 
personal attitudes affected decision-making would be through I RB sanctioned structured 
interviews with Board Members. Rehaag provided some preliminary indications of the 
benefit this kind of research could supply by observing that Fran9ois Crepeau, Delphine 
Nakache and Janet Cleveland had found through their interviews with former IRB Board 
members that " ... there are many personal characteristics that significantly influence the 
decision-making process of refugee adjudicators" .519 The characteristics that Rehaag 
highlighted included social criteria like empathy and cultural sensitivity; cognitive criteria 
like lucidity and open mindedness, and from my perspective, surprisingly, he also included 
the criterion of 'common sense'. 520 Given the vast array of cultures, religions and family 
situations represented by refugee claimants compared with the idiosyncrasy of the 
adjudicators' various social locations it's difficult to imagine how adjudicators could come 
up with a means for determining what would be commonsensical to all concerned. In 
particularly dramatic terms, Devlin and Pothier have pointed out how reliance on the use of 
'common sense' is seriously problematic as "Historical analyses make it clear that 
yesterday's common sense is, with hindsight, blatant racism".521 Equally unexpected, from 
my perspective, is that the characteristics of gender and political affiliation were not raised 
as potential influences by the IRB interviewees. Perhaps this omission can be explained 
518 Ibid. at 352. 
519 Ibid. at 354. 
520 Ibid. 
521 Devlin & Pothier, supra note 403 at 21. 
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by the fact that the interviewees were adjudicators themselves and they may believe they 
were not influenced by their genders or their political philosophies or ties, or, perhaps had 
not even considered the possibility of their influence. 
Frangois Crepeau and Delphine Nakache who have now published the results of 
their 2004 interviews with former IRB Board Members and other stakeholders in the 
process reported on a broad range of multi-faceted perceived and acknowledged 
influences on adjudicators' decisions. Unfortunately, this research could not be conducted 
in collaboration with the IRB, hence only former Board Members who volunteered to 
participate were interviewed. In order to arrive at their findings Crepeau and Nakache 
. analyzed the results of interviews with 16 former Board Members from four geographic 
regions; and from focus groups with 53 knowledgeable informants involved with the I RB 
as either lawyers, non-governmental organization workers, health professionals, and 
interpreters. In addition, 30 refugee claimants (both successful and unsuccessful) from 
three distinct geographical regions were interviewed.522 The researchers emphasized that 
given the inability to work in collaboration with the IRB to organize interviews, their 
interviewees were not randomly chosen and it would not be unreasonable to say the 
majority of former Board Members who were willing to be interviewed were likely more 'pro 
refugee' than others. However, Crepeau and Nakache support the legitimacy of their 
findings by concluding the Board Members who came forward were reliable and 
knowledgeable informants as they had, for the most part, long service records and some 
had additional responsibilities that provided for both a broad and deep view of the 
institution as a whole.523 
522 Crepeau & Nakache. supra note 509 at 54. 
523 Ibid. at 55. 
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Factors which Crepeau and Nakache identified which comport with what has been 
identified by the judicial decision-making research is that political affiliation was apparent in 
the approach taken and decisions made by some adjudicators. For example, it was 
observed by an adjudicator that partisan politics "could ... [be] demoralizing sometimes".524 
In addition, some members reported that some of their colleagues had the impression that 
they were required to decide cases as directed by the government of the day. 525 Such 
comments do not speak to either an apolitical or non-partisan approach to adjudication. 
Rehaag observes that as long as twenty years ago the Canadian Bar Association 
(CBA) had already complained about the extent of political influence in the appointments 
process. 526 Similarly, one of the adjudicators interviewed by Crepeau and Nakache noted 
that" ... these jobs at $100,000 a year are real plums and politicians are under 
considerable pressure from local supporters to consider them for the positions". 527 Another 
adjudicator referred to 'horse trading' going on within the governing party to determine 
what type of appointment would be made and for how long.528 News media coverage of a 
2010 conviction of an IRB adjudicator for offering to grant a refugee claim in exchange for 
sexual favours also commented on the CBA's critique of the pervasiveness of political 
patronage in the appointment process. 529 Adding weight to the CBA view, Crepeau and 
Nakache found that in 1997 the Auditor General had criticized the tools used by the 
government to select candidates noting they didn't actually assess for qualification. 530 
524 Ibid. at 81. 
525 Ibid. at 80. 
526 Rehaag, supra note 515 at 356. 
527 Crepeau & Nakache, supra note 509 at 60. 
528 Ibid. 
529 Sarah Boesveld, "Immigration Judge found guilty in sex bribery case", (21 April 2010) The Globe.and Mail. 
530 Rehaag, supra note 515 at 356. 
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Presumably to address this concern, procedures were put in place by the federal 
government in 2004531 so as to select candidates who are considered qualified to serve as 
adjudicators separate and apart from being politically connected. 532 More ~ecently, in 
2007, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Canada accepted the recommendations 
of the Public Appointments Commission's Secretariat and stated in a News Release that 
"changes to the selection process will strengthen the merit-based competency focus of 
GIC appointments to the IRB while increasing transparency and fairness".533 These 
changes focussed on the creation of a new Selection Advisory Board whose members 
would include I RB senior staff as well as Ministerial appointees. Another 'innovation' (the 
quotation marks are my emphasis) that was highlighted was the inclusion of a mark of 
'pass' or 'fail' for the test written by applicants. The underlying principle appears to be that 
being required to demonstrate a minimum standard of knowledge by passing a test will 
reinforce the importance of merit and improve the transparency of the selection process. 534 
Returning to the potential impact of personal characteristics, surprisingly, no 
commentary was provided on the impact of gender on approaches or outcomes to 
decision-making given Stribopoulos and Yayha's findings. 535 Interestingly enough, 
whether this was a function of personality, political affiliation, personal beliefs or a lack of 
understanding of the nature of their role, it was also opined that some adjudicators did not 
have the ability to approach their work with an open mind in that it was apparent that they 
had already made up their minds (either to accept or not) before the hearing had even 
531 Ibid. and Crepeau and Nakache, supra note 509 at 63. 
532 Crepeau and Nakache, supra note 509.at 63 and Rehaag, supra note 515 at 358. 
533 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, News Release, "Minister Finley announces revised selection process for 
appointments to the IRB" (9 July 2007), online: CIC 
<http://www.cic.qc.ca>. 
534 Ibid. 
535 Stribopoulos & Yahya, supra note 421 at 356. 
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begun.536 In addition, the high degree of influence of the adjudicator's perception of the 
proper execution of the role emerged from Crepeau and Nakache's research. For 
example, it was readily evident some adjudicators determined they should be giving the 
refugee applicant the benefit of the doubt when attempting to establish credibility rather 
than seeing " ... their main role ·as detecting lies, focusing primarily on looking for 
inconsistencies and contradictions, often on minor details (such as dates) or secondary 
issues (for example, how the claimant got to Canada)".537 It is abundantly clear from this 
kind of commentary and as noted by Rehaag how valuable it would be to verify these 
observations and speculations in comparison to grant rates over a longer term qualitative 
and quantitative empirical study.538 
In the past, as pointed out by Rehaag, the I RB decision-making process was 
based on two adjudicators hearing claims together where the claimant only had to 
convince one of the adjudicators in order to have his claim granted. 539 As a result, one 
could realistically assume this kind of process would have resulted in the possibility of a 
greater spectrum of influences on the decisions made and the potential for the dampening 
or amplifying effect of different points of views, as observed by Sunstein et al and 
Stribopoulos and Yahya, to come into play. As the process in place now is for only one 
adjLJdicator to make a determination (with an internal appeal process only recently being 
made available) given the great difference in grant rates within geographic regions, it is 
readily apparent that the personal characteristics and affiliations, and perhaps the 
personal perspective on the proper role of the adjudicator, can loom large with respect to 
refugee claimants' fates. 
536 Crepeau & Nakache, supra note 509 at 79. 
537 Ibid. at 100. 
538 Rehaag, supra note 515 at 355. 
539 Ibid. at 359. 
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Lawrence Baum introduces another motivation for judges (and I would posit, by 
extension, other types of decision-makers) arriving at particular decisions which relates to 
the concepts of both independence and impartiality. He notes judges are not like Dr. 
Spock with no emotions nor any desire to please others. 540 Therefore, he thinks it's 
reasonable to conclude judges' decisions may not only be influenced by party of 
appointment or other variables, but they may also be influenced by how they as individuals 
will be perceived and/or whether their decisions will be accepted by various audiences. As 
a result, in his estimation, except for the strongest ideologues and asocial individuals, 
judges care about self-presentation and various groups' responses to their judgments and 
their contributions to policy development. Baum believes that " ... judges' motivation to win 
the approval of their audiences can explain a good deal about their choices as decision-
makers ... ".541 For example, he has determined the views of judges' social groups and the 
legal community are important to the majority of judges; that policy groups are important to 
others, while the news media may also have relevance as a force on its own and as an 
intermediary between judges and other audiences. 542 
An example of the relevance of Baum's theory to the Canadian judiciary can be 
found in the comments made by the Right Honourable former Chief Justice Lamer (Chief 
Justice Lamer) when he indicated his support for striking down the law that made 
accessible abortion illegal in Canada, post Charter, was profoundly influenced by his belief 
that public opinion was not on the side of criminalizing abortion. Specifically, the then Chief 
Justice stated: "My reasoning is that unless you have a vast majority of people think 
540 Lawrence Baum, Judges and Their Audiences: A Perspective on Judicial Behavior(Princeton and Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 2006) at 17 4. 
541 Ibid. at 23. 
542 Ibid. at 163. 
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something is criminal, you should not make it a crime".543 This comment unequivocally 
demonstrates the power of majority public opinion on a particular Chief Justice's approach 
to the adjudication process. In addition, one can also imagine that another judge deciding 
the same issue may want to impress a different audience, perhaps, a minority public 
opinion, depending on what and who is important to her. Not surprisingly, these different 
audiences would be impressed by different decisions. For example, in Jeffrey Toobin's 
analysis of the behaviours and voting records of nine U.S. Supreme Court judges, The 
Nine Inside the Secret World of the Supreme Court, he observes one judge cared a great 
deal about what The New York Times journalists thought by saying" ... Kennedy always 
labored most closely on the sections of the opinions that might be quoted in The New York 
Times ".544 
Stribopoulos and Yahya also comment on David S. Law's study that looked at 
appeal court judgments delivered by the Ninth Circuit in the U.S. and found a similar 
proclivity. Specifically, for some judges, it was apparent that if the decision was to be 
published they would put out a dissenting opinion when the decision was not consistent 
with their ideological orientation. Whereas, if the judgment would not be published and 
their vote would not be in the public domain then they would be willing to support decisions 
that ran counter to their 'known'.. ideological orientation.545 
Third Analysis of Canadian Supreme Court Decisions (2008) 
Donald R. Songer, an American political science scholar, has focused considerable 
energy on the functioning of the Canadian Supreme Court (SCC). Specifically, he has 
attempted to determine whether the SCC's determinations can be categorized using the 
543 Catholic Insight "Antonio Lamer 'liberated' Canada for abortion" (2008) online: <http://catholicinsight.com>. 
544 Toobin, supra note 439 at 62. See Stribopoulos and Yahya, supra note 421 at. 323. 
545 Stribopoulos & Yahya, supra note 421 at 323. 
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legal, attitudinal or strategic model of decision-making.546 Songer conducted in-depth 
interviews of 60 to 90 minutes in duration with ten current and recently retired Supreme 
Court justices and four former law clerks, all of whose comments are not identified by 
name. These interviews were conducted over a six-year period from 2001 to 2007. He 
also analyzed a database of all sec decisions from over a roughly 30-year period. In 
looking at the cases he was especially interested in criminal law, Charter rights and 
liberties and economic disputes. 
Sanger's first observation that is particularly relevant to this discussion is the SCC (the 
Court) has changed dramatically as a result of the introduction of the Charter as it now has 
to deal with many issues that have impact far beyond the individual case being heard. In 
addition, when choosing what appeals it will hear, the Court has shown it is particularly 
interested in deciding cases that have national importance, where federal law is involved 
and particularly where provincial and territorial appellate courts have come to different 
conclusions. 547 Hence the Court has clearly established itself as a policy-making body 
especially in relation to rights adjudication and other constitutional issues. This 
observation is very important as it presents another challenge to impartiality and 
independence in that judges are not simply reacting to the cases brought to their attention. 
At this level they have the freedom to choose the cases they will (or want to) hear. This 
responsibility to choose what cases will be heard provides for more opportunities for 
political affiliations; policy preferences; gender affiliations or antagonisms and personal 
attachments that jurists may either be fully aware of or not aware of at all to influence their 
choices as to which issues deserve to be heard. 
546 Songer, supra note 419 at 5. 
547 Ibid. at 23. 
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Songer found that even with such politically contentious matters to decide, the 
court still maintained a high degree of collegiality. 548 This finding is very interesting from a 
theoretical point of view as it leads to the question of whether the desire to be collegial 
reduces the .willingness of jurists to maintain what may be unpopular but correct analyses 
based on 'black letter' law, precedent and social context. Or, does the influence of 
collegiality provide for unanimous decisions that are very narrowly focused so all members 
can sign on to them? Alternatively, does the presence of the views of other people who the 
decision-makers respect, a.k.a. a collegial approach, assist them to re-think or re-evaluate 
what might be an automatic or knee jerk reaction based on a political preference. If so, the 
impact of collegiality may be very positive in that it fosters deliberation and better decision-
making. However, we have evidence to demonstrate the opposite can also occur. 
Roger Brown, the noted social psychologist, ominously warns "There is nothing 
new to be learned in group discussion". 549 He observes that based on Burnstein's findings 
550 social issues related to capital punishment, race and gender engender polarizing 
discussions whereas discussions on topics unfamiliar to the participants resulted in 
depolarization. This is the phenomenon that was also observed in Sunstein et al's study 
described in detail earlier. For example, in cases involving gay rights where three 
Democrats were on the Panel they voted 100% in favour o.f gay rights; whereas Panels of 
three Republicans voted in favour of gay rights in 14% of the cases. By comparison when 
judges were not sitting in homogenous political Panels, Republicans voted for gay rights in 
16% of the cases and Democrats in only 57% of the cases.. Similar levels of convergence 
548 Ibid. at 242. 
549 Roger Brown, Social Psychology The Second Edition, (New York: The Free Press, Macmillan Inc., 1986) at 226. 
550 E. Burnstein produced "Persuasion as Argument Processing" in Group Decision-making, (London: Academic Press, 
1982); and with A. Vinokur " Testing two classes of theories about group induced shifts in individual choice" in the Journal of 
Experimental Psychology (1973) and 'What a person thinks upon learning he has chosen differently from others: Nice 
evidence for the persuasive arguments explanation of choice shifts" in The Journal of Experimental Psychology (1975). 
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of opinion or polarization (Republican to Democrat) was observed with the National 
·Environmental Policy Act (24% to 51%), in affirmative action cases (28% to 49%), in sex 
discrimination cases (17% to 46%), in the Americans with Disabilities Act (16% to 33%) 
and finally for campaign finances (14% to 31 %).551 Sunstein draws the obvious conclusion 
from this data set and his experience that deliberation amor;ig like-minded individuals with 
strongly held points of view results in a greater tendency toward convergence on the jointly 
held perspective. These data demonstrate that if a particular jurisdiction is interested in 
ensuring divergent points of view are taken into account when any entity is making 
process and/or substantive decisions, (whether it be a bench of appeal court judges or a 
Panel for an administrative tribunal or a group of facilitators), it will be necessary to provide 
for a diverse group of decision-makers. 
An experiment instructive in this regard is the Public Conversations Project (PCP) 
developed by a group of family therapists in 1989 in Waterton, Massachusetts to address 
intractable disputes. In one experiment, six women were brought together, three who 
were identified as 'pro-life' leaders and three who were identified as 'pro-choice' leaders to 
discuss abortion. They did so due to the killing of two women and the shooting of others, 
in Brookline, Massachusetts on December 30, 1994. 
The six participants met privately over a five and a half year period for 
approximately 150 hours. The January 28, 2001 article co-written by all six participants 
and published in The Boston Globe states: 
Our talks would not aim for common ground or compromise. Instead the goals of 
our conversations would be to communicate openly with our opponents away from 
the polarizing spotlight of media coverage; to build relationships of mutual respect 
551 Cass R. Sunstein, Why Groups Go to Extremes, (Washington, DC: The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research, 2008) at 6. 
187 
and understanding; to help deescalate the rhetoric of the abortion controversy; and 
... to reduce the risk of future shootings. 552 
The outcome of this experiment was the participants' mutual caring and understanding 
deepened while at the same time they all became firmer in their original views about 
abortion. While there were beneficial outcomes to their discussion, (e.g. they stopped 
using demonizing language about one. another's beliefs in public settings and they worked 
together to prevent further assaults in the Boston area), they did not achieve compromise 
nor were they expected to do so. Laura Chasin, the former Director of the PCP, is 
adamant that only dialogue can reduce polarization of opinion and/or demonization of 
those who disagree with us. She notes in her treatise on how to promote constructive 
discussion that: 
Taking the first step toward a more accurate understanding of our political 
opponents, becomes easier when we grasp that it is not the substance of our 
differences - neither their content nor their intensity - that polarizes us, but the way 
in which we express our passionate perspectives.553 . 
Ms. Chasin holds the view that we are able to make this distinction between style and 
substance when we are highly motivated and not feeling threatened.554 Interestingly 
enough, she sees 'compromise' as anathema to true dialogue. In fact, Chasin sees 
compromise as mutating " ... black a~d white views to an unacceptable shade of gray .. .,"555 
and that by engaging in dialogue we are able to bring colour into the conversation which in 
552 Fowler, A., Nichols Gamble, N., Hogan, F.X., Kogut, M., McCamish, M. and Thorp, B., 'Talking with the Enemy" The 
Boston Globe (January 28, 2001) at 2. 
553 Laura Chasin, "How to break the argument habit" The Christian Science Monitor (26 October 2004) at 2 online: The 
Christian Science Monitor <http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/1026/p08s01-coop.html>. Please note that the balding of the 
terms are 'substance' and 'express' is my emphasis. 
554 Ibid. at 3. 
555 Ibid. at 2. 
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her view" ... increases mutual understanding, builds respectful relationships, and 
stimulates fresh ideas about complex issues".556 
The reality of judicial decision-making is that rigorous analysis of litigants' 
competing needs and rights on matters of immense magnitude has.to be completed in a 
reasonable time frame. As a result, Sunstein's conclusion that" ... an understanding of 
group polarization helps show that heterogeneous groups are often a far better source of 
good judgments, simply because more arguments will be made available"557 is instructive 
on how to best proceed. This understanding is crucial to the discussion of impartiality and 
independence as it is impossible to say there is one right answer, or an objective truth, in 
law, or in many other social disciplines, in a diverse society. Therefore, it is readily evident 
that a wide variety of points of view represented by a diverse group of decision-makers is 
necessary in order to arrive at a carefully considered and fair outcome. 
A second theme also identified by Songer is that while the court decides cases on 
legal grounds there is also strong evidence to demonstrate judges decide cases not on the 
basis of precedent and 'black letter' law but also on their political preferences.558 In 
addition, there was also substantial gender difference in the voting patterns of justices. 
This shouldn't be a surprise given Stribopoulos and Yahya's findings cited earlier. 
However, while the voting patterns demonstrated that political affiliation and gender were 
influential, this observation was countered by the fact Songer found that the justices also 
took particular actions which suggest they were not driven solely by political preference 
and perspectives informed by gender. For example, he learned from his interviews with 
the ten justices that each justice spent a great deal of time preparing for oral argument by 
556 Ibid. at 3 
557 Cass R. Sunstein, supra note 551 at 24. 
558 Songer, supra note 419 at 245, 246. 
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reviewing the factums in an effort to master the legal arguments made; clerks were asked 
to do additional research on the primary issues being argued and to analyze precedents 
the justices weren't familiar with; each justice always discussed legal issues with their 
clerks prior to oral argument but only occasionally the policy issues; none of the judges 
said they asked the clerk to find ways to justify a decision on the basis of the judge having 
already made' up his or her mind on the basis of the factum; and, judges said they 
frequently switched sides after hearing oral argument. 559 While it appears Songer is 
praising these decision-makers for these behaviours, it would seem such activities would 
be pro forma when operating in an independent and impartial manner. Also, even though it 
is somewhat uncomfortable to do so, the question must be raised as to whether or not the 
interviewees were conscious their comments would be published and their answers, while 
sincere, were constructed to ensure their decision-making was not seen to be, in the main, 
'partial'. However, these actions themselves suggest to Songer that political preferences 
and gender sensitivities do not reign supreme and the law itself and precedent is influential 
to what he describes " ... to at least some non-trivial degree".560 In addition, it is also 
important to emphasize that all of the judges acknowledged that their personal 
predispositions and affiliations did indeed affect their votes and opinions at least some of 
the time and they did admit to bargaining with their colleagues on occasion. 561 
Unfortunately, Songer did not pursue or does not state what influences or variables were 
in play when the justices were not affected by their personal views or how and when the 
judges justified their personal points of view being influential when deciding particular 
cases. 
559 Ibid. at 245. 
560 Ibid. at 246. 
561 Ibid. at 236. 
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Another important conclusion Songer arrived at was the desire to deliver 
unanimous decisions and maintain collegial relationships was such that it appears the 
influence of judges' personal political preferences were dampened with the outcome being 
that of a moderate compromise position rather than a straightforward acceptance or 
rejection of the arguments presented. 562 In order to achieve unanimity it was observed by 
one of the justices that " .. .fudgier. .. "563 or more narrow judgments than originally drafted 
were ultimately written so as to provide room for everyone to sign on. This desire for 
unanimity conflicts with one of the Court's earlier stated goals which was to decide issues 
of national importance so as to ensure provinces and territories were not taking different 
paths on interpretation. Presumably, 'fudgier' judgments reduce the clarity the justices 
indicated they were seeking to provide. However, it must also be acknowledged that 
multiple opinions and dissents can also reduce clarity. Nonetheless, a unanimous 
compromise opinion that provides little direction on substantive issues does not seen to 
support the Court's stated intention for establishing a standard interpretation for lower 
courts to rely on. 
The third theme identified by Songer relevant to the notion of impartiality is the 
SCC is moderate from a political perspective. This outcome is demonstrated to Songer by 
the fact he did not discern dramatically high or low levels of support for either liberal or 
conservative policy positions or for business vs. government or individuals, etc.564 Ian 
Greene provides additional commentary on whether the right or left side of the political 
spectrum ·has gained supremacy in the courts by observing that left leaning academics 
opine that the courts have allowed the rich to become richer and for the disadvantaged to 
562 Ibid. at 249 
563 Ibid. 
564 Ibid. at 247. 
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be further disenfranchised. In contrast, Professor Greene notes that right leaning 
academics believed Charter challenges have been dominated by leftist special 
interests. 565 Ultimately Greene provides. support for Sanger's observation of the existence 
of an overall moderate approach in that he concludes that the criticisms from both 
academics from the left and the right may be indicative of the judiciary " ... doing a good job 
of steering a middle course."566 
Songer makes the final point that the SCC is a more democratic institution than 
other comparable courts as ordinary people have substantial access to the Court who are 
not connected to business or organized interest groups, and they win more often than they 
do in other comparable courts around the world. 567 He is also impressed with the diversity 
of religions being represented on the Court at the time of his study. However, his view of 
diversity is the presence of judges affiliated with two different Christian religions, 
specifically Protestant and Roman Catholics, being represented " ... on a fairly equal 
basis.~. "568 which many would agree is a very narrow definition of religious diversity. 569 The 
importance of having diverse religious view points represented was provided in the 
analysis undertaken by Adam Liptak, described earlier, which demonstrated that a U.S. 
Supreme Court majority which favoured one religious faith's position dismissed precedent 
in order to support the litigant who was championing their particular religious view. 570 
Songer is also impressed by the fact that Canadian Supreme Court judges come 
from many different law schools and undergraduate universities in sharp contrast to the 
U.S. and the U.K. experience where the highest court judges come from a very small 
565 Ian Greene, The Courts (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006) at 109. 
566 Ibid. 110. 
567 Songer, supra note 419 at 248. 
568 Ibid. at 251. 
569 Since the release of Songer's study two judges who are Jewish have been appointed to the SCC. 
570 Liptak, supra note 436 at 3. 
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number of elite institutions. Clearly having justices in place representing a broader 
diversity of economic and social circumstances should not only be considered 
praiseworthy but essential given the high degree of influence personal characteristics can 
have on judicial outcomes. The Honourable Madam Justice Maryka Omatsu in her 
account of her own appointment to the bench as an 'outsider', that is as a Japanese 
Canadian woman, in "The Fiction of Judicial Impartiality" speaks directly to the importance 
of social and economic diversity of appointees to the bench at all levels. SpeCifically, she 
has concluded that judges who are economically privileged do not deliberately make 
judgments that are advantageous to those of their particular social and economic class 
and those of their ancestors; rather, it is their lack of experience in milieux different from 
their own that can create a " ... systemic blindspot".571 Justice Omatsu notes that, as a 
direct result, this lack of experience can have a profound effect on their determinations of 
fact and motive. Her commentary is important as it is counter-intuitive to suggest a group 
of people who have no experience with poverty or homelessness with insufficient 
resources to care for their children, or their own basic needs would be able to effortlessly 
understand the actions or motivations of accused persons who know nothing else. 
Songer also notes that in 2008 Canada had more women sitting as Supreme Court 
jurists than U.S., Britain, and Australia combined.572 While this is a notable 
accomplishment and bodes well for the future, the inclusion of multiple perspectives of 
different women does not ensure judicial decision-making will be 'fair' in relation to women 
as noted by Justice Omatsu in her endorsement of Isabel Grant and Lynn Smith's view573 
that the system within which these women do their work was built with very little input from 
571 Maryka Omatsu, 'The Fiction of Judicial Impartiality" (1997) 9 Canadian Journal of Women and Law, at 7. 
572 Songer, supra note 419 at 252. 
573 Omatsu, supra note 571 at 5. 
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women. In addition, there is no good reason to believe that all women who are appointed 
as judges would necessarily be better informed or more capable than men who have been 
traditionally appointed to these roles in making appropriate use of social context with 
respect to race, ethnicity and socio economic class. 
However, in contrast to Justice Omatsu (t997), Razack (1998), Devlin (1995) and 
many others, Songer does not address one important aspect of diversity; that is, race and 
ethnicity. He does not comment on the fact the SCC has gone from " ... a pale, male 
bench ... "574 as the. Right Honourable Chief Justice Richard Goldstone from South Africa 
described the courts of yester years in his country, to now being a 'pale, male and female' 
bench. Justice Omatsu makes particular note of the fact that the judiciary is 
" ... overwhelmingly white, male and upper-middle class."575 The absence of race in 
Sanger's analysis is striking as the issue of race is a major theme in public discourse· as it 
relates to access to and the dissemination of justice in many jurisdictions. 576 Presumably, 
the same observation noted above about women not being involved in the construction of 
the legal system in the past, would also apply to those who are racialized, those who are 
not well educated or economically successful, etc. who traditionally have not been 
influential in the design or implementation of the justice system. For example, Toni 
Williams has looked at the disparities in the sentences imposed on black and white men 
within the criminal justice system in Ontario in an attempt to determine the rationale for 
differing outcomes. Her view is that the requirement for judges to assess the vague and 
574 Richard Goldstone, Panel Discussion at "Looking Back, Looking Forward: Judicial Independence in Canada and the 
World" University of Toronto, (29 November 2007) [unpublished] and The Kennedy Library Forums, The Struggle for 
Freedom and Justice in South Africa (undated) at 9. 
575 Omatsu, supra note 571 at 8. 
576 Examples include: Patricia Hughes & Mary Jane Mossman "Re-Thinking Access to Criminal Justice in Canada: A Critiical 
Review of Needs, Responses and Restorative Justice Initiatives" Department of Justice Canada (2004-01-13); 
http://www.justice.gc.ca/enq; Richard J. Lundman & Robert L. Kaufman "Driving While Black" Effects of Race, Ethnicity and 
Gender on Citizen Self-Reports of Traffic Stops and Police Actions" (2003) 41 Criminology 195. 
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undefined notions of an offenders' attitude or personality when imposing a sentence lends 
support to the theory that unconscious discrimination on the basis of race can influence 
outcomes. 577 
Songer also comments on what he considers to be the diversity of ethnic, linguistic 
and geographical representation as the SCC is made up of Anglophones from Ontario (by 
convention) Francophones (by law from Quebec) and western and eastern regional 
representation (by convention). 578 Notably, no reference is made to the fact that while 
great emphasis is placed on Anglophone and Francophone cultures being equally 
represented on the SCC the other founding nation of Canada, that being native or 
aboriginal peoples, has never been represented at the sec level nor have people of 
colour ever been represented on this top court either. 579 
Given the SCC Bench is comprised of nine people and their appointments are of a 
high profile nature it is not difficult to identify ethnicity and race. However, the demographic 
diversity of the much larger pool of federal judicial appointees is much more difficult to 
examine. While the number of men and women who are appointed is easily found, in 
contrast when Sonia Lawrence attempted to acquire statistics on other demographic 
criteria like race/ethnicity, disability or aboriginal status as it relates to the pool of 
applicants for federal appointments circa 2010 she was advised no such information was 
available. 580Early in 2000, Ian Greene pointed out through information gleaned from the 
Manitoba Aboriginal Justice Implementation Commission that as of 2001 eighteen 
Aboriginal judges had been appointed which represented .8% of the judiciary overall. 
577 Toni Williams, "Sentencing Black Offenders in the Criminal Justice System", in David Cole & Julian Roberts, eds., Making 
Sense of Sentencing (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999) at 214. 
578 Songer, supra note 419 at 21. 
579 Sonia Lawrence, supra note 414 at 202. In Lawrence's reflections on impartiality and independence she draws attention to 
the many scholars and organizations calling for the appointment of an aboriginal judge to the sec. 
580 Ibid. at 214: 
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While this may be considered an achievement in some circles the salary data also 
demonstrated that the aboriginal judges earned on average 42% less than the judicial 
average. This information demonstrates that the appointments were made to lower courts 
hence the previously identified salary gap. 581 
It is noteworthy that before R. D. S. was appealed to the Supreme Court, The 
Honourable Mr. Justice Freeman of the Nova Scotia Appeal Court stated in his reasons for 
dissenting with the majority opinion that "Judge Sparks [a black woman] was under a duty 
to be sensitive to the nuances and implications, and to rely on her own common sense 
which is necessarily informed by her own experience and understanding". 582 While his 
use of the term 'common sense' is troubling given it is not a meaningful term in a multi-
cultural/racial/pluralist society, Justice Freeman also points out emphatically that while 
cases which involve race are more difficult to decide due to the potential for volatility, the 
judge is still required to address the questions that arise " .. .freely and frankly and to the 
best of the judge's ability".583 When the appeal to the sec was successful it was noted 
by a local·journalist that this was an extremely important decision as it conveyed " ... a 
sense that for the first time ever Black experiences and perceptions have received some 
legitimacy with the court system". 584 This decision that addressed race when the 
evidence .was being examined " ... has clearly acknowledged that colour blindness is not 
necessarily synonymous with impartiality".585 However, it is extremely ironic given the 
systemic bias and racism experienced by people of colour in many different arenas, that 
the first judicial decision to be examined for racial bias by the sec was issued by a judge 
581 Greene, supra note 565 at 62. 
582 Devlin & Pothier, supra note 403 at 6. 
583 Ibid. at 7. 
584 Ibid. at 9. 
585 Ibid. at 37. 
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who was the the first black woman appointed to the bench in Canada and the first 
racialized person from Nova Scotia to fulfill this function. 586 Sherene Razack observed 
" ... how quickly and. efficiently the elites swung into action to call Judge Sparks to account, 
a showing of white group consensus?"587 in her analysis of how dangerous it can be for 
racialized people occupying public positions to challenge the traditional view of 
officialdom. 588 It is important to highlight for the purposes of this examination that the 
majority opinion concluded that rather than being racist, her decision was unbiased and 
" ... alert to a pervasive social reality". 589 This wording demonstrates with great clarity the 
importance of decision-makers being knowledgeable about a wide variety of social 
contexts, either through experience, study or effective listening in order for sensible 
decisions to be rendered. 
Martha Minow has made the point that when two African American judges, one 
man and one woman, refused to recuse themselves because it was believed they could 
not be impartial when it came to cases of race discrimination, it exposed the.following 
. belief: 
... the assumption that the neutral baseline against which to evaluate bias is the 
vantage point of a white male. They mean to show that even whites and males 
have a vantage point that can and should be evaluated for bias. Departure from a 
white male perspective does not necessarily mean bias .... 590 
These observations are_ very important to any analysis of decision-making as we must 
recognize what a mistake it would be to assume those whose race and gender are most 
dominant in terms of decision-making do not have personal prejudices or through some 
586 The Canadian Bar Association, News Release "Judge Corrne Sparks wins CBA 2008 CBA Touchstone Award" (15 
August 2008), online: <CBA <http://www.cba.org>. 
587 Sherene Razack, "R.D.S. V. HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN: A CASE ABOUT HOME" (1998) 9:3 FORUM 
CONSTITUTIONNEL 59 at 65. . 
588 Ibid. at 60. 
589 Devlin & Pothier, supra note 403 at 11. 
590 Minow, supra note 375 at 1207. 
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magical mental gymnastic feat acquired a 'view from nowhere'. 591 Devlin and Pothier also 
pointed out the irony that the research in both Canada and the U.S. shows that there is an 
increased likelihood that the decisions of judges who are racialized and/or women will be 
challenged for an apprehension of bias. One of their prescriptions for addressing this 
reality is to emphasize the need for appellate court judges to be mindful of the potential for 
this disturbing trend to be at play in the cases brought to their attention. 592 
Would it be reasonable to conclude from the foregoing information that ADR 
practitioners and decision-makers who claim to be impartial and independent, are 
therefore more like the majority of Canadian Supreme court judges whose decisions were 
assessed by Green and Alarie than like U.S. federal court judges or Ontario appeal court 
judges or the judges interviewed by Songer? As noted earlier, the 'attitudinal' model 
assumes the policy orientation of the judge is reflected in her judgments. As the majority of 
the empirical research on judicial decision-making generally supports this assumption 593 it 
is reasonable to explore whether this model would apply to other decision-makers and 
ADR practitioners' decision-making as well. However, using the established empirical 
method of assessing decisions made against some of the personal characteristics of the 
decision-maker or practitioner would be impossible given the vast majority of ADR 
practitioners' decisions to take particular actions or make various suggestions are not even 
written down and those that are, are rarely publicized. It must also be recognized that 
while some of the conclusions and recommendations put forward by some Ombuds are 
widely disseminated, the vast majority of the work is undertaken by all Ombuds is done in 
private and not discussed in the public domain. 
591 Nagel, supra note 473. 
592 Devlin & Pothier, supra note 403 at 27. 
593 Ibid. at 10. 
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Impartiality within ADR 
Wendell Jones, a former Ombudsman, and Scott Hughes; law professor, state with 
regard to Ombuds' roles in relation to impartiality: 
Even to say that impartiality and objectivity is a standard to which we should each 
aspire is to invoke a method of thinking and a view of reality that does not exist. 
There is no there there when it comes to this assertion. To use this thinking is to 
assume that which is not. To believe that we should seek impartiality and 
objectivity is to assume that such concepts exist outside of each of us, and that we 
can seek to examine understand, and emulate these concepts. It just ain't so. 594 
Similarly, Susan Sturm, (Professor of Law and Social Responsibility at Columbia 
Law School) and Howard Gadlin (Director and Ombudsman for Center for Cooperative 
Resolution/Office of the Ombudsman, the National Institutes of Health), in their analysis of 
how to effect systemic change using informal conflict resolution approaches, (e.g. ADR), 
also query the notion that 'detached neutrality' is the best way or the only way to overcome 
bias.595 As a result, their assessment of the non-adjudicative (e.g. facilitation, mediation, 
ombudsing) ways and means that have been effective in creating systemic and system-
wide change in a large and complex institution have determined the alternative notion of 
'multi-partiality' is an important means for checking· bias. They posit that in the use of the 
multi-partiality method "Bias is acknowledged as in~vitable and as something that must be 
surfaced and corrected". 596 Their observation is the use of 'reflective practice' in an 
interdisciplinary context, de-stabilizes bias in that reflective inquiry requires the ADR 
practitioners themselves to explain, to one another, on a regular basis, what they are 
doing and why. In addition, the analysis of root causes ensures those directly affected are 
594 Wendell Jones & Scott Hughes. "Complexity, Conflict Resolution and How the Mind Works", (2003) 20 Conflict Resolution 
Quarterly at 492. The emphasis on 'should' by use of bold text is mine. 
595 Susan Sturm and Howard Gadlin: "Conflict Resolution and Systemic Change" Journal of Dispute Resolution, 1, (2007) at 
4. 
596 Ibid. at 60. 
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consulted and while doing so, the ADR practitioners recognize they must be very careful 
how they perform that consultation as they are being observed. Finally, the intermediary or 
ADR practitioner is accountable to many different stakeholders or constituencies who 
typically participate only on a voluntary basis. In this modality the practice of multi-
partiality is defined as "Critically analyzing a conflict from multiple vantage points - as a 
way to check the inevitable biases in decision-making that must be continually surfaced 
and corrected". 597 Chris Moore, the prolific author on the subject of mediation has also 
applauded the introduction of the term and concept of 'multi-partiality' by describing it for 
mediators as "We're not removed, we're partial toward all parties trying to get their 
interests met".598 He notes, however, that mediators, when demonstrating multi-partiality, 
must also accept the principles of reasonableness and fairness. Kenneth Cloke 
introduced the term of 'omnipartial', which he defines as being simultaneously on the side 
of each party,599 to the dispute resolution lexicon as a means to describe what he thought 
parties involved in mediation expected from the mediator. He also contends that no one 
can be neutral in relation to conflict as our own experiences in this arena influence our 
perceptions of others' in similar experiences. In addition, Cloke argues that no one in court 
or work place environments can be neutral either as he does not believe it is possible to 
erase biases and points of view. It is noteworthy that he observe~ that judges in particular 
have what he calls 'intractable bias' and that is" ... the bias of believing they are without 
bias".600 
In a similar vein, Bagshaw, who describes himself as a post-modernist thinker, also 
defies the notion of neutrality, but in opposition to Jones and Hughes' 2003 analysis, he 
597 Ibid. at 4. 
598 Chris Moore, Video of Interview from Eye of the Storm (2006) ISBN #1-933857-04-8 online: <http://www.mediate.com>. 
599 Kenneth Cloke, Mediating Dangerously, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 2001) at 13. 
600 Ibid. 
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replaces neutrality with 'self-reflexivity'. He suggests a 'post-modern mediator' should 
attempt to: 
Avoid defining oneself and one's role as 'neutral' and emphasize the importance of 
self-reflexivity601 in the mediator (requires control of one's professional, personal, 
and cultural biases in order to understand the standpoint of the other), while 
valuing the creative use of self. 602 
Mulcahy uses similar language in her explanation of what she terms broadly 
'reflexive practice'603 which she observed through her examination of a British community 
mediation program. The approach taken was known as 'Advanced Mediation' in this 
instance. This modality came about through co-mediators initiating debriefing discussions 
subsequent to mediations where they assessed how their personal critiques of the issues 
in dispute and the behaviour of the disputants themselves had affected the way they 
. conducted the mediation and what options for resolution they brought forward. Through 
this debriefing process they made a concerted effort to illuminate their biases and to 
understand how they affected their performance as mediators.604 In addition, Mulcahy also 
observed mediators behaving in ways during mediations that verified " ... responsible 
partiality ... "605 in that when it was appropriate to do so, they served as champions for the 
causes of the parties (the neighbours in dispute) by taking the side of the residents against 
the powerful Housing Authority. It is evident from the examples cited, (e.g. ina~equate 
insulation, the density of the population, badly done conversions and lack of safe outdoor 
play spaces), 606 that the mediators determined this type of partiality was ethical in the 
601 The concept of self reflexivity as originally coined by Foucault in relation to the importance of self and the lack of objectivity 
found in the discipline of social sciences is now well established in all manner of activity where individuals engage in reflective 
practice in an effort to assess whether or not they are being influenced by 'good or bad bias'. 
602 D. Bagshaw, "The Three M's - Mediation, Postmodernism, and the New Millenium" (2001) Vol. 18 No. 3 Mediation 
Quarterly at 218. 
603 Mulcahy, supra note 356 at page 516. 
604 Ibid. at 517. 
605 Ibid. at 516. 
606 Ibid. at 518. 
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circumstances as the Housing Authority itself was responsible for the dysfunctional system 
which was creating the disputes being mediated. 
Hilary Astor, the Australian ADR scholar and mediator, categorically rejects the 
possibility of neutrality in mediation but taking a different tack, puts forward the notion that 
instead of mediators chasing neutrality, mediators should be emphasizing respect for the 
core value of consensuality. Her thesis is mediators always have an obligation to deal 
with power in relation to the parties, for instance, who is more privileged and how that 
privilege operates within the mediation and what has to be done from a procedural point 
of view in order to deal fairly with those power dynamics. Consequently, she theorizes 
that the recognition of a power dynamic should also be a constant in ADR practice and 
that the mediator must always be thinking about his or her own power in the process as 
well. As a result, mediators must constantly deal with the impact of varying degrees of 
power within mediations and intervene in many different ways to ensure the process is 
fair. Given this responsibility, they can never be neutral. Therefore, she believes the 
mediator's role should be more accurately defined as seeking the highest level of 
participation among the parties and assisting the parties themselves to maximize their 
control. In an effort to more clearly articulate what it is that mediators actually do when 
they are assisting parties to resolve their disputes Astor states: 
Maximizing party control is, for many mediators, a description of what they already 
do. However, a major change is that maximizing party control gives mediators 
more definable tasks. Instead of pursuing an undefined and unattainable goal of 
neutrality they seek to understand and acknowledge their own input into mediation; 
think carefully (about) what is appropriate input for the mediator and how they can 
ethically minimize their input and maximize the control of the parties.607 
At a much earlier juncture, Rifken, Millen and Cobb (1991) also rejected the 
possibility of neutrality and encouraged mediators to discard the task of message 
607 Hilary Astor, "Mediator Neutrality: Making Sense of Theory and Practice" (2007) 16 Social Legal Studies at 235. 
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transmitter from party to party in favour of constructing the role in such a fashion that it 
allowed them to " ... facilitate the production of a coherent narrative". 608 Their view is by 
using this approach mediators can help parties to develop acceptable agreements, 
through " ... the ongoing interactive nature of the mediation narrative". 609 They see this · 
method as being superior to mediators espousing a commitment to neutrality via the use 
of 'equidistance' (i.e. temporarily and equally aligning themselves with each party in order 
to get the issues out) as this intentional alignment designed to increase the potential for 
moving forward in a constructive manner actually resulted in mediators contributing to 
parties developing their sides or positions. 610 
These points of view are particularly instructive as they challenge the beliefs 
typically informing all manner of training programs and ADR literature that operate on the 
premise that mediators, Ombuds, arbitrators, facilitators are by definition, neutral and/or 
impartial without any discussion of the meaning of these terms and without acknowledging 
the difficulty associated with the attainment of these characteristics. 
Achieving Impartiality 
In contrast there are other individuals who have considered that impartiality is 
indeed achievable. Justice Huddart's prescriptions in her reflectively titled article "Know 
Thyself: Some Thoughts About Impartiality of Individual Decision-makers From an 
Interested Observer'' takes a 'self-regulation' trajectory and her belief is that being impartial 
means being loyal to the decision-maker's mandate rather than to the decision-maker's 
own conscience which is generally understood to be the moral values endorsed or 
608 J. Rifken J. Millen & S. Cobb, supra note 394 at 161. 
609 Ibid. at 160 
610 Ibid. 
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subscribed to by the individual.611 Chief Justice Mclachlin makes the same assertion 
when providing her views on how a judge must interpret constitutional principles in that 
she makes a clear distinction between 'personal conscience' and 'judicial conscience'. 
Mclachlin posits that it is a judge's duty to abide only by 'judicial conscience' which is 
predicated on the " ... judge's sworn commitment to uphold the rule of law. It Uudicial 
conscience] is informed not by the judge's personal views, nor by the judge's views as to 
what policy is best." 612 Huddart also puts forward the belief that impartiality involves 
demonstrating the courage to understand every party's interests from their individual 
perspectives and then make a decision based on the agency's mandate.613 She also 
provides examples for structural guarantors of impartiality, specifically: 1) the oath of 
office provides for a public declaration of the decision-maker's commitment to be 
courageous and free of external influence; 2) institutional independence; 3) public 
hearings; 4) a code of conduct for decision-makers; 5) published guidelines and policies 
for what will be considered and how decisions will be made; 6) the requirement to provide 
reasons; 7) immunity from litigation; and 8) education and training for building an 
611 Huddart, supra note 334 at 151. An alternative point of view exists in the literature of judicial decision-making as to the 
import and acceptability of the impact of personal conscience. Of particular note in this discussion is the argument made by 
H. Jefferson Powell in Constitutional Conscience: The Moral Dimension of Judicial Decision, (Chicago, University of Chicago 
Press, 2008). Although it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to explore this influence, to learn more about how 'personal 
conscience· factors into judicial decision-making, please see the following examples for various points of view: Benjamin L. 
Berger, "The Abiding Presence of Conscience: Criminal Justice Against the Law and Modern Constitutional Imagination" 
(2011) 61 University of Toronto Law Journal 579.;William Blake, "God Save This Honorable Court: Religion as a Source of 
Judicial Policy Preferences'' (2012) 65 Political Research Quarterly 814.;Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial 
Process, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1928); Sarah M. R. Cravens, "In Good Conscience: Expressions of Judicial 
Conscience in Federal Appellate Opinions", (2013) 51 Duquesne Law Review; Owen M. Fiss, "Objectivity and Interpretation" 
(1982) Faculty Scl1olarsl1ip Series. Paper 1217 <http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss papers/1217>.;Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey 
J. Rachlinski, Andrew J. Wistrich, "Inside the Judicial Mind" (2001) 86 Cornell Law Review 777.;Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski, Andrew J. Wistrich, "Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases" (2007) 93 Cornell Law Review 1.;John 
Irwin & Daniel Real, "Unconscious Influences on Judicial Decision-Making" (2010) 42 McGeorge Law Review 1.;Dennis R. 
Klinck. "The Unexamined "Conscience" of Contemporary Canadian Equity" (2001) 46 McGill Law Journal 571.;Dennis R. 
Klinck ''The Nebulous Equitable Duty of Conscience" (2005) 31 Queen's Law Journal, 206.; Paul V. Niemeyer," Law & 
Conscience" (1993-1994) 69 Notre Dame Law Review 1011.;Chad M. Oldfather" Judges as Humans: Inter-Disciplinary 
Research and the Problems of Institutional Design" (2007) 36 Hofstra Law Review 125.; Gregory C. Siske, Michael Heise, 
Andrew P. Morriss, "Searching for the Soul of Judicial Decision-Making: An Empirical Study of Religious Freedom Decisions" 
~2004) 65 Ohio State Law Review 491. 
12 Beverly Mclachlin, "Unwritten Constitutional Principles: What is Going On?" New Zealand Journal of Public and 
International Law. 4 (2006) at 162. 
613 Huddart, supra note 334 at 151. 
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atmosphere that respects and expects courage and integrity. 614Justice Huddart also uses 
the 'tool box' metaphor to describe ways and means that assist the decision-maker to be 
and be seen to be impartial. The tools she recommends include: 1) understanding of and 
application of fairness standards appropriate to the circumstances and ensuring 
procedural fairness is provided to the parties; 2) recognition that bias or its appearance 
contravenes the duty of fairness; 3) going beyond minimum legal requirements; and 4) 
truly understanding the mandate of the agency, board or tribunal. 615 
Justice Huddart's precise definition of impartiality is: 
It is to get into the skin of another. This capacity lets a decision-maker enter the 
minds and situations of those affected by her decisions. This is "decisional 
impartiality'' for me. It goes beyond disinterest to what Madam Chief Justice 
McLachlin calls "objective insight". It is to listen, to understand, and only then to 
decide.616 
In examining this recommendation one might wonder if it is actually possible for the very 
privileged individuals who serve as judges and Ombuds and ADR practitioners to actually 
inhabit the 'skin of another' who lives a life which is the opposite of their own experiences 
with respect to education, economic stability, minority status, etc. Obviously, being highly . 
motivated to do so is important. However, it is equally important to understand while it may 
not be possible to do so in all instances, a more practical strategy is to listen carefully and 
to empathize to the greatest extent possible. One might also question whether it is 
possible to listen equally intently to each party. While it may be difficult, it strikes me as 
being possible to do so, if the listener is disciplined, skilled and committed to the 
importance of acquiring the necessary insight for engaging in a fair process and providing 
for a fair outcome. Huddard's thesis is similar to that of Lorne Sossin who has explored 
614 Ibid. at 152 - 158. 
615 /bid. at 167. 
616/bid. at 170. 
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administrative decision-making as it relates to the provision of benefits and services and 
the notion of impartiality and fairness. Sessin advocates for a style of 'intimacy' which he 
defines in the administrative context as an open exchange of information based on a deep 
understanding of what it is like to be one another which is achieved through empathy and 
trust and recognition of the claimants' and the bureaucrats' mutual interdependence.617 In 
addition to Justice Huddart's commentary on the attitudinal 'ways and means' of impartial 
thought, as summarized above she provides her encouragement for the use of various 
structural criteria to guide decision-makers' thinking, (e.g. fairness standards, Codes of 
Conduct/Ethics) and demonstrates the not uncommon view that independence, impartiality 
and fairness are interdependent. 
In contrast, in expressing her resistance to the view that impartiality can be built on 
the aforementioned guarantors, Judith Resnik has indicated unequivocally, using her 
particular feminist lens, that" ... impartiality and disengagement can never be achieved, 
hence all judgment is (sub rosa) suspect, hence we are always living in a second best 
world in which we cover our tracks with doctrines of insulation".618 Presumably Resnik's 
reference to 'insulation' includes the various types of institutional structures and codes of 
conduct endorsed by Justice Huddard. 
Once again, yet taking a different approach, in opposition to Resnik's view, Chief 
Justice's Mclachlin, also an acknowledged feminist,619 believes judicial impartiality can be 
achieved. 620 Her specific prescriptions include: the development of 'conscious objectivity' 
which is based on the premise that the decision-maker recognizes her mind is not a blank 
617 Sessin, supra note 326 at 811. 
618 Judith Resnik, "On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for Our Judges", 61 South California Law 
Review, (1987 -1988) at 1943. 
619 Beverley McLachlin, "Remarks of the Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, P.C. Retirement Ceremony of the 
Honourable Claire L'Heureux-Dube" (10, June 2002), online: Supreme Court of Canada <http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca>. 
620 McLachlin, supra note 399 at 6. 
206 
slate and there are both positive and negative predispositions to be taken into account. In 
her view, via introspection, a judge can identify where her personal values conflict with her 
duty to render an impartial judgment. Chief Justice McLachlin also requires openness of 
·mind which allows the decision-maker to truly hear what is said and to be convinced by 
what is said even when the information provided conflicts with her own perspectives. Her 
final admonition is that a decision-maker must develop a high level of empathy in order to 
" ... recognize the legitimacy of diverse experiences and viewpoints".621 Chief Justice 
McLachlin makes the crucial point that empathy does not mean adopting a particular 
viewpoint but rather it requires the decision-maker " ... to attempt to imagine how each of 
the contenders sees the situation".622 Needless to say, these requirements are not easily 
met and their simplicity of expression should not be conflated with ease of 
accomplishment. Rather these cognitive strategies, in my view, illustrate the sophistication 
required for recognizing the pervasiveness of ethnocentrism, sexism, racism, classism, 
etc. while using intellect, emotion and experience to reduce their impact. 
In providing her view on the way forward for impartiality, Patricia Hughes, now the 
Executive Director of the Law Commission for Ontario, opines that" ... all of us, including 
judges, have our own tentative and partial perceptions"623 and the task at hand is to 
become impartial when determining the outcome of a case. She cites the SCC as 
" ... tentatively articulating a new understanding of judicial impartiality appropriate for a self-
consciously pluralist society". 624 She reviews the reasons provided by the majority and the 
dissent in R.D.S. 625 to demonstrate the SCC held it was acceptable for a lower court judge 
621 Ibid. at 9. 
622 Ibid. 
623 Patricia, Hughes. "A New Direction in Judicial Impartiality" (1997-1998) 9 National Journal of Constitutional Law 251. 
624 Ibid. 
625 R.0.S. supra note 397. 
207 
to take into account social context and therefore there was not a reasonable apprehension 
of bias when the jurist chose to believe the accused person's version of events over those 
of a police officer. As described in detail earlier, in R. D.S. a judge who is a black woman 
found the young black man's account of what had transpired more credible than the 
account provided by the white male police officer. Hughes asserts a new definition for the 
'reasonable person test' has been established through this case as it is acknowledged 
judges will bring their perspectives to bear on the cases before them. However, the new 
test includes whether they have considered their perspectives appropriately. Hughes' 
assertion that this type of reflective analysis must be done is predicated on the belief that 
inappropriate stereotypes must not be allowed to prevail and that 'social context' and 'life 
experience' are properly considered. Hughes cites the acknowledgement made by 
Justices L'Heureux-Dube and Mclachlin of the acceptability of influences from judges' life 
experience on their decision-making in relation to the test for 'reasonable apprehension of 
bias' by them stating that it is: 
... inevitable and appropriate that the differing experience of judges assist them in 
their decision-making process and will be reflected in their judgments, so long as 
those experiences are relevant to the cases, are not based on inappropriate 
stereotypes, and do not prevent a fair and just determination of the cases based on 
the facts in evidence. 626 
These two high ranking jurists further refine their view of what is and is not bias by 
explaining judges must determine if they have analyzed their views appropriately to ensure 
their personal views are not having too great an influence prior to making a determination 
by stating: 
We have established the legal fiction of separation of judicial body from human 
mind. By 'human mind' I mean human emotion, human prejudice, human 
predisposition, and human frailties. It cannot be done. And therefore we must 
develop rules to guide the scope within which the judicial body can act within the 
626 Ibid. at para 29. 
208 
revelation of the human mind. The judge loses the freedom to be defined by his or 
her human mind, which must now be circumscribed. This is all we can mean by 
impartiality. Thus it is not a lack of predisposition but an openness of mind that 
really characterizes the impartial judge.627 
Sossin agrees with Hughes' summary of the SCC's view in that he notes it has 
been" ... recognized, (albeit by a narrow majority) that it is appropriate to view judges as 
products of particular values, beliefs and experiences and that components of a judge's 
personality will have some influence over their decision-making".628 In his own examination 
of impartiality and reasonableness within the arena of administrative law, Sossin also 
emphasizes that an open mind is not predicated on blankness or the absence of 
knowledge of the matter under review and instead argues for a greater level of knowledge 
and understanding that comes from a deeper level of communication between those 
affected by decisions made and the people who are making them. Arguing for the benefits 
of this kind of approach, he envisions the pursuit of intimacy rather than anonymity and 
distance providing for the opportunity for the decision-maker to 'walk in the shoes' of the 
parties affected by the decisions as a contributor to impartial and fair decision-making.629 
Procedural Impartiality 
Another legal scholar, William Lucy, who has British, American and Canadian 
e~perience, has stated unequivocally that people can actually achieve one form of 
i~partiality and that is what he calls 'procedural impartiality' .630 He defines this form of 
impartiality as the application of impartial rules that do not favour either party to the dispute 
or they favour them equally. Also, as impartiality is embedded into the role and is 
understood to be so by the mediator, arbitrator, referee or adjudicator, the parties involved 
627 Ibid. at para 21. 
628 Sossin, supra note 326 at 819. 
629 Ibid. at 820, 821. 
630 William Lucy, "The Possibility of Impartiality" (2005) 25, 1 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies at 24. 
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in the dispute see these characteristics as an essential element of the role and expect to 
be bound by known rules. His view is if individuals make decisions in such a fashion that 
everyone involved has access to and is able to participate in properly, which is to have all 
of the information about the role and process; to be heard; and to be able to respond to 
what others have said about the matter in dispute, then human beings can indeed achieve 
procedural impartiality. However, Lucy's argument is tenuous in my view, as achieving 
procedural impartiality would be dependent upon each role, process and procedure being 
scrutinized beforehand to determine if it in itself is value-free or if it does unconsciously or 
unintentionally favour one gender or religion over another; those of one socio-economic 
class over another; those with particular abilities, or cultural beliefs, etc. Hence, I would 
argue, even with the best of intentions, the actual implementation of procedural impartiality 
would be difficult, if not impossible to achieve. 
Race and Class Analysis 
The comments of the Honourable Madame Justice M.E. Turpel-Lafond,631 formerly 
a judge in the Provincial Court of Saskatchewan and now the British Columbia 
Representative~ for Children and Youth and an aboriginal woman, exemplify what many 
would have considered to be a fair and procedurally impartial system to actually be the 
opposite. Specifically, Justice Turpel-Lafond calls for the justice system to continue to 
innovate based on input from a wide range of voices in order to address the fact that, in 
her words," ... aboriginal people are grossly overrepresented ... "632 in the criminal justice 
system. She also points out that all of the studies done on the system over many years 
have confirmed the perceptions of First Nations and Metis people that the justice system is 
631 Ms. Turpel-Lafond is currently on leave from the bench and was appointed in 2006 as the province of British Columbia's 
. Representative for Children and Youth, a.k.a. as the Children's Advocate. 
632 M.E. Turpel-Lafond in "Some Thoughts on Inclusion and Innovation in the Saskatchewan Justice System" Saskatchewan 
Law Review, (2005) 68 Saskatchewan Law Review at para. 18. 
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racist and culturally biased against them.633 However, she is hopeful this perception can 
change as a result of a Cree Court established in northern Saskatchewan lead by Judge 
Morin, which has resulted in the implementation of an alternative vision. By building a 
court that is culturally and linguistically sensitive and expert in aboriginal ways, the delivery 
of justice in that setting is now seen to be 'human' and credible. 634 Her description of what 
has transpired as a result of changes in process fits very well with the understanding that 
the procedures within the system itself have to be scrutinized and when found to be uni-
dimensional or biased in favour of a particular culture, changed in order to be fair. It is 
noteworthy that this successful aboriginal court has the benefit of a decision-maker who is 
knowledgeable, respectful and a member of what has been a traditionally disenfranchised 
and disengaged community. As a result of modifying the supposed 'impartial procedures' 
of the traditional court to be more accessible and congruent with First Nations' realities, 
this culturally specific Court is seen to be fair. 
Another cultural vantage point is illustrated in the examination of benefits .and 
disadvantages of the use of social context analysis in determining sentences for black 
women convicted of couriering illegal drugs. Sonia Lawrence and Toni Williams comment 
on the importance of challenging the traditional view of" ... the criminal-justice system as a 
neutral arbiter of conflicts, meting out impartial justice and treating everyone as equal 
before the law''. 635 Toni Williams demonstrates this reality by commenting on how the 
supposedly neutral characteristic of 'employment status' can have a dramatic unintended 
negative impact as it relates to race when sentencing decisions are being made about 
offenders within the criminal justice system. As the rate of unemployment is higher for 
633 Ibid. at para.15. 
634 Ibid at para 21. 
635 Sonia N. Lawrence & Toni Williams, "Swallowed Up: Drug Couriers at the Borders of Canadian Sentencing" (2006) 56 
University of Toronto Law Journal 286 at 295. 
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black men than it is for white men and since judges have the discretion to take 
employment status into account when determining whether or not to incarcerate an 
offender, this social and economic factor can unintentionally contribute to injustice as it 
relates to race.636 
Gender Analysis 
Given men have dominated the judiciary for centuries and rigid stereotypes about 
both men and women's behaviour have influenced society as a whole, it would be 
unreasonable to expect that decision-making processes as well as the minds of decision-
makers would be f~ee of gender bias. In assessing how decisions are made Kathleen 
Mahoney indicates the practices of institutions and the traditions that are part of dominant 
cultures will also be influential as will the impact of powerful precedents established on 
values that are discriminatory in and of themselves. 637 This uneven foundation is also 
supported by wrong-headed beliefs that women are likely to lie about sexual assaults or 
have provoked domestic violence by their behaviour. 638 As a result Mahoney advocates for 
judicial education lead by the judiciary itself that requires jurists to become aware of their 
own, unknown biases which are rooted not only in gender stereotypes, but are also 
prevalent with respect to racial, religious and ethnic groups and their presumed beliefs and 
behaviours. 639 
Patricia Cain postulates that feminist theory is useful for addressing the difficulty 
inherent in one person making judgments about another, while attempting to remain 
connected to that individual. She identifies .the primary issues as the complexity of 
636 Toni Williams, "Sentencing Black Offenders in the Ontario Criminal Justice System" in David Cole & Julian Roberts ,eds., 
Making Sense of Sentencing (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999) 200 at 212, 214. 
637 Kathleen E. Mahoney, "The Myth of Judicial Neutrality: The Role of Judicial Education in the Fair Administration of Justice" 
(1996) 32:4 Willamette Law Review 785 at 795. 
638 Ibid. at 798. 
639 Ibid. at 814. 
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differentiating between good and bad bias and. staying connected throughout the process 
of judging.640 Her four instructions for success in this arena are: firstly, don't just let one 
judge decide so as to prevent the dominance of a single perspective. By bringing in more 
perspectives there is more potential for good bias to prevail. 641 This admonition is 
consistent with the proposals made by Stribopoulos and Yahya for the construction of 
diverse Panels of appeal court judges and less forcefully, by Sunstein et al. In addition, 
Resnik, even though she uses a different feminist theory than Cain, also argues for 
" ... more communal modes of decision-making insisting upon groups of twq, three, or four 
judges to share the honor, the obligation, and the pain of decision".642 Secondly, as was 
recommended by the CBA previously, 643 Cain advocates for judges being appointed who 
have a wider variety of experience and who make a conscious effort to have contact with 
people who are different from them.644 Thirdly, she also encourages appeal courts to have 
the courage to acknowledge when 'bad' bias, e.g. racism, has affected a decision rather 
than reversing it on other less controversial grounds.645 Finally, Cain encourages more 
'story telling' so when cases are brought forward for adjudication the real details of the 
lives of the people involved and how they have been affected by the matters being 
reviewed are highlighted so that the judge and the litigant are less isolated from one 
another. 646 Cain's advice is consistent with the views espoused by Sessin in his analysis of 
ways and means for improving the fairness of administrative decision-making.647 This 
recommendation is also consistent with one of the major components of many mediation 
64
° Cain, supra note 463 at 1946. 
641 Ibid. at 1949. 
642 Resnik, supra note 618 at 1924. 
643 Canadian Bar Association, supra note 606. 
644 Cain, supra note 463 at 1950. 
645 Ibid. at 1952. 
646 Ibid. at 1954. 
647 Sossin, supra note 326. 
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models which provide for the parties in dispute to begin the process by describing to each 
other what transpired from his or her perspective and why the actions taken have resulted 
in a dispute. In fact, in many mediation models and training manuals the term of 'story 
telling' is actually used to describe what each party is expected to do in the preliminary 
phase of their attempt to resolve their dispute. However, in implementing this important 
and useful technique the mediator (and adjudicator, arbitrator, Ombuds) must also take 
into account the fact that some parties are much more adept at telling their stories than 
others. As a result, care must be taken not to privilege those that are in that enviable 
position. In addition, Rifkin, Millen and Cobb state "Gender, age, racial and cultural 
differences - all these and more - potentially affect one's ability to construct a story that is 
recognized by others as coherent".648 Given this reality, those that are responsible for 
facilitating story telling within adjudicative, inquisitorial and ADR processes must be very 
aware of ensuring all those involved are able to do so as effectively as is possible in order 
for any semblance of impartiality to prevail. 
Social Psychology Research Results 
Susan M. Anderson and her colleagues who have rigorously researched the notion 
of 'automatic thought' provide some useful insight with respect to how stereotypical thinking 
can be modified. This research provides room for optimism with respect. to the viability of the 
aspiration to impartiality. For example, their research that exposes participants to a 'social 
category cue' and examines whether subsequent judgments are influenced by attributes 
associated with that category, has shown that " ... if a stereotype is available in memory, 
relevant cues can activate it without need of awareness, intention, effort, or control".649 
648 J.Rifken, J. Millen & S. Cobb, supra note 394. 
649 Susan Anderson et al., "Automatic Thought" Chapter 7 of Social Psychology: Handbook of Basic Principles edited by Arie 
A. Kruglanski & E. Tony Higgins (Guildford Publications: 2007) online: Project Implicit 
<http://www.projectimplicit.net.articlesphp> at 141. The bold text is my emphasis. 
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However, they have also found there is potential for self regulation of thought, perhaps 
based on self reflexivity in that 
" ... the goal, to comprehend and also the goal to avoid bias shape the way stereotypes 
and traits are activated and applied in both judgment and behaviour. These goals may 
contribute to the inhibition of knowledge activation or disrupt its application ... Emergent 
evidence suggests that self-regulatory processes can take place relatively 
unconsciously and effortlessly ... " 650 
Anderson et al have pointed out that while there are long-standing assumptions in place to 
indicate 'automatic stereotyping' is not alterable, they have concluded that "Self regulation 
can help people to avoid the effects of automatic stereotypes by suppressing biased 
impulses, attending to alternative sources of information (e.g., focusing on egalitarian 
responses), and attempting to correct for biased actions ... ".651 They expound on this point 
to state the research conducted by Plant & Devine in 1998 and Moskowitz et al in 2004 
shows that: 
... Chronic egalitarians have a persistent goal to respond without stereotyping and 
prejudice ... It is also apparent that 'chronic egalitarians' readily detect information 
relevant to the goal of being egalitarian and inhibit personal responses that are not 
compatible with being unbiased ... 652 
Anderson et al have also concluded that repeatedly attempting to suppress a 
stereotype can lead to always doing so, when stimuli that would invoke a biased response, 
appear. According to Anderson et al it has also been posited by Sechrist & Stangor i.n 
2001; Sinclair, Lowery, Hardin, Colangelo in 2005 and Spencer, Fein, Zanna, & Olson in 
2003, that simply deciding to behave in an unbiased way can have an impact on what 
would instead have been an automatic stereotypical response. This information has lead 
to the belief as put forward by Devine, Monteith, Zuerwink & Eliot in 1991 and Monteith in 
1993 that: 
650 Ibid. at 155. 
651 Ibid. at 156. 
652 Ibid. 
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... In short, when people want to avoid bias, they may try to recognize when they 
have acted (or are about to act) in a way that falls short of their personal 
standards, in part because failing to do so would stimulate negative affect (guilt 
and disappointment) ... 653 
This research leads to the important conclusion that conscientious and self-aware. 
individuals can indeed educate and monitor themselves so as not to be influenced by 'bad' 
biases. As a result, this cognitive form of 'personal training' propels individuals to think and 
behave in a reflexive manner routinely, such that doing so becomes automatic, akin to the 
notion. of 'muscle memory' that is present when performing a repetitive physical task, rather 
than requiring constant intellectual attention. While the motivation may be for personal 
benefit in that the impetus is to avoid feeling ashamed for behaving in a biased manner, the 
outcome is such that bad bias is reduced. The viability of this type of intellectual exercise 
speaks to the poteritial for building or modifying behaviours that pave the way for impartiality 
and independent thought. 
Brian Nosek and Jeffrey Hansen provide a similar point of view that has been 
informed by the results obtained through the use of the Implicit Association Test (IAT) with 
107, 709 respondents. Their findings demonstrated that: 
... Ownership of mental associations is established by presence of mind and 
influence on thinking, feeling and doing. Regardless of origin, associations are 
influential depending on their availability, accessibility, salience, and 
applicability ... With awareness and control, one can opt to use his own evaluations 
to guide judgement and behavior, and choose not to use knowledge about others' 
evaluations ... 654 
This discovery has important implications given Brown's research cited earlier in which it 
was demonstrated that homogenous groups are more likely to adopt polarized positions 
653 Ibid. at 157. 
654 Brian Nosek & Jeffrey Hansen, "The Associations in our Heads Belong to Us: Searching for Attitudes and Knowledge in 
Implicit Evaluation" (2007) online: Project Implicit <http://www.projectimplicit.net.articlesphp> at p. 3. 
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when making decisions or talking about issues.655 It also speaks to the viability of an 
individual who thinks differently than others, to be successful when going against the grain, 
to dampen or intervene in the phenomenon of homogenous group think. It is important to 
recognize, though, that in order for any change in position to occur there must also be some 
willingness among the participants to consider the possibility of the legitimacy of an 
alternative point of view. 
While some theorists and practitioners have come to the depressing conclusion 
that human beings have no or very limited ability to overcome automatic thought which is 
biased or prejudiced, these authors have determined through their review of the literature, 
specifically that of :Gawronski & Boden ha us (2006) and Strack & Deutsch (2004) that: 
... humans also have the remarkable ability to unbelieve things that they once 
thought and believed. Distinguishing knowledge that is 'mine' from 'just the stuff that I 
know' is where explicit cognition has a decided advantage over implicit cognition. A 
luxury of conscious processes is that we get to decide whether we believe the 
information that bubbles up from memory.656 
Nosek and Hansen specifically address the issue of stereotyping about race, 
gender, age and political affiliation and observe that when these stereotypes become 
known to us, their research demonstrates that we can use them to make decisions or 
dismiss them. For example, we can look to significant historical figures like Dr. Martin 
Luther King who exhorted us to make assessments of others on the basis of their 
characters and not their physical characteristics. In these researchers' experience tactics 
of this sort provide the means for human beings, with concerted effort, to change old views 
and/or reject those of a dominant culture as well as to perceive and interact with others in 
an unbiased manner as is possible. 657 
655 Brown, supra note 549. 
656 Nosek & Hansen, supra note 654 at 17. 
657 Ibid. 
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The foregoing research results inject a hopeful dimension for consideration in the 
debate as to whether or not individuals have the capacity to control their thoughts and 
work toward impartiality. Their findings indicate that it is reasonable to conclude there is 
the potential for human beings whether they practice in the field of traditional or alternative 
dispute resolution to think and act with a high degree of impartiality. However, there are 
caveats that must be acknowledged, such as a high degree of self-knowledge, strength of 
character; self-discipline, empathy, the ability to continually suppress bad bias as well as 
the good fortune tc;> have inherited or developed sufficient cognitive capacity to continually 
acquire new information and challenge its authenticity. 
The Nature of Independence 
The impact of structural independence deserves further attention in this discussion 
given it has now been established through the research results presented on judicial and 
an administrative tribunal's decision-making that even though a decision-maker has no 
external influences other than those he chooses to pay attention to, he may still 
demonstrate inappropriate or unjustified bias. This outcome demonstrates if a decision-
maker does not have the insight and personal discipline as well as the necessary level of 
intellectual capacity to recognize and suppress stereotypes and personal irrelevant 
predilections, the fact that he occupies a structurally independent post is immaterial. 
Without the requisite independence of mind, the highest degree of structural 
independence would not make any difference to the quality of his decision-making process 
and the resultant conclusions. 
Madame Justice L'Heureux-Dube asserted in 1996 in 2747-3174 Quebec Inc. v. 
Quebec (Regie des permits d'alcool) (Regie) that: "An agency's independence from the 
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executive is a prerequisite for, but is not sufficient to guarantee, impartiality".658 This 
statement clearly supports the reality that structure alone does not ensure that a decision-
maker will be unbiased and even-handed. Interestingly enough, when the former Right 
Honourable Chief Justice Laskin (Chief Justice Laskin) became a member of the SCC he 
said to those at his induction ceremony that: 
( 1) I had no expectations to live up to save those I placed upon myself; (2) I had no 
constituency to serve save the realm of reason; (3) I had no influence to dispel 
unless there was a threat to my intellectual disinterestedness; and (4) I had no one 
to answer to save my own conscience and my personal standards of integrity.659 
Justice Laskin then recanted this commentary and later excused himself on the 
basis of the euphoria of the moment. He then rejected the import of the strength of his 
personal discipline and, ironically, given the findings cited earlier related to the observed 
influence of political biases in some areas of judicial decision-making, explained that the 
principle of judicial independence, which presumably he understood as being based on 
the traditional notion of a high degree of structural independence, would actually serve as 
his touchstone for his decision-making. Laskin's subsequent conclusion as to how he 
would safeguard his impartiality falls in direct opposition to the findings of social 
psychologists cited earlier with respect to the importance of self-awareness and self-
discipline, while much of his initial euphoric recitation is much more in keeping with the 
notion of a 'chronic egalitarian'. 
In 1986 Chief Justice Dickson in Beauregard v. Canada (Beauregard) provided the 
following less personalized definition for judicial independence: 
Historically, the generally accepted core of the principle of judicial independence 
has been the complete liberty of individual judges to hear and decide the cases 
that come before them: no outsider - be it government, pressure group, individual 
or even another judge - should interfere in fact, or attempt to interfere, with the 
658 Regie, supra note 335 at 106. 
659 Bora Laskin,"The Institutional Character of the Judge" (1972) 7, 3 Israel Law Review at 330. 
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way in which a judge conducts his or her case and makes his or her own 
decisions. This core continues to be central to the principles of judicial 
independence. 660 
It is important to note, however, that being structurally independent does not prevent a 
decision-maker from being influenced inappropriately or circumscribed by her own 
personal, internal beliefs or to make up for limited experience with and knowledge of other 
world views. Structural independence has limited value if the decision-maker has not 
expanded her personal horizons and examined her biases and how they have developed 
so as to be better equipped to limit their inappropriate influence. 
Chief Justice Dickson's explanation of the necessity for and the benefit of, an 
'influence-free' environment in Beauregard also demonstrates how vulnerable many ADR 
practitioners are to potential 'inappropriate' influence given the majority do not enjoy a high 
degree of structural independence. For example, it is reasonable to ask to what degree 
are ADR practitioners influenced, either knowingly or unknowingly, to agree with a 
particular point of view for strategic reasons, such as to qualify for renewal of an 
appointment; or to maintain or repair relationships that facilitate expeditious resolution of 
issues; or to increase access to needed resources; or, to be seen to be collegial or easy to 
work with to ensure their budgets are approved; or, to be chosen by parties for assistance 
with the resolution of future disputes, e.g. arbitrators or mediators who are chosen from 
rosters and must be acceptable to all parties. 
Diana Ginn undertook a useful examination of a series of decisions made on 
applications for judicial review for a two-year period where it was alleged that a decision-
maker was not impartial or not independent.661 The findings she conveyed are in line with 
660 Beauregard v. Canada, [1986] 2 S.C.R. at para. 21. 
661 Diana Ginn, "Recent Developments of Administrative Law and Practice" (1997-1998) 11 Canadian Journal of 
Administrative Law and Practice at 25. 
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the literature reviewed earlier with respect to impartiality in that she demonstrated that the 
judicial standard applied to decisions made by administrative tribunals was one of a 
. . 
reasonable apprehension of bias. The allegations which were adjudicated included 
institutional bias; association between the decision-maker and one of the parties; and 
attitudinal bias/antagonism.662 Whereas, for allegations related to policy and legislative 
matters, (e.g. decisions made by municipal councils), the lower standard of 'the closed 
mind test' was applied. With respect to the allegation of institutional bias, it is worthy of 
emphasizing that Ginn was struck by the fact that Justice Gonthier dismissed categorically 
the possibility of a reasonable apprehension of bias on the basis of a desire for collegiality 
or to show deference to a more senior colleague with the following words: 
They [the comite] have nothing to gain by not deciding as their consciences dictate 
and nothing to lose by doing justice. There is accordingly no reason to fear that 
Comite members would be influenced by the language of the complaint or the 
particular status of the author.663 
Ginn was surprised that the potential impact of close relationships could be 
dismissed so summarily. However, it appears Justice Gonthier arrived at his conclusion on 
the basis that judges are not only trained to be dispassionate but also take an oath of 
impartiality. These characteristics follow in the same tradition as the 'guarantors of 
impartiality' outlined by Justice Huddart. To suggest a tribunal or Conseil member or by 
extension another ADR practitioner has nothing to gain by making a decision favourable to 
an individual with whom he has regular professional or personal contact strikes me as 
· being disassociated from reality. Rather, it is self-evident that avoiding being influenced by 
a friendly, ongoing relationship actually requires a very high degree of self-awareness and 
662 Ibid. at para 32. 
663 Ibid. at para 33. This verbatim citation is excerpted from Ruffo v. Conseil de la magisture (1995) 130 D.L.R. {41h} 1 at 18 
(S.C.C.) at 42. In this instance no indication or hint is provided as to whether Justice Gonthier is referring to the tribunal 
members' 'personal conscience' or the tribunal members' equivalent of 'judicial conscience'. 
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demands considerable strength of character to overcome the desire to be congenial when 
the facts of a case require a decision-maker to make an unfavourable finding or impose a 
sanction, that has a profound negative impact on his friend or associate. While Justice 
Gonthier emphasized the importance of judicial training and a commitment to impartiality 
as the basis for his confidence in the objectivity of the decision-makers it would seem that 
it should also have been acknowledged how difficult it is to acquire and maintain the high 
degree of self-discipline, predicated on self-awareness that is the basis for impartiality. 
The Integration of Independence and Impartiality 
Ginn's analysis with respect to impartiality and independence is particularly 
valuable at this juncture as she emphasizes to a greater degree than some of the authors 
and commentators cited earlier that while independence and impartiality are interrelated 
they must also be seen as separate concepts. It is worthy of reiterating that the 
jurisprudence and some of the commentary cited earlier emphasized the import of a high 
degree of independence for preserving the perception of impartiality. This declaration is 
particularly controversial given the research cited on some aspects of judicial decision-
making that verified the influence of political affiliation in environments that enjoy a very 
high degree of structural independence. The lack of personal independence, or an 
independent mind-set, which is readily evident in decisions issued by those who operate in 
structurally independent environments, should motivate reflection on the multitude of ADR 
practitioners' roles which are not established by legislation and have very little structural 
independence yet aspire to and indeed assert that they are independent. For example, 
some mediators, conciliators, facilitators, Ombudspersons are employees of the 
organization, government department, hospital or bank or university in which the work is 
done. As result of these employment relationships alone, the three indicia of 
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independence laid out in Valente v. The Queen (Valente) as 'security of tenure, financial 
security and institutional independence'664 are either at risk or non-existent in many ADR 
roles. Specifically, legislation, pollcy and terms of reference which provide for renewable 
terms of service with no assessment criteria specified can provoke reasonable perceptions 
of lack of independence as the incumbent would be constantly aware of the potential for 
not being renewed every few years. Similarly, having your budget or salary increases 
approved by those. whose decisions you are investigating is al~o rife with potential for 
perceptions of and/or actual inappropriate influence. 
Addressing the Challenges to Impartiality and Independence 
As a result of reviewing key elements of the legal and ADR literature and empirical 
research on judicial and administrative tribunal decision-making, in addition to the social 
psychological research on stereotyping as well as Canadian jurisprudence, it is clear the 
notions of independence and impartiality have evolved over time. Laudably, a new 
definition and standard for impartiality is being promulgated .. At the same time the 
feasibiltty of neutrality has been summarily and in my view, appropriately rejected. 
Similarly, the traditional belief that impartiality flows directly from independence is now 
known to be hollow, 665 as it is observable from the empirical research on judicial decision-
making alone that a high degree of structural independence does not necessarily generate 
impartiality. Furthermore, I would posit it is reasonable to expect that judicial decision-
makers and ADR practitioners should readily acknowledge the difficulty of achieving 
impartiality and independence of thought and action. As a result of this acknowledgement 
they will be better positioned to demonstrate how they deal with 'good and bad bias' both 
664 Valente v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 673. 
665 This opinion is similar to that espoused by Lorne Sossin in relation to bureaucratic decision-making and that of 
administrative tribunals. See note 326. 
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in determining how they do their work and arrive at their conclusions. These kinds of 
efforts along with a high level of transparency will assist those who are affected by their 
decisions and/or their interventions to understand how decision-makers hold themselves 
accountable for the appropriate use of social context as well as their own experience. 
Similarly, when the opportunity to influence public policy in a particular way is afforded to 
decision-makers and ADR practitioners, in order to successfully meet the challenge of 
independence and impartiality it should also be expected that they will consistently 
demonstrate their willingness and ability to hear a myriad of voices and opposing points of 
view on how society should be organized. 
Instead of being disconnected and disinterested as the lore of former definitions of 
impartiality and independence proclaimed, Patricia Cain puts forward the working theory 
from her feminist perspective, (in opposition to Judith Resnik's differing feminist 
perspective), on how a judge can successfully deal with the complexity of being connected 
with an individual and the story that is being told while also making a decision about that 
story and the future of the individual or her rights and responsibilities. Cain's remedy is to 
" ... transcend self to listen, then a judge should decide with empathy and understanding -
as a new self, if you will, for having experienced the story of the other".666 
.. 
In my view the same prescription should be given to those who occupy third party 
roles in any forum used for alternative forms of dispute resolution, as it is unreasonable to 
suggest that human beings in any context can (or should) excise their experiences from 
their minds. On the other hand, it is completely reasonable to expect and indeed require 
that decision-makers, complaint handlers, Ombuds, mediators, arbitrators operate as 
conscientious, disciplined human beings who must not only open their minds to alternative 
666 Cain, supra note 463 at 1955. 
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points of view, but immerse themselves in the stories brought to their attention. By 
considering these narratives and the information collected in relation to the fairness 
standards, terms of reference, policies or regulations that are being used to decide on 
what is an appropriate process and fair outcome, the highly motivated and introspective 
practitioner has the best means for thinking as impartially as possible and demonstrating a 
high degree of independence. The following chapters will now bring the viability of the 
concepts of impartiality and independence to life through the new lens of experiences and 
insights of Ombuds gathered through the qualitative research process. 
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Chapter 4 Research Methodology and Execution 
Detailed Methodology 
The primary methodological underpinning for this qualitative research project is the 
production of grounded theory through the method of constant comparison. In addition, as 
a result of the approach taken and my academic influences, I have also engaged in a 
complementary mode of analysis, that being 'critical legal analysis' which involves in-depth 
scrutiny of the terms under study. In this section I will detail how the empirical research 
was conducted and the data set was analyzed. 
Data Collection Methodology 
Style of Interviews and Type of Interviewee 
The data were collected through the use of semi-structured interviews 667 with elite 
interviewees, who are defined as individuals who are knowledgeable about the subject 
matter, influential within their organizations or their respective communities, and typically in 
society generally.668 While it was observed in the methodological literature that elite 
interviewing can be problematic as it is difficult to gain access to this type of interviewee as 
their time is limited669 and they may be difficult to contact, this was not my experience. 
~ven though it took some time to connect with some of the interviewees, given that their 
direct email addresses were not in the public dornain, every person who was invited to 
participate responded in the affirmative with the exception of one person whose personal 
situation made it impossible to participate at that time. It has also been observed that 
interviewing this type of individual can be difficult as they may wish to control the interview 
667 Raymond Garrison, The Art and Science of Research Interviewing (Toronto, Ontario: York University, Institute for Social 
Research, 2008) at 4. 
668 Marshall & Rossman, supra note 22 at 94. 
669 Ibid. 
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or will resent what they consider to be narrow questions.670 Again, this was not my 
experience, perhaps due to the personalities of these particular interviewees and their 
great interest in the subject matter as well as their willingness to share their views for the 
benefit of Om buds practitioners, scholars and the users of these services. 671 
Consistent with the semi-structured interview approach or 'the interview guide' 
variation of qualitative interviewing672 as defined by Michael Quinn Patton, I compiled a set 
of open-ended questions which is shown at Appendix B. This approach allowed for 
flexibility as was appropriate to the situation as it gave me the ability to probe and explore 
new directions as was warranted. However, I found it very helpful to have a list of carefully 
delineated questions at my fingertips, rather than relying solely on a more informal 
conversational approach, as this framework assisted me to make optimum use of these 
very busy interviewees' time and input. While all of the interviews moved along at a 
comfortable pace I was always mindful of my interview schedule so as to be sure I 
covered all of the issues germane to this study. While I did not follow the order of the 
questions if the interviewee introduced the topics at different times, I did not find they 
attempted to wrest control of the content of the interview in any way. Rather, I found that 
all of the issues raised were relevant to my research. As a result I was able to assemble 
concrete and complete information for comparative purposes .. ln addition, the manner in 
which the interviewees' expressed their views allowed me to build a comprehensive 
database of the interviewees' strategies for recognizing and overcoming bias and on their 
perceptions of complainants' and respondents' perceptions on fairness and if they were 
670 Ibid. 
671 Many of the interviewees commented on the need for more Canadian focused research in the Ombuds field and reiterated 
their desire to assist in the accumulation of knowledge related to theory and practice the Ombuds role. Interestingly, one 
interviewee self-identified as an 'ombuds nerd' to underscore the degree of attention dedicated to thinking about how 
Ombuds roles should be constructed and implemented. 
672 Patton, supra note 11 at 343. 
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connected to independence and impartiality. Only one interviewee asked me for guidelines 
for the discussion in advance and I provided them on the basis that they would be held in 
confidence and destroyed after the interview. I made this request in order to ensure the 
questions I had in mind were not used for any other purpose, (e.g. training or education 
sessions), prior to my research being completed. 
With respect to the length of the interviews, each session was scheduled for one 
hour. However, notwithstanding this expectation, the majority of the interviews extended to 
at least 90 minutes and some continued for approximately two hours. 
Sampling Strategy 
Initially, I used the method of non-probability sampling known as purposive or 
judgmental sampling which has been identified by Newman as appropriate for specialized 
situations in exploratory field research.673 When using this method for selecting a sample 
of participants a researcher who is knowledgeable about the field of study, uses her 
judgment to select interviewees with a specific purpose in mind. In this instance my goal 
was to interview a diverse group of experienced and well-informed Ombuds ·and staff. I 
also used the strategy of purposive sampling674 as defined by Padgett, as rriy interest was 
in the quality of each interview rather than in conducting a large number of interviews for 
the purpose of voluminous data generation. Also, purposive sampling is appropriate for a 
study where the sample size does not have to be finalized prior to the research being 
conducted as is the case when theoretical sampling is also being used. In addition it is 
important to acknowledge that when using a purposive sampling approach it is rare that 
673 W. Lawrence Newman, Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches (ih edition) (Boston: Allyn & 
Bacon,2011)at267. 
674 Glenn A. Bowen, "Naturalistic inquiry and the saturation concept: a research note" 2008 Qualitative Research, 8(1) 137 at 
142. . 
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the interviewees selected are representative of the whole population. 675 As my objective 
was to be thoroughly saturated with relevant information from individuals with a high level 
of expertise and thoughtfulness, I selected individuals who had a minimum of two years 
experience in an Ombuds role. In addition, 50% of the interviewees had more than ten 
years of experience in the Ombuds field. As it was very important from my vantage point 
to interview individuals who were not only conversant with the Ombuds role, whether it be 
legislative, hybrids or organizational, but were also illustrative of the diversity of Canadian 
demographics, I developed a matrix that included the following criteria along these axes: 
geographical location676, gender, language,677 race, model of practice and type of Ombuds 
role. I then sought out names of potential interviewees and contact information so as to 
populate the matrix as fully as possible. Using all of the foregoing information I then 
composed a preliminary list of interviewees who were reflective of diverse demographic 
characteristics and included equal numbers of potential participants from the three models 
of Ombuds practice. 
In my view it was also crucial to interview Ombuds staff as well as individual 
Ombuds, as staff are not only implementing the concepts under discussion regularly they: 
are also required to articulate why and how they are doing so to complainants and 
respondents on a daily basis, in fact much more frequently than an Ombuds of a large 
office is required to do. In addition, I deliberately did not interview any staff of any 
Ombudsman/person who was recruited as an interviewee (other than in one instance and 
675 Newman, supra note 673 at 267. 
676 I chose a wide range of geographical locations in order to have as broad a range of possible interviewees and operated on 
the premise that I would find some means to interview them in person if they accepted my request to participate. In a number 
of instances they were willing to meet with me while passing through Toronto or while attending a conference in Montreal. In 
other instances in order to maintain the integrity of my sampling strategy I traveled to their offices to meet with them. 
677 1 deliberately chose Francophone interviewees to ensure the majority Anglophone population did not dominate the project. 
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that occurred by happenstance for logistical reasons) in o~der to avoid any potential 
discomfort on the part of either interviewee. 
I also engaged in a theoretical sampling strategy678 in that my original plan was to 
interview five Ombuds from each of the three models of practice and five Ombuds staff 
from various models and sectors for a total of 20 interviews. As the interviews progressed 
it became apparent that individuals who I thought practiced in the organizational model 
actually conducted investigations and should therefore be classified as hybrid Ombuds. As 
a result I deliberately sought out additional interviewees from the organizational model of 
practice. In addition, in one instance I interviewed an Ombuds and two staff from the Office 
as an unexpected situation arose whereby the Ombuds learned just prior to the interview 
that less time than originally anticipated would be available. The staff was on hand to 
complete the interview after the Ombuds' departure. Even though this Ombuds' availability 
was unexpectedly truncated a very generous amount of interview time was provided. 
Ultimately, my sample included nine interviewees from the hybrid model, seven 
interviewees from the legislative model and four interviewees from the organizational 
model. 
In addition, three of the people I interviewed I had actually worked with before and I 
chose them specifically as they had substantive experience in the Ombuds field and each 
had occupied a number of different roles throughout their careers in the Ombuds field. It 
seemed likely to me that given their lengthy and varied experience and the dedication they 
demonstrated to their work that they would be interested in and have considerable 
sensitivity to the issues under review. In assessing the possibility that our prior working 
678 Melanie Birks & Jane Mills, Grounded Theory A Practical Guide, (London: SAGE Publications Ltd., 2011) at 11. Birks & 
Mills emphasize the importance of making strategic decisions about additional interviewees as the iterative process 
demonstrates that additional data is needed from different sources in saturate the categories that are being compared. 
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relationships may have influenced the type or quantity of information provided I came to 
the conclusion that our prior relationship did not have any obvious negative impact on the 
collection of data as the conversations flowed freely and the participants expressed a wide 
variety of differing opinions. It is also important to note that I had also met seven of the 
interviewees at conferences or workshops previously. As a result I had some knowledge 
of the 50% of the interviewees in a professional capacity. While I had previous 
conversations with some of these interviewees in a social situation while attending a 
conference or workshop or professional event, the nature of our relationship was not that 
of a personal nature. As the objective of qualitative interviews is to create a dynamic of 
reciprocity between the interviewee and interviewer rather than to replicate that of a 
hierarchical nature which was the norm from a positivist perspective with respect to 
empirical work679, the fact that we were peers to some degree or had knowledge of each 
other above and beyond the researcher/participant dyad was a positive addition to the 
process as it was not necessary to dedicate a great deal of time to establishing a 
comfortable environment. For instance, in all of the interviews, each participant spoke 
confidently and easily without hesitation and showed no reluctance to provide what turned 
out to be differing points of view on any of the subjects discussed. Also, at the end of each 
interview, each of these interviewees (as well as many others) commented on how much 
they enjoyed thi11king about and discussing the principles I was studying. I also chose 
some Ombuds who were relatively new to the field in order to provide the opportunity to 
hear 'fresh' perspectives as well. In addition, as many of the Ombuds I identified in my 
matrix had a background in law I deliberately added Ombuds with different academic 
backgrounds to the sample, via the use of a theoretical sampling strategy, in the event 
679 Ibid., at 58. 
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based on the data that emerged, I saw some value in comparing and contrasting 
·perceptions on the basis of a legal to non-legal academic and professional background. 
Due to the generosity of the interviewees I was able to interview people from all 
regions of Canada, that is, the west, the east, the prairies, the north and central Canada. 
As well, in order to be reflective of Canadian demographics with respect to gender I was 
conscious of maintaining a sample of 50% men and 50% women. I became aware at the 
18th interview that the point of saturation had been met as no new information was being 
provided. However, the two subsequent interviews provided substantial depth and 
richness with respect to clarity and complexity of the same subject matter. I am aware that 
there is some controversy regarding the notion of the validity of a saturation point, that 
being as describ~d by Bertaux and Bertaux-Wiame, as "This point is reached when your 
data begin to stop telling you anything new about the social process under scrutiny''. 680 
Similarly, in reference to sociological inquiry, Glaser and Strauss define 'theoretical 
saturation'681 as being demonstrated by the researcher seeing the same information being 
repeated. Those who have critiqued this parameter have done so on the basis of querying 
how a researcher could demonstrate that the point of saturation had actually been 
reached. In an effort to address that criticism, I have been able to confirm by assembling 
the interview transcripts in chronological order of first to last conducted, that it is readily 
evident that no new ideas or thoughts were presented in any category after the 18th 
interview. However, the 19th and 20th interviewees' views continued to be instructive as the 
manner in which the previously presented ideas and thoughts were expressed was 
thought provoking and enriched the overall dialogue. Glaser and Strauss also noted that 
the researcher should be looking for the greatest level of diversity so that saturation is 
680 Mason, supra note 8 at 137. 
681 Glaser and Strauss, supra note 10 at 61. 
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based on a wide range of possibilities.682 Keeping this expectation in mind, to be sure that 
I had not come to a premature conclusion with regard to saturation and in order to 
maintain a diverse group of interviewees, both with respect to demographics and style of 
practice, I conducted two additional interviews. Finally, my original plan was to complete 
the interviews over a three-month period. However, I lengthened the time frame to a six-
month period in order to ensure that I had as wide a spectrum of input as possible. On the 
basis of the foregoing I would argue that the approach taken in this regard was not as 
detractors have said" ... ad hoc and unsystematic ... "683 and without any doubt had the 
desired result of dramatically increasing my understanding of a wide spectrum of points of 
view and positions on independence and impartiality as well as their connection to 
fairness. 
Reg uests for Interviews 
Each interviewee was sent a two-page interview request via email in February of 
2009. The template used to prepare the individual requests and to explain the ethical 
. considerations so as to ensure informed consent is attached at Appendix A. Given the 
length of time I have worked in the Ombuds field, 50% of the individuals I contacted knew 
that I was working in the field as an Ombudsperson. The other interviewees had no 
knowledge of my background as we had not met before. I deliberately did not say in the 
letter of invitation to potential interviewees that I was active in the Ombuds field as I 
wanted to emphasize that I was undertaking this research solely as a doctoral student so 
that the recipient knew immediately that I was doing academic research. My fear was that 
ifl included information about my current and past Ombuds' roles that the interviewees 
may erroneously conclude that the research was more practically oriented and descriptive 
682 Ibid. at 63. 
683 Marshall & Rossman, supra note 22 at 97. 
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in nature. In addition, I did not want interviewees to speak in 'ombuds short hand' or 
'ombuds talk' as I thought the potential richness of their commentary could have been 
diluted, if that route was taken. At the close of the interviews, a number of interviewees 
suggested other people who they thought would enjoy participating and offered to speak 
to them on my behalf if I wanted them to do so. I thanked them for their offer of assistance 
and declined to follow up as I wanted to maintain as varied an interviewee group as 
possible based on the systematic sampling strategy described above. 
Mechanics of the Interview Process 
Consistent with the expectations for grounded theory methodology, which is 
designed to create a more egalitarian and less hierarchical approach to the collection of 
interview data, all interviews were scheduled based entirely on the participant's choice of 
time, geographical location and venue; the interview guide was not applied in a rigid 
manner; and the interviewer and the participants engaged in a open dialogue which 
appeared to flow naturally from topic to topic.684 
Based on the preference of the interviewee, the majority of interviews were 
conducted in each participant's office. Due to geographical locations and travel itineraries, 
three interviews were conducted in hotel conference centres (complete with banging 
tables and staff shifting furniture) in various metropolitan locations across Canada; three 
interviews were conducted in an Executive Centre Office in Toronto, Ontario; two 
interviews were conducted in a meeting room in the Osgoode Professional Development 
Centre of Osgoode Hall Law School in Toronto, Ontario and one interview was conducted 
in my own office building in Toronto, Ontario. I attempted to find an alternative less 
personal space for this interview but all of the other spaces that were more appropriate for 
· 
684 Birks & Mills, supra note 12 at 58. 
234 
this purpose were booked and the interviewee was only available for the interview in 
Toronto for a specific time period on one particular day. 
Nineteen of the interviews were recorded in their entirety using a digital audio 
recorder. Unfortunately, the recorder malfunctioned at the halfway mark in one interview 
so I was dependent on my handwritten notes for capturing part of the data. As I am 
accustomed to taking.notes and hand writing a great deal of verbatim commentary given 
the nature of the work I do in a professional capacity, I think it is unlikely that I lost any 
data as a result of the malfunction. As well, when conducting all of the other interviews I 
also kept 'jot notes' so it was an easy transition to move to taking more detailed notes for 
the rest of this interview. In making the insightful comment that "No data are untouched by 
the researcher's hands"685 Silverman comments on the fact that the use of recording 
equipment within an interview and the review and signing of documents relative to meeting 
standard ethical requirements for informed consent can distort the naturalness of the 
conversation.686 I agree that this impact can be had when interviews are being conducted 
in some fieldwork situations. However, in this research project all of the interviewees were 
accustomed to the use of recording equipment and were completely comfortable with its 
use in this context as well as being fully acquainted with the rationale for the ethical 
requirements underlying informed consent. As these interviews were scheduled precisely 
for the purpose of soliciting practitioners' opinions on various topics I have the impression 
the review of and signing of consent forms was a beneficial addition to the process. 
Specifically, the emphasis placed on informed consent contributed to establishing a 
comfortable atmosphere as the confidentiality of the identities of those who wished to 
685 David Silverman, A Very Short, Fairly Interesting and Reasonably Cheap Book About Qualitative Research, (London: 
SAGE Publications Ltd., 2007) at 55. 
666 Ibid. 
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remain anonymous was clearly established. In addition, I had the impression that the 
audio recording as well as the signing of consent forms added to the gravitas of the 
occasion rather than having any negative impact. 
In contrast, while being aware 'of the positive influences noted above, I was also 
concerned about the possibility of contaminating the data due to awkwardness or over 
familiarity as a result of being known to some of the interviewees, in that we are all members 
of the Ombuds community in Canada. For example, prior to beginning the interviews, I 
wondered if some interviewees would speak about the principles under scrutiny in such a 
fashion that they presented the best possible face or an idealized version. However, it was 
evident to me in the first interview and every one thereafter that the interviewees spoke 
candidly and without hesitation. It was also my assessment based on the manner in which 
my questions were answered and the comments made that none of the interviewees I knew 
beforehand felt any compulsion to answer my queries or talk about the issues under review 
in a particular way. I have come to this conclusion on the basis of the degree of confidence 
· exhibited by each interviewee and the strength, idiosyncrasy and thoughtfulness of their 
. opinions. Their style of speaking also demonstrated to me that none of the interviewees felt 
any need to curb or embellish their commentary in any way, shape or form. In addition, a 
. number of interviewees provided me with documents they had written for perusal at a later 
date that suggested to me they had no concern about positing and debating their points of 
view in writing as well. Some interviewees also referred me to articles they thought would be 
. valuable given my research interests. Interestingly enough, one interviewee took the time to 
prepare a chart to reflect his perspectives on the principles under review and provided that 
to me as part of the interview. Ultimately, I agree with Silverman that it is impossible to 
collect data that is so pure that it has not been influenced in any way, shape or form by the 
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collector or the methodology used. In this instance I would argue the methodological 
influences had no obvious deleterious effect as the data collected are both robust and 
useful. 
Another aim of the use of grounded theory methods is to create a comfortable 
atmosphere whereby the researcher and the interviewee share 'the power'.687 In this regard 
the fact that I knew half of the interviewees was beneficial as the interviews in many 
instances were akin to a conversation rather than a formal question and answer format. 
Also, as the transcripts were so lengthy and the interviews were conducted over a six-month 
period and I had organized the transcripts in a non-identifying way I was not conscious of 
'who said what' about particular topics when I was ferreting out themes and coding the data. 
In fact, I found on a number of occasions when I was writing up the results and I would go 
back to the transcript to verify the accuracy of the 'in vivo' quotation I would note that when I 
had been thinking that it was a particular interviewee whose quotation I was citing, it was in 
fact a different interviewee. While I can not guarantee that my prior professional 
relationships ·did not have a negative effect and I am aware that there is a possibility that 
there may be have been some influencing factors of which I am unaware, I think it is 
worthwhile to keep in mind that the interviewees demonstrated no discomfort and spoke with 
a high degree of confidence and directness. It also worth noting that as I did not enter the 
interviews with a clearly defined hypothesis and I had not talked about the principles of 
independence and impartiality with any of the interviewees I knew beforehand, I think it's 
unlikely that they had any preconceived notions about what I would think would be the right 
way to respond to my queries. 
687 Birks & Mills, supra note 12 at 57. 
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However, a potential area of contamination emerged as I was analyzing and 
writing up my results. As I am aware from the research findings on judicial decision-
making that the impact of gender can be significant with respect to outcome I was 
interested in looking at whether I would see any differences between how men and 
women interpreted the principles under review and whether they would use different 
language in their descriptions. I anticipated that men and women would see these 
concepts differently and the data demonstrates in some areas that they did. However, I 
was surprised and then chastened when I realized that my own bias had initially lead to an 
erroneous preliminary conclusion. Specifically, as a result of my first round of analysis I 
concluded that many of the women interviewees believed it was very hard to be impartial 
and that none of the men had come to a similar conclusion about how difficult it was to 
maintain the degree of diligence required. I actually wrote up the analysis this way and 
was seeking advice on whether it was proper for me to comment on the gender difference 
I had observed given I only had ten women and ten men in my sample. However, in 
preparation for these discussions and through another review of my notes and transcripts, 
I realized that some men had also talked about how difficult it was to be impartial and to 
recognize their triggers and manage their biases. I believe I came to this incorrect 
preliminary conclusion as I expected there to be a notable difference. Also, I was thrown 
off somewhat by the fact that the interviewees who are men and voiced this opinion didn't 
speak about the difficulty of being impartial in the same way and at the same juncture of 
the interview as women. Rather, these men who discussed the challenges they 
experienced in this area did so throughout their commentary whereas the women who 
thought it was difficult made this kind of comment more emphatically at the beginning of 
various passages. Upon reflection, it is apparent to me that this preliminary error was 
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based on the strength of my expectation that ultimately proved to be incorrect with this 
group of interviewees. 
Attribution of Quotations 
In the letter of request for an interview I offered each recipient the option of having any 
of their approved comments that were quoted in the dissertation to be identified by name or to 
have them presented in an anonymous manner. Each .interviewee indicated which approach 
they wanted to take at the beginning and at the end of the interview. As it became clear when I 
began writing up the results of the research that the flow of the paper was negatively affected 
by identifying the source of some comments and not others, as the majority of the 
interviewees requested anonymity, I consulted with experienced qualitative researchers to 
determine how best to pro~eed. As a result of that consultation, I wrote to each of the eight 
interviewees who had agreed to be identified by name and detailed the problem I had 
encountered when writing up my ·results and explained that my plan was to present all of the 
interviewees' commentary anonymously for my dissertation. I also explained that my intent 
was also to write articles that would be informed by these data and at that point I would contact 
them again to obtain their permission to quote them. The majority of the interviewees 
contacted me immediately to acknowledge receipt of the information and express support for 
the completion of the dissertation in a timely way. At this point I devised a system whereby I 
identified each interviewee by a letter of the alphabet, which included avoiding assigning 
alphabetical letters to interviewees that matched either their first or last name, and the letter 
assigned, (e.g. Interviewee Q), is cited in the footnotes for each verbatim quotation. 
Volume and Handling of Data 
Approximately 50 hours of time was dedicated to conducting 20 interviews which 
generated 391 single spaced pages of text when transcribed. Initially, I attempted to 
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transcribe the audio recordings into Microsoft Word documents myself. As the amount of 
time involved in transcribing one interview was astronomical, I contacted a professional 
typist skilled in audio transcription who was recommended to me by a friend and an 
Osgoode colleague due to her positive experience with the typist's speed and accuracy. 
This individual transcribed each interview into Microsoft Word documents on the basis of a 
very reasonable hourly rate. In order to protect the confidentiality of the commentary, the 
typist did not know the names of the interviewees or the positions they occupied. However, 
as some of the commentary easily identified the role and/or the geographical location of 
the interviewee, I arranged for the typist to verbally affirm her commitment to keep all 
information heard and identities that emerged in confidence as well as for the signing of a 
confidentiality agreement. 
The data have been secured in the following manner: Transcripts in hard copy 
format are stored in a locked filing cabinet in my home office. Similarly, soft copies of the 
transcripts and the audio recordings are stored on USB keys and CDs and also kept in the 
same locked filing cabinet. All of the foregoing materials are also stored on an external 
hard drive that is pass-word protected and kept in a locked filing cabinet when it is not 
under my direct supervision. I also set up individual hard copy files to keep track of the 
written materials some interviewees provided to me at the beginning or conclusion of the 
interviews. 
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Method used for Data Analysis 
The generation of grounded theory as defined by Glaser and Strauss is ecological 
and incremerital688 rather than linear in its development and is interpreted by Marshall and 
Rossman as such in this fashion: 
Theory, data generation and data analysis are developed simultaneously in a 
dialectical process. If you are developing theory in this way, you will devise a 
method of moving back and forth between data analysis and the process of 
explanation or theory construction. 689 
Therefore, as is the expectation when conducting this form of qualitative research, after 
each interview was completed I listened to the audio recording and made notes about and 
wrote memos690 detailing my impressions of various aspects of the commentary, (e.g. 
comments that were surprising; provocative; particularly thoughtful or insightful; 
humourous ); and/or which challenged the status quo or traditional beliefs in some way or 
as the interviews progressed, occupied a true outlier status. In addition, as a result of this 
activity, as the interviews continued I changed the wording of the questions, in some 
instances, so that they would flow more easily given how the previous interviews had 
unfolded. As the transcripts were prepared I read them while listening to the audio 
recording and ensured the transcript was accurate. Following that review I re-read the 
transcripts and underlined what I considered to be key concepts and terms, at the time. 
When I completed the twentieth interview and began to prepare for more in-depth data 
analysis I listened to each audio recording again while re-reading the transcripts. I found 
the exercise of listening to the interviewee's voice well after the face-to-face interview had 
taken place valuable as it helped me situate myself, to the extent, that it is possible to do 
688 Glaser and Strauss, supra note 10. 
689 Mason, supra note 8 at 141. 
690 Birks & Mills, supra note 12 at 10. Birks and Mills emphasize the importance of recording the researcher's thinking via the 
act of writing memos as the study progresses. 
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so, within the original conversation so as to better appreciate the nuances in tone and 
delivery and emphases placed on particular topics or comments. 
Application of Open Coding Method 
In order to analyze the data in a systematic manner for the generation of grounded 
theory, I followed the regimen established for 'open coding' as articulated by Strauss and 
Corbin. The process of open coding is designed to break up the data in order to find 
categories and themes. The purpose of this technique is to allow for the making of 
comparisons that assist the researcher to move beyond assumptions and acquire new 
insights by using both personal and professional knowledge in conjunction with the 
scholarly literature. 691 
Through the coding process, I identified general concepts and then I labelled them. 
At that point I grouped the concepts into categories and looked for recurring specific 
commentary for each category. I compared the ideas and points of view in each category 
and looked for common themes and outliers. I also made note of in vivo codes, that is, 
specific phrases and words, which I found memorable, appealing, popular or unusual. For 
certain categories that related to how interviewees described how they actually performed 
an action I looked for examples of frequency, intensity and duration. 
In order to cope with the volume of work associated with the coding process which 
was very time consuming, monotonous and demanded intense concentration, I used the 
'Flip-Flop Technique' 692 whereby I turned various concepts and interpretations of 
particular phenomenon around and tried to think of what the opposite point of view would 
be and if this opposing point of view had been expressed by another interviewee, I looked 
691 Anselm Strauss & Juliet Corbin. Basics of Qualitative Research Grounded Theory Procedures and Techniques (Newbury 
Park, California: Sage Publications Inc. 1990) at 62. 
692 Ibid. at 84. 
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at how it had been expressed. In comparing the categ9ries, I did what is referred to as a 
'close-in' comparison693 to get beyond the usual or the obvious to ferret out all of the ways 
in which an idea or action or principle could be interpreted so as to move beyond 
description to analysis. The 'close-in' comparison was followed by the 'far-out' comparison 
which I did primarily at the beginning of the analysis when I was identifying all of the 
parameters for the 'why and how' of the. interviewee's interpretations. 694 
In order to make sure I was aware of extreme points of view, I made use of the 
'Waving the Red Flag'695 technique which is designed to sensitize the researcher to 
particular words and phrases that suggest a closer Jock is needed. The type of words I 
used as red flags were: 'always', 'never', 'obviously', 'the only way to ... ', 'perfect', 'wrong', 
'maybe it's just me but', etc. 
These techniques assisted me to delve deeply into the meanings of the words and 
phrases used by the interviewees so that I could come up with a wide variety of possible 
interpretations. As all of the interviewees were extremely articulate and had thought 
deeply about many of the issues under discussion as a result of their commitment to 
reflective practice and/or through their training or education, the essence of the issues 
from their individual perspectives was readily evident. 
I also used the technique of 'making metaphors' 696 as a device for reducing the 
data and as observed by Huberman and Miles " ... they have an immense and central place 
in the development of theory".697 Interestingly enough, the interviewees themselves 
occasionally made use of the same metaphors, (e.g. 'the proof is in the pudding') and I 
693 Ibid. at 88. 
694 Ibid. at 90. 
695 Ibid. at 92. 
696 Miles & Huberman, supra note 14 at 250. 
697 Ibid. 
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examined these phrases closely to determine why these concepts or assertions resonated 
with me (or not) and if they had been used to describe the same abstraction from 
interviewee to interviewee. 
Finally, I looked very carefully at outlier comments and examples of 'negative 
instances'. Contrary to Huberman and Miles' experience that researchers are inclined to 
try to ignore them or discount them when they are actually very valuable data,698 I found 
them particularly instructive as the new view or minority opinion assisted me to look much 
more carefully at the majority opinion and how it came to be, (e.g. reflective of type of 
training or mentoring undergone; dominant historical view, etc.) and to test the validity of 
my own assumptions. 
Gender 
In constructing my questions I followed the lead provided by Susan Speer who 
works from a feminist methodological perspective who said: 
Likewise, if one wants to analyse interview talk where participants are asked to 
comment on gender issues in order to discover how people do gender as a matter 
of course, then such prompted 'gender commentary' may seem contrived, and 
thus not the best data for our present 
purposes. 699 
As a result, I deliberately did not ask interviewees if they thought gender had an impact on 
how their perceptions evolved or the actions they take, or others take, as they relate to 
independence, impartiality and fairness or if they believed gender had any impact on the 
perceptions of complainants and respondents. As I did not introduce the issue of gender it 
is instructive that a number of women raised the issue of gender in their commentaries 
which informed my analysis considerably. 
698 Ibid. at 268. 
699 Susan A.Speer, 'Natural' and 'contrived' data: a sustainable distinction? (2002) Discourse Studies 2002 at 520. 
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I also made use of Speer's instruction in relation to how the analysis of 
conversation, and in this case, interviews could benefit from the use of a feminist research 
methodology. For instance, she provided examples of strategies that had been 
recommended by feminists from a methodological perspective for use as prompts such as 
audio and video clips, strategies for story completion, photographs, etc.700 As I didn't think 
this kind of artifact was appropriate within this particular interview process, I used a 
modified version of this approach. Early on in the interview I made reference to and asked 
for the interviewee's reaction to the judicially stated belief that "Independence is in short a 
guarantee of impartiality". 101 I found this was a very useful prompt as it generated a great 
deal of animated discussion. However, I used the same strategy as a prompt by 
introducing briefl~ the research findings with respect to the influence on judicial decision-
making of political affiliation and in some cases, gender and asked if the interviewee 
thought there was the potential for Ombuds to be influenced similarly. Unfortunately, this 
prompt was not very useful as some of the interviewees thought I was suggesting that 
Ombuds and judges fulfilled similar roles or had similar responsibilities and/or engaged in 
discussion about how the appointment processes differed for Ombuds and judges. As a 
result, that particular prompt was not very helpful in many of the interviews. 
The theories that have emerged from this analysis are presented under the three 
headings of impartiality, independence and the connection of independence and 
impartiality to th'e perception of fairness for complainants and respondents. In addition, 
through this analysis I have identified a number of strategies used by Ombuds for 
700 Susan Speer, 'What can conversation analysis contribute to feminist methodology? Putting reflexivity into practice" (2002) 
Discourse and Society 3(6) 780 at 786. 
701 Regie, note 335 at 106. 
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overcoming bias, reducing partiality and for contributing to independence. These data also 
inform the overarching theories presented in my conclusion. 
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Chapter 5: Findings and Discussion 
Examination of Ombuds' Perceptions of Impartiality and Independence 
The central question under investigation is whether the principles of impartiality 
and independence are achievable, aspirational or impossible to attain. I place specific 
emphasis on the question of their viability, as they relate to the role of Ombuds in Canada. 
This query is informed initially by the interviewees' perspectives on how these traditional 
characteristics which are frequently identified as seminal to fairness, are defined and how 
they apply to those occupying Ombuds roles. Following the analysis of the interviewees' 
perspectives on impartiality and independence, I examine the strategies used by the 
interviewees to contribute to what they perceived to be the most appropriate expression of 
impartiality and independence. This is explored specific to Ombuds roles and I would 
argue what has become apparent is also applicable to adjudicative and ADR roles on a 
more general basis. The findings that have emerged from this analysis are that informants 
were largely of the view that while impartiality is neither achievable nor impossible, it is 
reasonable to aspire to be as impartial as possible based on ongoing introspection, and 
concerted intellectual and studied behavioural effort. The additional theoretical vector that 
has emerged from the data is that an Om buds' (or other third party's) demonstration of the 
highest degree of impartiality has much greater impact on parties' perceptions of fairness 
than the degree of structural independence imbedded in or ascribed to the role by statute, 
policy or terms of reference. 
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Analysis of the Construct of Impartiality 
The interviewees' conceptions of the principle of impartiality fell into three 
categories: impartiality as an observable behaviour; impartiality as an unobservable or 
invisible cognitive and intellectual exercise; and impartiality as a combination of behaviour 
and intellectual effort such that the outcome of the internal machinations was readily 
observable through specific, considered actions and commentary. Broadly stated, the 
exercise of impartiality in some interviewees' minds was clearly evident through their daily 
activities and the use of specific processes, while others' definitions of impartiality were 
described as internal, intellectual exercises which were evident only to themselves and 
finally, some interviewees believed that while impartiality was internally driven, it was 
readily discernable from specific actions or behaviours. The categories that emerged from 
the analysis of impartiality as an observable behaviour are presented first and the category 
of impartiality as an intellectual exercise is presented second. Behavioural demonstrations 
of impartiality flow from the following examples: 
A: Impartiality as an Observable Behaviour 
In identifying impartiality as a behaviour, it was characterized by some 
interviewees as being concrete and recognizable in how they interacted with complainants 
and respondents. A comment such as " ... how we speak to people ... what we do 
everyday"702 is illustrative of this point of view. It is worthy of note that very frequent 
reference to 'not taking sides' was made by many interviewees through comments like 
" ... Making sure that we do not take sides in any way, shape, form"703 or 'We are not here 
to represent them nor do we represent the organization". 704 One interviewee noted that 
702 Interviewee Q. 
703 Interviewee K. 
704 Interviewee Q. 
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credibility as well as impartiality comes from not being aligned with either side. Another 
interviewee took a slightly different approach with respect to the use of the 'sides' 
metaphor and described the function itself as being an unaligned role and therefore 
impartial. This ideation of the role follows in the tradition of the International Ombudsman 
Association (IOA) terminology of the Om buds as a 'designated neutral'. 705 
A(i) Academic Preparation and Professional Experience 
A contributing factor discussed in detail and at length by two very experienced 
interviewees was the importance of recognizing how critical professional and academic 
backgrounds are.to how Ombuds behave and the resultant impact of their interactions with 
others. For instance, both of these interviewees noted how individuals who had a legal 
background were profoundly influenced in how they performed with respect to their 
capacity for impartiality, either positively or negatively, depending on the values of the 
interviewee, by their academic preparation and their practical experience in the legal field. 
This particular area of expertise was singled out as these interviewees had observed, by 
comparison, how colleagues who were trained in a wide variety of different disciplines, 
(e.g. engineering, health care, social work, as well as all manner of arts and science 
academic disciplines), conducted themselves differently. One interviewee's assessment 
was that the initial training and years of practice in a particular field had a strong impact on 
some aspects of what many deemed as the foundation of impartiality, that being, the 
capacity to establish rapport and communicate in an encouraging fashion so as to acquire 
all of the relevant information. 706 This observation of the import of academic preparation 
and/or work experience on the behaviour of individuals deserves considerable 
705 
'What is an organizational Ombudsman" online: International Ombudsman Association 
<http://www.ombudsassociation.org>. 
706 At this juncture an intellectual component was also noted that being the capacity to entertain various points of view 
simultaneously. 
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examination. Many advertisements for Ombuds roles ask for specific types of academic 
preparation and professional experience such as Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), 
social work and/or law. Presumably, it would be useful to determine if all or any of these 
backgrounds can be relied on to recruit individuals who attempt to think In an impartial 
manner. Alternatively, it would be equally useful to determine if particular academic and 
professional backgrounds are actually an impediment or stumbling block to developing the 
skills that best support the pursuit of impartiality. For instance, in looking at the seven 
individuals who have occupied the role of the Ontario Ombudsman (as a permanent 
appointee) since its inception, five were trained as lawyers (two were also judges) and one 
was a university professor specializing in human rights. 707 Therefore, would it be 
reasonable to say that law is the best background for this type of role as it is has been the 
dominant mode for this jurisdiction or has it simply become a tradition to appoint a lawyer 
without such a choice being necessarily predicated on such evidence as 'observable' 
behaviours? Or, alternatively, were the individuals chosen more reflective of the 
backgrounds of those who are most interested in this kind of role and therefore, after the 
requirement to compete for the position was put into place in 1998, most likely to apply for 
the position? 
In stark contrast, the Ombudsman for Alberta has been drawn from the ranks of 
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and other police forces for six of the eight 
appointees. 708 Again, one wonders whether this trend is based on tradition or on 
707 The Ontario Ombudsman role has been occupied by the following individuals from 1975 to the present date: Arthur 
Maloney (lawyer); Justice Donald Moran; Dr. Daniel Hill (sociologist); Roberta Jamieson (lawyer); Justice Clare Lewis; Andre 
Marin (lawyer). 
708 Lorna Stefanick, "Following Responsibility in an Era of Outsourcing" in Provincial and Territorial Ombudsman Offices in 
Ontario, Stewart Hyson, ed., (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009) 27 at 31. In 2009, there had been seven 
appointees. As of 2011, there are eight appointees with the most recent appointment being a former Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police (RCMP) officer, Mr. Peter Hourihan who prior to being appointed was the commanding officer for the RCMP 
for the province of British Columbia. "Meet the Alberta Ombudsman", Alberta Ombudsman Focused on Fairness online: 
<http://www.ombudsman.ab.ca>. 
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expectations for particular kinds of behaviour related to the expression of impartiality and 
the demonstration of independence. Without further exploration it is impossible to know 
whether lawyers or police officers or alternatively, journalists, nurses, counsellors or 
educators are best prepared with respect to capacity for investigative rigour and the type 
of communication skills required for the proper execution of this kind of role. Or, it may be 
reasonable to question if academic preparation and professional training and experience 
are irrelevant as it may be contended that it is the self-awareness and self-discipline of the 
individual that occupies the role that determines the capacity to act as impartially as 
possible and to maintain an independent office. To date, we have no empirical studies to 
draw from in order to determine how best to prepare for a role of this nature. Given how 
influential those who occupy Ombuds roles can be, and the volume of resources 
dedicated to these ·roles and how important it is that these roles be implemented properly, 
this is a very fruitful area for future investigation. In addition, as many Ombuds rely on staff 
to conduct investigations and engage in various forms of ADR, the type of preparation that 
is most advantageous to success in these roles is also worth exploring. In my own 
experience, the most capable 709 Ombuds' investigators came from liberal studies, public 
administration, nursing and science backgrounds. As a result, given the multiplicity of 
possibilities evident, one again has to query whether it is preparation in a particular 
academic discipl.ine that matters most with respect to the behavioural aspects of the 
pursuit of impart~ality or in the final analysis, perhaps it is ultimately the combination of 
personal characteristics and professional experience and academic studies that 
contributes to the ideal candidate for Ombuds' roles. Unfortunately, to date there are no 
709 The criteria I am using to define 'capable 'include the ability to build rapport and establish credibility with complainants and 
respondents so as to engage in early resolution activities; the ability to plan an investigation and collect information properly 
and expeditiously; to analyze the data collected thoroughly and accurately; and prepare accurate and easily understood 
written investigative reports. 
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data to draw on to respond to this query, as in my experience, preferences for particular 
kinds of training, education or previous work experience has been solely based on 
tradition, the beliefs of the hiring committee or in the case of Ombuds staff, the current 
appointee's preferences. 
A (ii) Complaint Handling Policies. Guidelines and Methodologies 
Another behavioural means suggested .for contributing to or creating impartiality 
and perhaps, more accurately, preventing partiality or reducing bias, was the emphasis 
. placed on the importance of the articulation of and use of policies, guidelines and 
methodologies for ensuring the investigation of complaints was undertaken in an objective 
or unbiased manner. One interviewee observed that 
... but impartiality you know is not a function of the person only. It is a function of 
rules that are established, values, and also I would say, tools in the management 
of the investigations ... Because it is very easy to adopt some bias in an 
investigation. You may become more sympathetic or influenced toward a person. 
You may be influenced by different factors that should not influence you ... 710 
This interviewee's conclusion was that the tools used and the guidelines followed in . 
conducting investigations were key contributors to impartiality. This belief is comparable to 
that expressed by Justice Huddart whereby she argued for the importance of the 
publication and use of guidelines for how reviews will be conducted and decisions arrived 
at by administrative tribunals to contribute to impartiality. 711 This belief ·is also similar to that 
promoted by William Lucy, who has posited the feasibility of 'procedural impartiality' 712 
which he defined .as all parties involved being well informed about the role and the 
processes that will be followed which include the opportunity to be heard and reply to what 
others have said about the matter being reviewed. Another interviewee spoke in a similar 
710 Interviewee C. 
711 Huddart, supra note 334 at 158. 
·m Lucy, supra note 630 at 24. 
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manner but predicated the notion of an impartial approach to investigation on beginning 
from an objective stand point and then proceeding by" ... assessing all sources of available 
evidence and making your findings based on the sufficiency or the reliability or the 
relevance of the information that you have gathered". 713 The importance and necessity of 
such an approach may be considered to be obvious and some might describe as 
'textbook'; however, the majority of the individuals who espoused this belief, that is, the 
certainty that a fair and carefully constructed process would provide for impartiality, did not 
express any caveat to acknowledge the very real possibility that the manner in which 
evidence is collected and the functions of assessing the sufficiency, reliability and 
relevance of information gathered could also be influenced by personal biases which are 
unknown to the investigator or the Ombuds and which could interfere with their capacity to 
operate on an impartial basis. Similarly, no acknowledgement was made of the possibility 
of structural biases inherent in various review processes which reflect the experience 
and/or values arid beliefs of those who created them, (e.g. in-depth knowledge of 
bureaucratic process; high levels of literacy and numeracy; sufficient time to make various 
applications or sufficient financial resources to hire experts to do so on their behalf, a 
sense of their own culture's superiority to others, etc.). As a result, those whose life 
experiences are different than those who created the review procedures may not share 
the same definitions of sufficiency, reliability or relevance as those who are making 
assessments of the quality of their complaint or response. For example, an individual who 
is not familiar with standard administrative process when being interviewed by an Ombuds 
investigator, may not provide all of the information that is actually relevant, which may then 
have a negative impact on the credibility ascribed to his complaint, as unless he is asked a 
713 Interviewee Y. 
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specific question he wouldn't know that this additional information should have been 
provided to support his contention. Whereas a complainant who is very familiar with 
bureaucratic process may provide many more details, comparatively speaking, using a 
larger vocabulary, that results in a different and perhaps more advantageous or credible 
appearance even though the actual nature of the two complainants' dispute with the 
respondent is identical. As a result, I am sceptical of the notion that the use of rigorous 
investigative processes contribute to impartiality on a behavioural basis due to their 
scrupulous application as it should now be readily evident that all processes (whether 
investigative or decision-making) must constantly be assessed by individuals from diverse 
backgrounds for evidence of bias in their construction. It would be a useful exercise for 
Ombuds themsel,ves to attempt to determine if their own processes have been organized 
in such a fashion so as to be biased, whether intentionally or not, in favour of those who 
occupy a particular social location with respect to culture, socio-economic class, gender, 
level of formal educational, languages spoken, age, etc. 
In contrast to the foregoing examples of impartiality conceived as behavioural in 
nature, a number of themes emerged with respect to the notion of impartiality as an 
intellectual undertaking and they are explored here. 
B: IMPARTIALITY AS AN INTELLECTUAL EXERCISE 
Not surprisingly, all interviewees spoke to their belief that everyone is influenced by 
their past life experience and the resultant biases influence how they react to and view the 
concerns, complaints and disputes that are brought to their attention. Specifically, one 
interviewee with lengthy experience in an Ombuds setting as well as in other inquisitorial 
roles said: 
I think impartiality is an extremely rare beast because I think we can as an 
Ombudsperson, one can strive to be as impartial as possible but there are going to 
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be certain elements, certain internal biases that will affect that Ombuds' ability to 
be as independent and as impartial as he or she possibly can. 714 
B (i) Recognition and Management of Bias 
As part of the generally held recognition that past life experiences and personal 
biases, recognized and unrecognized, would always be influential in how the interviewees 
responded to complainants and respondents, making the effort to be aware of 'our 
triggers' as well as learning how to better manage our reactions was identified as being an 
extremely important intellectual approach to attempt to overcome bias. Similarly, 
terminology like" ... a certain flexibility to look beyond, think outside the box, go beyond the 
standard parameters of a certain issue"715 was also used to underline the importance of 
having the capacity to be open to a wide variety of possible interpretations of the same 
subject matter. Others emphasized the importance of open mindedness generally and 
" ... no conflict of interest intellectual or otherwise ... "716 for the foundation of impartiality. 
B (ii) Flexibility and Open-Mindedness 
A number of interviewees spoke to the importance of having the flexibility of mind 
that provided for the ability to recognize the authenticity of the very different perceptions 
that complainants and respondents could have about a seemingly straightforward 
scenario. One interviewee articulated his intellectual approach by way of the following 
analogy: 
I guess impartiality starts with a recognition that it doesn't matter how thin you 
make the pancakes, there are two sides. You can't take the complaint at face 
value, nor can you take a response to the complaint at face value, that you know 
people will have different perceptions of the same thing.717 
714 Interviewee T. 
715 Interviewee M. 
716 Interviewee K. 
717 Interviewee M. 
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The use of this explanatory device is very useful in that it can be used to move beyond 
the importance of recognizing the possibility of two individuals, the complainant and the 
respondent, perceiving the same situation very differently to recognizing that some parties 
may also experience what appears to a third party to be the same situation, very 
differently. The pancake metaphor was used to demonstrate that the one side of the 
pancake that is burnt may be obscured by the one that is cooked to perfection, or vice 
versa. The analogy put forward by the interviewee is representative of a more widely held 
point of view that 1posits that the intellectual capacity to be able to entertain and appreciate 
the validity of various and opposing points of view simultaneously is crucial to impartiality 
and is essentially an intellectual pursuit. 
B (iii) Vigilance 
There was a striking addition to many of the interviewees' commentary on 
impartiality and that is the degree of difficulty and watchfulness inherent in striving for 
impartiality from an intellectual perspective. For example, a number of interviewees spoke 
to impartiality as being predicated on the need for "constant vigilance"718 ; "a bit of a 
struggle"719; " ••• always a struggle ... "720; "constantly reminding myself of potential for 
bias"721 ; "always at the top of my mind"722; "constantly questioning your own applications of 
those principles"723 ; and "the best possible due diligence [to prevent biased thinking]".72~ 
These kinds of comments were made either at the beginning of the interviewee's definition 
of impartiality or were made as they expanded upon their definitions of impartiality and 
718 Interviewee D. 
719 Interviewee I. 
720 Interviewee 0. 
721 Interviewee T. 
722 Interviewee H. 
723 Interviewee B. 
724 Interviewee D. 
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were made, for the most part, emphatically rather than casually in order to demonstrate 
both how important and how difficult it was from their perspective to think impartially. 
In addition to the notion of impartiality as either a behavioural expression or an 
intellectual undertaking, a third option was identified which incorporated both intellectual 
effort and specific behaviours. This conception is explored here. 
C: IMPARTIALITY AS BOTH BEHAVIOURAL AND INTELLECTUAL ACTIVITY 
One interviewee demonstrated the intellectual and the behavioural components of 
impartiality as melded together by providing the following description: "Reflective; being 
present; self-aware; being aware of body as well as voice, intonation and so on". 725 For 
those who held this view, some stated explicitly and some more obliquely, the importance 
they attributed to first thinking and then acting in such a fashion so as to demonstrate their 
impartiality. In a similar vein, another interviewee said "a well honed sense of empathy"726 
was critical to impartiality and an empathetic approach was mentioned less emphatically 
but tangentially by others. As an empathetic approach requires the intellectual flexibility to 
imagine and to ~ry to understand what another party has experienced in conjunction with 
having the beha.vioural and communication skills to demonstrate these capacities in their 
interactions with individuals, the ability to do so successfully is indicative of both 
intellectual and behavioural effort. This kind of commentary is reflective of what I would 
posit is the ideal with respect to the pursuit of impartiality in that it recognizes that cognitive 
capacity and intellectual effort are required along with considerable attention being paid to 
comportment with respect to body and spoken language and the behaviours exhibited in 
particular situations. 
725 Interviewee P. 
726 Interviewee A. 
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THE VIABILITY OF IMPARTIALITY 
With respect to the viability of the concept of impartiality, the research results 
demonstrate that the majority of the twenty Ombuds and staff interviewees' views 
coalesced around the belief that impartiality is clearly not achievable but rather is 
aspirational in nature. The level of success that a practitioner achieves is dependent on 
the degree of self-awareness, the rigour of his or her self-discipline and reflective capacity 
as well as a strong commitment to ongoing self-development. However, interestingly 
enough, one interviewee's self-assessment was that of never having any instance of 
partiality or bias for or against anyone or an issue in her current role. Her explanation for 
this achievement was that due to extensive training and experience in roles that also 
required impartiality, this characteristic had now been thoroughly integrated into the 
thinking and behaviour essential to the impartial implementation of the current Ombuds 
role. This comment is reminiscent of the assessment made by Kenneth Cloke who 
identified those (in his experience, judges) who think they are unbiased are likely to be 
biased. 727 It is interesting to see the contrast between the interviewee's comment cited 
earlier who was also very experienced who had come to the opposite conclusion in which 
impartiality was described as a 'rare beast'. 728 
Another vector was added to the discussion and emphatically articulated by 
another interviewee who stated in complete opposition to the notion of 'complete or perfect 
impartiality' that not only was impartiality impossible to ach.ieve, it should not be vaunted 
as a desirable quality. Her view was that being impartial meant not caring about the 
outcome of a dispute. She saw this type of indifference as being highly undesirable as her 
view was that this kind of perspective can only be created by a high level of 
727 Cloke, supra note 599. 
728 Interviewee T. 
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detachment. 729 In contrast, it is worthy of note that another interviewee specifically 
indicated that it was helpful to describe to complainants that the approach taken in 
handling complaints as being impartial by stating that "we do not have a vested interest in 
the outcome, personally".730 The interviewee who saw the desire to be detached and 
separate as largely a white, male construct observed that while such an orientation was 
highly valued in society, she had concluded that such a view did not actually contribute to 
fairness. Rather, she promoted the importance of partiality by these words: 
The more, the more partial you are to as many people as possible then the more 
informed your opinion can be. So as opposed to try to remove yourself, I would 
say you try to involve yourself with as much as possible and to see both the 
limitations and advantages of many different perspectives. 731 
This interviewee also emphasized the importance of attempting to understand the 
motivations and rationales for various behaviours. This approach is akin to what has been 
identified by Lorne Sessin in his prescription for how impartiality can be pursued by a 
decision-maker who is deciding on claims and benefits by encouraging that information be 
exchanged openly in a respectful, empathic way so as to increase mutual 
understanding.732 This interviewee also took considerable pains to distinguish 'empathy' 
from 'agreement' in that she clarified that empathy simply meant trying to appreciate what 
others were going through rather than agreeing with their statements or behaviour or 
believing that you could experience situations in the same manner as they did. In the 
729 This commentary has had an important influence on my own practice as in describing the role of the Ombudsperson I 
have typically stated that being impartial meant that I had no vested interest in a particular outcome. As a result of the insight 
gained from this interviewee's comments I am no longer use that terminology as clearly an Ombuds should be heavily 
invested in a fair outcome. I now clarify that I do not act as a representative or advocate for either side of the dispute and that 
if I find that an error has been made then I will make a recommendation or propose a remedy for an outcome that is fair to all 
concerned. 
730 Interviewee Q. 
731 Interviewee H. 
732 Sessin, supra note 326 at 814. 
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course of her commentary she introduced the term of 'multi-partiality'733 into the 
conversation to best describe what she aspired to in her interactions with others when 
discussing concerns and complaints. Her view was that multi-partiality was the ideal 
modus operandus for an Ombuds and could be achieved through a high degree of 
empathy, if defined correctly, for all concerned. It is noteworthy that this interviewee had 
the least amount of experience in an Ombuds role and in dispute resolution generally, of 
all those interviewed. While she was unaware that the expression of 'multi-partiality' had 
already surfaced in scholarly literature, her views are closely connected to those 
expressed by Sturm and Gadlin734 and Christopher Moore735 and their recent introduction 
of the term of 'multi-partiality' to the ADR discourse and is comparable to 'omni partiality', 
the concept of being partial to all parties simultaneously,736 that was introduced by 
Kenneth Cloke in Mediating Dangerously. In addition, two other women interviewed also 
noted that women do make decisions differently than men in that they take different and 
often more information into account before arriving at a conclusion. While not expressed 
as multi-partiality, these two interviewees' belief that women collect more and different 
information thari men (in these interviewees' experience) struck me as being somewhat 
similar to the modality of multi-partiality as expressed above. Both interviewees explained 
how much time they devoted to· gathering as much relevant information as possible and 
the importance of having the self-discipline and patience to truly understand what had 
happened from all parties' perspectives. 
733 I am taking pains to describe how the tenn of multi-partiality was expressed in this interview, e.g. preceded by "umm, 
umm, like ... " as I had the impression the interviewee had not encountered the tenn before and was creating it as we spoke to 
best describe how she believed she should interact with complainants and respondents. 
734 Stunn and Gadlin, supra note 595 at 4. 
735 Chris Moore, supra note 598. 
736 Cloke, supra note 599. 
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Another related but differently expressed point of view was presented as "I do think 
there is a difference between white males of influence who previously have been the 
decision-makers in our society and the way in which other people might make those 
decisions ... they will take into account different things along the way that make up who 
they are".737 This commentary is comparable to what was explored by Justice Wilson in 
""Will Women Judges Really Make Difference?"738 and was corroborated by James 
Stribopoulos & Moin A. Yahya's findings.739 These comments made by women who are 
Ombuds provide additional fodder for the possibility that men and women may approach 
the resolution or investigation of complaints and the analysis of evidence differently 
resulting in substantially different outcomes for complainants and respondents depending 
on who is in charge of and/or implementing the investigative or early resolution process. 
Another point raised that relates to gender is one interviewee's observation of how 
difficult it had been to retain staff members who are men for the Office with which she is 
affiliated. While this interviewee thought it was very important to have the views of both 
men and women on the issues being reviewed, past experience was that the retention of 
male staff was low. Specifically, she had observed that the men hired previously were not 
willing or able to maintain the degree of patience that was required to work with difficult 
complainants. As a result, those men who were very interested initially in the Ombuds 
field subsequently left to pursue other forms of employment and rarely were there any 
significant number of men who applied for the positions advertised. 
As there are many men who work in the Ombuds field and have done so for 
lengthy periods of time, both as sole practitioners, heading small and large Offices and as 
737 Interviewee A. 
738 See Bertha Wilson, 'Will Women Judges Really Make a Difference?" (1990) 28 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 507. 
739 Stribopoulos & Yahya, supra note 421 at 354. 
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members of investigative or informal resolution teams, this interviewee's experience may 
be unique. However, her point of view adds to the richness of the discussion of how men 
and women may approach and practice within the Ombuds role quite differently, 
depending on the type of Ombuds role and perhaps, geographical location of the Office 
and/or the social location of the Ombuds staff, complainants and respondents. 
INTUITION AND IMPARTIALITY 
It is noteworthy that one interviewee specifically addressed the influence of life 
· experience and intuition in how he views impartiality in the following manner: 
The first is that if we are going to try to do Ombuds work, we either have a 
computer or we have humans. There is no appetite among the [population being 
served] for that sort of computerized, mechanized view going about this type of 
work. We've heard a lot [at a particular conference] about the requirement and the 
benefit of the flexibility which an Ombudsman brings. That requires a measure of 
intuition. Part and parcel of human intuition is this notion of bias and the life 
experience we all bring to our decision-making. So I am not sure that talking about 
the fact that there is this evidence of a cognitive connect into decision-making in all 
that we know as humans we experience, really gets us very far.740 
This individual was also adamant that as the body of work that he had assembled and the 
activities pursued in other roles prior to being retained as an Ombuds was readily available 
in the public domain, those who made use of the Office should rightly understand that his 
past experiencei; and well known .values, would influence his approach and his views on 
how to properly implement the Ombuds role. In addition, other men who were interviewed 
as well as some women also emphasized the import of their intuition as being highly 
influential and valuable in how they viewed people and issues. Another interviewee spoke 
in a particularly evocative manner about the complexity of intellectual and emotional 
components associated with attempting to understand various perspectives. Specifically, 
she said: 
740 Interviewee D. 
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... I need to use different senses to help me understand, so I do, I do benefit from a 
visual orientation, from an intuitive sense. I always trust my gut. It is not only an 
intellectual exercise or an exercise based on language and the manifestations of 
language, it is gut. What am I hearing, seeing, feeling, that helps give me~ richer 
understanding. 741 
An ideal definition of the components and approach to achieving the highest degree of 
impartiality as is personally possible was described in the following way: 
A set of process freedoms. But then, how I use those freedoms can be very 
biased. I may not live out the notion of impartiality and I suppose what I am using 
as my definition of impartiality is an open mindedness, an objectivity, a willingness 
to hear and understand and accept different views, or if the opposite, to reject 
views. To do so without preconceived notions, biases, prejudices, stereotypes, 
etcetera. And to be able to make an evaluation that has the purest, if we can kind 
of think of it that way, process and intellectualization around it. I am not sure that I 
achieve this all the time but in [my field] particularly, we must have a goal or a 
notion of optimum [effectiveness] and we are working towards that. I suppose just 
as in law you have the notion of absolute justice or pure fairness, or other 
wonderful phrases, you use those as your, your sort of sign posts in the future you 
are working towards. Yet the reality is that many times you must accept less than, 
because that is all that you can make happen.742 
This kind of commentary demonstrates how differently the concept of impartiality is 
understood and implemented by thoughtful Omb.uds practitioners in comparison to the 
original notion of detachment and disinterest that characterized the ideal of impartiality in 
the past and is still described as such in some arenas. 
In deconstructing the concept of impartiality I found it ironic that one interviewee 
indicated that he had become more comfortable with using the term 'objective' rather than 
impartial as he finds it to be a better description of how he approaches situations. It was 
interesting that this interviewee did not attach any significance to the fact that impartiality 
and objectivity are used frequently as synonyms and the analysis of whether objectivity is 
aspirational, achievable or impossible would be virtually identical to the critique of the 
concept of impartiality. Rather he had concluded after extensive contemplation that 
741 Interviewee P. 
742 Interviewee P. 
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'objectivity' was a better fit than 'impartiality' for what he aspired to do when approaching 
situations. 
These data suggest that individuals who believe in impartiality (or objectivity) as a 
positive attribute recognize that self-awareness and monitoring of reactions is key to 
achieving as high a degree of impartiality as possible for them as individuals. Similarly, the 
manner in which one communicates and the rigour with which the complaint handling 
processes are implemented was also seen to be demonstrative of an impartial approach. 
In looking at the conclusions arrived at by some of the interviewees for the purpose of 
theorizing, I am proposing that impartiality is best described as a skill that individuals work 
at improving on a longitudinal basis. While it was recognized that some people may find it 
easier to become more skilled in thinking and behaving in an impartial manner than others 
based on personality and academic preparation and work experience, the majority do not 
see impartiality qS an end that could be achieved in its entirety and is better understood as 
a 'work in progress'. As a result, I am positing the theory that an individual who is very self-
aware and skill~d at suppressing stereotypes and demonstrating that capacity to others 
through the manner in which he or she communicates, is well positioned to demonstrate a 
high degree of impartiality in particular situations. However, it is also evident that 
regardless of the high level of skill development, as identified by one interviewee in 
particular, situations may present themselves where the subject matter is such that the 
Ombud's reaction is so negative, (e.g. death of a child due to neglect or abuse), that there 
is no potential for looking at the situation impartially prior to making a determination, 
regardless of the desire to do so and the highest skill level and self-discipline. Therefore, I 
would contend that some individuals may demonstrate a high degree of impartiality in 
many situations based on their continuing attention to self-awareness, self-knowledge and 
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capacity to manage the impact of stereotypical responses or past experiences so as to be 
as open minded as is possible; whereas in other situations it is impossible for these highly 
skilled and evolved individuals to do so. As a result, a high degree of impartiality may in 
fact be situation-specific. Moreover, a number of interviewees indicated that in order to 
ensure a matter was reviewed properly and in an unbiased manner it was necessary to 
decline further involvement given the negative feelings the individual's behaviour and/or 
attitudes evoked. Therefore, in order to ensure that parties are treated fairly, individuals 
must know when they should remove themselves from a matter presented for review as 
their past experiences or personal values are too influential in a particular scenario. 
The foregoing analysis goes far beyond the traditional notion of 'conflict of interest' 
where an individual recuses herself because of a potential financial benefit or a close, 
personal or professional relationship. In contrast, this kind of recusal or withdrawal from an 
interaction can only occur as a result of a high degree of self-knowledge coupled with the 
discipline and confidence to be able to articulate in a respectful manner why. Om buds were 
not able to continue their involvement with a matter given their negative reactions to 
particular values espoused and/or behaviours justified on the basis of those values. 
Conversely, while this possibility was not raised by the interviewees, I am asserting 
that it would be equally .important to be mindful of the possibility for partiality to emerge in 
the opposite scenario whereby an individual who aspires to be impartial is also able to 
recognize when shared values and beliefs are .. well developed in a complainant or a 
respondent. In a situation where the influence of 'positive bias' is in play the Ombuds 
would also require sufficient self-awareness so as to counteract the assumption that a 
person the Ombuds admired or with whom he had established a very comfortable rapport 
was telling the truth, or was more credible than the other party, without further 
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assessment, given the positive persona presented and the strong connection that had 
been created. 
These data demonstrate that individuals who aspire to be as impartial as possible 
have to make a sustained effort to do so by developing and maintaining the capacity to 
recognize their biases and how to best overcome them when it is appropriate to do so. In 
addition-, those occupying third party roles must also be able to gracefully remove 
themselves from the dispute resolution process when an individual's belief systems or 
behaviours inspire a negative or overly positive response. As a result, my research also 
includes inquiry into the strategies that individual Ombuds have used successfully to 
reduce the potential for bias and partiality in their own practices. Given the generic manner 
in how these strategies have been expressed by the interviewees, they are also readily 
applicable to other dispute resolution domains, (e.g. all manner of arbitration, mediation or 
inquisitorial processes or adjudicative processes) which are also predicated on an 
impartial approach. 
The type of strategies identified can be broken down into two different categories. 
The majority view is the notion that individuals must be sufficiently introspective and self-
critical so as to have developed the degree of self-awareness that allows them to identify 
and recognize their biases and the circumstances and behaviours which trigger them. This 
includes the capacity to develop and maintain sufficient self-discipline to thwart or 
overcome biased or partial responses. Interestingly enough, a minority and opposite point 
of view presented is: 'you are either impartial or you are not by virtue of personality'. The 
interviewee who expressed this point of view most strongly believed that it was not 
possible to teach someone to be impartial and/or essentially effect a change in personality, 
rather this orientation or personality characteristic had to be inherent in an individual's 
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make up. Initially, this point of view seemed incongruent with the degree of introspection 
and resultant self-awareness and ongoing skill development that others posited as being 
required for an approach or response which is as impartial as possible. However, as I 
reflected on this notion further, the comment made suggests that in order to be as 
impartial as it is possible for a human being to be, clearly that individual has to value 
impartiality and be willing to work at being impartial. Therefore, the 'dyed in the wool 
partisan' who does not value impartiality would likely have no interest in developing the 
self-awareness and discipline and concomitant communication skills which are the 
foundations for being willing to look at all sides of an issue and to see value in being open 
to understanding and accepting points of view that are different than the ones she 
currently holds. It is also worthy of comment that one other interviewee also talked about 
having the type of personality that allowed her to pull back from an automatic biased 
response. However, the more widely held view of the concept of a 'trained professional' 
which resulted from all manner of academic and work experience, years of service in roles 
characterized as 'impartial' underlined by constant introspection, self examination and a 
commitment to ongoing personal development, was the dominant view for the means for 
becoming as impartial as possible. Within these general parameters, the following 
strategies and techniques were put forward as being very effective. 
Strategies and Techniques for Increasing Impartiality 
1. Checking Biases with Others 
It is instructive that the specific techniques identified by all interviewees were very 
similar for those who worked as sole practitioners and those who worked with colleagues, 
with one notable exception. That being, those who worked with colleagues talked 
frequently about the degree to which they depended on their co-workers to challenge their 
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biases, whereas those who worked alone had to depend on their own capacity for self 
reflection and in one person's description, "my conscience". 743 
The style of group reflective practice where colleagues speak openly to one 
another and provide feedback is very similar to that espoused by Sturm and Gadlin in their 
analysis of how to generate systemic improvements in a science and health care 
setting.744 The importance of being exposed to varying points of view and perspectives on 
people and issues is also demonstrated in the research findings of Cass Sunstein et al 
and Stribopoulos and Yahya on judicial decision-making. Their data verified that with 
benches composed of those with differing political affiliations, the impact of their political 
views on decisions was dampened by the presence of one judge of a different political 
affiliation, and in other situations, by gender.745 In some instances, a discussion of the 
substance of the matter may have been debated in such a manner that 'bad' bias was 
identified and tempered or eliminated or the in-depth discussion resulted in a change of 
opinion. In the Ombuds setting, the value and the mechanics of the team based approach 
for contributing to impartiality was introduced when group discuss·ion was used to help a 
colleague understand that she may be biased through comments". like: 
We have had some open discussions about ... and we put our own biases on the 
table ... We feel comfortable enough here to do that. .. som.e of us get involved in 
assisting in the decisions if there is a sense that someone's [bad] personal bias on 
a particular type of issue may unduly influence the way we should proceed. 746 
Individuals also highlighted the great benefit that came from talking with team 
members or colleagues about issues they were examining so that they could be certain 
that their own initial negative or positive reactions to an issue did not affect how they 
743 Interviewee L. 
744 Sturm & Gadlin, supra note 595. 
745 Sunstein et al, supra note 432 at 347 and Stribopoulos and Yahya, supra note 421 at 347. 
746 Interviewee Q. 
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approached the handling of the complaint. Some referred to making use of regularly 
scheduled meetings, for instance, " ... a weekly team huddle ... "747 where cases were 
discussed in detail and how helpful it was to have other views presented not only to 
advance more options for how to address the complaint or response but to remind them 
not to prejudge the legitimacy of a complaint or be influenced by a negative reaction to a 
complainant or respondent. One interviewee talked about how regularly scheduled coffee 
sessions for discussions about cases were very useful when someone was dealing with a 
very challenging individual to say "Here is the road map to finding out whether or not the 
[complainant's] concern has merit and we will look at those things. Divorce yourself from 
the [complainant] for a moment. We'H do the same when we deal with a pesky 
[respondent] as well".748 In addition, taking the import of the same kind of dialogue 
considerably further, a number of interviewees spoke passionately about how they 
regularly asked their colleagues or staff to vigorously challenge them on why the approach 
they were proposing could be seen to be biased and wrong and/or how it could or should 
be improved. 
Another interviewee discussed the scenario whereby he becomes aware of the 
impact of his bias after he has completed .his review and has come to a conclusion. This 
reality becomes evident to him when he is in the midst of writing a letter to advise a 
complainant that the contentions can not be supported and he realizes he is having 
difficulty doing so because he can not adequately answer his own questions. At that point 
he recognizes the need to assess his own reactions and ask others for their input in order 
to do his best work. He indicated in this circumstance he comes to realize that "I need to 
keep an open m,ind; recognize that there are going to be biases. So I look for different 
747 Interviewee I. 
748 Interviewee D. 
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types of individuals to be involved in decision-making; that will consider [different things]. 
That way you get the best product you can have".749 
In the same trajectory, that is, making use of others' views to challenge your own 
reaction, but using a different tactic, the same interviewee spoke about how lengthy 
experience had taught him to look for input from those with very different backgrounds to 
his: 
... have been doing this kind of work for a long time; has attuned me to it; best way 
to overcome those biases is to have divergent views; canvass everybody's 
opinions. If all lawyers, they could look at it the same way; [in a previous role] the 
beauty was that not everyone a lawyer. Some scientists, social workers, nurses, 
teachers. No right or wrong way. Put it out there from the beginning. You need 
diversity in their decision-making because people will approach problem solving in 
a different way.750 . 
A similar approach to using deliberate and systematic consultation with colleagues was 
described by an interviewee in that he sought out input from external knowledgeable 
individuals, in order to check his assumptions, and prevent potential bias. One of the 
strategies used to seek information from well informed individuals outside of the Ombuds 
Office was described as: 
We did a round table with [a particular group], .... , I am always willing to question 
my own ideas. When you're a [particular focus] you only hear from these people 
but when you're in this position you have access to a greater number, a wider level 
of sources, and you're foolish not to use them. So both to reinforce or to determine 
whether I was on the right track but were there other issues to examine?751 
The foregoing examples demonstrate how seeking input from colleagues and external 
informants, when possible, was found to be very beneficial for identifying and overcoming 
personal bias or partiality at many stages of the complaint handling and fairness 
assessment process. 
749 Interviewee S. 
750 Ibid. 
751 Interviewee G. 
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2. Systematic Procedural Approach to Contributing to Impartiality 
Other interviewees also spoke to the importance of having a system in place that 
created conditions that contributed to an impartial approach, (e.g. establishing procedures 
that contributed to ensuring both sides were heard and that evidence was assessed 
objectively). In addition, in some offices, systems were established for auditing files after 
they had been closed, either by other staff or as an exercise in self-assessment, to 
determine whether the case had been handled as fairly as possible, with the 
demonstration of impartiality being a key criterion in that review or audit. The importance 
of being highly self-critical with respect to how the work of the Ombuds was accomplished 
was related to the fact that an Ombuds, by definition, is often in the position of criticizing 
the work of others so individuals in this role should therefore be constantly providing for or 
engaging in criticism of their own work. In addition, individuals who worked in offices with 
multiple staff talked about how advantageous it was to have programs in place to mentor 
new staff and to train them to demonstrate a high degree of impartiality and when to ask 
for assistance prior to ever having contact with those bringing forward complaints. 
3. Focus on the Issue 
The individual skills required for developing the capacity to be as impartial as 
possible were epitomized in comments like: "Focus on the problem. Focus on what it is 
your job is. It does not negate at all my own sort of personal feelings for the difficult 
situation they find themselves in". 752 This type of commentary was provided to 
demonstrate that while a complainant's situation may evoke great sympathy it was also 
possible to determine objectively if a respondent had fairly assessed whether a 
complainant was actually eligible for a particular service or benefit. 
752 Interviewee Q. 
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Another example of the use of 'focus' for dealing with bias was expressed as 
withholding judgment on the behaviour and honing in on whether there is a valid issue to 
address by not allowing the complainant's behaviour to influence the assessment of the 
validity of the complaint. One interviewee described the process used in the following 
manner: 
you know, irrespective of how this person acts. And so we deal with 
[complainants] who will call and yell at us. They're mean to you, are ignorant and 
they're rude and say things that.... But do they have an actual issue? And it is 
harder sometimes with those cases to try and find that. Yes, there is an issue here 
even though he is telling me I am a jerk and all those kinds of things. So there has 
certainly been situations ... where I have dealt with people I didn't like but had to · 
work harder to make sure that if there was an issue I still helped as best that I 
could.753 
Another interviewee spoke about how respondents can be equally challenging by stating: 
A particular [respondent] will react in a certain way which offends my sensibilities 
so I know and I prepare going into that that we will have to strip that down, that 
means taking 15 or 20 minutes of just obnoxious commentary and then say okay 
you got that out of your system now lets focus on the issues.754 
The reality that both complainants and respondents can be challenging to the impartiality 
of a practitioner is acknowledged in the following commentary whereby the interviewee 
demonstrates the means he uses, that is, a high degree of self-awareness and 
knowledge, to ensure the style of the difficult person does not overcome his perception of 
the substance of the matter: 
but to understand yourself and say you know what, this [complainant] is a 
bombastic .... but you know what, that [complainant] has, when all is said and 
done, a legitimate complaint about the fairness he or she has received from the 
[respondent]. A [respondent] can be closed minded, heavy handed, but at the end 
of the day there may be a legitimacy to their particular position with respect to that 
particular point. 755 
753 Interviewee G. 
754 Interviewee D. 
755 Ibid. 
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Another example was provided whereby it had been determined that the complainant had 
a valid complaint. The difficulty was that the individual's language and behaviour was so 
offensive (racist, sexist, etc.) it was very challenging to engage in any kind of interpersonal 
communication so as to move forward on the matter. In order to be able to do so, one 
interviewee gave the following explanation: 
The individual's complaint has a lot of merit but the manner in which he presents; it 
really is a big turnoff: belligerent, rude, says offensive things; even if you caution 
him he keeps going on. I have had to hang up on him a couple of times. He hasn't 
threatened me but is known to be verbally abusive. At the end of the day he's got a 
good case. So I put all that aside; focus on the issue; limit my interactions with him; 
decide how much time he should receive. I will not entertain any offensive 
language; disparaging comments about other races, individuals. I may have to 
limit him to corresponding only by mail; may not be allowed to attend at the office. I 
maintain a professional decorum at all times ... 756 
As is demonstrated in the commentary above, the common thread in the data that 
emerges from discussions about the strategies used to address bias is the high degree of 
self-awareness and discipline associated with recognizing the potential for negative bias 
. based on the manner in which an individual interacts with the Ombuds or staff. As a result, 
emphasis was placed on focusing as exclusively as is possible on the material issues 
under review and the matters in dispute so as to prevent or overcome what may be a 
. strong desire to dismiss the complaint so as to end the interaction. It is important to note 
that in describing these scenarios the 'style of interaction' or 'offending behaviours' can not 
be equated with the term of 'personality'. Rather, in this context, the values of the 
complainant or the respondent and the behaviours exhibited and attitudes espoused are 
indicative of a manner of interacting that makes it almost impossible to communicate in a 
productive manner. 
756 Interviewee S. 
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4. Identifying Triggers and Managing Reactions 
Many interviewees spoke to the importance of recognizing behaviours and 
situations that triggered a potentially partial response. One interviewee identified 'abuse of 
power' by respondents as a key trigger for her. In order to avoid jumping to an erroneous 
conclusion she has adopted an approach whereby she gives respondents the 'benefit of 
the doubt' if they don't call back in a timely manner rather than assuming they are trying to 
use their position or power in order to avoid dealing with the Ombuds. This interviewee 
said rather than assuming the person who wasn't returning my call was behaving 
inappropriately I say to myself: 
How would I address this in any other way? I wouldn't automatically assume 
because, you know, the plumber didn't answer on the first call that he was being, 
you know, elitist or arrogant. So. I can't assume that is the case with the . . . . I 
have to, you know, give him the same opportunity. I will call, a secondary call, and 
an e-mail ... You know, just know that it is there [possibly deliberately not 
responding to demonstrate power or to obstruct review] but just go about doing it 
like I woul,d in any other situation in being fair with it.757 
Another interviewee spoke about the fact that due to a great deal of time spent in reflecting 
on her reactions in an attempt to increase her self-awareness she is now very aware of the 
triggers that could overcome her desire to be impartial by saying: 
at this point I know myself well enough that I can identify the cues, those 
circumstances or those individuals that upset my own value system, my own way 
of seeing things. And I cannot change my value system and I cannot seem to 
control the upset, but I am able to identify this is one of those circumstances. 758 So 
what I do right off the bat is engage in a very active reflective self-checking 
practice. If I find that there is something about the individual or the circumstances 
that, or me, you know, if my own fatigue factor I mean you have to be aware of it, I 
will stop the relation and hand it over to someone else.759 
It is important to point out that prior to coming to the conclusion that she could not continue 
working with a complainant or respondent due to his or her offensive views or behaviour, 
757 Interviewee F. 
758 The behaviours which elicited the interviewee's reactions were sexist, racist, ageist, etc. 
759 Interviewee P. 
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this Ombuds also indicated how much time and effort was spent in challenging the 
individuals on the stereotypes that were influencing their views and had resulted in the 
biased commentary or behaviour. In some instances, it was possible through respectful 
and careful dialogue to discuss the commentary and behaviour and come to an agreement 
such that the unacceptable behaviour would not continue so that the discussion of the 
matter under review -could continue. The following words are indicative of steps that must 
be taken: 
There are times when [complainants and family members] are not acting in the 
appropriate way and they need to be called on that behaviour. In a respectful way. 
There has to be many elements to that calling but one must call the behaviour and 
one must put an end to it. And that same thing applies to [respondents].760 
It is instructive with regard to the use of this strategy that it must also be acknowledged 
that when it has not been possible to successfully challenge and prevent the continuation 
of unacceptable behaviours another individual would be asked to deal with the case to see 
if this type of behaviour could be managed differently so the complaint review process 
could be concluded successfully. 
The handing over of a complaint to a colleague is an option in Ombuds Offices with 
large staff groups but for those who are solo practitioners, other means have to be used. A 
sole practitioner who identified mental health issues as being an area where she must be 
mindful of the potential for bias to affect her approach advised that in order to ensure she 
doesn't come to a premature and erroneous conclusion because of the condition of the 
person bringing forward the complaint, she uses a number of strategies. Specifically, she 
ensures she uses a consistent standard of assessment and looks very carefully at the 
facts presented so as to truly understand the nature of the problem before determining 
how to proceed. In addition, she noted that she is also careful to demonstrate 
760 Ibid. 
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unequivocally when speaking with respondents that she will not accept a respondent's . 
immediate conclusion that the complaint must not be valid because of the complainant's 
mental health disorder. She describes the following approach as helping her (and others 
involved in the discussion) to handle this kind of scenario more appropriately and in as 
unbiased a manner as possible: 
It requires a much closer look at what you're hearing from all of the parties involved 
and hopefully, at least in [the sectors I have been involved in] all of the parties 
involved quite often come from different types of backgrounds. So you are hearing 
from people that bring a different perspective. Um and some of them will be farther 
away and some of them will be closer to what yours is, so there will be that 
challenge. Sort of being kept on your toes in looking at the process. 761 
As noted previously, the interviewees indicated that a high degree of self-awareness as to 
what your triggers are, for instance, disrespectful or obnoxious interpersonal interaction, 
racist, sexist, pro or con reactions to various religious beliefs or socio-economic class, etc., 
and/or various types of conditions is required. Following from this awareness is the 
necessity for developing and maintaining the capacity to confront offensive and 
unacceptable commentary and behaviours in a respectful and professional manner. In 
addition, the practitioner must have the reflective capacity and self-knowledge to 
determine if her bias is of the 'good' or 'bad' variety and if it is of the 'bad' variety, to 
overcome it so as to handle the complaint fairly. 
5. Develop a Malleable Mind 
The notion of setting aside an initial reaction and making yourself think more 
broadly, was also used frequently as means for aspiring to -be impartial. One interviewee 
articulated this mental activity as telling yourself to: "put that aside and be open and [then] 
wrapping your mind around a different opinion, to be malleable".762 Another individual 
761 Interviewee 0. 
762 Interviewee F. 
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spoke directly to the situation whereby the Ombuds had previous contact with an individual 
who had brought many issues forward none of which were founded. When the same 
individual brought forward another issue she did the following: "So really just trying to open 
myself up and silence the eye roll and you know those feelings and it is like, no, open my 
mind. Listen to this. Look at it as if I have never heard from this person before".763 She 
summarized this mode of thinking by describing it as having "an argument in my head"764 
whereby as soon as she recognizes her bias emerging she talks through her initial 
reaction in her head; remonstrates herself and then listens openly and carefully to the 
individual's concerns. Once again, both self-awareness and self- discipline are key 
requirements to the successful use of this technique. 
6. Begin from and Hone Empathy 
As in the Ombuds field 765 (as in other complaint handling and dispute resolution 
arenas) it is a given that many people who bring forward complaints and those who 
respond to them may also behave in an angry, hostile or unreasonable manner it is not 
surprising that many interviewees indicated that dealing with particular types of individuals 
tested their impartiality. As a result, a number of interviewees spoke about their ability to 
empathize with individuals who approached or responded to them in a rude or arrogant 
manner, whether they are complainants or respondents, as being integral to their capacity 
to be as impartial as possible. 
Examples of how Ombuds deal with this reality include comments such as: "I 
guess I can emphasize with ... a little bit and I try and put myself in their shoes and say 
763 Interviewee I. 
764 Ibid. 
765 The reality of diffictJlt, challenging or unreasonable complainants is so pervasive that the Forum of Canadian 
Ombudsman (FCO) hosted multiple day-long workshops on dealing with unreasonable complainant behaviour, in six cities 
across Canada, in 2009, 2010 and 2012, which were filled to capacity. In fact the NSW UCC Behaviour Manual and training 
program which is the platform used for these workshops begins with the premise that dealing with unreasonable people is a 
large part of the job of an Ombuds. 
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look past what they are saying and what they are throwing at you, and try to imagine 
where this is coming from".766 This desire to understand why someone is behaving in this 
fashion and continuing the conversation was supported by following this mantra: "Breathe 
deeply and dig deeply". 767 
A similar response to deal with obstructive, obnoxious or insulting behaviour was to 
" ... silently say to myself he is doing the best he can with the skills he has".768 In a similar 
vein another interviewee talked about putting more effort into getting out of his own 
comfortable world and trying to think about the issue as if he was in the same situation by 
· saying "but also working harder yourself to get, to put aside your own biases, your own 
perceptions, yourown ... [and say] what would I do if I was them".769 In the course of 
discussions about the importance of relating to individuals empathetically, it was 
articulated by a number of interviewees how important it was to recognize how different, 
and, in my view, how much more privileged, the practitioners' circumstances are from 
some of the complainants that bring forward their concerns and sorne of the respondents 
who interact with them. 
7. Effective Listening 
Not surprisingly, basic components for dealing appropriately with complainants and 
respondents that supported the highest degree of impartiality included characteristics of 
good communic.ation that would be present in any setting like: listening very carefully; 
taking notes; being mindful of asking relevant questions; and demonstrating real interest in 
each of the parties' perspectives. Another interviewee spoke about the importance of 
moving away from past training and work experience, that was very beneficial when 
766 Interviewee M; Interviewee H. 
767 Interviewee M. 
768 Interviewee B. 
769 Interviewee G. 
278 
litigating, but inhibiting in an inquisitorial process and detracted from his ability to manage 
his biases, so he had worked on " ... shutting off that part of our brain that is preparing a 
response while we are listening".770 Another interviewee spoke to being able to 
compartmentalize a suspicion of being lied to, then recognize his potential for bias and to 
listen carefully from that point forward in order to understand the issues being presented in 
this way: 
The other one is being aware of the little voice in my head that would say things 
like 'oh shut up' when someone was telling a story that I heard before and didn't 
feel that they were necessarily being truthful ... Essentially by making a point of 
becoming aware of those things when there is potentially a bias or [if] I don't like 
someone ... it's important to recognize that's the case and sort of compartmentalize 
that and then deal with the other issues. 771 
The notion of being able to recognize and then compartmentalize or seal off an 
unacceptable reaction or response and then move forward with a more open mind was 
seen to be critical to effective listening for increasing impartiality. 
8. Take the Time 
A key element of impartiality which to date, I have not heard articulated in the 
same fashion for those who aspire to be impartial in other roles is the notion that the 
Ombuds' singular role is to review and resolve complaints and only that. As a result, by 
definition, the Ombuds has greater opportunity to deal appropriately not only with the 
complexity of the issue but also with recognizing and managing triggers so as to overcome 
bias. One interviewee made the following comment: 
We have the· time. That's what we are hired to do. To take the time to do that and 
part of that time taken is to be reflective and to think well, what was my initial 
reaction? What was my initial instinct and fight to try and put that aside and to 
continue looking at the issue. I think that's part of the role, is that struggle.772 
770 Interviewee B. 
771 Interviewee J. 
772 Interviewee 0. 
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This particular insight is very important in my view as it demonstrates not only that the 
proper implementation of the Ombuds role requires dedicated effort, it is enhanced by the 
fact that this is the_ only role fulfilled by the incumbent such that the individual is not also 
teaching classes; or making far reaching logistical or financial decisions for a large 
organization; or lobbying for different funding arrangements, etc. Another interviewee 
addressed this point specifically by indicating that for respondents making decisions on 
'the front line' they may have only a few minutes to make a decision given the number of 
issues and/or people waiting in the queue, whereas the Ombuds or staff has the ability to 
spend a much longer period of time researching what the rules and regulations are and if 
there are no specific guidelines or rules in existence, the ability, via quiet contemplation, to 
think about what would be the fair route to take in particular circumstances. 
The expectation that an Ombuds will be singularly focused on handling complaints 
in order for fairn~ss to prevail is explicitly stated in many Ombuds' statutes such that the 
incumbent shall not occupy any other paid or public roles during their term in order to 
avoid real or perceived conflicts of interest. For example, for those who work in the 
organizational model of practice, an Ombuds cannot be a full voting member of the 
International Ombudsman Association (IOA) if the individual fulfills two roles 
simultaneously, (e.g. Ombuds and Ethics Officer or Ombuds and Associate Dean). 
However, these data demonstrate the reality that this expectation goes far beyond 
traditional definitions of 'conflict of interest' to providing the Ombuds with the benefit of 
sufficient time and space to thoroughly excavate her own reactions for evidence of bias or 
partiality. The analysis advanced by these interviewees regarding the advantage of having 
sufficient time and how only one mandate supports their quest for impartiality adds much 
greater richness to the importance of a singular focus. However, it is worth noting that 
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there are Ombuds roles in Canada where the incumbent is the Ombudsperson on a half or 
part time basis while fulfilling another role within the organization, (e.g. professor or 
student or Ethics officer). In these kinds of situations it was opined that specific steps 
would have to be taken to reduce the perception of the potential for conflict of interest 
given multiple working relationships and reporting relationships. Similarly, it was argued 
that it would require exceptional ability and personal credibility in order to overcome the 
potential for the perception of partiality and lack of independence given the responsibilities 
of the other role and the proximity and affiliation the Ombuds has with respondents or 
complainants in her other capacity. 
9. Turn It Upside Down 
Another interviewee described a technique which he had learned from a visual 
artist who showed him how he used a mirror to see his paintings while they were in 
progress from a different perspective. This interviewee found that he could use the same 
technique in difficult cases where his initial reaction was to assume the complaint was not 
legitimate based on the complainant's style of presentation. The need to do this could run 
the gamut from the complainant's inability to articulate her concern clearly due to various 
social factors to a degree of elitism or self regard that included disregard for normal 
responsibilities. Ultimately, by re-conceptualizing the issue presented by making himself 
look at it from a completely different perspective he was able to move forward in an 
appropriate manner. This approach, while described in less picturesque ways, was used 
by other interviewees as well to assist them to re-orient their thinking to increase their 
potential to be impartial by not allowing the style of the complainant or respondent to 
supersede the substance of the matter under review. 
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10. Sustained Effort 
While the degree of difficulty associated with aspiring to think and act impartially is 
woven throughout this commentary, it is also crucial to acknowledge the import of the 
generally held belief that constant and continuous attention to the aspiration of impartiality 
is key to the success of implementing the foregoing strategies or techniques. The following 
comment summarizes well this widely held belief: 
Well the other thing we do is that you can't have an oversight function and expect 
adherence to fairness from bureaucracies if you can't do that yourself. That seems 
trite but it [impartiality] takes a lot of work. And it is not work that is ever finished. It 
is ongoing. Human development or just reminders.773 
All of the data analyzed regarding the rationale for and the application of the foregoing 
techniques were eloquently summarized by a thoughtful practitioner in his description of 
his constant vigilance of his reactions to individuals and their stories. When he realized he 
had jumped to a premature conclusion he said he did the following: "A kind of reality 
check. Hold on, I can't draw that assumption until more information has been gathered. It 
is unfair, unprofessional. I know better".774 In addition, the interviewee observed that he 
also had the time to and benefit of being able to talk through difficult cases with a 
colleague. In working through his reaction he explained: "So talking through also helped to 
break down the bricks of whatever barriers that I may have erected, ano preconceived 
notions that I may have been entering into this matter with".775 In addition, this interviewee 
spoke to how his lengthy experience in roles that required impartiality was beneficial to 
him in many ways, and noted that notwithstanding this experience, he was also acutely 
aware of his, and in his view, everyone's ongoing potential for bias and partiality. 
773 Interviewee D. 
774 Interviewee T. 
775 Ibid. 
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The theoretical constructs that emerge from these data regarding impartiality as 
aspirational are based on the following components: an individual must have adopted 
personal values that embrace and emphasize open mindedness; have developed the 
ability to be introspective and highly evaluative of one's own reactions and performance as 
well as the time, contextual knowledge and discipline to focus on the complainants' and 
respondents' input and perspectives on the matter in dispute. The insight generated by 
these practitioners suggests further that the notion of impartiality should not be considered 
to be an essential characteristic or element or a standard operating principle that is static 
or achievable in nature. This belief challenges the unequivocal statement made in Regie 
that "While independence can be seen as a continuum, the same is not true of impartiality. 
An agency can be either impartial or biased: there is no intermediate option."776 I would 
argue that it would be much more accurate to say that an Ombuds (or the individuals who 
populate an agency or a tribunal) must make every effort to be as impartial and as 
unbiased as possible. It will likely come as no surprise that two interviewees had already 
moved beyond the notion of impartiality as an absolute or a commodity that one acquires 
upon appointment to a role by promoting the view that impartiality should more realistically 
be known as a 'best practice'. This kind of terminology evokes the notion that the capacity 
to act as impartially as possible results from knowledge, skill and experience . when 
compared to bench marks established informally in a collegial manner or in conjunction 
with or imposed by an external body. 
Notwithstanding the insight generated by these interviewees, given how closely 
connected impartiality is to the perception of fairness, the notion of 'best practice' does not 
convey to me the degree of rigour, import and personal commitment that I see as being 
776 Regie, supra note 335 at 7. 
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necessary in this context. In contrast, another interviewee descri.bed impartiality as " ... an 
imperative ... "777 which I believe has more standing and is a more compelling expectation. 
Given that 'imperative' when used as a noun, is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary 
as "Demanding obedience, execution, action, etc.; that must be done or performed; 
urgent; of the nature of a duty; obligatory", 778 this term in my view is a more accurate 
demonstration of what aspiring to impartiality requires. As the data reveal that striving for 
impartiality requires a high level of continuous attention and activity, both intellectual and 
behavioural in nature, this commitment to skill development so as to operate at as 
sophisticated a level as possible, is only realistic, in my view, if it is seen to be an 
indisputable obligation. Clearly, while impartiality for an Ombuds is a 'duty' that is imposed 
on the practitioner by the construction of the role whether it be by statute or policy, it also a 
'duty' the practitioner must personally adopt and embrace as is evidenced by the personal 
commitment required for the constant self examination needed for continuous 
improvement espoused by many interviewees. By accepting impartiality as an imperative 
the practitioner must also commit to continuous skill development. Therefore, I am positing 
that 'imperative' is a much more accurate and powerful descriptor for the aspiration to 
impartiality than is the use of terms like 'best practice' or 'guiding principle' or 'essential 
characteristic'. 
As the data demonstrate that impartiality is not a characteristic that is static, I 
would argue that depending on how self-aware the practitioner is, how meaningful 
impartiality is to the practitioner, and how much effort is expended, the greater potential 
there is to become more highly evolved and therefore more effective in this area. While to 
do so requires constant attention it appears that in some situations, as the social 
777 Interviewee D. 
778 Oxford English Dictionary Oxford University Press, 2011 online: Oxford English Dictionary <http://www.oed.com>. 
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psychology research provided earlier suggests, it becomes easier with frequency and 
longevity. However, as is demonstrated by this interview data, intense and lengthy effort 
should not be seen as a cure-all as one must be mindful of the fact that interviewees with 
many years of experience spoke to the continuing difficulty inherent in overcoming biases 
and stereotypes. Therefore, it is axiomatic that Ombuds (and by extension ADR 
practitioners and adjudicators) have to be careful not to be complacent and to think that 
because they are both experienced and committed to the imperative of impartiality that 
they are aware of and catch every trigger so as to recognize and overcome every biased 
or stereotypical thought. Consequently, I would agree that impartiality as an aspiration in 
addition to being an imperative for an Ombuds can also be seen as comparable to being 
highly motivated to change a destructive behaviour. Specifically, the Ombuds must have 
the desire to think and behave as impartially as possible and, I would argue, equally 
importantly, the requisite skills to effect t_he necessary changes. Subsequently as noted 
earlier, being as impartial as possible is more akin to developing a skill than it is to 
acquiring knowledge or making a commitment to a particular set of values as the 
intellectual efforts and behaviours leading to impartiality have to be constantly refined in 
order to be successfully implemented. Notwithstanding the fact that a particular type of 
personality may be better suited to striving for impartiality than others, the data reveal the 
reality that the capacity to be as impartial as possible requires continuous effort and 
attention. While I would argue that total or perfect impartiality is never attainable or 
achievable I contend that the data shows that it is reasonable to aspire to be impartial and 
to actually demqnstrate a high degree of impartiality in many situations if an Om buds (or 
other dispute resolution practitioner) is highly motivated to do so and develops and 
maintains the requisite intellectual and behavioural skills. 
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In examining the debate around the viability of impartiality one must also look at 
the term of 'neutral' as it is often equated with 'impartial' or used to define impartiality. 
However, the majority of the interviewees concluded that 'neutral' and 'impartial' have 
different meanings. However, within this view there was a spectrum of opinions in that 
some interviewees were adamant these terms had very different meanings whereas 
others thought while they were different they were still pretty close in meaning. In 
opposition to these views, one interviewee indicated that she had thought about these 
terms extensively and came to the conclusion that 'impartiality', 'neutrality' and 'unbiased' 
all had the same meaning and had determined there was no benefit to be had in any 
further debate about the matter. Other interviewees were much more equivocal in that 
they thought the terms were close in some ways but in others were dramatically different. 
As was identified in the earlier discussion of the challenges to impartiality in Chapter 
Three, the majority of interviewees were of the view it was impossible to be neutral as 
opposed to something one could strive for or aspire to as was the case with impartiality. I 
wondered if there might be a notable difference between people who were trained and 
practiced as lawyers and non-lawyers, given that the professional education of lawyers 
would be very similar versus the many different types of professional education 
represented within the group of interviewees who are not lawyers. Interestingly, 33% of the 
interviewees who had trained and practiced as lawyers thought the terms had the same 
meaning and for the most part had not considered the question before. However, when 
they started to think about whether or not there was a difference or whether these terms 
were synonyms, their comments suggested their interpretations became less 
straightforward as a result of thinking about what the terms actually meant. In contrast, 
65% of the interviewees who were not trained as lawyers thought 'neutrality' and 
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'impartiality' had very different connotations and had given the examination of the meaning 
of the two concepts significant attention as part of their thinking about how they perform 
their jobs. 
One example of the definition of 'neutral' provided by an interviewee was that it 
meant not caring about the parties to a dispute which was anathema to his view of the 
proper implementation of his role. Another interviewee, who is a lawyer, made the same 
distinction between these two terms but for a different reason. He said: 
You cannot be neutral because in the face of injustice, being neutral means being 
indifferent. In the face of seeing something wrong that you should address, ask 
someone to correct or even make a proposal for a solution to redress the injustice, 
being neutral means at the limit, being passive. 779 
In this individual's opinion being neutral meant not fulfilling the role of Ombuds properly as 
to be neutral wou.ld mean not addressing unfairness. 
Another interviewee who is not a lawyer defined 'neutral' as not having any 
personal opinions or being affected by past experiences that are similar to or remind you 
of what you are currently addressing. Her view was that " ... Truly neutral would require that 
you would just be so new or fresh to a situation you don't carry any related baggage".780 In 
her view this was impossible and therefore should not be used in connection with the role 
of Ombuds and the approaches used. It is instructive to learn that a number of 
interviewees indicated that over time they had come to the conclusion through thinking 
about how their role should be described that they would no longer use the terms of 
'neutral' or 'neutrality' to describe the role or the manner in which the work is done as they 
now saw it as being a wholly inaccurate descriptor. 
779 Interviewee K. 
780 Interviewee 0. 
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Conversely, another individual expanded on the notion of 'neutral' by specifically 
describing it as a feeling about a situation or an issue, that is, you cared about it or you 
didn't or as a response to reviewing a particular situation, by saying: "Or in a case where, 
... there is misunderstanding, really obvious misunderstanding, I find those situations 
easier to be neutral. The clearer, I suppose the clearer the case, the more neutral. .. You 
feel neutral about it or you don't."781 This description provides more food for thought in that 
it is possible the reason for the interviewee not caring about a dispute is that the issues 
brought forward were not important to her which could be due to a different form of bias. 
Whereas the majority point of view was that it is impossible to be neutral in that all that an 
individual has experienced and learned can not be excised from one's psyche prior to 
looking at an issue consistent with the interpretation articulated by Justices Mclachlin and 
Heureux-Dube in R. D.S. 782 
Another interviewee who is also a lawyer made the type of distinction that has 
been identified by mediators in the development of the term of 'equidistance'783 by stating: 
There are times when I would argue that you need to be less than completely 
neutral. And I use those words "in order to be impartial". So if there is a power 
imbalance in the parties in negotiations you may consciously you know shift 
yourself to the less empowered person in order to make sure that there is 
impartiality of the process. 784 
While not articulated in the same manner as described above, a number of interviewees 
spoke to the power differential that is often in play between the complainant and the 
respondent and the seminal role that an Ombuds plays in attempting to provide balance or 
781 Interviewee H. 
782 R.D.S., supra note 397. 
783 J.Rifken, J. Millen & S. Cobb, supra note 394 at 152- 153. 
784 Interviewee B. 
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'level the playing field' between disputants who occupy dramatically different social 
locations. 
Another individual who distinguished between these two terms saw impartiality as 
recognizing and overcoming biases but said: 
Neutrality I think I view a little bit different because I can have those biases or 
perceptions of bias but yet can still be neutral in my decision-making. So that's how 
I would kind of separate the two. So I can still have those biases but ... remain 
neutral in my decision ... 785 
The difficulty with this view is that no explanation was provided for how the inherent biases 
acknowledged by the interviewee were separated so they had no impact on her judgment. 
Perhaps, though, it's reasonable to assume that an experienced and self-conscious 
practitioner would be relying on the various strategies described earlier and therefore 
would see no need to explain how the separation referred to was achieved or maintained. 
The data have demonstrated that initially a number of interviewees saw 'neutrality' 
and 'impartiality' as synonyms whereas when they thought about these terms even a little 
bit they made fine and/or significant distinctions. In contrast, other interviewees stated 
unequivocally these terms were synonyms and had no interest in breaking them down. 
Interestingly, the manner in which some of the interviewees' engaged in this area of 
discussion telegraphed to me that they saw the similarity or dissimilarity of these terms as 
so obvious that they queried internally why would anyone be interested in comparing and 
contrasting them. I had the impression that the initial reaction for some interviewees was: 
Why waste your time thinking about this when it's so obvious they are the same or for 
others, it is so obvious that they are not at all comparable. It is instructive, as noted earlier, 
that one interviewee had thought about the terms in an in-depth and painstaking manner 
and came up with 'yes, they are the same' while other interviewees concluded after 
785 Interviewee Y. 
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lengthy service in their respective roles and consideration of how they should be 
described, that 'neutral' and 'impartial' had completely different meanings. 
The theoretical direction that the data has lead me to is that when the majority of 
prac;;titioners are challenged to think about what neutrality and impartiality mean they 
identify differences and the majority would agree with the majority SCC opinion in R. D.S. 
on this matter. This development is important as it strikes me as being crucial for 
practitioners to be very precise when using the terms of 'neutrality' and 'impartiality' so that 
they don't give the wrong impression to complainants and respondents, and discredit the 
role of Ombuds or the incumbent, as those they interact"with may have also thought about 
the viability of neutrality and have rejected it. 
Analysis of the Construct of Independence 
The interview data demonstrate that the broad continuum of structural 
independence that spans from traditional arenas of dispute resolution, such as courts of 
; 
law, to administrative tribunals to various ADR processes like arbitration and mediation, is 
also readily evident within the Ombuds community. Specifically, within the Ombuds world 
there is a lengthy gamut moving from those roles that have a very high degree of structural 
independence to identically named roles that have virtually no structural independence. 
Strikingly, within this niche area of dispute resolution, there is also variation within the 
enabling legislation underlying various Ombuds roles that generally speaking provides a 
high degree of structural independence. For instance, different degrees of traditional 
contributors to independence can be found on an individual basis within statutes, (e.g. 
length of term, and whether the term is renewable and if so, what type of renewal 
mechanism should be used; as well as the processes required for auditing the financial 
records). Much more dramatic and significant differences were evident between Om buds 
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offices established within private and public sector organizations founded by policy or 
terms of reference or different types of governmental tools. Not surprisingly, the offices 
that do not have a legislative base have a much lower level of traditional indicia of 
structural independence. However, while the structural protections (or lack of) are 
idiosyncratic it is most notable that for virtually all interviewees while structural 
independence is recognized as being ideal, in the final analysis, it was the majority opinion 
that it is the mindset of the incumbent that determines whether or not the Office is actually 
independent, regardless of how it was established. In addition, many Ombuds with very 
low standards of structural independence, demonstrated a high degree of confidence in 
the strength of their capacity to handle situations as they saw fit with no external influence 
and to make wide ranging and/or specific recommendations without the security and 
protection provided by traditional forms of structural 'independence'. It seems reasonable 
to accept these interviewees' assessment as being truthful and accurate for their situations 
as they readily acknowledged the potential for the opposite perception to prevail for those 
who were not familiar with their work. 
Another factor that it is relevant to this discussion is that it appears that those who 
apply for the position of Ombuds which is set up on a defined term basis, have already 
accepted the fad that regardless of how well they fulfill the role, it is by definition a time 
limited role. If the term is renewable it must also be recognized that many variables can 
affect whether Ombuds are renewed regardless of the incumbent's effectiveness. As 
result, I would argue that those who apply for Ombuds roles are acutely aware of the 
inherent lack of long-term job security and perhaps by virtue of self-selection, are more 
independent by nature. 
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Definitions of Independence 
By way of foundation for this discussion, all interviewees made comments that 
indicated they had accepted traditional definitions of independence by providing 
commentary like: "Independence is the ability to act and speak without threat of 
consequences to my position";786 "Independence is the ability to undertake the mandate of 
the office without political or bureaucratic interference";787 "A Chinese wall788 between us 
and the administration"; 789 "Free to say and do and act in a way that you feel is appropriate 
given your mandate, without fear of ... reprisals";790 "The operational independence to go 
look at those issues as we see fit and to not have dictated us where we should go or 
where we should~'t go in terms of our examinations"; 791 "Excluded from the hierarchy of 
... and from all of its bureaucracy and governance issues".792 The notion of operational 
freedom was expressed by "No second guessing."793 and "A finality of some kind".794 One 
interviewee took the 'distance' metaphor a step further and posited the belief that 
"Independence is the distance795 between yourself and an institution, .the person or a 
subject that allows you to be perfectly impartial and fair''.796 Given historical antecedents 
and the judicial opinions cited earlier, and the traditional view that structural 
independences is the foundation for impartiality, it was surprising that only two of the 
786 Interviewee H. 
787 Interviewee D. 
788
1 am aware that the use of this term is not acceptable as noted by Justice Low 'The term has an ethnic focus which many 
would consider a subtle form of linguistic discrimination. Certainly, the continued use of the term would be insensitive to the 
ethnic identity of the many persons of Chinese descent. Modern courts should not perpetuate the biases which creep into 
language from outmoded, and more primitive, ways of thought." in Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Superior Court 200 
Cal.App.3d 272, 293-294, 245 Cal.Rptr. 873, 887-888 (1988). I have observed through conversation that an alternative term 
now in use is 'ethical wall'. 
789 Interviewee E. 
790 Interviewee G. 
791 Interviewee M. 
792 Interviewee W. 
793 Ibid. 
794 Interviewee A. 
795 I have the impression 'distance' in this instance included both physical and psychological dimensions. 
796 Interviewee C. 
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twenty interviewees, with dramatically different degrees of structural independence in 
comparison to one another, indicated they predicated their capacity for impartiality on 
these structural underpinnings. In contrast, the vast majority of the practitioners indicated 
that structu.ral independence in and of itself does not ensure a high degree of impartiality. 
With exception to the two references to legislated or policy-driven independence 
providing for impartiality, the other interviewees' descriptions of their understanding and 
demonstrations of independence were multiple and diverse in orientation. To begin, the 
two most predictaple and obvious distinctions made were 'de jure' [by law] independence 
and 'de facto' [by practice] independence. The traditional trappings that provide for de jure 
independence included being established by legislation; being appointed for a term of 
reasonable duration, 797 rather than serving 'at pleasure' of the appointing body; tabling 
annual and special reports with a legislature or Parliament, or governing council or board 
of directors, instead of to an elected official or senior government or organizational leader; 
the ability to initiate own motion inquiries and/or investigations; the ability to determine 
procedures for handling cases; receiving a fixed budget allocation (with no further 
involvement from the funder other than meeting the requirement to report on activities on a 
regular and timely manner); and the ability and the responsibility to issue public reports 
with no requirement to acquire prior approval of a report or the conclusions and 
recommendations contained within it in advance of releasing it publicly. 798 These kinds of 
protections were interpreted by the interviewees to mean that Ombuds in these 
circumstances experienced no interference with the way they implemented their 
mandates, (e.g. how the office was organized; how investigations and other complaint 
797 The ideal length of term was identified as five to seven years. However, some terms were renewable and some were not. 
798 In some instances the courtesy of advance notice of the dissemination of a report is provided. However, given the manner 
in which Ombuds reports are developed, the content of the report should not be a surprise to the respondent or legislature or 
organization when it is released. 
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resolution activities were undertaken; and how monies were allocated for appropriate 
delivery of services) other than the requirement to report on the activities undertaken by 
the Office on at least an annual basis and to demonstrate fiscal accountability. 
The notion of de jure independence was often characterized by the interviewees 
as providing for easily articulated and recognizable distance from elected officials, civil 
service employees and the institutions they oversee. As noted above, reference was also 
made to the importance of 'distance' from subject matter as well by one interviewee. 
However, this kinq of distance is difficult to imagine unless one is referring to the actual 
machinations, such as the policy-making or decision-making processes, that lead to the 
subject matter becoming a point of contention. One interviewee expanded on that notion 
by making the point that independence should not be construed to mean that you are so 
far removed from the jurisdiction or the place and time in which you work, " that you live in 
a monastery somewhere and you don't know what eBay is ... ".799 
Another interviewee indicated that a very high degree of structural independence 
gives the incumbent both "peace of mind"800 and the ability to "speak [his] mind" 801 in an 
appropriate and respectful way. However, it was observed by a number of interviewees 
that there is no absolute freedom in any situation, as even with a very high degree of 
structural independence economic forces may result in changed circumstances. For 
instance, large budget cuts due to austerity programs are applied to many government 
and organizationally funded entities. This has in fact happened for many Ombuds offices 
over the years and could not be avoided regardless of the high level of structural 
independence in place. It is also worthy of note that a change of leadership in a 
799 Interviewee A. 
800 Interviewee K. 
801 Ibid. 
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government or an organization could result in the respective enabling legislation or policy 
or terms of reference being amended or even repealed. In addition, it must also be 
emphasized that a high degree of structural independence does riot prevent an individual 
who does not want to 'rock the boat' by virtual of personality or long term career 
aspirations or who is very positively disposed toward a particular government, union or 
management group's modus operandi, from adopting a passive or even sycophantic role. 
One could also imagine that some Ombuds could be similarly inclined as some judges are 
as speculated by Lawrence Baum to communicate in such a fashion so as to please 
particular audiences. 
It was also observed by some interviewees that in some jurisdictions with very 
small populations or in relatively small organizations, even though all the requisite formal 
structures may be in place for a high degree of independence, it may not be feasible to 
actually be independent of all issues and the individuals involved. By virtue of working in 
such a location, it, is often impossible not to know the parties or someone who knows them 
well or to have been exposed to the issue being brought to your attention as a complaint in 
other ways beforehand. Therefore, in these scenarios, it was advanced that the 
independent mindset and the capacity to think and act impartially are much more 
important than the existence of formal or de jure structural protections. However, the 
strength of one of the formal trappings of structural independence, that being, the inability 
for the Ombuds to be fired without a very good reason like personal misconduct, was 
identified as being useful for providing a tangible indicator of the high degree of separation 
between the Ombuds and the appointing body when a complainant queried whether the 
Ombuds Office was actually an independent entity. 
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Another interviewee who had experience in a number of different Ombuds settings 
noted that the size of the organization also has implications for the perception of 
independence in a different way. Within a very large organization, it was observed that it 
is much more difficult for potential critics to say the Ombuds is closely affiliated with 
someone or some unit as the number of possible affiliations is so vast; whereas in a 
smaller organization, the Ombuds has to be much more vigilant not to be seen to be too 
closely connected or affiliated with particular individuals or a unit of the organization simply 
by virtue of proximity to a particular location. As was stated by Justice L'Heureux-Dube in 
Regie, one interviewee recalled that independence is required but is not all that is needed 
for impartiality to prevail. 802 In fact many interviewees shared this core belief but 
reinterpreted it to refer to de facto rather than the de jure independence as envisioned by 
the Supreme Court jurists. 
It is noteworthy that the overwhelming feedback from the majority of the 
interviewees who had very little structural independence demonstrated unequivocally that 
they believed they could be and were seen to be extremely independent. In fact, it was 
stated by some individuals that if they felt any attempt to compromise their operational 
independence they would not be able to continue in the role. In addition, an interviewee 
with the highest degree of structural independence commented that he thought those 
without that protection could still operate as independently as he does by virtue of the 
Ombuds' personal approach.803 As is demonstrated by the commentary of many of the 
802 Regie, supra note 335. 
803 To date, I am not aware of an Ombuds being terminated prior to the expiration of the term in Canada for unpopular 
actions, views or reports. However, there have been occasions where Ombuds have not been renewed when their terms 
ended, e.g. Federal Ombudsman for Victims of Crime, Steve Sullivan (201 O); Veterans Ombudsman, Pat Strogan (2010). In 
the case of the Veterans Ombudsman role it was acknowledged by the federal government that the length of the term was 
too short and it was extended from three to five years when Guy Parent was appointed as the second Veterans Ombudsman; 
and the Yukon territory Ombudsman was not renewed in 2012 for a second five year term. In contrast, high profile Ombuds 
who have issued scathing reports have been renewed to fulfill a second term, i.e. Ontario Ombudsman, Saskatchewan 
Ombudsman, BC Ombudsperson, Newfoundland and Labrador Ombudsman. 
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interviewees, it is their belief that the personal commitment to and their ability to think and 
act as impartially as possible so not to be influenced im.properly is significantly more 
important than various forms of legislated or organizationally structured distance. 
The expectations for and descriptions of de facto independence, that is working in 
an independent manner without any structural protections, or as one interviewee coined as 
"working without a net" 804, were very similar to those provided by those who enjoyed de 
jure independenc~. It was frequently stated that it is ultimately the individual who occupies 
the position who determines and demonstrates whether the Ombuds mandate will be 
I 
implemented in a'1 independent manner. Notwithstanding this important personal 
characteristic, it was also recognized that to have structural protections in place for 
creating a high degree of independence certainly made it easier to assert independence to 
those whose understanding of independence was tangible in nature. Concrete examples 
that emerged as indicators that both contributed to, but ironically, depending on the 
circumstances, could also have a deleterious effect on the notion of independence are 
analyzed next. 
1. Reporting Relationships 
For Ombuds who are paid for their services directly by the organization for which 
they had oversight, an interesting criterion for creating independence was identified as the. 
personal view or understanding of the Chair or President or Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
as to what actually constituted independence. Those individuals who indicated they felt no 
pressure of any kind described relationships that were respectful and separated from the . 
executive function while knowing they had the full confidence of the person to whom they 
ultimately reported from an administrative perspective. Clearly this finding has important 
804 Interviewee Q. 
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implications for the establishment of Ombuds roles and the import of the approach taken 
by organizational leaders to demonstrate to others in the organization that the role should 
be as independent of all other roles as is possible. In addition, though, one interviewee 
spoke to the benefit that the CEO's deferred authority added to the respect for the 
Om buds role. As with many complex issues, that which can be very beneficial in one area 
can also ultimately be a detractor. For example, if the CEO who expresses such 
confidence in the Ombuds was also perceived to control the Ombuds' activities, that would 
be the death knell of de facto independence. However, if, as was the case in the scenario 
described, the CEO expressed high regard for the role and the work of the incumbent as 
well as articulating the commitment to and the importance of the Ombuds being wholly 
independent of the management hierarchy, the message delivered was ideal. To 
demonstrate the lengths that some CEOs went to in order to ensure as a high degree of 
independence as possible, some interviewees noted that mechanisms had been put into 
place to provide for the review of complaints about the President or CEO's actions using 
alternative means, that being, those that are separate and apart from the most senior 
employee such as addressing the complaint directly with the Board of Directors or a 
comparably constituted body. This kind of arrangement is presumably an attempt to 
parallel the right that legislative Ombuds have to bring an unresolved issue to the attention 
of a legislature while recognizing that the constituencies involved and the governance 
structures are very different in nature. 
2. Collaborative Relationships 
Some additional examples of contributors to independence which may be 
surprising given the foregoing commentary and conventional markers of independent 
bodies include the importance of respectful and collaborative relationships with service 
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providers and potential respondents. One interviewee who enjoys a very high degree of de 
jure independence noted that: 
The other part of independence for me is, I believe that part of independence is 
that I can have ongoing and good communication with ... officials as well. I think 
some might say independence means the less communication the better, but in my 
mind I think I need to have that kind of interaction and again you can't have that if 
you feel there isn't going to be independence. 805 
Other interviewees reiterated this point of view by discussing the importance of having 
forthright and informal conversations to resolve individual complaints in a way that could 
only be accomplished by having a mutually respectful and collaborative approach. A very 
similar point of view was expressed by other interviewees who indicated that it was 
consistent with their high degree of independence, either de facto or de jure, to also work 
with representatives of the organization, institution or government to identify and correct 
system-wide or systemic problems quickly and informally. Working within this conceptual 
framework, distar,ce is not the epitome of the gold standard for independence. Rather, it is 
the capacity to bridge the distance between Ombuds and respondent in such a fashion so 
as to maintain an independent outlook and status while solving problems informally and 
expeditiously in a cordial806 and respectful manner. Taking a slightly different tack on the 
same subject, another interviewee connected the importance of working with respondents 
in a constructive manner to impartiality rather than independence. However the outcome 
was the same in' that he observed "One has to, one can be impartial but one also has to 
be aware that you can't do your job making enemies wherever you go. That will impact 
ultimately your ability to be there for the complainant community as a whole".807 This 
605 Interviewee B. 
606 It is instructive that when I had this discussion with the interviewee and the term 'cordial' was raised we discussed how 
these relationships evolved and I made use of the term 'friendly' as a paraphrase of the discussion. Interestingly, the 
interviewee made a point of correcting me to say that 'cordial' was a more accurate descriptor of the nature of the interaction 
than 'friendly'. 
607 Interviewee T. 
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comment underscores the daily realities of attempting to resolve disputes with a wide 
variety of parties and those with whom an Ombuds or staff will be in touch with repeatedly 
due to the volume or nature of the issues received or a particular respondent's wide span 
of control. In those kinds of situations the Ombuds and staff can not be regarded with 
enmity or disputes would not be resolved informally and the Ombuds would be rendered 
ineffective as respondents would not engage in an enthusiastic way to resolve disputes, 
rather they could avoid contact or at worst stonewall. If this type of dynamic developed the 
only way to fulfill the Ombuds' mandate would be to go forward on all issues in a 
formalistic and potentially adversarial manner and the success achieved through early 
resolution activities which are so much the norm for Ombuds work would be lost. 
One interviewee indicated that the work of the Office had been enhanced by the 
following belief system: 
Our work is more effective when we are welcomed in that we are not seen as 
some sort of finger pointers or blamers. You know I am not coming to find blame 
here. I just, you know, I am going to point out that this is an issue here and I 
repeatedly say, ... that we have the same goal, to make the system better.808 
A similar perspective was enunciated in the following manner: 
The independence certainly helps but I think the independence and the respectful 
relationship go hand in hand. I think [the respondent] has to know that for that 
level of interaction to work, [the respondent] needs to know that we are not out 
there intentionally trying to embarrass them. That it is not our goal just to look 
backward, find fault and assign blame. We are there to make the delivery of the 
public service better.809 
Another interviewee emphasized a similar sentiment by indicating that her approach is not 
" ... about finding fault and error and then the things that might result from that, 
compensation, penalty, public humiliation, whatever it is. It is not about that. It is about 
808 Interviewee A. 
809 Interviewee W. 
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finding instances where there are opportunities to improve ... ".810 This interviewee also 
indicated that her approach was predicated on recommendations being formulated in a 
fashion such that " ... improvements should take place so that they are meaningful and 
genuine and reflective of the core issues, values, concerns, of the complaint originally".811 
Hence when recommendations were made, great care was taken to demonstrate a full 
understanding of the essence of the issue and to emphasize education and development 
of the respondent rather than punishment of a perpetrator, while recognizing that 
disciplinary action could be recommended when appropriate. All interviewees identified the 
importance of making credible recommendations that addressed both individual concerns 
and contributed to system-wide or systemic improvements, whether they did so after an 
investigation had been undertaken or by raising an issue informally and simply talking it 
through in order to achieve fair and expeditious outcomes. 
Another Ombuds made a similar comment in observing that the object of the 
exercise from his perspective is to improve service and not to try to embarrass, vilify or 
assign blame. Rather, in his opinion, the Ombuds role is in place for improving the delivery 
of services both in specific instances and on a general basis. Concomitantly, the style of 
interaction used and recommendations made flow from that orientation rather than from an 
adversarial and punitive approach. Another interviewee illustrated his similar belief in the 
following manner: 
I don't believe an Ombudsperson can perform his or her duties by being too 
aggressive and just plumbing everyone over the head so to speak. There has to 
be a middle ground. Facilitation. Bringing parties together, because I think there 
are greater changes or greater possibility of change through an air of co-operation. 
Convincing the respondent, and hence the complainant, that to consider such a 
path will benefit them and the [community served] as a whole. 812 
810 Interviewee P. 
811 Ibid. 
812 Interviewee T. 
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Another interviewee commented in a like manner by stating that "everyone has a different 
approach and I think we all rely on our strengths and part of it for me is the interpersonal 
relationships that allow me to have those candid and sometimes informal conversations 
that still get results;'.813 Clearly, from the majority of interviewees' perspectives, and based 
on my own experience in a wide variety of 0111buds settings, respectful collaborative 
activity is a key element of the Ombuds role and complements rather than compromises 
both de facto and de jure independence. 
3. Generalist vs. Specialist 
One interviewee raised the unique point of view that as an Ombuds of general 
jurisdiction - whether it is for a governmental jurisdiction or an organization - the Ombuds 
often had to address many different types of issues without the benefit of being an expert 
or a specialist in any particular area, other than in fairness. The sense is that this fact 
contributed to both the perception of and actual independence. For instance, as a result of 
not having engineers investigating complaints related to engineering faults, or health 
professionals investigating complaints about the minutiae of a particular medical 
procedure, it was much easier to demonstrate that the review was truly independent as the 
emphasis was on proper process being undertaken rather than on the technicalities of a 
particular matter, This is a provocative view with respect to hiring decisions as some 
organizations have decided that an Ombuds must have subject matter expertise, (e.g. 
professor or senior student for Ombuds in higher education). Similarly, the same approach 
has been taken with particular Ombuds roles where the focus is specialized, (e.g. The 
Veterans' Ombudsman is a veteran; the Victims of Crime Ombudsman has background in 
criminology; the various Ombudspersons for law societies in Canada are all lawyers and 
813 Interviewee D. 
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members of their respective law society.) Similarly, bank Ombudsman are always drawn 
from the individual banks' employee group, as is the case with media Ombuds roles. It will 
require further research to determine whether a generalist or a specialist is better prepared 
to be and seen to be independent of the subject matter brought forward for review. 
4. Social Interaction 
An example of how some Ombuds maintain their independence is to be seen not 
to be privy to 'insider talk'. This is often achieved by being located some physical distance 
away from or in separate premises from the executive offices or as expressed by one 
interviewee, being far removed from the "mother ship".814 In a similar vein, another 
interviewee talked about the importance she ascribed to consistently demonstrating she 
had no social interaction with employees of the organization by never attending 
organizational events that had a social component, (e.g. retirement parties, holiday meals, 
etc.). In complete opposition to that view, another Ombuds indicated how important it was 
to her to attend organizational events of this nature in order to raise awareness of the work 
of the Office. In her view, not to attend events of this nature and the informal opportunities 
they provide for contact with a wide range of individuals would be a valuable opportunity 
lost for ensuring potential users of the service were aware of its existence and scope. 
Similarly, in her experience based on information requested of key informants, polite social 
interaction had not compromised the perception of either complainants or respondents or, 
in her own assessment, the reality of the independence of her role and her approach.· 
Once again, opposite points of view on the same variable were articulated by thoughtful 
and experienced practitioners. I would argue that these points of views are indicative of 
the constant tension an Ombuds must deal with regardless of where the role is located. 
814 Interviewee W. 
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Ultimately, the decision on how much contact or how little contact is appropriate, (outside 
of the complaint handling process), must be made on a case-by-case basis. 
5. Funding and Employee Status 
For those Ombuds who were employees of an organization, many, but not all, 
commented on how the fact they were paid by the organization had been raised as a 
concern by some people who were seeking a review of their concern or complaint. Some 
interviewees indicated that they used humour to address this kind of comment by saying 
something to the effect that they were not being paid enough to be untruthful and by 
explaining openly the nature of their employment relationship. In many cases, the 
interviewees were of the view they had been able, both by virtue of their candour and how 
they handled the file, to overcome any preliminary or lingering perceptions of a lack of 
independence. Two interviewees were incredulous about what they deemed to be .the 
unreasonable expectation that if an Ombuds received financial compensation for their 
work from an organization or from a government body that they had compromised their 
rndependence. One responded to this belief by providing the explanation that "I'm not the 
fairy of fairness who volunteers my time".815 Another interviewee echoed this view by 
stating how he had taken pains in various interactions with potential complainants and 
respondents to niake the following point: "I don't work for free".816 Other interviewees took 
a different approach and countered this concern when raised by complainants by 
explaining that they were not decision-makers for the organization and were not part of the 
management hierarchy. One interviewee said some Ombuds she had encountered had 
suggested that in order to be independent " ... you can only work off-site if you are going to 
815 Interviewee F. 
816 Interviewee K. 
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be independent and give me a cell phone and pay me through PayPal". 817 She was 
flummoxed by that this notion as it appears those Ombuds who espoused such a definition 
of independence were not taking into account the fact that financial compensation was still 
being provided by the appointing body regardless of how it was delivered to the 
incumbent. 
The belief of inherent dependence that derives from being paid by a governmental 
or organizational entity in some fashion for delivering a service are confounding to me as 
they relate to Ombuds as it is well known that the judiciary and administrative tribunal 
members in Canada, all of whom are appointed by the government of the day, are also 
paid with governm.ent funds. The high degree of structural independence articulated for 
the terms of employment for the judiciary in Valente 818 no doubt supports the confidence 
that is shown by s.ome in the untouchable status of judges. Nonetheless, it is still 
surprising to me that the origin of the financial compensation is considered to be an 
indicator of 'dependence' as some Ombuds employed by organizations are even more 
independent than. judges with respect to administrative matters in that they are able to hire 
and supervise all of their own staff and determine their employees' remuneration and 
duties as well as the location of their physical premises without any input from the funder. 
In addition, some Ombuds have their compensation established in such a fashion that the 
per annum rate rises on a percentage basis without any involvement from any party so as 
to remove any perception that the Ombuds' compensation is tied to performing in such a 
way so as to please the funder(s). Similarly, some interviewees spoke to the fact that the 
financial penalty the organization would have to bear for firing them as a result of 
disagreeing with a report or recommendation, was so significant that it served as a strong 
817 Interviewee F. 
818 Valente, supra note 664. 
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deterrent to any interference. One Om buds referred to this deterrent as 'condo clause', 819 
which was often used to illustrate to constituents why the employer would not intrude on 
the Ombuds' independence and allay any fears they had about the Ombuds' willingness to 
take a controversial issue forward. 
Some other interviewees spoke to the fact that since they could only be terminated 
for personal misconduct, they saw this as adequate protection against any potential for 
reprisal or retaliation for actions taken or recommendations made. One interviewee took 
another approach by explaining that the conclusion that employee status lead to lack of 
independence was countered by this recitation of how the role had been established: 
the fact that the creation of an Ombuds in an organization, was done willfully with 
no constraints. It was not ordered or mandated by a Court of anything. It was an 
undertaking of the organization after years of discussions and consultations. It 
was some sort of bet that the organization took on itself. To be successful with a 
sense of direction and then you have to be able to say, sure they are serious. If 
· they say they are going to do. it, we trust that they are going to do it [properly] ... 820 
However, a sceptic may assume that the act of establishing an Ombuds role is solely 
driven by a desire to mollify complaints rather than to ensure the organization is operating 
fairly. This assumption can be mitigated by the fact that all organizations receive 
complaints and not all organizations establish Ombuds roles. As a result, it strikes me as 
being believable that a progressive organization would embrace the concept of an 
Ombuds solely for the purpose it is intended, which is to address unfairness and receive 
negative feedback via an organized and independent process. 
Other interviewe.es commented on the manner in which the funding is 
funnelled for the ~peration of the Ombuds Office as being very important to the perception 
and reality of independence. For instance, in some instances, the funding may be split 
819 Interviewee K. In this instance the payout the employer would be required to make for ending the contract prematurely was 
the equivalent of the purchase price for an expensive condominium. 
820 Ibid. 
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between a number of different bodies and sources of funding, and this configuration 
increased the perception and actuality of independence. It was the interviewees' view that 
the likelihood of one entity being able to influence the other to pull the Office's funding in 
order to reduce its effectiveness or terminate the Ombuds was virtually non-existent. As a 
result, the perception and the reality of the independent nature of both the role itself and 
the appointee were dramatically increased by equal funding from different entities. 
In contrast to the foregoing examples, one interviewee who had lengthy 
experience in the Ombuds field generally noted categorically that when occupying an 
organizational Ombuds role, complainants do not accept the fact that the Ombuds is 
independent due to the employee/employer relationship. As a result, she has become 
convinced that her commitment to impartiality and the demonstration of it was significantly 
more important thpn any attempts to demonstrate the degree of structural independence 
she enjoyed. She had come to this conclusion even though there were some elements in 
place like office space in a distant location from the senior decision-makers, a 'hands off' 
mentality and an employment contract that only allowed for termination on the basis of 
personal misconduct. Once again, dramatically different points of view were posited on the 
same seemingly straightforward variable. 
6. Terms and Tenure 
A number of the interviewees were appointed for specific terms, some of which 
were renewable and some were not. The majority of those that had renewable terms had 
not been advised of any clearly defined process for how the renewal decision would be 
made. As a result, one could reasonably conclude that wanting to be re-appointed could 
compromise an incumbent's independence. However, this particular group of interviewees 
held the view that if they decided they wanted to be renewed, that desire would have no 
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influence on how they conducted their work. For instance, one interviewee declared: 
" ... but the thing is I can live with having tried to make a difference and [failing to be 
renewed] but I could not live with coasting for ... years and keeping everybody happy".821 
A slightly different danger was identified for those who had permanent employee 
status and lengthy tenure via the comment made by a practitioner of long standing: "But it 
is a challenge to maintain impartiality, independence, fairness when you're more and more 
embedded in an organization". 822 The tension that comes from the potential to be and/or to 
be seen to be an 'insider' due to lengthy service823 adds another layer to the degree of 
self-awareness and self-discipline required of Ombuds in that type of situation. 
7. Annual and Special Reports 
A number of interviewees used 'the proof is in the pudding' metaphor to argue that 
the annual reports of Ombuds can be used to demonstrate both the Ombuds' 
independence and impartiality. A number of interviewees were confident that these types 
of reports, which were designed to be easily accessible to all and sundry, served as an 
artifact or a paper trail for establishing and confirming the Ombuds reputation for 
independence, impartiality and fairness. While I agree .that reports of this nature fulfill an 
important function with respect to accountability and credibility, they are not a full 
representation of all that is done by an Om buds. While .reports contain statistics about the 
number and type of complaints received and the outcomes in some situations, such a 
report does not show how the work is done on a day-to-day basis. Therefore, this type of 
tool is better described as a still photograph in that how the work is actually accomplished 
821 Interviewee M. 
822 Interviewee 0. 
823 1 was advised by an Ombuds for an Ivy League institution in the U.S. who had recently retired from her post after a very 
long tenure (in excess of 20 years) that her biggest concern was how she would spend her newly found spare time as given 
her commitment to independence she had not established any social relationships in her work environment. 
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can only be interpreted rather than verified from the narrative descriptions provided. In 
addition, in order to protect the confidentiality of the complainants, important details are 
often removed from the case description which can also take away from a full 
understanding of all that occurred and how the Om buds actually demonstrated (or not) . 
impartiality and independence throughout the process. 
A differing interpretation of how the independence of the role is demonstrated was 
provided by one interviewee by indicating that appointees were interviewed at length, 
vetted extensively rather than getting the job " ... by lottery". 824 This approach is common to 
the majority of the Ombuds' appointments which are now predicated on a competitive 
hiring process and organized in such a fashion that stakeholders of all stripes or 
representatives of all political parties have to come to agreement on the appointee. By 
virtue of these processes the perception of the appointee of being independent of the 
appointing body is increased as the successful candidate is required to demonstrate his 
suitability for the position over many others rather than being seen as a patronage 
appointment of the government in power or the CEO or President's personal choice. In 
addition, the quality of the work done by the Ombuds, year over year., demonstrates the 
same concept to another interviewee. 
In the final analysis, the traditional belief of de jure independence being the 
foundation or a guarantee of impartiality was not supported by experiences described by 
the majority of the interviewees. Rather, the opposite was argued by many in that their 
day-to-day and year-to-year experience was that if you have the capacity to be impartial 
then you can also be seen to be independent on a de facto basis because you are so 
demonstrably independent of mind and action. Therefore, while structural independence 
824 Interviewee K. 
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was seen to be beneficial in some ways, it was not deemed to be necessary if the 
appointee has the strength of character so as not to be influenced by ongoing 
relationships or personal benefits that could accrue by avoiding controversial matters. 
From a theoretical perspective, using the 'chicken or the egg' analogy I am arguing that 
impartiality comes first and is in fact more important than structural independence for the 
following reasons: an appointee with a high degree of integrity coupled with self-
awareness and a commitment to continuous personal development can operate very 
effectively as an Ombuds with a high degree of impartiality without a high degree of 
structural independence. Similarly, a high degree of structural independence is irrelevant if 
the incumbent does not have the desire to be as impartial as possible and the willingness 
and capacity to develop and maintain the requisite skills for implementation of an 
independent role for the duration of the term of appointment. However, it must be 
acknowledged that given the strength of historically held beliefs and the tradition of 
identifying structural independence as the foundation of impartiality, the existence of an 
independent status may increase the perception of the impartiality of the Ombuds by some 
parties, regardless of whether it is in reality a factor of any significance. Ultimately, the 
majority of the interviewees' commentary demonstrated while structural independence 
may make the job easier, the seminal requirements for the Ombuds to operate in a 
manner consistent with the expectations for the role is an independent mindset and the 
personal commitment to thinking and acting as impartially as possible. 
In conclusion, the data reveal with respect to the foundational concept under 
review, that in the final analysis the vast majority of the interviewees' believe that it is the 
incumbent Ombuds who is primarily responsible for contributing to the perception of a high 
degree of impartiality and in so doing is creating conditions that lead to the perception of 
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some degree of independence by virtue of how she thinks and how she behaves. 
However, a government or organization as well as the appointee can also contribute to a 
perception of actual independence by ensuring the proper set up of the office from a 
structural perspective, and conveying a strictly adhered to 'hands off' approach regardless 
of the issue, so as to increase the possibility of the perception of a high degree of 
independence. As a result, a hybrid or organizational Ombuds who has a very 
independent mindset and enjoys a long term appointment or permanent employee status 
along with fiscal and administrative independence and own motion capacity can be seen 
to be and act as independently as an Ombuds established by legislation with all the 
requisite means in place for de jure independence. These findings have important 
implications for the personal characteristics that should be sought when choosing an 
Ombuds. Characteristics such as personal integrity, independent thinker and actor who 
has the ability to resist internal or external pressure to think or act in a particular manner 
are therefore crucial. It is also critical that the foregoing characteristics be coupled with the 
capacity to maintain cordial relationships that provide for opportunities for cooperation as 
is appropriate to the situation. Similarly, it is important to recognize that structural means 
for demonstrating independence should also be put in place either by legislation or terms 
of reference or policy so as to augment the perception of the highest degree of 
independence of the role and the appointee. 
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Chapter 6: The Intersection of Impartiality, Independence and Fairness 
As the concepts of impartiality and fairness are often intertwined or used as 
synonyms for one other or even as a definition, (e.g. impartiality= fairness), an 
examination of how Ombuds and their key stakeholders view these principles is essential 
to any analysis of how the Ombuds role is configured and implemented. In addition, the 
degree to which independence and impartiality are connected to perceptions of fairness is 
necessarily explored. As a result, the manner in which Ombuds determine whether 
decisions being complained about have been handled fairly will be investigated as well as 
the interviewees' perceptions of complainants and respondents' views on whether they 
have been treated fairly. In this chapter, the import of 'impartiality' and 'independence' to 
Ombuds, complainants and respondents will be identified as well as how these concepts 
fit into the fairness equation from all three stakeholders' perspectives. This examination is 
particularly relevant to the deconstruction of the role of Ombuds as holding others to 
account for fair administration and contributing to an ethic of fairness through orientation 
and education with respondents and the community served generally, is a defining feature 
of the Ombuds role. Similarly, articulating and adhering to a high standard of fairness 
within Ombuds' own practices is also critical to this form of dispute resolution. Therefore, I 
will begin this examination with an explanation of the various forms of fairness standards 
used by interviewees followed by their perceptions of how both respondents and 
complainants determine if an Ombuds has behaved fairly. I will then demonstrate if, and if 
so, when and how, independence and impartiality are considered critical to either or both 
Ombuds and complainants and respondents as they pursue administrative fairness .. 
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Ombuds' Fairness Standards 
As Ombuds use many different modalities for resolving complaints, it would be a 
gargantuan task to discuss the fairness standards employed for the wide variety of 
activities that are undertaken under the aegis of the Ombuds, (e.g. shuttle diplomacy, 
inquiries for the purpose of clarification, mediation, investigation, conflict coaching, 
discussion and evaluation of options), I have focused this research specifically on the 
standards used When a complaint is being investigated. Notwithstanding the fact that my 
query to interviewees was oriented specifically to the fairness standards used to determine 
whether a complaint was valid, it's important to acknowledge that all interviewees 
conceptualized the investigative process as a continuum. Specifically, prior to discussing 
the standards used when determining whether a complaint should be supported or not, 
many interviewees commented on the importance of particular actions being taken before 
a matter even went forward for investigation. Specifically, it was noted that it was crucial 
from a fairness perspective to confirm that 1) the subject matter of the complaint was 
actually within their jurisdiction as articulated in their legislated mandate or terms of 
reference or policy; and 2) the complainant had already brought the concern to the 
attention of the respondent (which generally speaking the complainant is expected to do in 
order for the respondent to have the opportunity to address the matter) prior to the matter 
being brought to the Ombuds for review, as one of the fairness criteria they use. For 
obvious reasons it would be unfair for complainants to waste their time being interviewed 
and providing documents, etc. if the matter could not be acted on by the Ombuds given 
that the concern was either non-jurisdictional or within jurisdiction but premature in that a 
final decision had not been made. It was also noted by various interviewees that given the 
vulnerability of many of the complainants who approach the office, even though the issues 
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raised are not within their mandates, or are premature, they still believe it is fair and 
reasonable to spend some time with complainants trying to determine what alternatives for 
addressing the complaint may be available. Other interviewees took a similar tack in 
expressing the importance of determining whether the complainant had the capacity to 
take an issue forward by virtue of inquiring into the complainants' level of knowledge about 
the dispute resolution process of the agency or organization being complained about and 
their level of conf:idence in making use of it. The rationale for doing so was to interact with 
the complainants in such a fashion that complainants left the discussion feeling sufficiently 
conversant and confident to take matters forward using the correct path. 
After a matter had been investigated, a very compelling argument made by one 
interviewee was the importance ascribed to explaining to respondents that meeting their 
legal requirements was not sufficient to demonstrate they had discharged their 
responsibilities fairly. It was observed that it was not uncommon to be told by a 
respondent when an issue was raised that no regulation had been violated or law broken. 
The Ombuds' immediate response was "Okay. That is a good start. Now have you done 
enough?"825 This kind of commentary was predicated on the notion that it was expected 
that in order to be fair the respondent also had to provide as much information as possible 
while being attentive to the concerns raised and ensuring that others who had requested 
the same type of service were treated similarly. This approach is comparable to that 
articulated by other interviewees in various sectors whereby they indicated their fairness 
standards included looking at the quality of the decision-making process in conjunction 
with the reasonableness of the outcome as well as taking into account the style of the 
825 Interviewee E. 
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communication and whether the complainant was treated with respect throughout the 
process. 
The same concept but articulated differently was captured in the notion of 'raising 
the bar' which has resulted in the elimination of what could be construed as an arbitrary 
line which indicated fairness on one side and unfair on another. By moving to this type of 
analysis, a respondent is asked to consider: Have you done the best you can in this 
situation? This kind of approach is more reflective of working toward an administrative 
'best practices' methodology rather than accepting the meeting of minimum legal 
requirements or rigidly applying a policy without taking into account the context, as an 
adequate response. As such an approach is not mechanical and therefore requires a 
higher level of analysis, it strikes me that in order for respondents to believe this type of 
assessment was done fairly, the Ombuds would have to be perceived as operating on the 
basis of a very high degree of impartiality. 
Surprisingly to me, reference was also made to the use of 'common sense' as a_ 
fairness standard which is problematic given our diverse culture, as was discussed earlier 
in Chapter Three826 what is considered to be 'common sense' to one person may be 
unheard of to another or racist or ageist, etc. Even though the term is used frequently in 
discussions, popular and scholarly literature as well as in jurisprudence, the fact that the 
use of such a criterion would be promulgated as being adequate for making a 
determination on whether something was fair is unacceptable, in my view, in the vast 
majority of instances. Another example that was put forward as an acceptable criterion for 
determining fairness was the term of 'your judgment'. The use of such a generic term is 
also difficult to understand when what would be considered to be a fair judgment could 
826 See Devlin and Pothier's argument at note 519. 
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vary depending on who is involved in the complaint handling process and the diversity of 
the complainant and respondent community. 
Other interviewees talked about the importance of looking at the matter being 
complained about in relation to the applicable policies to determine if the respondent had 
handled the matter fairly. It was also observed that the matter would be assessed to see if 
the circumstances were such that a deviation or exemption from the policy would be 
warranted. When the circumstances were such that it was clear that the respondent 
should have made an exemption, a number of interviewees indicated how important it was 
to be able to discuss the situation with decision-makers so that they came to their own 
conclusion that an exception should be made due to the extenuating circumstances. In a 
similar vein, it was also noted by another interviewee that through an open discussion of 
information with respondents who originally defended their decisions as being correct, it 
was not uncommon for reflection on what had transpired to occur. Subsequently, it would 
then be acknowledged by the respondent that an error was made and corrective action 
would be taken without any necessity for the Ombuds to form conclusions and 
recommendatioris. It was also acknowledged by one interviewee that it can be difficult for 
respondents who are not familiar or comfortable with the appropriate exercise of discretion 
to know what to do when the Ombuds calls. Specifically, respondents may remember 
being advised by the Ombuds previously that they should have followed the applicable 
policy when it becomes apparent the unfairness occurred because the relevant policy was 
not followed. This kind of conversation may then be followed by a different discussion with 
the same Ombuds who will inquire as to why discretion was not exercised in another and, 
most importantly, very different circumstance. While the Ombuds' expectations for 
differential treatment in different circumstances, was eminently reasonable and fair, it was 
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recognized that this level of complexity can be difficult for some respondents to 
understand and implement. 
Reference was also made to the use of 'procedural fairness' and 'the principles of 
natural justice' as important criteria for assessing whether complaints were valid. When 
queried about the burden of proof the Ombuds expected, some interviewees indicated 
they use the 'balance of probabilities' whereas another interviewee indicated that she only 
operated in the 'clear and convincing' mode and yet another noted that she would 
determine which burden of proof had to be met depending on the nature of the 
circumstances associated with the complaint. For instance, she used the 'balance of 
probabilities' for issues which were largely interpersonal in nature and no witnesses were 
available, and a more stringent standard of 'clear and convincing' (which is still within the 
balance of probabilities modality), when records and documentary materials were being 
reviewed. Typically, both complainants and respondents are advised what standard will be 
used when a review is being conducted to provide both for transparency and reasonable 
expectations. A number of interviewees highlighted the use of detailed and robust 
procedures or guidelines for gathering information; followed by assembling it properly for a 
thorough review and then assessing relevant evidence to determine if complaints were 
founded. In some instances, detailed explanations were provided for how a file progressed 
through the review process and the levels of approval required prior to a final 
determination being made on the outcome of the review to demonstrate how they 
determined if a matter had been handled fairly. Interestingly enough, from my perspective, 
given that the Ombuds role occupies a small niche within the larger realm of ADR there 
was no commonly stated fairness standard that would be used when determining the 
validity of complaint. However, it was clear from all of the explanations provided that the 
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principles of natural justice, which were understood as having the opportunity to know the 
case against you and to be able to articulate your perspective in response, within the 
context of an unbiased review, whether titled as such or described as such, were the 
standard criteria in use. Ideally, this would be the normative standard that would be 
conveyed to both complainants and respondents in Ombuds' descriptive and promotional 
literature so that these stakeholders have an accurate understanding of what to expect 
from an Ombuds review. 
Not surprisingly, it was a commonly held belief that compelling arguments had to 
be developed methodically providing clear rationale for the Ombuds' view on complaints 
raised in order to be fair and to convince the complainants and the respondents of the 
soundness of the outcome of the Ombuds' review. It was also noted that a very well 
articulated rationale for a conclusion and recommendation was not only required for the 
fairness of the Ombuds process but also to model to respondents the kind of behaviour 
that was routinely expected of them. 
· One interviewee emphasized the importance of taking the time to look at all the 
information gathered in relation to the substance of the complaint and what the appropriate 
processes were for addressing the problem. He then uses the equivalent of the 
'reasonable person' test to say: "If I was 'joe blow' [from the immediate community], some 
education, a job827 and I looked at the process that was followed and the decision and how 
that person was treated, would I think that was fair?".828 This kind of approach 
demonstrates the importance ascribed to the substantive, procedural and interpersonal 
827 A defect in this approach is that there may well be community members who are not employed and/or not educated who 
may be equally capable of making a proper determination on whether the matter in dispute was handled fairly. 
828 Interviewee L. 
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aspects of what happened from the perspective of someone who is similarly situated to 
both the complainant and respondent. 
The same interviewee emphasized the importance he places on satisfying himself 
that he has handled situations fairly by thinking about what he does to ensure he has met 
the highest level of fairness. He noted how an Ombuds does not have the luxury of saying, 
after reflection, this wasn't my best effort in terms of behaving fairly but I'll do better next 
time. The import of this personalized assessment deserves consideration on a more 
general basis, as typically in Canada, Ombuds' conclusions as to whether to support a 
complaint may not be appealed. Specifically, Ombuds' Offices established via statute at 
provincial and territorial levels have privative clauses829 that restrict litigation to personal 
misconduct on the part of the Ombuds or staff and to competing views between a 
respondent and the Ombuds on the Ombuds' jurisdiction. In other words, the complainant 
does not have the right to appeal the Ombuds' conclusion on whether to support or 
dismiss a complaint. Therefore, there is virtually no recourse, other than to pursue the 
substance of the complaint through litigation against the governmental body or 
organization that made the decision that the complainant brought to the attention of the 
Ombuds. The complainant who is dissatisfied with the Ombuds' action (or lack of action) 
can bring her concerns about how the Ombuds has handled the file to the attention of the 
entity that appointed the Ombuds. However, while the complainant may derive some 
comfort from telling a body that appoints the Ombuds about her dissatisfaction with how 
the complaint was handled, it must be acknowledged that government officials, neither 
629 Section 23 of the Ontario Ombudsman Act R.S.O, 1990, Chapter 0.6 is demonstrative of the strong privative clauses 
enjoyed by Ombuds of general jurisdiction established via legislation in Canada: "No proceedings of the Ombudsman shall 
be held bad for want of form, and, except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, no proceeding or decision of the Ombudsman 
is liable to be challenged, reviewed, quashed or called in question in any court." The Alberta Ombudsman Act RSA 1980 has 
identical wording at Section 24. 
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elected nor Deputy Ministers, nor organizational officials, have the ability to interfere with 
or change the Ombuds' determination. 
While Ombuds in other forms of practice (hybrid and organizational) do not enjoy 
this type of legislated immunity, usually if the complainant disagrees with the Ombuds, 
subsequent litigation would likely be initiated against the respondent governmental 
department or organizational entity for whatever relief the complainant had originally 
brought to the attention of the Ombuds. This reality highlights the import of the personal 
integrity and diligence of the office holder and staff for establishing very high standards for 
evaluating their own behaviour while assessing complaints against clearly articulated 
fairness standards. Also, as Ombuds typically establish their own procedures for complaint 
handling, the approach taken and the conclusions drawn have to be very well thought out 
in order to ensure they are fair as complainants communicating their disagreement on the 
sidewalks via sandwich boards and/or through cyberspace via twitter and biogs are 
ultimately the only ways, in many instances, to indicate dissatisfaction or disagreement 
with an Ombuds' handling of a matter. However, it is important to keep in mind that some 
interviewees had processes in place for complainants to have the manner in which their 
complaint was handled to be assessed by an external body, such as a committee of 
stakeholders, or internally, by 0th.er Ombuds staff, who are assembled for determining 
whether the file was handled as it should have been in comparison to the statute or terms 
of reference or policy underlying the role. However, it must be recognized that this kind of 
assessment is conducted similarly to the judicial review process in that the focus is 
primarily on the process used rather than a review of the merit or substance of the 
complaint. 
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In traditional dispute resolution regimes in Canada, it is not considered appropriate 
or fair for the same body or individual to investigate an allegation and then also decide on 
its proper determi.nation. For example, the police investigate an allegation; the police on 
their own initiative and/or on the advice of the Crown Attorney lay charges and a judge or 
jury determines guilt or innocence. Similarly, in a non-criminal setting, the Public Sector 
Integrity Commissioner identifies the clear demarcation of investigative processes from 
decision-making as a 'best practice' in a symposium report focused on building trust 
between the private and public sectors. 830 In Regie while it is acknowledged that "While a 
plurality of functions is not necessarily problematic in a single administrative agency ... "831 
it is emphasized that "Prosecuting counsel must never be in a position to participate in the 
adjudication process. The functions of prosecutor and adjudicator cannot be exercised 
together in this manner".832 In considering the plurality of functions undertaken within the 
Ombuds role, it must be kept in mind that Canadian Ombuds neither prosecute nor 
adjudicate. Nonetheless, I explored Ombuds' perceptions on the fairness of conflating the 
role of investigator with determining the validity· of the complaint. Specifically, as Om buds 
are often sole practitioners or operate with a very small staff, it is possible that an Ombuds 
could undertake the investigation of a complaint and then assess the evidence amassed in 
order to form a conclusion and if appropriate, make recommendations. A broad range of 
perspectives was presented on this issue in that some interviewees were strongly in 
favour of the Ombuds being kept separate from the investigation process and the final 
determination that would be made on whether the complaint should be supported. One 
830 Office of the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner of Canada, "Symposium Report - BUILDING TRUST TOGETHER: The 
public and private sector experience" (2008) online: Office of the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner of Canada 
<http://www.psic-ispc.gc.ca>. 
831 Regie, supra note 335. 
832 Ibid. 
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interviewee, in particular, was adamant that it was crucial from his perspective to only be 
reviewing the eviqence gathered by investigators rather than participating in this phase of 
the complaint review process so as to be seen to be as impartial as possible. He indicated 
"within the office there is a very clear divide between who collects the evidence and who 
assesses it". 833 Other interviewees thought it would be ideal to organize their work in this 
fashion. However, as they are sole practitioners or if not working alone, resources are 
limited to the extent that if they removed themselves from the investigative process the 
work of the office.would not be accomplished in a timely or effective manner. Other 
interviewees did not get involved until the end when determining whether 
recommendation~ should be made and what type, but were not concerned about the 
separation of these functions for fairness reasons, rather they had organized the complaint 
handling process: in this fashion for operational efficiency. Other interviewees from all 
sectors saw no difficulty with the Ombuds being involved both in conducting the 
investigation and forming conclusions and recommendations for one primary reason, that 
being, the Ombuds was making a recommendation on the basis of a conclusion(s) being 
reached rather than making an enforceable decision or issuing a directive. For example, 
some inteniiewees indicated that as the Ombuds has no ability to coerce anyone to do 
anything and no capacity to implement a recommendation on their own, the fact that an 
Ombuds is both investigating a complaint and then deciding what the final determination 
would be is irrelevant from a fairness perspective. One interviewee thought the collapsing 
of roles was not an issue as in the Ombuds sector no damages are awarded, if it is 
determined a mistake was made. However, from my vantage point it is important to take 
into account the reality that Ombuds' recommendations are generally taken very seriously 
833 Interviewee D. 
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and to suggest the Ombuds' influence is not significant would be incorrect in most settings. 
In addition, recommendations are routinely made that result in individuals receiving 
benefits that may be financial in nature or that result in eligibility for or increased services 
that when quantified would represent a substantial financial gain to a complainant and the 
requisite allocation of resources by the organization or institution. Also, the notion of an 
Ombuds not having any capacity to exert pressure that could result in a recommendation 
that was initially rejected being accepted is not necessarily viable, as many Ombuds have 
the ability to take a recommendation that has been dismissed at a lower level to higher 
levels of the organization or government for further consideration. Ultimately, many 
Ombuds have the ability to publish reports about recommendations that are rejected (or 
accepted) on either an annual or special report basis. This kind of ability suggests to me 
that while there is no power of enforcement within the Ombuds role on a de jure basis, for 
many situations there is a possibility that an Ombuds' recommendations will be accepted 
in order to avoid ~my public controversy. Hence, the lack of 'power to enforce' or to award 
costs for damages is not a viable argument in favour of discounting the perception of 
potential unfairness inherent in the collapsing of investigative activities along with 
determining the outcome of the complaint. However, I would argue that the practical reality 
of a sole practitioner or a small office having no alternative but to fulfill both an 
investigative and determinative role, is defensible on the basis of the use of a fair and 
transparent investigative and assessment process conducted by a self-disciplined 
practitioner who is acting as impartially and as independently as possible .. 
Ironically, from the point of view of this research, only one interviewee mentioned 
'impartiality' as being integral to the fairness of the Ombuds' own review process. In 
addition, none of the interviewees included 'independence' as a criterion for the fairness of 
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their own processes. Perhaps neither term was specifically enunciated as these elements 
are considered to be implicit to all Ombuds' work. Nonetheless, from my perspective, the 
lack of comment about impartiality and independence as specific fairness criteria was 
striking given the subject matter under discussion and the usual construction of Ombuds 
roles. 
Ombuds' Perceptions of How Complainants Define Fairness 
Initially, it was unanimously stated by all interviewees that complainants' 
perceptions of fairness were predicated on the quality of the communication between the 
complainant and the Ombuds office. The importance of respect and courtesy, coupled with 
sufficient time to provide all of the information they thought was relevant resulted in 
complainants stating they felt heard, respected and fairly treated. Another element that 
was repeated frequently as an indicator of fairness was the importance of timeliness as 
'justice delayed' was perceived as 'justice denied'. The other elements which were 
identified by the majority of the interviewees included the necessity of demonstrating 
openness and transparency of the process by explaining carefully what steps would be · 
taken in addressing the complaint when, why, by whom and how. The manner in which : 
the Ombuds or staff approached their work was also seen as crucial for demonstrating that 
a thorough and fair methodology was diligently implemented in reviewing the 
complainants' concerns as the degree of professionalism attributed to the Ombuds or staff 
contributed significantly to the complainants' perception of a credible and fair process. 
It was also noted that, in some instances when complainants did not get the 
outcome they wanted and they concluded that the reason for that was that the Ombuds 
was not impartial, these Ombuds found their best defense was the ability to demonstrate 
that the implementation of a very sound review and assessment process based on a 
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rigorous methodology had resulted in unequivocal reasons for why the complaint could not 
be supported. However, it was recognized that even when using the best possible review 
process, some complainants still only believe the complaint was handled fairly if they get 
the result they want. Once again, this outcome reinforces the notion of the Ombuds having 
personal responsibility for setting high standards for himself when evaluating the quality of 
his work as neither complainants (nor respondents) may be able to step outside their self-
interest to do so. · 
One interviewee whose experience is that complainants are very satisfied with the 
fairness of Ombuds' reviews emphasized that in the initial discussion with complainants 
every effort is made to explain very carefully that the Ombuds Office will also be 
interacting with the respondent in the same way. For instance, the complainants should 
expect the Ombuds will be listening to everything both the complainant and the 
respondent has to say as well as keeping each party abreast of what is happening. As a 
result, each complainant is fully aware from the first interaction that the respect and 
attention provided to him will be replicated with the respondent. This example was used to 
demonstrate the importance of educating the complainant about the even handed nature 
of the process and is emblematic of the importance ascribed to ensuring complainants 
understood the Ombuds would not be going forward on the basis of advocating or 
representing the complainant. 
Some interviewees indicated that in an effort to ensure complainants do not feel 
unfairly treated when it becomes clear that the complainant's only interest is gaining 
financial compensation, they take great pains to explain before the complaint is even 
reviewed with the respondent, that a financial settlement may not necessarily come to be, 
as the complainant's position may not be supported and/or if supported, financial 
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compensation may not be warranted, given the totality of the circumstances. Other 
interviewees explained that as part of their commitment to fairness they will attempt to 
manage complainants' expectations in other ways, that is if a complainant indicates she is 
expecting an outcome that the Ombuds has no authority to recommend, such as the 
Ombuds ordering the firing of a staff person the complainant dislikes, a great deal of effort 
is made to educate complainants on what are possible outcomes if a fault is found so that 
they do not enter the process with unrealistic or unreasonable expectations. In a similar 
trajectory another interviewee indicated how difficult it can be to assist some complainants 
to understand that while a complaint may be founded, the Ombuds' view and the 
complainant's view on what would be a fair outcome may be dramatically different, given 
the Ombuds' responsibility to take into account the proportionality of the matter. It was 
noted that in situations where a minor mistake was made that has minimal negative 
impact, the Ombuds may make a recommendation for an apology to be issued and 
training to be done so it doesn't occur again, whereas the complainant may expect the 
staff person involved to be fired or to receive financial compensation. It was observed by 
some interviewees that when those kinds of situations develop, whereby a complainant's 
expectations are unrealistic or unreasonable, even with the best up-front orientation as to 
the responsibility of the Ombuds to be fair to all concerned, it is virtually impossible to 
. . 
come to a meeting of the minds, between the Ombuds and the complainant, on what is a 
fair outcome given the circumstances. 
One interviewee spoke to the fact that on some occasions, a complainant will 
approach the Ombuds only to advance concerns for the benefit of system- wide 
improvement as they see the errors made as isolated or minor in comparison to all of the 
other positive benefits that have accrued to them. In stark contrast to the aforementioned 
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magnanimous approach, a number of other interviewees spoke to the unfortunate reality 
that in some situations even though an error is found and a recommendation is made, the 
circumstances are such that the clock can not be turned back so as to benefit the 
complainant personally. In situations of this nature while the complainants have 
contributed to system-wide improvement and their complaint has been supported as valid, 
they are not satisfied with the result. This kind of scenario was used by a number of 
interviewees to demonstrate the difficulty they had in reconciling what the Ombuds had 
determined to be feasible and fair with some complainants' desires and expectations for 
retribution to be meted out to the respondent, regardless of the circumstances. In being 
well aware of the potential for this kind of complainant discontent, other interviewees 
explained that they work very hard to ensure each complainant feels that he or she has 
received some benefit from interacting with the Ombuds even if their complaints are 
identified early on as not being within jurisdiction or premature. Similarly, the same 
intensity of effort 1is made later on in the process, as it becomes clear that the complaint 
will not be supported, by providing explanations for alternatives or engaging in discussion 
about how to raise a complaint in a constructive manner so as to have greater potential for 
useful interaction with a decision-maker in the future. As a result of these activities, in 
some instances, some Ombuds have found that complainants will say they found the 
Ombuds to be both fair and helpful, even though their complaints were not supported. 
Finally, the importance of providing a very good explanation for why the Ombuds 
had arrived at the conclusion not to support a complainant was considered fundamental to 
complainants' perception of the Ombuds' fairness. One interviewee noted that in 99.9% of 
matters reviewed, complainants would be convinced of the validity of the outcome and the 
Ombuds' fairness on the basis of the reasons provided. It was acknowledged that while 
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they may not be happy with the outcome they deemed the process to be fair. However, 
other interviewees indicated they had encountered much lower levels of satisfaction when 
complaints were not founded even when the best rationale possible had been provided. In 
those instances, interviewees noted the complainant's entire focus was on whether he or 
sh~ got what they wanted even though they acknowledged they were satisfied with the 
quality of the interaction and the review process. It was also a widely held point of view 
that if complainants misunderstand the role and can not be convinced of the fact that the 
Ombuds is not able to act as their representative or advocate, the complainant will always 
be unhappy with the result even if the review process was implemented flawlessly. 
The Ombuds' individual perceptions as cited above were also supported by 
surveys that a number of interviewees undertake on a regular basis. From their own 
surveys and evaluation efforts, these Ombuds indicated the respect shown to the 
complainant and the quality of the communication was given very high ratings. However, 
the survey data also showed that there are always some complainants who do not 
correlate the quality of the interaction and the review of their complaint with the Ombuds 
behaving fairly, if their complaints are not supported. In those instances, it was noted that 
while the majorit¥ of complainants indicated they appreciated the chance to be heard by 
voicing their concerns and to have them considered carefully in an even handed way, 
some still concluded that the Ombuds was unfair if they didn't get the result they thought 
was warranted. 
Another means to obtain feedback was offered by two interviewees who indicated 
that they deliberately solicit comments from third parties, advocacy groups and informants 
from specialized fields whenever possible, to get a sense of what complainants are saying 
about the fairness of the Ombuds. They found that the feedback they receive is generally 
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positive in that while there are informants who say they may not always agree with the 
outcome determined by the Ombuds they believe the issues were fairly considered. It was 
also noted that these informants continue to refer complainants to the Ombuds given their 
positive perception of the fairness of the complaint handling and review process and will 
speak publicly about their belief that the Ombuds is fair. The supposition is that individuals 
in these roles have the capacity to see the big picture, even though they do not always 
agree with the Ombuds' assessment on every issue raised by the individuals they serve or 
represent. 
Interestingly enough, only infrequently was commentary made about the 
importance of impartiality and strikingly, none of the interviewees commented on the 
importance of independence to complainants' perceptions of the fairness of the Ombuds' 
process. Once again, perhaps these characteristics are considered to be implicit to the 
role and that is why complainants' do not make note of this concept and as a result they 
did not figure prominently in the Ombuds' understandings of complainants' perceptions. In 
the final analysis, the data revealed, that in the majority of situations, the interviewees' 
experience is that the complainants who make their discontent known are primarily 
concerned about the quality of the interaction, and ultimately in some situations, whether 
they got what they wanted. As a result, the structural aspect with respect to the 
independence of the review process and how it is organized is irrelevant to them. 
However, it is worthy of comment that it was noted by one interviewee that if the complaint 
is not supported then it is not unusual for the complainant to conclude that the Ombuds 
was, by definition, partial to the respondent and not operating independently. Given this 
logic, it could be argued that for some complainants, it may be that only their perception of 
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the absence of impartiality is worthy of comment if their complaints are not found to be 
valid. 
Ombuds' Perceptions of How Respondents Define Fairness 
It is noteworthy that the vast majority of interviewees indicated that their 
experience is that complainants and respondents use the same criteria to decide whether 
the Ombuds has behaved fairly. Specifically, they expect the Ombuds to approach the 
matter or issues raised in a professional and courteous manner using a clearly articulated 
and fair review process whereby the respondents have the opportunity to provide their 
point of view on the matter under consideration. It would seem pro forma but some 
interviewees spoke at length about the importance of ensuring that the respondent had 
been given the opportunity to address the matter before the Ombuds brought it forward for 
consideration as a complaint. Also, it was a generally held view that when the Ombuds 
finds that errors have been made and recommendations are put forward to correct them, a 
key element of the respondents' perception of fairness, is whether the recommendations 
made are credible and realistic. 
A number of interviewees observed that as they do not enjoy de jure 
independence and respondents know the Ombuds is a fellow employee, independence is 
irrelevant as a fc~irness criterion even though there are various means in place to create 
distance and reduce the possibility of inappropriate influence from other employees. As 
result, in these interviewees' experience the respondents are very focused on the extent to 
which the Ombuds has demonstrated a high degree of impartiality through the quality of 
the work done, both during the review of the matter and in the rationale provided for the 
conclusions reached. 
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A number of interviewees spoke to the importance of having the opportunity to 
interact informally with respondents so as to resolve complaints that are founded 
expeditiously and fairly. By approaching matters in a way that allows respondents to 
identify when a mistake has been made themselves, there are many situations where 
there is no need for the Ombuds to make recommendations as the respondent analyzes 
the issues raised and comes up with what are fair, mutually acceptable and appropriate 
remedies. One interviewee went further to say that in particular situations when it 
becomes clear to all concerned that the respondent made mistakes, as soon as the 
respondents recognize it, they commit to correcting the errors. As a result, it was 
emphatically stated that" ... there is no need to make a public spectacle of it".834 The 
debate then arises as to whether mistakes should be publicized in some fashion for the 
benefit of others, (e.g. to educate other employees so they can recognize where errors 
were made and how to avoid them in their work, or, alternatively, for potential 
complainants to become aware of how they should be treated and/or how their claims 
should be processed). In addition, publicity on Ombuds' interventions and conclusions can 
build awareness of the role of the Ombuds on a more general basis and of the 
responsibility for respondents to do their work fairly. In opposition to this line of ,thought, a 
substantial number of interviewees also spoke to the fact that the ability to work informally 
with respondents on the basis of raising issues respectfully and giving them the 
opportunity to make necessary changes without exposing them as inept, when it is 
appropriate to do so, is a key element of being seen to be fair. In addition, interacting with 
respondents in such a manner results in a reputation for fairness that precedes the 
Ombuds or staff and bodes well for future encounters. One interviewee made the case in 
834 Interviewee F. 
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relation to the importance of dealing with respondents in a fashion that allowed for giving 
them the benefit of the doubt when it was readily apparent that mistakes had been made 
but the errors were due to a lack of knowledge rather than for disregard for policies or 
fairness principles, by saying: 
They didn't mean to do this. They didn't know any better. So. Now that they know 
better, they will do better. And I think that opens up the doors later on if you need 
to deal with them on another issue. It is always better they assume that you are 
going to be fair because [they] know you were fair the last time and you gave them 
the opportunity to rectify the situation. 835 
Also, it was observed by some interviewees that by approaching respondents in a 
fashion that demonstrates the Ombuds is looking for organizational improvement and 
accountability rather than to assign individual blame allows for much greater opportunity 
for the Ombuds tb garner additional information for use in identifying and then addressing 
major systemic or system-wide issues. As respondents in these situations are no longer 
fearful that individuals will be vilified or that their unwitting individual performance or 
unintended mistakes will be dissected in the public domain they are both open and 
cooperative. Also, it was observed by some interviewees when Ombuds demonstrate that 
their wide ranging powers of investigation will not be abused for personal aggrandizement 
or to demonstrate power over others, the respondent is more likely to see the Ombuds as 
acting in a fair and reasonable matter. When the respondent experiences this kind of 
approach they are comfortable asking for assistance and suggestions for improvements 
rather than reacting with fear and/or responding in an adversarial fashion and resisting 
implementing what are reasonable recommendations given the situation. One interviewee 
noted that in some cases respondents welcome the Ombuds' involvement as they know 
there are system-wide issues that require improvement but they haven't been able to 
835 Interviewee F. 
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motivate these Ghanges themselves. Respondents that fall into this category hope that as 
a result of the-Ombuds' review, recommendations will ensue which will lead to greater 
allocation of resources and/or a beneficial re-organization. It was observed that these 
kinds of reactions from respondents are particularly likely to occur when the respondents 
believe that the Ombuds' objectives are the same as their own which was articulated by 
one interv_iewee as "we have the same goal, to make the system better''.836 
On the face of it, the principles of impartiality and independence and cooperation 
or collaboration may seem to be in conflict but in actuality, these principles can be 
separate but mutually beneficial depending on how the collaborative effort is undertaken. 
However, it would seem that it would be especially important for the Om buds to ensure 
that he is interact,ing with respondents in such a way that the complainants would not see 
the willingness to work cooperatively as collusion or as demonstrating a greater degree of 
identification with the respondent than the complainant, which would ultimately result in the 
loss of both independence and impartiality. One mechanism that I rely on personally is that 
an Ombuds should conduct herself as if both the complainant and the respondent are 
observing the discussions the Ombuds has with either party. If the interaction was audio or 
videotaped, the normative standard would be that the Ombuds would feel comfortable with 
both sides seeing and listening to what was discussed and how the discussion ensued. 
It is noteworthy that one interviewee described a unique experience whereby the 
role of Ombuds is so firmly identified with the term of 'advocate' in the respondents' minds, 
regardless of how she conducts herself, that respondents do not expect her to behave 
fairly when interacting with them. She noted how in one situation a respondent 
commented on how much she appreciated the Ombuds' empathy for her situation and the 
836 Interviewee Y. 
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respect shown for the rationale the respondent had provided for a decision that then 
became the subjed of a complaint. The interviewee emphasized that this response was 
an anomaly as generally speaking the respondents' wrongly and strongly believed that the 
role of Ombuds is that of an advocate or representative for one group of constituents, 
regardless of the facts of the case under review. As a direct result of this erroneous 
perception, this interviewee's experience was that both complainants and respondents 
based their belief on whether she was fair on whether the outcome was favourable to 
them. This kind of experience speaks to the benefit of an Ombuds having the ability to 
accept complaints from all constituents who populate an organization or a political 
jurisdiction so that they are not seen to be solely identified with one group, (e.g. as an 
Ombuds for students or an Ombuds for faculty or an Om buds for employees). Also, as this 
particular Ombuds' role had been established on the basis of a relatively short term, it was 
difficult for the incumbent to establish a personal reputation for not serving as a zealous 
advocate for indiYiduals, regardless of the circumstances, so as to supersede the 
respondents' overarching erroneous impression of how an Ombuds is expected to fulfill 
her role. 
Are Complainants and Respondents' Perceptions of Fairness Intertwined With 
Independence and Impartiality? 
Given the fact that fairness is traditionally and contemporaneously a central 
construct for th~ establishment and ongoing existence of an Ombuds role, I discussed with 
each interviewee whether the Om buds. believed that complainants and respondents' 
perception of the fairness of the Ombuds was connected to the concepts of independence 
and impartiality. The responses were fairly evenly distributed around the possible· 
combinations. For example, some of the interviewees believed the perception of 
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impartiality was significantly more important to both complainants and respondents than 
independence. However, it was noted by one interviewee that while de jure independence 
was not important to the complainants in her practice they wanted to be assured the 
Om buds role was. not part of the 'bureaucracy'. It was also observed that when the Office 
was seen to be impartial by respondents, then other staff of the organization would contact 
the Ombuds to ask for information on trends in complaints received so they could use that 
information themselves to improve services. It was noted that this level of disclosure did 
not occur with some respondents who always thought the Ombuds was advocating for a 
particular individual or cause (even though the Om buds was advocating for a fair response 
for all involved) when the circumstances were such that a complaint was found to be valid. 
The conundrum that is illustrated by the foregoing example deserves further 
explanation as it was discussed at length by a number of interviewees. The issue at play is 
that while Ombuds typically describe their role as an advocate for fairness rather than as 
an advocate for a particular individual, it is often difficult for respondents to make that 
distinction as they are wedded to the notion of whether their view of the situation prevailed, 
or simply put, 'who wins'. As a result, when the Ombuds makes a recommendation that is 
fair to all concerned after an impartial review and an individual complainant benefits, the 
respondents' erroneous perception, in some instances, is that the Ombuds has taken up 
the individual's cause as his personal representative. A number of interviewees noted 
how difficult it is to overturn this type of misconception regardless of the soundness of the 
rationale for the recommendation and the high degree of impartiality demonstrated by the 
Om buds. 
Another group of interviewees believed the respondents' perception of fairness 
came from the track record established by the Ombuds as it had been demonstrated firstly 
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through the personal approach and reputation of the Ombuds, and secondarily, from the 
annual reports prepared by the Office. It was emphasized by these interviewees that this 
kind of track record readily demonstrates the Ombuds' capacity to be impartial even when 
not structurally independent. One interviewee in this group commented particularly on 
how the Office often comes to be inextricably entwined with the Ombuds' personality and 
approach so the incumbent has to be extraordinarily vigilant in all interactions, even when 
not involved in discussions about complaints, to be seen to be as objective as possible. 
It was very difficult to categorize some of the interviewees' responses with respect 
to independence, which initially appeared to be the principle that they thought contributed 
most to the perception of fairness, as their understanding of independence was so highly 
individualistic. For example, some interviewees stated that independence was more 
important than impartiality. However, it was also observed that if the incumbent was not 
also seen as impartial, the Ombuds would not be described as fair. Another interviewee 
thought impartiality was subjective therefore not quantifiable like independence and 
neutrality are (in his view), therefore by process of elimination, independence was more 
important to othe.rs' perceptions of the fairness of the Ombuds. One interviewee favoured 
independence as most important but this belief was complicated by the notion that once 
the Ombuds is advocating for findings and recommendations to be accepted, the Ombuds 
is no longer impartial. This perception struck me as being idiosyncratic to this individual as 
the standard expectation is that the Ombuds actually remains impartial throughout the 
whole complaint handling and review process and when forming conclusions and then 
making a recommendation(s) is advocating for an ethos of fairness generally rather than 
solely for the benefit of a particular individual, regardless of the circumstances. 
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Yet another complication came about through the views of some interviewees who 
had concluded that fairness came from being seen to be cooperative and no reference 
was made to either independence or impartiality and their connection to fairness. Finally, a 
number of interviewees were unequivocal in their beliefs that independence and 
impartiality and fairness were inextricably intertwined and if either impartiality or 
independence was not evident, the Ombuds would be perceived to be unfair by 
complainants or respondents. Perhaps the belief that the principles under review are 
intertwined explains why very little direct commentary was made about the importance of 
impartiality and independence to complainants' and respondents' perceptions of the 
fairness of the Ombuds' process in response to my query about how fairness is perceived 
by these actors. If Ombuds think of independence and impartiality being so thoroughly 
imbedded in the role that they are considered implicit, it may be that it never occurred to 
the interviewees that additional explanation was required. Also, it is worthy of note that the 
view that independence and impartiality and fairness were inextricably entwined was 
expressed exclusively by those Ombuds with de jure independence but not all Ombuds 
with de jure independence shared this view. As a result of the disparity in opinions about 
this matter, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the interviewees had very 
different experiences in relation to respondents' and complainants' views on whether 
impartiality and independence are connected to perceptions of fairness. This outcome is 
surprising given how Ombuds offices have been created by statute and by policy to 
promote fairness with great emphasis being placed on providing for as much 
independence as possible and that the work should be done on an impartial basis. 
However, as noted previously, the expectation for independence and/or impartiality may 
be considered implicit to the role so perhaps complainants and respondents did not 
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comment on it unless posed a specific question about its impact or absence. These 
outcomes demonstrate how important it is for individual Ombuds to develop some means 
to elicit the criteria that complainants and respondents use to determine whether an 
Ombuds has acted fairly so as to assess the quality of their own practice. This kind of 
feedback could then be used to determine whether adjustments in the type of 
communication and/or education of complainants and respondents are required. 
It was very interesting to learn that one interviewee advised that she 
believed she had been impartial when in working in other roles which were advertised as 
such but now as a result of being immersed in the Ombuds role, she realizes she wasn't 
acting impartially in her other roles. Specifically, in non-Ombuds roles, she realized she 
was ultimately responsible for limiting liability and while she thought she was acting 
impartially and would have been offended if anyone had said otherwise, in the final 
analysis that was not the case. I find this observation particularly significant given, as has 
been pointed out previously, the tag of impartiality is applied to many roles in both the 
private and public sectors. However, the insight obtained by this interviewee only came 
about as a result of having had the opportunity to work in other so-called impartial roles 
prior to becoming an Ombuds. Following in this trajectory it would be important for 
Ombuds to be mindful that they may also fall prey to being partial to the organization or 
government that has appointed them, in order to be seen to be adding value to the 
organization, or the complainants who approach them, without realizing it as well. 
As was demonstrated in the analysis of impartiality, these data underscore the 
importance of Ombuds' being aware of what constitutes fairness in particular 
circumstances and holding themselves personally accountable for behaving fairly as some 
complainants and respondents do not necessarily concern themselves about whether 
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independence and impartiality are in place unless they disagree with the Ombuds' 
conclusion on the complaints under review. This reality reinforces the importance of 
Ombuds holding themselves responsible for demonstrating the highest level of fairness 
throughout the complaint review process by devising and publicizing transparent means 
for demonstrating the criteria that complainants and respondents can use to evaluate 
whether the Ombuds behaved fairly. In addition, Ombuds must have the self-discipline, 
humility and honesty to make their own determination on whether the complaint was valid 
as the self interest of complainants and respondents may be so great that they may not be 
able to come to a fair determination. 
Once again, the perceptions provided by the interviewees demonstrates that, in 
their experience, respondents and complainants believe the independence of the Ombuds 
is predicated much more heavily on 'independence of mind' or an independent mindset 
rather than the trappings of structural independence. This finding reveals that it is the self-
awareness and self-discipline coupled with the use of defensible systematic approaches 
that are indicative of the Ombuds' capacity to fulfill the role independently. Accordingly, 
greater weight is placed on a high degree of impartiality and the resultant perception 
thereof, as the pliimary requirement for the Ombuds to be seen to be operating fairly. In 
addition, the data shows that the perception of fairness was also firmly based on the 
Ombuds' method of communicating with complainants and respondents so as to be able 
to explain in a manner that is credible and with evidence that is convincing as to whether 
to support or dismiss the complaint. 837 
837 It must be reiterated that this research queried only the perception of fairness as it related to investigative process and 
outcomes. Due to the high volume of work that is undertaken under the aegis of early resolution, it was impossible to 
interrogate this area of Ombuds work as well. 
339 
In the final analysis, though, it must be acknowledged that Ombuds can not rely 
solely on complainants' and/or respondents' assessment alone as these assessments 
may be based on their interest in getting what they believe is deserved and/or an 
inaccurate assessment of their own level of altruism. Therefore, neither the complainant 
nor the respondent may be a fair arbiter in the assessment of the validity of their own 
actions and of the Ombuds' performance. As Ombuds may be prone to the same type of 
self-interestedness or unaware of partialities and prejudices which inhibit a fair review, the 
same question must be asked about the degree to which an Ombuds can be relied on to 
accurately assess the fairness of her own actions. Can we realistically assume that 
Ombuds have the capacity to jettison the self image they have established based on an 
over arching philosophical commitment to fairness, to then look at their own actions, 
without this anchor of positive bias in place, as objectively as possible? These data 
provide v~ry clear direction that the majority of Ombuds did recognize that they must be 
extraordinarily vigilant and brutally honest when assessing the fairness of their own 
actions as there may be no one else who is able to do so with any degree of objectivity. 
Also, as no one else is actually in a position to do so on any kind of rigorous basis, unless 
parties are asked by the Ombuds for their input via a third party or anonymous evaluation 
process, it is incumbent on Ombuds themselves to arrange for as many means as 
possible for acquiring feedback on how the role is implemented with respect to the 
demonstration of impartiality, independence and fairness. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
While my empirical research was focused on the specialized and unique area of 
dispute resolution engaged in by Ombuds, I am positing that the results arrived at are 
applicable to all who engage in traditional as well as other forms of dispute resolution as a 
third party, on an arms length basis, e.g. as an adjudicator, a mediator, arbitrator or a 
member of an administrative tribunal. My rationale for this claim is both my primary and 
secondary research has revealed or confirmed (depending on the perspective of the 
reader) the answer to one aspect of my central research question in no uncertain terms: Is 
impartiality achievable, aspirational or impossible? The research results demonstrate, 
unequivocally, that impartiality can only be explained and understood as aspirational, as 
human beings can not purge themselves of all their knowledge and experience that create 
negative or bad biases or predispositions, both known and unknown, thus colouring all that 
is seen and influencing all actions taken and conclusions reached or decisions taken. 
Simultaneously, it is also clear that there should not be any attempt to become a blank 
slate as the self-k.nowledge gained through introspection plus as much familiarity as is 
possible with the experiences of those that are different from our own is necessary for 
thinking and behaving as impartially as possible. 
In an effort to move the notion of impartiality forward from a philosophical 
discourse to ways and means of meeting this legal requirement, (which has many different 
meanings depending on the context and the parties involved), I am positing the theory that 
impartiality should be understood as an imperative for the proper implementation of the 
role of the Ombuds (as well as others who are assisting with the resolution of disputes as 
a third party). Consequently, by definition, this imperative must be enthusiastically 
embraced by the practitioner. This paradigm is very different than the notion of a 'best 
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practice' or a 'guiding principle' or a 'characteristic' or a bullet point in a position 
description. Instead, it is a duty and an obligation to perform to the highest standard 
possible that is ever present in all the activities undertaken by the Ombuds. The impact 
and result of accepting this personal obligation is it must also be readily recognizable by 
others in all their interactions and observations of all dimensions of the implementation of 
the Ombuds role. It must also be emphasized as once this imperative is embraced there 
is no 'opt out clause' for Ombuds, in particular (unless the circumstances of the case 
require recusal) as the conclusions formed and actions taken are typically not appealable 
or justiciable in Canada, other than in the court of public opinion. Given the finality of the 
Ombuds' view of a matter, those who occupy this role must operate at the most advanced 
level with respect to demonstrating the highest degree of impartiality as possible all of the 
time. 
My research results also demonstrate that developing an impartial way of thinking 
and behaving is a skill that has to be developed and maintained via intentional and 
considerable ongoing effort. Therefore, the incumbent must be begin ·by committing to this 
imperative both for self and staff, and constantly reflect on and evaluate progress made so 
as to be able to d~termine what are appropriate improvement strategies. As with any skill, 
working toward being as impartial as possible has to be learned and maintained and if the 
appointee does not have sufficient practice or does not devote sufficient·attention to self 
evaluation the individual can lose skillfulness and capacity. Former Chief Justice Barak of 
the Supreme Court of Israel framed the requirement for this type of skill building within the 
judicial context as [the judge] " ... must be capable of looking at himself from the outside. 
He must be capable of analyzing, criticizing and controlling himself." 838 
838 Beverly Mclachlin, supra note 399 at 8. 
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Given that many of the interviewees had similar personality characteristics, that is, 
curious and inquiring, I suspect the ability to achieve a very high level of skill in this area is 
also analogous to the individual who has the good fortune to be endowed with particular 
\ physiological attributes (e.g. excellent eye/hand coordination or perfect pitch). Using these 
scenarios as examples, individuals with these capacities may be able to develop tennis 
playing skills quickly or pick up unknown songs easily, often much faster than someone 
who is not so inclined. I would argue that this type of skill building is comparable to 
developing the capacity for impartiality. Specifically, if an appointee has the type of 
personality that is curious, open and inquiring which is then coupled with the desire and 
the skills to self-regulate, communicate well and to empathize, it will likely be easier for an 
appointee with these characteristics to develop and maintain a high level of impartiality. 
However, I would also argue that those that are very committed to development in this 
area may be able to do as well or better than those who have simply inherited a particular 
facility or predisposition given the requirement for continuous and ongoing attention to self 
development and improvement. 
As a high level of self-awareness and self-discipline are base-line requirements for 
thinking as impartially as possible, these skills must also be well developed and 
maintained. As a result, an appointee may come to the Ombuds role well prepared as a 
result of skill building accomplished through previous experience in similar roles and 
therefore be more mindful of the pitfalls to avoid so as to practice at a high level. However, 
the appointee or practitioner must be aware, regardless of length of experience and 
dedication to the goal, that the role is not implemented in a vacuum. Given that 
circumstances may present themselves which offer different challenges than the Ombuds 
has faced before and since individual capacities ebb and flow, depending on both 
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physiological and psychological factors, (e.g. a series of crises and the resultant fatigue; 
professional or personal stressors or a visceral negative or positive reaction to a 
complainant or respondent's behaviour or value system), the appointee's best efforts can 
be thwarted given both the circumstances and the current skill level. In addition, new 
predispositions and antipathies may arise as a result of the appointee's ongoing lived 
experience that the practitioner is unaware of until a situation that is relevant presents 
itself. Therefore, I would argue that the aspiration to impartiality is always 'a work in 
progress' and should be accepted as the norm for those for whom impartiality is an 
imperative for the proper execution of the role. However, as posited by Anderson et al 
(2007), Nosek & Hansen (2007) from a social psychological perspective, 839 it is heartening 
to know that individuals can become very good at recognizing and managing biases so 
that they don't have a deleterious effect on the manner in which an issue is being 
assessed or as a reaction to a particular style of behaviour. Notwithstanding these well-
developed skills and strongly held commitments, the potential for partiality and bias 
remains ever-present given the fluidity of the environments in which Ombuds (and other 
third parties as well as human beings generally) operate. Given this reality I am putting 
forward the following recommendations for skill development for Ombuds (and other third 
parties) who have embraced impartiality as an imperative that is central to their work: 
• Increase capacity for engaging in introspection and building self-
knowledge; 
• ln~rease capacity to accept the reality that 'good and bad bias'840 is 
rampant in human psyches as a precursor to developing and maintaining 
· 
839 See Susan Anderson et al supra note 649 and Nosek and Hansen supra note 654. 
840 See notes 463 and 464, respectively, for a discussion about 'good and bad bias' as defined by Patricia Cain and Justice 
Beverly McLachlin. 
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the ability to recognize bad bias and partialities and the effect they have on 
thinking and behaviour; 
• Increase the capacity and continually raise the bar for recognizing triggers 
that are indicative of bad bias as well as how to appropriately manage 
reactions to these triggers; 
• Increase capacity to empathize and to gain knowledge and insight into the 
lives of people who are very different than the circumstances of the 
appointee; 
• Increase capacity to communicate with a wide range of individuals so as to 
elicit and understand whatever has transpired from the perspectives of all 
parties involved; and 
• Acquire the ability to maintain the requisite level of humility so as to accept 
the fact that maintaining a high degree of impartiality is very demanding 
and will require constant and life-long attention. 
I 
By developing these kinds of skills the Om buds (or other dispute resolution practitioner) 
has: a strong foundation for thinking and acting as impartially as is possible in a wide 
variety of situations. By breaking down the aspiration to impartiality in the foregoing 
fashion, the concept moves from an enigmatic and nebulous principle to a more 
measurable and demonstrable skill. Equally importantly, it must be reiterated that the 
literature reviewed and the empirical data collected demonstrate that individuals who 
aspire to be impartial must always be in a developmental mode, regardless of how high a 
. 
level of capacity has been demonstrated on previous occasions. 
In summary, while I would argue that it is indeed impossible to be perfectly 
impartial all of the time, highly skilled and committed individuals can operate at a very high 
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level in this area on an ongoing basis. As the social psychology research841 and the 
interview data demonstrates, individuals can get better at thinking and behaving impartially 
with continued effort and varied experience. Ultimately, I would argue, though, that it is 
only possible to achieve a high degree of impartiality and maintain this capacity if the 
Ombuds not only has the motivation to do so but has also mastered the skills associated 
with thinking and behaving in an impartial manner and is committed to making this effort 
on a continuous ba,sis. 
Contrary to previously cited judicial statements of independence guaranteeing 
impartiality, the research results convey the reality that the level of impartiality achieved is 
predominantly the purview of the incumbent. Specifically, impartiality is a matter of thinking 
and behaving in a way that is reflective of being even-handed with respect to amount of 
attention given, knowledge acquired, respect shown and diligence demonstrated to both 
the complainant and respondent. This style of thinking and interaction should be 
implemented in the same fashion whether the Ombuds has the highest or lowest degree 
of structural independence in place. Equally importantly, the ability to think and behave as 
impartially as possible is supported through seeking input from others and considering 
differing perspectives on the matter under review prior to formulating.a conclusion. 
Therefore, proactivity and outreach is also essential. By making use of a broader and 
more diverse array of perspectives, similar to the way in which 'structural impartiality' has 
been endorsed by, Sonia Lawrence for the edification of the judiciary, 842 the potential to 
understand the issues as experienced by the parties involved as fully as possible is greatly 
enhanced and does not contradict independence. Rather, a high degree of both structural 
841 See Susan Anderson et al and Nosek and Hansen's results at notes 649 and 654, respectively. 
842 Lawrence, supra note 414. 
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independence and/or an independent mindset allows for this kind of exchange of 
information to occur in a manner which would be considered to be fair by all involved. 
The second part of the research question is: Is independence achievable, 
aspirational or impossible? As is already well established, a very high degree of structural 
independence is achievable and verifiable depending on the criteria used for assessing 
the degree of freedom inherent in the construction of the role. For example, the Valente843 
criteria provide for an extremely high degree of independence for the Canadian judiciary. 
Ombuds that are established by legislation, and in some instances via policy, terms of 
. reference or charter, also enjoy a high degree of structural independence. However, even 
with that high degree of structural independence in place, it is important to acknowledge 
that there is no absolute independence. Ultimately, a government or institution or 
organization can decide it no longer requires or wants an Ombuds role and can repeal or 
amend the enabling legislation, or revise or remove the policy or terms of reference, 
respectively, and eliminate the office or change its operations in such a fashion that the 
office is less independent. Consistent with a high degree of political accountability, in either 
a democratic society or a hierarchical environment, such an action can be opposed, but 
there is no means for ensuring an untouchable status regardless of the level of grass roots 
or institutional support. Therefore, there is no ability to prevent incursions of this nature 
even if an Ombuds is operating very effectively and enjoys a high degree of structural 
independence. This is a reality that those who fulfill Ombuds roles must acknowledge and 
and be prepared for before an appointment is accepted. 
Structural independence is tangible and therefore can be achieved as set out in a 
statute, a policy, terms of reference or a Charter. However, as the research on judicial 
843 Valente, supra note 664. 
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decision-making in particular demonstrates844, an individual can enjoy the highest degree 
of structural independence and still be improperly influenced by both internal and external 
variables. Therefore, structure alone is clearly not a panacea for the creation of an 
environment that is entirely free of inappropriate influences. Once again, these data reveal 
that if an appointee is very resistant to pernicious and friendly influences, due to her 
commitment to impartiality and the development and maintenance of the requisite skills, 
she has the capacity to establish and maintain an independent role. However, it must be 
acknowledged tha~ without a high degree of structural independence the same individual's 
efforts may be overtly or covertly undermined by institutional resistance to the Ombuds 
conclusions and recommendations. In those instances, the incumbent has the 
responsibility to oppose those efforts by making use of the various tools and means at her 
disposal such as public reporting, access to the most senior decision-makers, well-
researched and presented, irrefutable investigative reports and/or trends analyses. 
Simultaneously, the Ombuds must always keep in mind that the same reality exists with 
respect to those roles that have a high degree of structural independence in that 
recommendations can be rejected; or if accepted for strategic reasons by the respondent, 
worked around or in some instances, ultimately, ignored unless the Ombuds follows up 
relentlessly. 
Echoing the parameter set down by Justice L'Heureux-Dube in Regie845-
independence is necessary but not sufficient - the data collected from Ombuds 
demonstrates that a high degree of structuraJ independence, while not determinative, is 
useful but for a different reason than for the foundation for impartiality. Rather, some 
degree of separation and freedom to fulfill the role as the Ombuds sees fit must be in 
844 See Sunstein et al, Stribopoulos & Yahya, Ostberg & Wetstein, Songer, etc.in Chapter 3. 
845 Regie, supra note 335. 
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place to demonstrate to the citizenry or students or employees or customers or 
constituents or civil servants (whoever are the complainants and respondents) that 
sufficient structural supports are in place to prevent the Ombuds from being perceived to 
be vulnerable to inappropriate influence. In this arena, as it is the 'perception' that is being 
addressed it would be difficult for observers to conclude that an individual who has limited 
structural freedom would be able to maintain an independent role unless they are familiar 
with his or her work. Ultimately, though, it must be acknowledged that regardless of the 
degree of structural supports in place, if the incumbent doesn't have the strength of 
character or courage to go against the grain or take unpopular positions when necessary, 
and ultimately to speak truth to power, then the structural provisions for independence are 
irrelevant. As a result, the choice of the individuals who fulfill the Ombuds role and the staff 
who are hired by the Ombuds to investigate, engage in early resolution modalities, write 
reports and fulfill the Ombuds' mandate on a daily basis is equally important in my view. 
Accordingly, it is essential that those who are establishing Ombuds roles and conducting 
competitions to secure appointees, understand the type of-sensibilities and skills an 
appointee must have developed for as high a degree of personal resolve as is possible to 
be maintained. Therefore, the appointee's commitment to the highest degree of impartiality 
coupled with an independent mindset along with the capacity to operate in such a fashion 
so as to implement this imperative in how the work is actually done is paramount. These 
personal characteristics complement and in some instances have greater import than the 
so-called 'guarantees' like arms-length employment status1 an independent mechanism for 
establishing remuneration and administrative or institutional freedom as absent the 
personal conviction to speak truth to power, the structural freedoms are irrelevant. 
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As there is no authority for anyone associated with the jurisdiction or organization 
for which the Ombuds has oversight to interfere with the Ombuds' choice of process to be 
used and his determination of the appropriate resolution, the Ombuds and staff must have 
a large repertoire of skills at their disposal to use as means for checking for biases and 
predispositions that could interfere with the proper handling of a case. Once again, while 
structural supports are highly desirable (and necessary to prevent termination for reasons 
other than misconduct or malfeasance) and contribute to the perception of independence 
for some, in the final analysis, true independence is predicated on impartiality. It is the 
mastering and maintenance of the aforementioned skills that contribute to the 
demonstration of the highest level of impartiality of the appointee or Ombuds staff and the 
resultant perceptiori of independence, of those who are responsible for fulfilling the 
promise of fairness. At the same time, community members, legislators and funders have 
to be vigilant in th9t if an Ombuds is not fulfilling the role properly, they must also be willing 
to hold the Ombuds to account. Simultaneously, Ombuds must have free rein to do the job 
properly so holding the Ombuds to account must be done in such a way· that the Ombuds' 
essential oversight role is not circumscribed. Given how difficult it is to do this properly 
particular attention should be paid to appointing Ombuds and hiring Ombuds staff that 
have the correct orientation from the outset. 
One of the primary roles of an Ombuds as noted earlier is speaking truth to power. 
While Ombuds have supports in place to fulfill this role on an independent basis, it still 
requires a great deal of strength of character to stand up to a powerful entity or individual 
and provide negative information that is new to them or that they already know of but do 
·not want discussed in the public domain. Clearly, this is much easier to do when the 
appointee has no fear of losing an appointment and her livelihood for doing so, but it still 
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requires courage of conviction and willingness to deal with a negative reaction irrespective 
of how the role is structured without losing confidence in the course of action taken. 
As said by Andre Marin, the current Ombudsman for Ontario, "I'm often treated like 
the proverbial skunk at a garden party. This is not a job that makes you popular with 
government- if you're doing the job properly".846 As is readily obvious it can be much 
easier for legislated Ombuds who work in premises completely separate and apart from 
the staff employed py the appointing entity and who will not likely encounter respondents 
or complainants on a casual basis, to deal with such a perception and continue with their 
work. However, it is a much different scenario for those who work in similar locations as 
the respondents and complainants, and in smaller organizations, as they regularly 
encounter all manner of complainants and respondents in their work place. In both 
contexts, though, I would argue the notion of 'popularity' is irrelevant. Rather, the 
relationship between the Ombuds and the appointing body and respondents should be 
that of respect and confidence in the reliability of the Ombuds and staff to operate as 
impartially and independently as is possible. In addition, Ombuds must also remember the 
wisdom imparted by Hertogh who found that cooperation and collaboration have far-
reaching beneficial results for fairness to prevail for a large part of the constituent 
population.847 Given this reality, a working relationship must be achieved whereby 
impartiality and independence co-exist simultaneously with cooperation and collaboration 
as is appropriate to the circumstances. The development of this kind of dialectic between 
Ombuds and respondent while requiring considerable skill is demonstrated throughout 
Canada on a regular basis where incisive, well researched and documented Ombuds 
646 Andre Marin, ''The Ombudsman in the Justice System" (The Ontario Bar Association Festive Awards Dinner, Toronto, 1 
December 2006) [unpublished] online: Ombudsman Ontario <http://www.ombudsman.on.ca>. 
647 Hertogh, supra note 306. 
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reports are promptly accepted or rejected, by all manner of appointing bodies while all 
forms of early resolution activities are also being undertaken simultaneously and 
continuously. 
It is also axiomatic that the Ombuds role requires humility as the incumbent must 
be aware that while she has unlimited access to all relevant information she is not 
necessarily always. right in her assessment and must be truly open to alternative points of 
view and constructive feedback. Similarly, the Ombuds must be careful not to use the 
power to investigate and her independent status for personal gain or enjoying the 
adulation that comes from some for the potential for creating fear in an organization or 
jurisdiction. Rather the power and the prestige associated with the Om buds role and the 
willingness of the parties to cooperate should be used to stimulate the desire on the part of 
both complainants and respondents to 'do the right thing' by pursuing a fair course of 
action for all concerned. Ultimately, the motivation of all parties should be for fairness to 
prevail when interacting with one another during the complaint handling process such that 
officials who are responding to Ombuds' conclusions and recommendations do so 
enthusiastically rather than on the basis of being fearful of the Ombuds' capacity to 
publicize various instances of maladministration. 
Again, the Ombuds must be careful not to accept the positive or negative media 
attention, (or the praise that comes from both complainants and respondents), as it may 
be skewed due to sensationalism for the sake of an attention-grabbing headline or a top 
story. Similarly, the vigilant Ombuds must be mindful of the fact that easy access to pithy 
sound bites may have lead to a more positive spin than is necessarily deserved. Hence, 
brutal honesty and self-assessment must be the order of the day for the Ombuds to judge 
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his or her effectiveness with respect to the imperative of impartiality and the maintenance 
of an independent mindset. 
I had anticipated that both impartiality and independence would be seen to be very 
important aspects of fairness from all interviewees' perspectives given traditional 
constructs for disp~te resolution. However, the research results were equivocal on this 
front. The commentary suggests to me that those who are above the fray believe the 
parties expect a high level of impartiality and independence but for many complainants 
and respondents the acid test is: Did I get what·I want? As a result, from the complainant's 
perspective, if the complaint is not supported or from the respondent's perspective, the 
complaint is not dismissed or considered unfounded, it is only at that point that individuals 
may question the impartiality and independence and fairness of the Ombuds' intervention. 
However, if the complainant or respondent get their desired result, little attention is paid to 
the manner in which the outcome was achieved other than appreciation for the respect 
given and attention paid to the issues in dispute. For those complainants and respondents 
who have the capacity to think impartially about their own situation, I suspect the 
impartiality and independence of the Ombuds is valued and seen as a key contributor to 
fairness. However, as self-interest and advancement may be the driving force for 
complainants and respondents, once again, it is up to the Ombuds to engage in critical 
reflection to deterrnine whether the matter was handled as fairly as possible. 
I would argue that the power of recommendation rather than the force of coercion 
are supportive of both impartiality and independence and the connection to fairness, as 
this reality requires the Ombuds to convince the parties of the correctness of her view in 
order for the dismissal of a complaint or for conclusions and recommendations to be 
accepted. Accordingly, the early resolution or investigative work undertaken by the 
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Ombuds and staff has to be done extremely well and communicated well. Rather than 
taking away from the effectiveness of the Ombuds role this defining criterion - non-binding 
recommendations - is beneficial rather than detrimental as having conclusions and 
recommendations accepted on the basis of the quality of the work and the arguments 
made is the ideal manner in which to effect change and build an ethos of fairness overall. 
At the same time, the Ombuds has to be able to deal with a conclusion being discounted 
and/or recomme~dations not being accepted and not be demoralized as even the best 
argument may be rejected for reasons beyond the Ombuds' control. This kind of dynamic 
requires the Ombuds to maintain an impartial stance and not react in a negative manner or 
develop a personal bias against the decision-maker or the complainant in these 
circumstances. Ultimately the Ombuds must have the courage to proceed with humility 
rather than a 'win/loss' mentality to accept the reactions of both complainants and 
respondents, whatever they are, and analyze them to see where the Ombuds could have 
improved the explanation of the rationale, and have the confidence in what has been 
done, if it was done well, to move forward and address other issues. 
This research reveals conclusively that the concept of indifference, detachment 
and distance from the individuals whose actions are being reviewed is no longer the 
hallmark of impartiality and in fact the opposite is the case. Rather, empathy 848coupled 
with self-awareness and self-discipline is actually the essence of impartiality. In order to 
think and act in an impartial manner the practitioner must be able to appreciate and 
understand to the extent that it is possible to do so, the contextual reality, motivations and 
understandings of all parties involved in the dispute. As a result, I would argue that 
848 McCormick and Green identified compassion, sensitivity, tolerance and an appreciation of the pressure experienced by 
those who appear before them under the heading of 'empathy' as a quality that was valued by individual judges and admired 
in those judges who were able to maintain a high degree of empathy under difficult circumstances, (e.g. when exposed to 
values, attitudes and lifestyles that were different from their own). See note 422 at 107. 
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Ombuds Codes of Ethics and Standards of Practice should emphasize the importance of 
empathy and the ongoing requirement to learn more about the lives of people with whom 
appointees normally have no contact with or know little about in order to fulfill the role 
correctly. In the same trajectory, both the research on judicial decision-making and my 
interview data demonstrated that soliciting input from those who occupy different social 
locations than th~ appointee, with respect to social and demographic characteristics as 
well as values and belief systems is very advantageous with respect to thinking about an 
issue in an impartial manner. In the same fashion as described above, the highly evolved 
practitioner has to work at being impartial by continually attempting to see the world from 
the perspectives of those whose views and experiences are dramatically different from her 
own. To rely solely on her own experience, education and value system is akin to 
assuming that by accepting a position of Ombuds or as an Ombuds staff person you have 
also been granted the mantles of impartiality and personal independence. My empirical 
results and the secondary research presented as well as my own experience 
demonstrates that neither impartiality nor an independent mindset is given, attained or 
achieved in its entirety. Rather every effort must be made to examine one's own beliefs, 
values and predispositions as well as understanding and appreciating what others know 
and believe that conflicts· with the Om buds world view. Only then does the Om buds have a 
foundation for thinking and behaving as impartially as possible and operating 
independently in a manner that is fair to all concerned. 
Concomitantly, as a result of the research conducted for this study a number of 
areas that are ripe for further or new exploration have emerged. For instance, it would be 
very useful to deyelop some means for assessing what is the best preparation for an 
effective Ombuds and staff members, (e.g. early resolution staff, investigators, managers, 
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Directors, Deputy/Associate Ombuds) so as to predict and perhaps even ultimately ensure 
that the resources dedicated to Ombuds roles are used to best advantage. A possibility 
may be the development and testing of a 360-degree assessment process whereby 
knowledgeable informants (including complainants and respondents) are invited to 
confidentially rank Ombuds and staff performance in key areas, (e.g. demonstration of 
impartiality and independence; effective communication skills). The results obtained could 
then be compared to the academic and professional backgrounds of the individuals being 
assessed to determine what type or types of backgrounds are the best predictors for the 
demonstration of impartiality, independence and fairness. At the same time, this method of 
research could be used to _determine the best means for soliciting this kind of feedback so 
,__as to reduce the potential for any attempt to use the data collected to impinge on the 
independence of the role. This kind of modality would also be applicable to third parties 
who are required to and are desirous of operating at the highest levels of impartiality, 
independence and fairness like judges, arbitrators, mediators, adjudicators, etc. 
Another valuable area for further exploration is to rigorously inquire into how 
Ombuds and other individuals who assist with dispute resolution, whose social locations 
educationally, financially, culturally are very far removed from those whose actions they 
are in place to assist or evaluate, can bridge those differences. Given the importance of 
empathy to impartiality and given how difficult it is for those who are very privileged to 
know or remember what it is like to have no or very little privilege, this area of research 
would benefit not only Ombuds and staff but all manner of third parties who decisions have 
life-changing impact. While the capacity to empathize has been studied in the judicial 
·decision-making context by a variety of researchers, I would encourage undertaking 
additional empirical studies, similar to the one undertaken by Jill D. Weinberg and Laura 
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Beth Neilsen that was reported on in "Examining Empathy: Discrimination, Experience & 
Judicial Decision-making"849 not only to assess capacity but also to determine how best to 
assist individuals to increase their capacity to empathize. 
Following on the judicial decision-making research that demonstrated men and 
women decide issues differently, it would be beneficial to assess this likelihood in the 
Ombuds and ADR arena generally. It would be useful to know if women who are Ombuds 
operate differently than men who are Om buds, and if so, what approach( es) are the most 
effective and fair. 
849 Jill D. Weinberg & Laura Beth Neilsen, "Examining Empathy: Discrimination, Experience & Judicial Decision-making" 
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Nora J. Farrell 
11 Edgedale Road 
Toronto, ON M4X 1 N5 
DATE 
Name and address of 
Potential Interviewee 
Dear ............ . 
Appendix A 
I am writing this letter to ask if you would consent to speak with me. I am 
conducting research on the conceptualization and implementation of the principles of 
independence, impartiality and fairness as they relate to the practice of ombudsmanship. 
As you have been practicing in ..... or since you are the ........... , I believe that you would 
be an excellent person to speak with about these topics. I anticipate taking no more than 
(60) sixty minutes of your time. I would be very interested in meeting with you at some 
point over the next six weeks, if your schedule permits. I'd be happy to meet with you 
whenever and wherever it is most convenient for you, e.g. before or after work at a 
location that is suitable to you or at your office, during office hours. 
Among the specific issues I would like to canvass with you are the practical 
application of the concepts of impartiality, independence and fairness. In addition, I would 
like to understand how you determine whether complaints are founded or not. 
Our meeting would be more like a consultation or discussion than a formal 
interview. I am now a Ph.D. student at Osgoode Hall Law School and my intention is to 
use the notes from our discussion in my dissertation. Dissertations are published, but not 
widely circulated. As well, I might later wish to publish an academic article that is informed 
by our discussion .. 
Needless to say, you are under no obligation to meet with me or to answer any of 
my questions, and you may call the session to a close at any time. Normally I take notes 
and tape record only to assist my note taking. I would be pleased to speak with you on a 
not-for-attribution basis or, if you prefer, to attribute comments that you make, or ideas we 
have discussed. However, if I do wish to quote you by name or in any way that could be 
attributed to you, I undertake to provide you with a copy of the intended quotation. You will 
have the opportunity to revise any comment associated with your name. 
The notes and tape recordings from our discussion will be kept in locked storage 
for a period of at least two years. I will treat the notes as confidential to the limit allowed by 
law, as is York University's policy. Neither the topics we will discuss, nor any writing I will 
do afterwards is intended to be a "report card" on any person or organization, and I do not 
anticipate you providing me with information that might be considered confidential or "off 
the record". Please be aware that if you decide that you would like to withdraw from the 
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study, as soon as I receive your request, all associated data collected, will be immediately 
destroyed where possible. 
This research project has been reviewed and approved for compliance with the 
Faculty of Graduate Studies policy on research ethics and with the research ethics 
protocols required by the Human Participants Review Subcommittee (HRPC) of York 
University. If you have questions or concerns you are welcome to contact the Manager, 
Office of Research Ethics, York University, York Lanes at 416.736.5914 or my Graduate 
Program Office at Osgoode Hall Law School and speak to the Graduate Program Director, 
Ben -Richardson, at 416.736.5431. If you are willing to speak with me, at the interview, I 
will ask you to sign and date my copy of this letter to ensure that you have given your 
informed consent. 
I look forward to hearing from you, but I will also be in touch with you within the 
next few days to see if a convenient time for this meeting can be arranged. Please do not 
hesitate to be in touch with me if you have any questions or concerns. I can be reached at 
NoraFarrell@osgoode.yorku.ca and 416.922.8984. 
Thank you very much for your consideration of my request. 
Nora Farrell, Ph.D. Candidate 
I consent to have this discussion. 
--
(Signature of lnteryiewee) Date 




1) How do you define 'independence'? 
· 2) Legal and political science scholars and Supreme Court jurists have stated that 
independence is a guarantor of impartiality. How does that fit with your view of the 
connection between independence and impartiality as an Ombuds? 
Impartiality 
3) How do you define 'impartiality'? 
3a) Do you think there's a difference between neutrality and impartiality? 
4) There is a great deal of research data derived from extensive reviews of judicial 
decision-making both in the U.S. and Canada demonstrating that some judges' decisions 
can be predicted on the basis of party of appointment and, in some cases, gender. Do you 
think Om buds would be viewed differently than judges in this regard? If the answer is 'no', 
discuss the rationale for this belief and then go to Question 8. 
5) [a] If the answer is 'yes', how have you come to this conclusion? Why do you think 
Ombuds are different than the judges whose decisions were analyzed? 
5) [b] Many modern thinkers and philosophers believe that it is impossible for people to be 
objective. Some social psychologists, Susan Anderson in particular, has found that many 
people are governed by what is called 'automatic thought' which includes stereotypes that 
immediately pop into our minds based on audio and visual cues. Wendell Jones, a 
physicist and former Ombudsman and Scott Hughes, a lawyer and professor, argue that 
our biases are hardwired in our brains and that it is impossible to eliminate them. What do 
you think about these beliefs? 
5) [c] Have you ever been in a situation where you have had to consciously address a bias 
. that you yourself recognized you brought to a particular dispute or complaint? What kinds 
of strategies did you use to guard against bias influencing your review or involvement in 
the situation? 
6) Do you believe that it is possible for Ombuds to be seen to be impartial, if they do not 
have a high degree of structural independence. (e.g. the Ombuds reports to a Minister 
within government or the President or Vice-President of the organization)? 
6) [a] If so, how do Ombuds in this situation (or, how do you) demonstrate impartiality? 
7) Following from Question 4: Since you believe that people can't be impartial or 
independent, how do you deal with the fact that virtually all Ombuds' legislation, Charters, 




8) How do you determine whether or not to: 
• Act on an inquiry in response to a complaint 
• Support or dismiss a complaint (if a classical or hybrid Ombuds) 
[Note: if the above information is articulated in the legislation, Charter or Terms of 
Reference for the position of the interviewee I didn't ask the above question.] 
9) [a] Do you use a particular framework for determining whether or not decisions have 
been made fairly by respondents? If 'yes', can you describe it to me? If 'no', how do you 
decide whether or not a complaint should be supported? 
9) [b] In many areas of decision-making the individual who has investigated the allegation 
and laid the charge is prohibited from deciding who is 'guilty or innocent' of wrong doing. 
However, classical and hybrid Ombuds routinely investigate allegations and render an 
opinion on whether or not a decision made or action taken was done so fairly. Do you think 
this overlap of responsibilities should be a concern for hybrid and classical Ombuds? 
Note: If an interviewee indicated that Ombuds can not be impartial and/or independent I 
did not ask Questions 10 (c) and (d) shown below. Instead I asked: 
10) What criteria do you think people who you interact with use to determine whether or 
not you have treated them fairly? 
Independence. Impartiality and Fairness 
10) [c] Do you think your ability to be and be seen to behave fairly is connected either to 
independence or impartiality (or to both independence and impartiality)? 
10) [d] Do you think complainants and respondents would accept your interventions, 
conclusions and recommendations as being fair if you were not seen to be independent 
and/or impartial? 
Certification 
11) There has been much discussion of certification of individual Ombuds and Ombuds 
offices to demonstrate they have met certain standards and qualify as 'professional 
Ombuds' in the U.S.A. Do you think this is an appropriate evolution for Ombuds in 
Canada? If the answer to this question is 'no', discuss why this view is held and go to 
Question 12 (b) 
12) If you agree with certification, who do you think should determine the criteria that have 
to be met? 
850 Some interviewees were not asked Questions 9 - 1 O as they do not make determinations on fairness. 
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12 a) Would those criteria include some mechanism for an appropriate demonstration of 
impartiality, independence and fair decision-making? [Note: I modified this question to 
relate to fairness only if an interviewee had already indicated that independence and/or 
impartiality are impossible to achieve .. ] 
12 b) In your opinion, should there be any restriction on the use of the term 
Om buds/man/person? 
12 c) If so, what entity should determine who can use the term of Ombuds/man/person? 
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Appendix C 
The locations of the interviews are not provided as, in some instances, they could easily 
identify the interviewee. 
April 16, 2009 
April 17, 2009 
June 24, 2009 
July 3, 2009 (2 interviews) 
July 15, 2009 
July 17, 2009 
July 22, 2009 
August4,2009 
August 17, 2009 
August 21,2009 
August 24, 2009 (2 interviews) 
August26,2009 
September 1, 2009 
September 14, 2009 
September 23, 2009 
September 24, 2009 
October 1 , 2009 
October 7, 2009 
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